In Re H.R. and A.R., Jr., Juveniles

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 25-AP-400
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

MAY TERM, 2026

In re H.R. and A.R., Jr., Juveniles } APPEALED FROM:
(A.R., Father*) }
} Superior Court, Addison Unit,
} Family Division
} CASE NOS. 22-JV-00733; 22-JV-00732
Trial Judge: Alison S. Arms

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Father appeals from the termination of his residual parental rights in H.R. and A.R. We
affirm.

H.R. was born in October 2008; A.R. was born in March 2010. The children lived with
mother and father in Texas until 2019. At that point, father was hospitalized for mental health
reasons. Mother and the children left Texas around 2020 and lived in various states; they
eventually moved to Vermont. Father has not seen the children since 2019.

In May 2022, the children were taken into emergency custody of the Department for
Children and Families (DCF). About five months later, the children were adjudicated as children
in need of care or supervision (CHINS). Father continued to live in Texas. DCF sent an
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) home study request to Texas. The
request was denied, however, because father did not complete a required background check.

The court adopted a disposition case plan that called for reunification with mother only.
The plan contained action steps for father, which included completing a domestic-violence
intervention program, articulating the impact his physical aggression and violence had on the
children, completing a substance-use assessment by a licensed drug and alcohol counselor and
following all recommendations in the assessment, and signing a release to allow DCF to speak to
his evaluator.

DCF’s first petition to terminate parents’ rights was denied. In August 2025, DCF moved
for a second time to terminate parents’ rights. Mother was notified of the termination hearing
but did not attend. The children, father, and their respective attorneys were in attendance. At the
close of the hearing, the court concluded that terminating both parents’ rights was in the
children’s best interests.

The court made numerous oral findings, including the following. The children came into
DCF custody after mother caused a fire at their home. Shortly before the fire, mother had a
physical and verbal altercation with the children. Mother kicked and injured H.R. Mother began
burning photographs, repeating that she didn’t want to hurt the children. Mother lost control of
the fire and it presented a safety hazard. Mother did not try to extinguish the fire; A.R. did so.
This was not the first time that the children had to extinguish a fire that exceeded mother’s
control. Mother was undressed during the altercation and the fire, and she was described by
various witnesses as frantic, agitated, and confused.

Mother’s erratic behavior began when she moved to Vermont and stopped taking the
medicine prescribed for her bipolar disorder. Mother exhibited paranoid and delusional
behaviors. The children were essentially fending for themselves in mother’s care and both
mother’s life and the children’s home life were unstable. The court made numerous additional
findings concerning mother that we do not repeat here.

The court credited the hearing testimony of both children. H.R., who was seventeen
years old, testified that she loved living with her brother and foster parents. H.R. described the
chaotic living situation with mother and father in Texas. There were often parties and a lot of
parental fighting. Father would get aggressive and loud; at times, he would throw things,
including when mother made food that he did not like. He drank daily. Father got very angry
with H.R. and A.R. over minor things, such as walking in front of the television. He would yell
and scream and get in the children’s faces. Father disciplined the children with a belt. Father
also handcuffed the children together and handcuffed them to their beds. H.R. wanted the court
to terminate both parents’ rights. She testified that father had not come to visit her in Vermont,
she had essentially no contact with him, and that she would not feel safe living with him.

A.R., who was fifteen years old, also testified that he enjoyed living with his foster
family. He agreed with H.R.’s description of their home life in Texas, including that father often
used handcuffs on the children as discipline and out of anger and aggression. Father also yelled
at A.R. and hit him without provocation. A.R. testified that parents drank daily in Texas and that
they appeared intoxicated; mother tried to introduce A.R. to marijuana and alcohol. A.R.
explained that the family left Texas because father was cheating on mother; father also tried to
overdose on what he thought was a painkiller and he was placed in a mental institution. A.R.
described the poor quality of life and lack of parental care while in mother’s custody. Mother
took medicine prescribed to the children, she acted aggressively toward A.R., and her reactions
were disproportionate to the circumstances. Mother smoked and drank daily and she did not care
if A.R. went to school. A.R. had minimal contact with father. A.R. last saw father when A.R.
lived in Texas and he did not want to reunify with father. A.R. did not think mother or father
were fit parents and he wanted the court to terminate their parental rights.

The court further found that the children had been living with the same foster family for
approximately three years. It credited the testimony of the children’s foster parent that the
children responded very well to stability, they were flourishing and engaged in school, and their

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anxiety had decreased. The foster parents provided structure in the home and testified that the
children knew they were loved.

A DCF family services worker described her struggles to communicate with mother. As
of October 2024, mother was not complying with the requirements of the case plan with respect
to her mental health. She did not sign releases to allow DCF to verify that she was receiving
mental-health treatment or provide urine samples on a regular basis. The family services worker
observed mother to be under the influence at a meeting in April 2025; mother exhibited
concerning behavior and DCF contacted police. Mother, who had driven to the meeting, was
later convicted of a driving-related offense. Between April 2025 and the date of the termination
hearing, mother remained unwilling to engage in the case plan. She did not take any
responsibility for what the children had gone through and the need for DCF involvement.
Visitation between mother and the children declined over time.

Father had very minimal engagement with DCF during the three-and-a-half years the
children were in custody. Although father asked for an ICPC to be considered as a placement for
the children, he failed to comply with the ICPC’s requirements so that it could be completed.
The children did not want contact with father. A family services worker called to check in with
father and asked him weekly if he wanted to call her. He never did. Father did not complete his
action steps in the case plan. He did not engage in domestic violence programming in Texas and
there was no objective information that he was sober. He did not sign releases for any providers
in Texas as contemplated by the case plan. Another family services worker similarly testified
that efforts were made to contact father through texts and calls, but he was not responsive.

Based on these and other findings, the court concluded that parents had stagnated in their
ability to parent the children. Parents did not engage in any meaningful way in the court-ordered
plan of services summarized in the disposition report. They could not put their children’s needs
before their own. Their minimal participation in services had little impact on the crucial issues
that brought the children into custody.

Turning to the best-interests analysis, the court concluded that the statutory factors
supported terminating parents’ rights. Parents could not parent the children now or in the
reasonably foreseeable future. They had not and could not presently provide the children with a
safe and stable home. A reasonable time had passed from the children’s perspective for parents
to improve their parenting skills. The children had been in DCF custody for three-and-a-half
years and would be harmed by any further delay. Father had minimal contact with the children.
The children’s foster family were meeting the children’s needs and providing the children with a
loving, supportive, and nurturing environment. The children were thriving in their care. Parents
clearly could not play a constructive role in the children’s welfare as parents had insufficiently
addressed their own needs, including father’s mental health, domestic violence, and substance
abuse issues. Parents had not addressed the trauma the children suffered that brought them into
DCF custody. For these and other reasons, the court concluded that termination of parents’
rights was in the children’s best interests. This appeal followed.

Father argues that the court erred in evaluating the statutory best-interests factors. He
maintains that his rights should not have been terminated because the children were in a safe and
nurturing environment and they were close to the age of majority. Father cites 33 V.S.A.
§ 5101(a)(3) in support of this argument, asserting that the best-interests criteria must be

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construed “to preserve the family” absent a need “to protect the child from serious harm or in the
interests of public safety.” Father asserts that he cared for the children for an extended period of
their lives, which created a parental bond, and that it was not his fault that the children were
placed in DCF custody. Father suggests that his rights were terminated solely because the ICPC
was not completed and he had “inconsistent” contact with the children after 2019.

To modify an existing disposition order, the trial court must find that there has been a
substantial change in material circumstances and that termination of parental rights is in a child’s
best interests. In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994). To determine a child’s best interests, the
court must consider four statutory factors. See 33 V.S.A. § 5114. “The critical factor is whether
the natural parent will be able to resume parental duties within a reasonable period of time.” In
re B.M., 165 Vt. 331, 336 (1996); see also In re B.S., 166 Vt. 345, 353 (1997) (explaining that
reasonableness of time period for resuming parental responsibilities “must be viewed from the
perspective of the needs of the child”). “As long as the court applied the proper standard, we
will not disturb its findings [on appeal] unless they are clearly erroneous, and we will affirm its
conclusions if they are supported by the findings.” In re G.S., 153 Vt. 651, 652 (1990) (mem.).
As we have repeatedly emphasized, “[o]ur role is not to second-guess the family court or to
reweigh the evidence, but rather to determine whether the court abused its discretion in
terminating [father’s] parental rights.” In re S.B., 174 Vt. 427, 429 (2002) (mem.).

Father fails to show an abuse of discretion here. The trial court applied the appropriate
standard in reaching its decision and its decision is supported by the record. As required by
statute, the court evaluated the statutory best-interests criteria to determine if termination of
father’s rights was in the children’s best interests. Section 5101, cited by father, does not
provide a different standard. That statute provides that “[t]he juvenile judicial proceedings
chapters shall be construed in accordance with” various purposes identified in § 5101(a)(1)-(6).
While family preservation is one of these purposes, ensuring “safety and timely permanency for
children” is the “paramount concern[] in the administration and conduct of [these] proceedings.”
33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(4). The court acted consistently with § 5101 here.

As set forth above, the court found that father had not seen the children since 2019. The
children’s life with father was chaotic and disturbing. Father had minimal contact with the
children while they were in DCF custody. Father did not comply with the action steps in the
case plan related to his substance abuse and history of violence, which was reported by the
children and others. He did not engage with DCF. He did not take the steps necessary to
complete the ICPC home study. The children did not want to be reunited with him and he could
not parent them. The fact that the children were doing well in their foster placement does not
mean the court was required to deny the termination motion, as father suggests. Instead, it
supports the court’s finding that the foster home promoted the overriding goal of safety and
timely permanency. The court considered the children’s relationship with their foster family,
along with the other statutory factors, in reaching its conclusion. The court did not find that the
children had a bond with father, as father asserts, and the court’s conclusion is amply supported
by the children’s testimony and other evidence. Even if it had found a bond, we have made clear
that “[p]ublic policy . . . does not dictate that the parent-child bond be maintained regardless of
the cost to the child.” In re B.M., 165 Vt. at 342 (quotation omitted). The court concluded that
that the children needed permanency and that father could not parent them within a reasonable
time as measured from their perspective. The children had been in DCF custody for more than
three years. While father believes that his rights should not have been terminated, his belief
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alone cannot make out a case for abuse of discretion. The court’s decision is supported by the
record. See Meyncke v. Meyncke, 2009 VT 84, ¶ 15, 186 Vt. 571 (mem.) (explaining that
arguments which amount to nothing more than disagreement with court’s reasoning and
conclusion do not make out case for abuse of discretion). There was no error.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

Christina E. Nolan, Associate Justice

Michael P. Drescher, Associate Justice

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