Evan John Casey Coyne v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and
Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
EVAN JOHN CASEY COYNE
OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 2534-01-4 	JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
OCTOBER 29, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
James H. Chamblin, Judge
William B. Moffitt (Asbill Moffitt & Boss,
Chtd., on brief), for appellant.
Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Evan John Casey Coyne conditionally pled guilty to the
charge of possessing a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute it as an accommodation. 	See Code § 18.2-248. 	He
contends on appeal that the Commonwealth is barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel from prosecuting him for that
offense because the Commonwealth previously had successfully
convicted another individual of the same offense based on the
same facts. 	For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
conviction.
I.
Prior to accepting Coyne's conditional guilty plea, the
trial judge held a hearing on Coyne's motion to dismiss the

indictment. 	The evidence established that the Commonwealth
indicted Donald Keith Bryden for distributing controlled
substances to an informant for the Loudoun County Sheriff's
Department on August 23, 2000. 	Bryden tendered a plea of guilty
to the indictment. 	At the hearing on Bryden's plea, the
prosecutor proffered that the evidence would prove the informant
arranged the transaction in a telephone conversation with
Bryden, that Bryden met the informant at the prearranged
location on August 23, 2000, and that Bryden personally sold ten
tablets of a controlled substance to the informant. 	The
prosecutor proffered that the transaction was captured on both
video and audio recordings. 	At the hearing, Bryden acknowledged
those facts to be true. 	The trial judge accepted Bryden's
guilty plea and convicted Bryden of distributing the controlled
substances on August 23, 2000 in violation of Code § 18.2-248.
Two months after Bryden was convicted, a grand jury indicted
Coyne for the same offense.
At the hearing on Coyne's motion to dismiss the indictment,
the prosecutor acknowledged that the facts recited above were an
accurate representation of the incidents occurring at the prior
proceedings when the judge convicted Bryden on his guilty plea.
The prosecutor asserted, however, that the prosecutor who made
the proffer at Bryden's hearing "misspoke" when he said Bryden
personally delivered the controlled substances to the informant.
He told the trial judge that "[w]hen [the other prosecutor] said
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the drugs were delivered by Bryden, he should have said through
an agent, Evan Coyne."
The trial judge ruled that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel did not bar the prosecution "because . . . Coyne was
not a party to the proceeding between the Commonwealth and . . .
Bryden," and he denied Coyne's motion to dismiss. 	Coyne then
tendered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of distributing
the same controlled substances to the informant on August 23,
2000. 	The proffer at Coyne's hearing established that after
Bryden spoke to the informant and agreed to sell the controlled
substances, Bryden left town. 	The proffer further established
that Coyne met the informant and delivered the controlled
substances to the informant. 	On these facts, the trial judge
accepted Coyne's conditional guilty plea to the charge of
distributing the controlled substances as an accommodation in
violation of Code § 18.2-248. 	As permitted by Code § 19.2-254,
Coyne appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss.
II.
Relying upon federal law, Coyne contends that this case is
governed by the principle that, "[u]nder collateral estoppel,
once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to
its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the
issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party
to the first case." 	Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
He further contends that "[a]lthough [collateral estoppel was]
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first developed in civil litigation, [it] has been an
established rule of federal criminal law." 	Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
Relying on Virginia law, the Commonwealth contends that to
invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel in Virginia, the
parties must be the same in each of the lawsuits. 	Whitley v.
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 482, 489, 538 S.E.2d 296, 299 (2000); Lee
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1108, 1110, 254 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1979).
In addition, the Commonwealth contends the doctrine of
collateral estoppel does not bar the prosecution because the
trial judge "in Bryden's case could have grounded [the]
conviction on a factual issue other than who physically handed
the informant the drugs on August 23." 	See id. at 1111, 254
S.E.2d at 127.
Neither Coyne nor the Commonwealth addresses head-on the
choice of law issue. 	Although Coyne relies on federal cases
that apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, he makes no
persuasive argument that federal law, rather than state law,
governs the issue as it arises in this context. 	Coyne makes no
claim that his collateral estoppel argument as it is raised in
the context of this case is grounded in constitutional
principles such as double jeopardy, due process, or other
guarantees. 	Put simply, he contends that the preclusive effect
of the prior judgment convicting Bryden necessarily bars his
prosecution in a state criminal proceeding.
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At its core, collateral estoppel is a common law doctrine.
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984). 	Although
the Supreme Court "[i]n Ashe v. Swensen, . . . recognized that
the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of
collateral estoppel," Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,
347 (1990), the Supreme Court has also recognized that "the
collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is
inapposite" in some cases. 	Id. at 349. 	Thus, in the absence of
a claim of constitutional dimensions, the preclusive effect of a
state court judgment is a matter governed by state law. 	See
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316-17 n.10 (1983). 	See also
Allen, 449 U.S. at 96 (holding that "Congress has specifically
required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to
state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from
which the judgments emerged would do so"); Kane v. Hargis, 987
F.2d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that in an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 "[t]he collateral estoppel effect of the
Virginia court's decision is determined by Virginia law").
Applying state law, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
consistently held that "before the doctrine of collateral
estoppel may be applied, . . . the parties to the two
proceedings must be the same." 	Whitley, 260 Va. at 489, 538
S.E.2d at 299. 	See also Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Dean,
233 Va. 260, 355 S.E.2d 579 (1987); Jones v. Commonwealth, 217
Va. 231, 232, 228 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1976). 	We have held likewise
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in Jones v. City of Lynchburg, 23 Va. App. 167, 171, 474 S.E.2d
863, 865 (1996). 	As the United States Supreme Court noted in
Haring, "[a]lthough the doctrine of mutuality of parties has
been abandoned in recent years by the courts of many
jurisdictions, . . . it has not been rejected by the courts of
Virginia." 	462 U.S. at 606 n.10 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge did not err in
applying Virginia law and denying Coyne's motion to dismiss.
We, therefore, affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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