Deborah Williams v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Bray
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
DEBORAH WILLIAMS
v. 	Record No. 2133-95-1 	MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 	JUNE 25, 1996
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Randolph T. West, Judge
Bryan L. Saunders for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Deborah Williams appeals her convictions, after a bench
trial, for grand larceny and felony destruction of private
property. 	She argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove
her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 	We affirm the convictions.
In July of 1994, Michelle Carlsen was living in Newport News
with her husband and four-year-old daughter. 	The family resided
in a new home that was in good condition. 	Ms. Carlsen, a
sergeant in the U.S. Army, received a duty assignment in Texas,
and her husband was also away on military assignment. 	She
arranged for Deborah Williams, who worked at her daughter's day
care center, to care for the home and forward the mail. 	Ms.
Williams also agreed to care for Carlsen's puppy. 	Carlsen had
disconnected the battery to her truck, but told Williams where
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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the key was in case of an emergency. 	Carlsen gave a house key to
Williams and no one else.
By September, Carlsen was concerned because she had received
only one package of mail from Williams. 	She left Williams
numerous messages, and finally reached her on October 13, 1994.
Williams told her that she had been busy working in a hotel at
night, but that everything was fine at the house. 	Still
concerned, Carlsen sent a key to a friend, Petty Officer Dauth,
and asked him to check the house.
On October 15, Dauth arrived at the house and found it
unlocked. 	He entered the house and noticed a rancid smell.
Dauth discovered the remains of the dog, decomposing and covered
with maggots, on the floor in the den. 	The dog had a hole in its
head, and blood had soaked through the pad under the carpet.
There were large black stains on the carpet and the tile floor,
and black handprints on the walls. 	Tables were turned over, and
there were piles of dirty dishes in the kitchen, as well as moldy
food. 	Upstairs, there were dried urine and dog feces in the
guest bathroom, and the bedrooms were in disarray. 	The master
bedroom had apparently been ransacked, and snack food was piled
on the bed in the guest room. 	Dauth became covered with fleas.
Dauth removed the dog and buried it in the backyard. 	He
purchased multiple insecticide foggers to kill the fleas. 	He
activated the foggers and left the premises, locking the door
behind him.

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Dauth and his wife returned the next day in order to
continue their efforts to clean up the house. 	They found a flea
fogger and a can of bug repellent that had not been there the day
before. 	The washing machine had apparently just stopped and
there was still a ladies' pantsuit inside it.
Cheryle Harris, Carlsen's neighbor, had observed Williams at
the house on several occasions while Carlsen was in Texas. 	She
saw Williams loading her car with clothes in clothes baskets and
with other property concealed in large green garbage bags. 	She
saw people other than Williams going in and out of the house, and
saw Williams and others driving Carlsen's truck. 	She saw
Williams for the last time in mid-September, but observed others
at the house until shortly before Carlsen returned.
Carlsen returned to the house on October 30, 1994. 	She
observed that in addition to the property damage, items of
personal property including clothing, jewelry, and tools were
missing. 	She estimated that the value of the missing items was
over $2,000, and paid over $1,000 for clean-up and repair of the
home. 	She confronted Williams at work, and testified that
Williams told her that someone else had been taking care of the
house. 	She tried to contact this individual at the number
Williams gave her, but no one at that location had heard of the
individual.
Ms. Williams gave a statement to the police, which was
introduced at trial, and also testified in her own behalf. 	She

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stated that she had moved to Gloucester over Labor Day weekend,
cleaning the house before she left, and after that did not go to
the Carlsen house every day. 	After moving to Gloucester she
returned to the house to do her laundry and feed the dog.
Williams stated that about a week prior to the call she received
from Carlsen, she had discovered the dog dead in the house. 	She
claimed that the dog had been alive and healthy during her last
visit. 	She covered the dog with a sheet and left it there, and
did not return to the house after that. 	Williams testified that
she did not give a house key to anyone else, and claimed to have
no idea how the house came to be in such terrible condition.
The Commonwealth argues that Williams failed to preserve her
objection to the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Rule
5A:18. 	Williams moved to strike the Commonwealth's evidence, but
failed to renew her motion to strike after she presented her own
evidence. 	However, before the court rendered a final order, she
made a motion to set aside the verdict that challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence. 	This motion preserved her
sufficiency objection after the bench trial. 	See McGee v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 321, 357 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (1987).
On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. 	Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 	In a
case based on circumstantial evidence, the Commonwealth must

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exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 	Lafon v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 411, 425, 438 S.E.2d 279, 288 (1993)
(citations omitted). 	The Commonwealth is not required to
disprove every remote possibility of innocence, but is instead
required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. 	Id. 	The Commonwealth is only required to exclude
reasonable hypotheses of innocence which arise from the evidence.
Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 289-90, 373 S.E.2d
328, 338-39 (1988) (citations omitted).
Both Carlsen and Williams testified that Williams was the
only person with a house key. 	There were no signs of forced
entry. 	Williams was seen going in and out of the home, and was
also observed removing items from the home in garbage bags.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, these
facts support the inference that Williams was responsible for the
damage to the home and for the theft of Carlsen's property.
Williams' improbable account of her actions provides further
evidence of her guilt. 	She acknowledged visiting the home about
a week before Dauth did, but claimed to have no knowledge of the
home's condition. 	Her claim that she left the home in good
condition and her account of the dog's death were contradicted by
other evidence in the record. 	Her testimony was inherently
improbable and inconsistent with circumstances in evidence, and
the judge was therefore entitled to reject it. 	Servis v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 525, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988).

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Moreover, the trial court could properly consider her false
testimony as affirmative evidence of her guilt. 	See Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992); Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va.
838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981) (citations omitted). 	The
trial court could reasonably conclude that Williams, and not
other individuals whom she may have invited into the home, did at
least some of the damage and stole Carlsen's property. 	For these
reasons, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.