Ballinallee Properties, LLC v. Shawn Mateo

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 25-AP-096
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

FEBRUARY TERM, 2026

Ballinallee Properties, LLC et al. v. Shawn } APPEALED FROM:
Mateo* }
} Superior Court, Bennington Unit,
} Civil Division
} CASE NO. 23-CV-05342
Trial Judge: David A. Barra

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Shawn Mateo, self-represented, appeals from the trial court’s decision in favor of
plaintiffs Patrick Gray and Ballinallee Properties, LLC. We affirm.

Plaintiffs filed suit against Mateo in December 2023, seeking possession of real property
and damages for unpaid rent, and raising additional claims. Mateo filed counterclaims. The
court held a bench trial and made the following findings. Patrick Gray and his wife are the
owners of record of the real property subject to this litigation, known as 2323 U.S. Route 7,
Pownal, Vermont, and 2325 U.S. Route 7, Pownal, Vermont. Gray owns Ballinallee Properties,
LLC. In September 2020, Ballinallee, Gray, and Mateo entered into a written agreement
concerning the property; Gray signed as agent of Ballinallee. Mateo intended to use the property
for business purposes, including tag sales. Mateo was provided with an option to buy, which
expired at midnight on June 10, 2021, unless extended. To exercise the option, Mateo was
required to deliver written notice of intent to purchase and specify a valid closing date. Mateo
did not exercise the purchase option prior to its termination. The agreement also referenced “a
prior lease agreement, the subject of which is the aforementioned Property,” but neither party
provided a copy of any prior lease agreement.

In May 2023, the town’s zoning administrator issued a notice of violation to Gray
regarding the property. Mateo was in possession of the property at the time and the violation
related to Mateo’s use of the property. Mateo was responsible under the parties’ agreement to
keep the property in good condition and comply with applicable state law and town ordinances.

Mateo did not live on the property before August 2023. Mateo also sublet a mobile home
on the property to another person without plaintiffs’ written consent as required by the
agreement. He had not paid rent since January 2024.
Mateo received notice to quit the property in August 2023. The notice cited unpaid rent,
failure to keep the premises in good and safe condition, and subletting without prior written
consent. The notice referenced both 2323 U.S. Route 7, Pownal, Vermont, and 2325 U.S. Route
7. Mateo did not vacate the premises.

Based on these and other findings, the court addressed the parties’ legal claims. It
rejected several claims that plaintiffs raised against Mateo, and it rejected all of Mateo’s
counterclaims. The court concluded, based on various legal theories including breach of
contract, that plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the property and that Mateo owed $39,000
in unpaid rent. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to a writ of possession and $39,000 in
damages.

Following entry of the court’s order and issuance of a writ of possession, plaintiffs asked
the court to clarify, pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), that the court’s decision
applied to both “911 addresses” for the property in question: 2323 U.S. Route 7, Pownal,
Vermont, and 2325 U.S. Route 7. Plaintiffs asserted that Mateo told others that because the writ
of possession did not bear the address of 2323 U.S. Route 7, he would not quit the property, but
would instead move himself and his belongings from 2325 U.S. Route 7 to 2323 U.S. Route 7.
Mateo also allegedly stated that the order and writ did not apply to his girlfriend to whom he had
sublet a mobile home on the property. Plaintiffs asserted that uncontroverted testimony from
Gray and Mateo, as well as several of plaintiffs’ exhibits, showed that although the property had
two 911 addresses, it was one, unsubdivided parcel, and plaintiffs sought possession of the whole
property. Plaintiffs asserted that, without action by the court to clarify its order and writ, the
sheriff could not enforce the writ and restore full possession of the property to plaintiffs, and the
dispute between the parties would remain unresolved.

The court granted the motion and clarified that the real property at issue in this litigation
was known as 2323 and 2325 U.S. Route 7. Mateo then moved for reconsideration, arguing that
the amended finding violated his due process rights and reflected a bias against him. The court
denied his request. It found that Mateo’s motion appeared to assert that the judgment should not,
or could not, have been amended, but the motion did not do so with particularity, and it did not
include a concise statement of the facts and law relied upon. The court noted that plaintiffs
sought amendment of the judgment because the court’s findings and judgment had inadvertently
misidentified the address of the subject property. The court had granted the amendment to
correct the mistake as there was ample evidence to support the finding. This appeal followed.

Mateo raises numerous claims of error on appeal, which we address in turn. He first
asserts that the court erred in granting plaintiffs’ request to amend the final judgment order.
According to Mateo, the court violated his due process rights by referencing 2323 U.S. Route 7
in its judgment order and writ of possession and referencing in the writ of possession his
girlfriend, in addition to plaintiff and “any unidentified persons” who were occupying the
property.

We reject this argument. Plaintiffs moved for relief under Civil Rule 60(a), asking the
court to clarify that its decision concerned the entire parcel. Mateo was provided notice of the
motion and the court considered his opposition to plaintiffs’ request. Pursuant to Rule 60(a), the
court can correct “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission.” The court found that the property was not properly
described in its initial order due to oversight and that there was ample evidence to show that,
while the property had two 911 addresses, it was one lot. This evidence included the notice to

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quit, which referenced both 911 addresses, and the town’s grand list, where the property was
listed as one lot. The court’s decision is supported by the evidence and while Mateo disagrees
with the court’s conclusion, he fails to show the court abused its discretion or violated his rights
in granting plaintiffs’ motion. See Warner v. Warner, 2025 VT 70, ¶ 14 (recognizing that “trial
court has discretion in determining whether to enter a corrected judgment, and we review [its
decision] only for an abuse of that discretion”).

Mateo next asserts that the court did not hear his counterclaims. This argument is
without merit. The record shows that the court considered and rejected each counterclaim in its
decision.

Mateo further argues that he was unfairly denied a jury trial. The record shows that
Mateo did not timely request a jury trial, however, and the court did not err in denying his
request on this basis. See V.R.C.P. 38(b), (d) (outlining requirements for requesting jury trial
and providing that party’s failure “to serve and file a demand as required by this rule constitutes
a waiver by the party of trial by jury”).

Mateo next complains that he was given a “hard time” about his evidence by plaintiff’s
attorney and the trial judge. The record does not support this assertion, and tenant has not shown
any bias or violation of his rights with respect to any specific evidentiary rulings. To the extent
that tenant challenges the exclusion of any particular evidence, he has not provided any citation
to the record in support of such argument. “It is the burden of the appellant to demonstrate how
the lower court erred warranting reversal,” and “[w]e will not comb the record searching for
error.” In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 297 (1988); see also V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4) (explaining that
argument on appeal must contain citations to “parts of the record on which the appellant relies”).
In a related vein, Mateo contends that Gray’s evidence should have been excluded as hearsay.
Mateo again fails to show that he objected to any specific evidence on hearsay grounds below
and he does not specifically identify any objected-to evidence with citations to the record. We
thus reject this argument as inadequately briefed. See V.R.A.P. 28(a); Johnson v. Johnson, 158
Vt. 160, 164 n.* (1992) (explaining that Court will not address contentions so inadequately
briefed as to fail to minimally meet standards of V.R.A.P. 28(a)). Mateo’s assertion that the
court erred in denying a change of venue is also inadequately briefed. Mateo additionally
references a lease from 2020 in his brief but provides no record citation for this document. As
stated above, “[w]e will not comb the record searching for error.” In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. at 297.

Mateo also attempts to relitigate claims that the court considered and rejected, including
his harassment claim and his assertion that he purchased the property. It was for the trial court to
evaluate the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and we do not reweigh the evidence
on appeal. See Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 497 (1997) (“As the trier of fact, it [is] the province
of the trial court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the persuasiveness of the
evidence.”). Mateo next claims that he had an agreement with Gray, not Ballinallee Properties.
The court found, however, that Gray signed the agreement as agent for the corporation. Gray is
listed as Ballinallee’s agent on the first page of the parties’ agreement. Mateo fails to show this
finding is clearly erroneous. Lofts Essex, LLC v. Strategis Floor & Décor Inc., 2019 VT 82,
¶ 17, 211 Vt. 204 (explaining that trial court’s factual findings will stand “unless clearly
erroneous when viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,” and “appellant must
show there is no credible evidence to support the finding”). We note that Gray is also a named
plaintiff in this case. Mateo wars with other findings and conclusions, essentially asking this
Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

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Mateo next challenges the denial of his written motion to recuse the trial judge, which
was referred to and denied by the Chief Superior Judge. See V.R.C.P. 40(e) (setting forth
process for filing motions to disqualify). Mateo argues that recusal was required because he was
suing the trial judge about another case. The Chief Superior Court rejected this argument. It
found that the particular facts set forth in Mateo’s filing did not support disqualification simply
because Mateo may have brought an action against the trial judge. It recognized that “[a] judge
is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.” In re Vt. Sup. Ct.
Admin. Directive No. 17, 154 Vt. 217, 226 (1990) (recognizing that allowing such an “easy
method of disqualification” would “permit manipulation of the court” (quotations omitted)).
Mateo offers no compelling ground for reaching a different conclusion here.

Finally, Mateo argues that he was not afforded sufficient time in which to present his
case. This assertion is not supported by the record, and we reject it. We emphasize, moreover,
that the trial court is authorized to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence,” V.R.E. 611(a), and the trial transcripts show
that both parties were provided a fair opportunity to present their cases.

We have reviewed all arguments discernable in Mateo’s brief and consider them all
without merit.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice

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