Stanley Reynolds v. State of Vermont

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal
revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions by email at: Reporter@vtcourts.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State
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before this opinion goes to press.

2025 VT 34

No. 24-AP-040

Stanley Reynolds Supreme Court

On Appeal from
v. Superior Court, Washington Unit,
Civil Division

State of Vermont March Term, 2025

Timothy B. Tomasi, J.

David C. Sleigh of Sleigh Law, PC, St. Johnsbury, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, and Hannah Yindra, Assistant Attorney General,
Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

Stephanie Roberts Hartung, New England Innocence Project, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Vanessa Potkin, Innocence Project, New York, New York, and Jeffrey S. Gutman, George
Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll, Cohen and Waples, JJ.

¶ 1. COHEN, J. Plaintiff Stanley Reynolds1 appeals the civil division’s decision

dismissing his complaint for damages under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA), 13

V.S.A. §§ 5561-5585. Plaintiff argues that the plain language of the VIPA allows an individual to

recover damages for imprisonment under a conviction that is later vacated and does not limit

1
In November 2024, before the parties presented oral argument, plaintiff passed away.
Plaintiff’s attorney subsequently filed a motion to substitute plaintiff with his estate. We granted
the motion. For the purposes of this appeal, we continue to refer to Mr. Reynolds as plaintiff
because that is how the case was originally filed below.
recovery to persons exonerated through DNA testing. Plaintiff argues in the alternative that the

legislative intent and history of the VIPA and public policy support a broader interpretation of its

language. The State moves to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We deny the State’s

motion and affirm the court’s decision below.

¶ 2. Plaintiff alleged the following facts in his complaint. In 2012, plaintiff was

convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to a term of five years to life. In August 2020,

plaintiff’s conviction was vacated. While not alleged in the complaint, plaintiff provided a copy

of the trial court’s decision in his printed case, which indicates that plaintiff’s conviction was

vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Plaintiff was subsequently released from prison,

having served just over eight years.

¶ 3. In June 2023, plaintiff sued the State under the VIPA, seeking damages for his

imprisonment under the vacated conviction. Plaintiff maintained that he was innocent of the crime

charged against him and requested compensation of over $400,000 for his imprisonment. In

November 2023, the State moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c), arguing that the plain text of the VIPA provides a cause of action only to plaintiffs

who were exonerated based on DNA evidence proving actual innocence. Plaintiff opposed the

motion, arguing that the plain language of 13 V.S.A. §§ 5572-5574 does not require exoneration

through DNA testing and that plaintiff met the requirements outlined in those sections.

¶ 4. In January 2024, the court granted the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Because neither party argued that the statute was unclear or ambiguous, the court looked to its

plain language. The court found that the VIPA only allows for claims by plaintiffs who have been

exonerated pursuant to DNA testing. The court relied on the language of § 5572, which states “a

person convicted and imprisoned for a crime of which the person was exonerated pursuant to this

chapter shall have a cause of action.” The court reasoned that exoneration “pursuant to this

chapter” required the person’s conviction to have been vacated as the result of a petition for DNA

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testing, because that is the only means for exoneration outlined in chapter 182 of Title 13. The

court noted that other sections in the VIPA refer specifically to exoneration through subchapter 1,

which is the subchapter on DNA testing. The court held that because plaintiff’s conviction was

vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and not through DNA testing, plaintiff was not

within the statutory class of claimants under the VIPA. The court did not address whether vacating

plaintiff’s conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel was considered an “exoneration.”

Instead, it focused on the fact that DNA testing was not the basis for overturning the conviction.

Plaintiff appealed.

I. Motion to Dismiss

¶ 5. After plaintiff’s death in November 2024, the State moved to dismiss this appeal

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that plaintiff’s claim under the VIPA did not survive

his death. “As a result of our independent obligation to ensure that we act only in cases where we

have subject-matter jurisdiction, we may consider such arguments on our own motion or at any

time during the pendency of a proceeding.” Mullinnex v. Menard, 2020 VT 33, ¶ 11, 212 Vt. 432,

236 A.3d 171. “A case becomes moot—and this Court loses jurisdiction—when there no longer

is an actual controversy or the litigants no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome

of the case.” Paige v. State, 2017 VT 54, ¶ 7, 205 Vt. 287, 171 A.3d 1011. Even if there was an

actual controversy when the case was first filed, intervening events can render it moot. Id.

¶ 6. The State argues a claim under the VIPA cannot survive the death of the claimant

without an express survival provision in the statute, or a reference in the general survival statutes.

The VIPA does not contain a survival provision. See 13 V.S.A. §§ 5561-5578. The survivorship

statutes at 14 V.S.A. §§ 1451-1452 do not explicitly refer to the VIPA or post-conviction relief in

general. However, they do allow general tort actions for bodily injury to survive the death of the

plaintiff. 14 V.S.A. §§ 1451-1452; see Whitchurch v. Perry, 137 Vt. 464, 468, 408 A.2d 627, 630

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(1979) (“Vermont’s survival statutes, 14 V.S.A. §§ 1451-1453, abrogate the harsh common law

rule that personal tort actions die with the person of the plaintiff or the defendant.”).

¶ 7. As explained above, the VIPA allows a person “convicted and imprisoned for a

crime of which the person was exonerated pursuant to this chapter” to have a cause of action for

damages against the State. 13 V.S.A. § 5572(a). We conclude that this type of claim is analogous

to a common-law claim for wrongful or false imprisonment, a tort that has long been held to

survive the death of the plaintiff because it seeks damages for a form of bodily injury.

¶ 8. In Administrator of Whitcomb’s Estate v. Cook, 38 Vt. 477 (1866), the plaintiff

was arrested as a debtor and charged under a statute which granted the arrested person the

opportunity to be taken before a magistrate who issued the writ for arrest for an examination prior

to being imprisoned. When the plaintiff asked his arresting officer to bring him before the

magistrate, the officer, knowing the magistrate was not in the county, imprisoned him. The

plaintiff sued for wrongful imprisonment, and it was undisputed that the plaintiff did not claim

assault or battery and that he was arrested and imprisoned without force or violence. The plaintiff

died before the suit could be completed, leaving the Court to determine on appeal if his suit

survived under the survival statute effective at the time, 1862 G.S. ch. 52, §§ 10-11. Whitcomb,

38 Vt. at 481.

¶ 9. That statute provided as follows:

In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the
following shall survive and may be commenced and prosecuted by
the executor or administrator . . . actions of trespass and trespass on
the case for damages done to real or personal estate.

If, in any proper action now pending, or which may hereafter be
commenced, for the recovery of damages for any bodily hurt or
injury, occasioned to the plaintiff by the act or default of the
defendant or defendants, either party shall decease during the
pendency of such action, such action shall, nevertheless, survive,
and may be prosecuted to final judgment by or against the executors
or administrators of such deceased party.

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1862 G.S. ch. 52, §§ 10-11. We held that “damages for any bodily hurt or injury” included

confinement by unlawful imprisonment. Whitcomb, 38 Vt. at 481-82 (emphasis omitted). We

explained that the Legislature intended the phrase to be read broadly by including the word

“injury.” Id. If the Legislature had intended survival to be limited to actions involving claims of

actual force or violence that caused physical pain and suffering, it would have simply used the

phrase “damages for any bodily hurt.” Id. (emphasis omitted). By including the term “injury,”

the Legislature deliberately broadened the scope of damages claims that survived. Id. We

determined that confining a person’s “body in a jail, and restraining him of his liberty” is an injury

to the body and was therefore the type of claim that survived under the statute. Id. at 482. We

noted that “[f]or unlawful arrests and imprisonments, it has always been held that trespass was the

proper and the only remedy, though no actual force or violence be used in making the arrest and

imprisoning the plaintiff.” Id. at 481-82. Whitcomb has not been modified or overruled since it

was decided, and the language of the current survival statute is essentially identical to the prior

statute. Compare 14 V.S.A. § 1452, with 1862 G.S. ch. 52, § 11.

¶ 10. Here, plaintiff claims that he was imprisoned for just over eight years after his

improper conviction in 2012. During this time, his “body [was] in a jail” and he was

“restrain[ed] . . . of his liberty.” Whitcomb, 38 Vt. at 482. Under the reasoning of Whitcomb,

plaintiff’s VIPA claim survives his death because he sued “for the recovery of damages for any

bodily hurt or injury.” Id. at 481; see 14 V.S.A. § 1452 (stating “action for the recovery of damages

for a bodily hurt or injury” shall survive death of party). As the language of the current statute has

not significantly departed from the 1862 statute, our interpretation in Whitcomb controls our

understanding of the extent of survivorship in this context. The State’s motion to dismiss is

therefore denied.

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II. Merits

¶ 11. We accordingly turn to the merits of plaintiff’s appeal. We review de novo the trial

court’s decision granting judgment on the pleadings. Island Indus., LLC v. Town of Grand Isle,

2021 VT 49, ¶ 10, 215 Vt. 162, 260 A.3d 372.

¶ 12. Plaintiff argues that the plain language of the VIPA does not limit the class of

plaintiffs to those exonerated through DNA evidence.2 Instead, he claims, the statute simply

requires the complaint to allege, and plaintiff to prove, that he was exonerated by his conviction

being reversed or vacated, which could occur for reasons other than DNA exoneration. See 13

V.S.A. §§ 5573(3)(a)(2), 5574(a)(2). Plaintiff claims that if recovery is limited to cases of

exoneration by DNA testing, the provisions requiring the complaint to allege, and the complainant

to prove, that the complainant was exonerated by a reversed or vacated conviction, dismissal of

charges, acquittal at trial, or pardon would become surplusage. In the alternative, plaintiff argues

that the legislative and statutory history of the VIPA make it clear that the Legislature did not

intend to limit the class of plaintiffs to those exonerated by DNA testing. Finally, plaintiff asserts

that Vermont can only address the damage faced by those wrongfully imprisoned through

broadening the scope of eligibility under the VIPA.

¶ 13. At issue here is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review without

deference to the trial court. State v. Berard, 2019 VT 65, ¶ 7, 211 Vt. 39, 220 A.3d 759. Our

primary objective when construing a statute is to “give effect to the intention of the Legislature”

which is done through examining the “plain language of the statute.” Maple Run Unified Sch.

Dist. v. Vt. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 2023 VT 63, ¶ 13, 218 Vt. 496, 311 A.3d 139 (quotations omitted).

If the language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the statute according to its terms and our

2
The Innocence Project filed an amicus brief in this case. Amici raises similar arguments
to plaintiff regarding the purpose of the VIPA and policy reasons for allowing a broader category
of plaintiffs to recover damages under a broader scope of plaintiffs under the VIPA.
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inquiry proceeds no further. Town of Pawlet v. Banyai, 2022 VT 4, ¶ 21, 216 Vt. 189, 274 A.3d

23. Statutory language is not read in isolation and is instead construed together with the whole

statute. State v. A.P., 2021 VT 90, ¶ 12, 216 Vt. 76, 268 A.3d 58.

¶ 14. The VIPA is set forth in chapter 182 of Title 13, which contains four subchapters.

Relevant here are subchapters 1 and 2. Subchapter 1 sets forth a process under which a person

convicted of a qualifying crime may request postconviction DNA testing of any evidence obtained

during the investigation or prosecution of the crime, and may have his or her conviction vacated if

the testing shows the person is innocent. 13 V.S.A. §§ 5561-5570. Subchapter 2 provides a

process for seeking compensation for wrongful convictions. Id. §§ 5572-5578.

¶ 15. Specifically, § 5572(a) provides that “[a] person convicted and imprisoned for a

crime of which the person was exonerated pursuant to this chapter shall have a cause of action for

damages against the State.” The statute requires the person to file a complaint alleging that “the

complainant has been convicted of a felony crime” and “the complainant was exonerated through

the complainant’s conviction being reversed or vacated, the information or indictment being

dismissed, the complainant being acquitted after a second or subsequent trial, or the granting of a

pardon.” Id. § 5573(a).

¶ 16. A plaintiff is entitled to judgment if the plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing

evidence four elements, including that “the complainant’s conviction was reversed or vacated” and

“the complainant is actually innocent of the felony or felonies that are the basis for the claim.” Id.

§ 5574(a)(2)-(3). A plaintiff must commence an action for compensation “within three years after

the person is exonerated pursuant to subchapter 1 of this chapter through the person’s conviction

being reversed or vacated, the information or indictment being dismissed, the person being

acquitted after a second or subsequent trial, or through the granting of a pardon.” Id. § 5576(a).

Additionally, courts are required under the VIPA to provide the information in subchapter 2 to a

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person exonerated “pursuant to subchapter 1 of this chapter through vacating or reversing the

person’s conviction . . . or . . . receiving notice of a pardon.” Id. § 5577(a).

¶ 17. The plain language of the statute makes clear that compensation is limited to

persons who were exonerated using the process set forth in subchapter 1. Section 5572 specifically

states that “a person convicted and imprisoned for a crime of which the person was exonerated

pursuant to this chapter shall have a cause of action.” (Emphasis added). “Pursuant to this chapter”

plainly means that a plaintiff must be exonerated through a means authorized by chapter 182. The

only such procedure authorized by chapter 182 is DNA testing.

¶ 18. We reject plaintiff’s argument that §§ 5573(a)(2) and 5574(a)(2) expand the means

of exoneration beyond DNA testing. These provisions are properly viewed as defining the starting

point for the limitations period set forth in § 5576. The language contained therein cannot be

viewed in isolation from the rest of the statute, which requires a plaintiff to prove that they are

“actually innocent,” meaning that they “did not engage in any illegal conduct alleged in the

charging documents for which he or she was charged, convicted, and imprisoned.” Id.

§ 5574(a)(3); see State v. A.P., 2021 VT 90, ¶ 12. This plain language indicates that the VIPA

requires more than a vacated conviction or dismissed charge based on any reason—the plaintiff’s

conviction must have been vacated because of actual innocence. As described above, the only

enumerated basis in chapter 182 for a plaintiff to be proved innocent is by the procedure for

postconviction DNA testing set forth in subchapter 1. 13 V.S.A. §§ 5561-5570.

¶ 19. Other provisions of the VIPA support our conclusion. Section 5576(a) requires an

action under the VIPA to be commenced “within three years after the person is exonerated pursuant

to subchapter 1 of this chapter.” (Emphasis added). Similarly, § 5577(a) requires “a

court . . . exonerating a person pursuant to subchapter 1 of this chapter through vacating or

reversing the person’s conviction” to provide a copy of subchapter 2 to such person. (Emphasis

added). These provisions demonstrate that the right of action contained in subchapter 2 is limited

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to individuals whose convictions were vacated by reason of DNA testing. If anyone imprisoned

under a conviction that was vacated could sue for compensation regardless of the basis for the

reversal, it would follow that anytime a court vacated an individual’s conviction they must be

notified of their rights under the VIPA. However, that is not provided for in the statute. Further,

plaintiff’s interpretation would potentially lead to inconsistent limitations periods for bringing

compensation claims depending on the basis for exoneration, a result we doubt the Legislature

intended.

¶ 20. The language of the VIPA is clear and unambiguous: only plaintiffs exonerated as

a result of DNA testing may file an action for compensation under the VIPA. We therefore need

not address plaintiff’s arguments regarding legislative history and public policy. Town of Pawlet,

2022 VT 4, ¶ 21. Furthermore, plaintiff did not raise these arguments below and therefore failed

to preserve them for our review. See Progressive Ins. v. Brown ex rel. Brown, 2008 VT 103, ¶ 6,

184 Vt. 388, 966 A.2d 666 (holding appellant must properly preserve argument on appeal by

presenting argument to trial court “with specificity and clarity” (quotation omitted)). Plaintiff

cannot pursue a remedy under the VIPA because his conviction was vacated due to ineffective

assistance of counsel. The trial court therefore properly granted judgment on the pleadings in favor

of the State.

Affirmed.

FOR THE COURT:

Associate Justice

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