Margaret L. Sharp v Roland M. Woodard

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
MARGARET L. SHARP MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 0990-98-2 	PER CURIAM
NOVEMBER 10, 1998
ROLAND M. WOODARD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge
(Augustus S. Hydrick, Jr., on briefs), for
appellant.
(Mary P. Usry; Hairfield, Morton & Allen, on
brief), for appellee.
Margaret L. Sharp (mother) appeals the decision of the
circuit court modifying the child support paid by Roland M.
Woodard (father). 	Mother contends that the trial court erred in
(1) deviating from the presumptively correct amount of child
support payable under the statutory guidelines; and (2) failing
to award her attorney's fees and costs. 	Upon reviewing the
record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. 	Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of
the trial court. 	See Rule 5A:27.
Deviation from Guidelines
The facts are not in dispute. 	As set out in the written
statement of facts, mother moved to reinstate this case and
sought a change in custody and in child support. 	By agreement of
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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the parties, mother was awarded sole custody of the parties' two
minor children. 	The trial court calculated the amount of child
support which would be presumptively correct under the statutory
guidelines based upon the parties' joint income. 	See Code
§§ 20-108.1(B) and 20-108.2(B). 	The court then determined that
mother's receipt of approximately $100,000 as her share of the
proceeds from the sale of an inherited beach house made
application of the guidelines unjust or inappropriate. 	The court
reduced the amount of support payable to mother by father from
$958 to $750.
Mother contends that the trial court erred in deviating from
the statutory guidelines on the basis of the sale proceeds. 	We
find no error.
"[I]n determining child support, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the amount
determined in accordance with the statutory
guidelines, Code § 20-108.2, is the correct
award." 	Should the trial judge conclude that
"application of [such] guidelines would be
unjust or inappropriate in a particular case
as determined by relevant evidence pertaining
to the factors set out in §§ 20-107.2 and
20-108.1," the court may depart from the
statutory schedule, provided the attendant
order adequately explains the deviation.
Cooke v. Cooke, 23 Va. App. 60, 63, 474 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1996)
(citations omitted). 	See Richardson v. Richardson, 12 Va. App.
18, 401 S.E.2d 894 (1991). 	Here, the trial court first
determined the parties' gross income pursuant to the statutory
guidelines, then found that application of the guidelines would
be unjust or inappropriate under the circumstances. 	The trial

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court did not attempt to include the proceeds of the sale of the
beach house in mother's gross income. 	Therefore, the extent to
which mother realized any capital gains was irrelevant. 	Based
upon this record, we do not find that the trial court's decision
to deviate from the guidelines was an abuse of discretion. 	See
id. at 21, 401 S.E.2d at 896.
Attorney's Fees and Costs
An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the
sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal
only for an abuse of discretion. 	See Graves v. Graves, 4 Va.
App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). 	The key to a proper
award of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the
circumstances. 	See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277,
338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). 	The trial court found that mother
had realized an "extraordinary gain" as a result of the sale of
her family's beach house. 	We cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to award mother her attorney's
fees and costs.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.