Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder

2005 UT 41
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Steven Mouty, Rick Burrell, 	No. 20050101
Barbara Peterson, Gerald Jantz,
Ted Brown, and Save Our
Communities, Inc.,
Petitioners,
v.
The Sandy City Recorder and Sandy 	F I L E D
City, a municipal corporation,
Respondents. 	July 1, 2005
---
Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys: 	Robert H. Hughes, Salt Lake City, for petitioners
Walter R. Miller, Sandy, for respondents
Stephen K. Christensen, Jeffery S. Williams, Salt
Lake City, for the Boyer Company
Mark E. Hindley, Salt Lake City, for Gibbons Realty
Company
Vincent C. Rampton, Salt Lake City, for Lowe’s
---
DURRANT, Justice:
¶1 	To resolve the present controversy, we must determine
whether a city ordinance that amends the permitted and prohibited
uses of land in a particular zoning category can be subjected to
the referendum process. 	If the ordinance in question is
referable, we must then determine whether the ordinance is a
“land use law,” a class of referable laws subject to a higher
signature threshold than generally required. 	We conclude that
the ordinance is referable and that it is not a “land use law.”
BACKGROUND
¶2 	At stake in this case is whether the voters of Sandy
City, Utah, will be given the opportunity to hold a referendum on
an amendment to one of the city’s zoning categories. 	If the

1 The term “big box” refers to the type of structure such
retailers typically occupy. 	See Benjamin B. Quinones,
Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with
Resident Control, 27 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 689, 725 n.133 (1994)
(“‘Big box retail’ refers to the many types of retail entities
that typically sell low cost goods out of glorified warehouse-
type spaces. 	The store is in effect a big box.”).
No. 20050101 	2
amendment is not rejected via referendum, a large parcel of land
in the city may ultimately serve as the location of a commercial
complex featuring at least two prominent “big box” retailers. 1
The parcel in question (the “Gravel Pit”) is approximately 100
acres in size and for many years served as a source for sand and
gravel products.
¶3 	In 1988, Sandy City created a new zoning category
specifically for the Gravel Pit. 	That category, termed “Special
District Mixed Use--SD-X--Ski Connect” (“SD-X Zone”), was only
applied to the Gravel Pit, and the Gravel Pit remains the only
parcel of land that is classified as an SD-X Zone. 	At the time
of its creation, the SD-X Zone permitted nine uses and prohibited
twenty-six. 	Among the prohibited uses was use of the parcel for
a “Hardware/Building/Home Improvement Store, or a combined
Drug/Variety/Garden Center.” 	Sandy City, Utah, Municipal Code
§ 15-29-20(c)(3) (2002). 	Discount or department stores, as well
as supermarkets, were also prohibited. 	Id.
¶4 	In April 2004, The Boyer Company (“Boyer”) contacted
Sandy City via letter and requested that the ordinance outlining
the permitted and prohibited uses of land classified as an SD-X
Zone be amended to allow a substantial commercial development
project on the site of the Gravel Pit. 	The development project,
as contemplated by Boyer, would include big-box retailers Wal-
Mart and Lowe’s. 	Sandy City considered Boyer’s request, and the
city’s planning commission and city council both held multiple
public hearings and meetings at which members of the public were
invited to voice their opinions about amending the SD-X Zone
category to permit such a development project.
¶5 	In the summer of 2004, several Sandy City residents and
business people formed Save Our Communities, Inc. (“SOC”),
intending to fight the proposed development of the Gravel Pit.
Although SOC now states that it considered the approval of the
SD-X Zone amendment to be “predetermined,” SOC actively opposed
the amendment by participating in the public hearings and
meetings leading up to the amendment’s passage. 	SOC also voiced
its opposition to the amendment by sending letters to both the
planning commission and the city council. 	After the public

2 No party to the current petition has made any allegation
that the procedure followed by Sandy City in passing Ordinance
No. 04-45 was deficient in any manner. 	Rather, it appears from
the documentary evidence supplied by the parties that Sandy City
actually exceeded notification and public participation
requirements.
3 The Utah Code defines a “legal voter” as one who either is
registered to vote at the time of signing the referendum petition
or becomes registered before the petition signatures are
certified. 	Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-101(6) (2003).
3 	No. 20050101
hearings and meetings were concluded, and approximately seven
months after Sandy City initially received Boyer’s request for an
amendment of the SD-X Zone category, the Sandy City Council
enacted Ordinance No. 04-45, which amended the SD-X Zone category
to allow the development activity proposed by Boyer. 2
¶6 	Just over a week after the ordinance was passed, SOC
submitted an application for a referendum petition to the Sandy
City Recorder, hoping to obtain enough signatures to subject
Ordinance No. 04-45 to a referendum vote. 	Approximately one
month later, SOC completed its signature drive and submitted
signed and verified petition packets to the Sandy City Recorder.
During the course of its drive, SOC was able to secure over 8,000
signatures. 	However, when seeking signatories to a petition, not
all signatures are created equal, as only signatures by legal
Utah voters 3 residing within the local jurisdiction are counted
toward the required signature number. 	Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-
605(1) (2003). 	Therefore, pursuant to section 20A-7-606 of the
Utah Code, id. § 20A-7-606, the SOC petition packets were
delivered to the Salt Lake County Clerk’s Office for signature
certification.
¶7 	After the signature certification process was complete,
the Salt Lake County Clerk forwarded the SOC petition packets to
the Sandy City Recorder for a final signature count. 	Typically,
the mumber of valid signatures that a party must obtain in order
to force a referendum on a legislative action taken by a city is
equivalent to at least ten percent of the total number of local
voters who cast votes for candidates in the last gubernatorial
election, assuming the total number of votes cast in that city
exceeded 25,000. 	Id. 	§ 20A-7-601(1)(a) (Supp. 2004). 	However,
because the Sandy City Recorder determined that Ordinance No. 04-
45 is a “land use law,” the SOC petition packets were subjected
to the doubly demanding twenty percent requirement applicable to
such laws. 	See id. § 20A-7-601(2)(b).

4 Several individuals joined SOC in petitioning this court
for extraordinary relief. 	However, as the position and interests
of the individual petitioners are aligned with those of SOC, for
convenience we refer to petitioners collectively as “SOC.”
Additionally, we note that Sandy City, Boyer, and Gibbons Realty
Co. have submitted memorandums opposing SOC’s request for an
extraordinary writ.
No. 20050101 	4
¶8 	Informed by the Salt Lake County Clerk’s Office that
39,700 Sandy voters had participated in the last gubernatorial
election, the Sandy City Recorder determined that 7,940 legal
signatures--twenty percent of the total number of local voter
participants in the last gubernatorial election--were required in
order to force a referendum on Ordinance No. 04-45. 	The Sandy
City Recorder then counted the number of signatures certified by
the Salt Lake County Clerk’s Office and concluded that SOC had
obtained 6,425 valid signatures. 	Because SOC failed to meet the
twenty percent signature requirement, the Sandy City Recorder
refused to accept and file SOC’s referendum petition.
¶9 	SOC subsequently pursued its right to seek an
extraordinary writ in this court compelling the Sandy City
Recorder to accept and file its referendum petition. 4 	See id.
§ 20A-7-607(4)(a) (2003) (“If the local clerk refuses to accept
and file any referendum petition, any voter may apply to the
Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so .
. . .”). 	In its petition, SOC contends that the Sandy City
Recorder erroneously concluded that Ordinance No. 04-45 is a
“land use law” and therefore improperly subjected SOC’s
referendum petition to the higher twenty percent signature
requirement. 	In response, Sandy City argues that Ordinance No.
04-45 is not referable to the voters at all because it is an
individual property zoning decision and therefore immune from the
referendum process, and that, even if the ordinance is referable,
the Sandy City Recorder correctly determined that the ordinance
is a “land use law,” and that SOC was therefore properly
obligated to meet the more stringent twenty percent signature
requirement.
¶10 	Typically, this court exercises appellate jurisdiction,
reviewing the decisions of the state’s district courts and those
of the Utah Court of Appeals. 	However, this court has original
jurisdiction over certain matters, including petitions for
extraordinary writs. 	Id. § 78-2-2(2) (2002). 	In such
situations, we do not conduct a review in our appellate capacity,
but rather serve as the forum in which claims are initially
heard. 	We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code section 78-2-2(2) (2002).

5 Prior to the completion of the signature certification
process, SOC filed suit in the district court seeking to enjoin
Sandy City from granting any development approvals pertaining to
the Gravel Pit until the referendum process had been completed.
For reasons undisclosed by the record, the district court
proceedings were subsequently stayed “until further request of
counsel.”
5 	No. 20050101
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 	Because there are no disputed material facts, our
review in this matter is confined to discerning the proper
interpretation of various provisions of the Utah Code. 	We
conduct our review for correctness and grant no deference to the
Sandy City Recorder’s legal determinations. 	See Tobias v. S.
Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d 373, 373-75 (Utah 1998)
(conducting a correctness review and granting no deference to a
city recorder’s determination that an application for a
referendum petition was not timely filed).
ANALYSIS
¶12 	In order to ascertain whether it is appropriate to
issue a writ compelling the Sandy City Recorder to accept and
file SOC’s referendum petition, we must determine the following:
(1) whether Ordinance No. 04-45 is referable to Sandy City voters
at all, and, if so, (2) whether that ordinance is a “land use
law,” requiring SOC to obtain twice the number of signatures
typically necessary before a referendum petition is deemed
legally sufficient. 	We address each of these issues below.
However, we first respond to Boyer’s suggestion that, because
Boyer’s applications for the development of the Gravel Pit have
now been accepted by Sandy City, the vested rights doctrine
precludes the possibility of a referendum and that the current
controversy is therefore moot.
I. 	THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE DOES NOT RENDER THE CURRENT
CONTROVERSY MOOT
¶13 	Boyer claims that SOC’s petition is moot because Boyer
has now obtained vested development rights that cannot be
disturbed by referendum. 5 	The only legal authority Boyer cites
in support of its mootness claim is Western Land Equities, Inc.
v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 	In that case, we
held “that an applicant is entitled to a building permit or
subdivision approval if his proposed development meets the zoning

No. 20050101 	6
requirements in existence at the time of his application and if
he proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a compelling,
countervailing public interest.” 	Id. at 396. 	We went on to
provide, however, that an applicant is not entitled to rely on
zoning ordinances in effect at the time of application if
“proceedings to amend [those] zoning ordinances” are underway.
Id. 	The latter limitation resonates nicely with estoppel
principles, which provide the primary policy rationale underlying
the development of the rule articulated in Western Land Equities.
See id. at 391-93 (describing “zoning estoppel” and stating that
it would be unfair to disallow development when an applicant has,
reasonably and in good faith, detrimentally relied on government
acts or omissions in pursuing what was perceived as a valid
development project).
¶14 	In the present case, we are not persuaded that the rule
announced in Western Land Equities serves to protect Boyer from
the possibility of a referendum. 	To begin with, documentary
evidence provided to this court establishes that SOC’s efforts to
pursue a referendum on Ordinance No. 04-45 were well known,
making any reliance by Boyer on the validity and unassailability
of Ordinance No. 04-45 unreasonable under the circumstances. 	We
additionally note that the Utah Constitution provides that the
residents of a municipality have the right to “require any law or
ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by
statute, before the law or ordinance may take effect.” 	Utah
Const. art. VI, § 1(2)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). 	In other words,
article VI prevents referable laws from taking effect until local
voters have had the opportunity to exercise their right to seek a
referendum. 	In the case at hand, local citizens initiated the
referendum process, forestalling the effective date of Ordinance
No. 04-45. 	Sandy City may have approved development applications
that were in conformity with newly-enacted zoning requirements,
but considering that the effective date of those requirements was
tolled pending the exercise of the referendum right, the new
zoning requirements had not yet taken effect. 	Consequently, the
development applications were not in conformity with “the zoning
requirements in existence at the time of . . . application.”
Western Land Equities, 617 P.2d at 396.
¶15 	Also, this case presents a situation in which a
compelling, countervailing public interest exists, which defeats
any operation of the vested rights doctrine. 	Although our
opinion in Western Land Equities touched directly only on
countervailing public interests involving the appropriate use of
cities’ police powers, we conclude that the exercise of the
people’s referendum right is of such importance that it properly

7 	No. 20050101
overrides “individual economic interests.” 	Id. 	To hold
otherwise would lead to an absurd legal landscape where a
municipality could circumvent the people’s referendum right by
enacting a legislative change--no matter how comprehensive--to
zoning categories and then quickly approving development
applications under the new legislation. 	Such a situation would
make hollow the constitutional guarantee that the people of this
state retain direct legislative power. 	The referendum right, so
fundamental to our conception of government, should not and
cannot be so easily thwarted.
¶16 	Having concluded that the issues raised by SOC’s
petition are not moot, we now analyze (1) whether Ordinance No.
04-45 is referable to the voters of Sandy City, and, if so, (2)
whether Ordinance No. 04-45 is a “land use law” triggering the
heightened twenty percent signature requirement applicable to
such laws.
II. 	ORDINANCE NO. 04-45 IS REFERABLE TO THE VOTERS OF SANDY CITY
¶17 	Determining whether SOC can seek a referendum on
Ordinance No. 04-45 requires an analysis of various sections of
the Utah Code. 	When interpreting statutory law, our “primary
goal . . . is to give effect to the legislative intent, as
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve.” 	Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004
UT 75, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation omitted). 	We also
“assume that each term included in the [statute] was used
advisedly.” 	Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 30, 104
P.3d 1208. 	“Only if the language of a statute is ambiguous do we
resort to other modes of construction.” 	O’Keefe v. Utah State
Ret. Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998). 	We also note that the
present controversy implicates title 20A of the Utah Code, which,
pursuant to the instructions of the legislature, we are to
“construe . . . liberally to carry out the intent of [the]
title.” 	Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-401(1) (2003); see Adams v.
Swensen, 2005 UT 8, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d 725 (“[W]hen confronted with
malleable statutory language, our shaping of its meaning will be
guided by the policy of encouraging ballot access . . . .”).
Keeping these principles in mind, we now turn our analysis to the
relevant statutory provisions.
¶18 	The Utah Legislature’s authority to regulate referendum
procedures derives from the Utah Constitution, which provides
that
[t]he legal voters of any county, city, or
town, in the numbers, under the conditions,

6 We note that Sandy City’s contention that section 20A-7-
601 is so confined, while arguably correct, seems a somewhat
strained reading of the statute given that section 20A-7-601 does
not use the term “local law” when outlining the general scope of
its applicability. 	Instead, the statute uses the phrase “law
passed by the local legislative body,” which SOC argues is not
necessarily equivalent to the term “local law.” 	In any event, we
have no need to resolve this particular disagreement because,
even assuming that section 20A-7-601 is only applicable to “local
laws,” we conclude that Ordinance No. 04-45 is a “local law” and
subject to the referenda proceedures outlined in section 20A-7-
601.
No. 20050101 	8
in the manner, and within the time provided
by statute, may . . . require any law or
ordinance passed by the law making body of
the county, city, or town to be submitted to
the voters thereof, as provided by statute,
before the law or ordinance may take effect.
Utah Const. art. VI, § 1(2)(b). 	Pursuant to this grant of
authority, the legislature has outlined by statute the mechanisms
by which the people can exercise their constitutionally
guaranteed local referendum right. 	See generally Utah Code Ann.
§§ 20A-7-601 to -612 (2003 & Supp. 2004).
¶19 	Section 20A-7-601 provides that “a person seeking to
have a law passed by the local legislative body submitted to a
vote of the people shall obtain” the signatures of a specified
percentage of the total number of local voters who cast votes for
a candidate in the last gubernatorial election. 	Id. § 20A-7-
601(1) (Supp. 2004). 	The statutory scheme appears simple at
first blush. 	A quick and superficial reading of section 20A-7-
601 would lead one to conclude that any municipal ordinance is
referable to local voters so long as a statutorily-set number of
signatures can be obtained. 	However, the history underlying the
development of the statutory scheme, and our case law
interpreting that development, complicate our state’s facially
facile local referendum procedure. 	This reality requires that we
carefully analyze the manner in which Ordinance No. 04-45
interacts with local referendum procedures, if at all.
¶20 	Sandy City argues that Ordinance No. 04-45 falls
entirely outside the purview of section 20A-7-601. 	According to
Sandy City, section 20A-7-601 limits the universe of referable
acts to those acts that meet the statutory definition of a “local
law.” 6 	In making its argument, Sandy City points out that the
legislature specifically excluded “individual property zoning

7 	Sandy City contends that SOC, in its briefing before this
court, conceded that Ordinance No. 04-45 is an individual
property zoning decision. 	According to Sandy City, that
concession, coupled with its own position that section 20A-7-601
applies only to “local laws,” compels the conclusion that
Ordinance No. 04-45 is not referable. 	We disagree that SOC has
conceded such a critical component of its argument. 	Although
SOC’s briefs do emphasize that Ordinance No. 04-45 affected only
one parcel of land, SOC’s pleadings before this court cannot be
fairly read as conceding that the ordinance in question is an
individual property zoning decision as that phrase is used in
chapter 7 of title 20A. 	Consequently, we reject Sandy City’s
argument that SOC has conceded that Ordinance No. 04-45 is
nonreferable.
8 The statute at issue in Marakis was repealed in 1994, see
Act of Jan. 27, 1994, 1994 Utah Laws 61, but the exclusion of
“individual property zoning decisions” from the definition of
“law or ordinance” was recodified in section 20A-7-101(7)(b), id.
§ 9, 1994 Utah Laws at 69 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-
101(7)(b) (2003)). 	A subsequent revision retained the exclusion
of “individual property zoning decisions,” but amended “law or
ordinance” to read “local law.” 	See Act of Mar. 1, 1994, sec.
30, § 20A-7-101(7)(b), 1994 Utah Laws 247, 262. 	In other words,
while the defined term has changed, the definition has remained
the same.
9 	No. 20050101
decisions” from the definition of “local law,” id. § 20A-7-
101(7)(b) (2003), and contends that Ordinance No. 04-45 is an
individual property zoning decision. 	Therefore, Sandy City
argues, Ordinance No. 04-45 cannot be subjected to the referendum
process because it is not a “local law,” but an “individual
property zoning decision.” 	If Ordinance No. 04-45 is, indeed, an
individual property zoning decision, Sandy City’s logic would be
unassailable. 	However, we disagree with Sandy City’s blanket
assertion that Ordinance No. 04-45 is an individual property
zoning decision. 7
¶21 	In Citizen’s Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117
(Utah 1994), we were called upon to determine “the nature and
scope of an ‘individual property zoning decision’ under section
20-11-24(2)(a)(ii) [of the Utah Code].” 	Id. at 1121. 	Similar in
all material respects to the definition of “local law” now found
in section 20A-7-101(7), the section analyzed in Marakis excluded
“individual property zoning decisions” from the definition of
“law or ordinance.” 8

9 See J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Adoption of Zoning Ordinance
or Amendment Thereto as Subject of Referendum, 72 A.L.R.3d 1030
(continued...)
No. 20050101 	10
¶22 	As we stated in Marakis, by excluding “individual
property zoning decisions” from the definition of “law or
ordinance,” the legislature intended to incorporate our case law
on the referability of municipal zoning actions. 	873 P.2d at
1122 (citing Floor Debate, vote on S.B. 9, 47th Utah Legis., Gen.
Sess. (Feb. 9, 1987) (Senate Recording No. 54, side B) (statement
of Sen. Finlinson)). 	Specifically, we concluded that the
exclusion of “individual property zoning decisions” was an
attempt to codify our determination that administrative zoning
matters are not referable to the voters as a matter of
constitutional right while legislative zoning matters are
referable. 	See id.; see also Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251,
252-53 (Utah 1982) (outlining the constitutional interpretation
that gave rise to the administrative-legislative distinction).
Consequently, in Marakis, we held that the general language used
to define “law or ordinance,” and which is now used to define
“local law” in the present statutory scheme, “corresponds to
legislative zoning matters that are subject to referenda.” 	873
P.2d at 1122. 	We went on to state that the exclusion of
“individual property zoning decisions” from the definition of
“law or ordinance” was intended by the legislature to “refer[] to
administrative zoning changes,” which are exempt from referenda.
Id.
¶23 	Unfortunately, as we acknowledged in Marakis, the
statutory incorporation of our case law addressing the
appropriateness of referring zoning matters to local voters
“failed to remedy a shortcoming in that case law.” 	Id.
Specifically, while the statutory scheme expressly excluded
administrative zoning matters from the referendum process, there
remained no clear mechanism by which to determine whether a
particular zoning act was administrative or legislative. 	See id.
In Marakis, we supplied that mechanism, identifying particular
areas of inquiry that must be assessed before determining whether
a particular zoning act is administrative (and therefore
nonreferable) or legislative (and therefore referable). 	Id. at
1122-26.
¶24 	Given our decision in Marakis, it would seem to be a
foregone conclusion that determining whether Ordinance No. 04-45
is referable simply involves applying the Marakis test, which was
designed to answer such questions. 	However, both Sandy City and
SOC contend that conducting the admittedly fact-intensive
analysis prescribed by Marakis 9 is not necessary in the present

9 (...continued)
§ 2, at 1035 (1976) [hereinafter Kemper] (“Although the
legislative-administrative distinction is difficult to apply in
almost any context, it is especially so in connection with zoning
enactments, which involve an unending variety of factual
circumstances and relate to peculiarly local matters.”).
11 	No. 20050101
case.
¶25 	Sandy City argues that a Marakis analysis is
unnecessary because the legislature effectively overruled Marakis
when it amended section 20A-7-601 in 1999. 	According to Sandy
City, at that time, the legislature sought to eliminate the need
for a Marakis analysis by listing in the referendum statute
itself the type of “zoning matters” that are amenable to the
referendum process. 	The amendment in question added a new
subsection to section 20A-7-601 that provides heightened
signature requirements before a referendum can be held on a “land
use law passed by the local legislative body.” 	Utah Code Ann.
§ 20A-7-601(2)(b) (Supp. 2004). 	The subsection states that,
“[a]s used in this Subsection (2), ‘land use law’ includes a land
use development code, an annexation ordinance, and comprehensive
zoning ordinances.” 	Id. § 20A-7-601(2)(a). 	Sandy City argues
that the legislature intended the phrase “land use law” to cover
every referable municipal zoning act and that the legislature
therefore intended to impose the higher twenty percent signature
requirement on all referable zoning actions. 	Therefore,
according to Sandy City, even if Ordinance No. 04-45 is
referable, it is by default a “land use law,” and SOC was
obligated to meet the higher twenty percent signature
requirement. 	Because SOC failed to meet that higher signature
threshold, Sandy City argues that it is unnecessary to conduct a
Marakis analysis as, even were we to conclude that Ordinance No.
04-45 is referable, SOC nevertheless failed to submit a legally
sufficient referendum petition.
¶26 	We acknowledge that Sandy City’s approach is grounded
in a commonsense understanding of the phrase “land use law.”
After all, any ordinance that affects zoning almost certainly
affects the use of land. 	However, as we recently pointed out in
Carrier, determining the meaning of a particular phrase in a
statute or ordinance is largely a contextual matter. 	2004 UT 98
at ¶ 32 (“In its broadest sense, the term ‘mineral’ necessarily
encompasses the term ‘gravel.’ 	Whether the term ‘mineral’
actually incorporates the term ‘gravel’ in any given situation,
however, is largely contextual.” (citation omitted)).
¶27 	We are unpersuaded that, when considered in context,

No. 20050101 	12
the 1999 amendment was intended to eliminate the need for a
Marakis analysis in zoning matters and that the amendment
contemplated subjecting all referable municipal zoning actions to
the higher twenty percent signature requirement. 	There is simply
nothing in the language of the amendment that evidences an intent
to limit the types of municipal zoning actions that can be
referred to the local voters. 	Rather, the 1999 amendment appears
to be an attempt to raise the hurdle local voters must leap when
they seek a referendum on a municipal zoning action that falls
within a specific category of zoning actions, namely, “land use
laws.” 	We also note that the legislative history relating to the
1999 amendment is devoid of any indication that the amendment was
an attempt to do away with our line of cases addressing whether a
particular zoning action is administrative or legislative. 	See
Floor Debate, vote on Sub. H.B. 129, 53rd Utah Legis. Gen. Sess.
(March 1, 1999) (Senate Recording No. 47, side A). 	In the
absence of textual evidence or legislative history that lends
meaningful support to Sandy City’s interpretation of the 1999
amendment, we feel compelled to reject that interpretation.
¶28 	Like Sandy City, SOC also argues that a Marakis
analysis is not necessary under the facts of this case. 	However,
unlike the approach advocated by Sandy City, SOC’s argument is
grounded in the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act
(“OFMGA”). 	Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-101 to -1312 (2003 & Supp.
2004). 	According to SOC, the fact that Sandy City has adopted
the council-mayor form of government, as allowed by the OFMGA,
necessarily solves the administrative-legislative quandary
typically faced in zoning referendum situations. 	SOC argues that
the council-mayor form of government provides for a strict
separation of governmental powers, by which the city council is
foreclosed from undertaking any action that is not, by
definition, legislative. 	We agree with SOC, and hold that zoning
actions properly taken by a city council operating under the
council-mayor form of government are necessarily legislative and
therefore subject to referenda.
¶29 	There is support for this conclusion both in the text
of the OFMGA and in our case law interpreting that act’s
provisions. 	See, e.g., id. § 10-3-101(2) (Supp. 2004) (“The
government of a municipality operating under the council-mayor
form of government is vested in two separate, independent, and
equal branches of municipal government consisting of . . . the
mayor, who exercises executive powers . . . and . . . a council
of five or seven members, who exercise the legislative powers.”);
Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 1978) (noting
that the council-mayor form of government “specifically vest[s]
the whole of the executive powers in the Mayor and only the

13 	No. 20050101
legislative powers in the Council” and that it “is a true
separation of powers form of government”).
¶30 	Consistent with that understanding of the council-mayor
form of government, decisions from this court, as well as those
from the court of appeals, involving the council-mayor form have
taken pains to confine the coequal branches to their respective
spheres. 	See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221
(Utah 1992) (“As legislative functions, the powers of zoning and
rezoning cannot be delegated to a quasi-judicial body such as a
board of adjustment.”); Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758
P.2d 897, 898-99 (Utah 1988) (holding that appeals from a
planning commission’s denial of building permits cannot be heard
by a city council in a council-mayor municipality because “the
authority to resolve zoning disputes is properly an executive
function rather than a legislative one”); Salt Lake County
Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Sandy City, 879 P.2d 1379, 1383
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the Sandy City Council cannot
perform the executive function of hearing appeals from grants of
conditional use permits).
¶31 	Further, the existence of the council-mayor form of
government undercuts a primary rationale for the very creation of
the administrative-legislative dichotomy. 	In Wilson, we
acknowledged that the initial need to formulate a distinction
between administrative zoning acts and legislative zoning acts
“was doubtless made necessary by the fact that some lawmaking
bodies . . . act in an executive or administrative as well as a
legislative capacity.” 	657 P.2d at 252.
¶32 	Wilson strongly implies that our case law developing
the administrative-legislative dichotomy was motivated by the
need to determine which hat a governing body empowered with both
administrative and legislative authority was wearing at the time
a particular action was taken. 	However, we are cognizant that
other factors counseled in favor of creating the administrative-
legislative distinction. 	For example, we have been hesitant to
hold that an unqualified referendum right extends to municipal
considerations involving necessarily complex issues, as the
resolution of such matters may be best left to the mechanisms
generally employed by municipal governments. 	See Shriver v.
Bench, 313 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1957) (stating that an ordinance
fixing salaries for fire and police personnel “presents a problem
of such complexity that it is not practical for the public to
give it sufficient time and attention to make a proper
determination of the matter”). 	We reaffirmed this concern in
Marakis, when we expressly made the complexity of the zoning
issue in question a relevant factor to consider when determining

10 Some jurisdictions have found that zoning matters are so
complex and critical to municipal functioning that they should be
excluded from the referendum process altogether. 	See generally
Kemper, supra note 9, § 6 (1976 & Supp. 2002) (collecting cases).
For example, in Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 312 A.2d 154
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), the court held that the state
legislature of New Jersey granted zoning power to the state’s
municipal governments and that the state act granting voters the
referendum right did not supercede the exclusive grant of zoning
authority. 	Id. at 156-58. 	The court recognized that “the
ultimate question is whether major decisions should be made by
the planning boards and governing bodies . . . or whether they
should be open to a final decision by the vote of the entire
population.” 	Id. at 156. 	We note, however, that cases from
outside our jurisdiction are of limited value in this arena, as
the nature of the referendum right and zoning processes differ
widely from state to state.
No. 20050101 	14
whether the matter should be referable. 	873 P.2d at 1125. 10
¶33 	Another concern underlying our previous opinions is the
potential for havoc in municipal land use policy should an
unchecked referendum power be given full freedom to operate. 	See
id. 873 P.2d at 1125 (opining that “the undesirable phenomenon of
city government by referendum” is “inefficient” and “arbitrary”);
Bird v. Sorenson, 394 P.2d 808, 808 (Utah 1964) (“If each change
in a zoning classification were to be submitted to a vote of the
city electors, any master plan would be rendered inoperative.”).
¶34 	Despite the above concerns, we are mindful that our
state constitution retains for the people a relatively broad
referendum power, which we have previously interpreted as
extending to all legislative acts taken by a municipal
government. 	See, e.g., Wilson, 657 P.2d at 252 (“The meaning of
[the referendum] guarantee [has been] definitively
construed . . . .”). 	We are also mindful that the legislature
has allocated only legislative authority to city councils
operating under the council-mayor form of government, see Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-101(2), and that the legislature has previously
endorsed our line of cases concluding that legislative zoning
acts are subject to referenda, see Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1122.
Consequently, it would be inconsistent with our prior case law to
now hold that the people’s referendum power does not extend to
zoning actions taken by a city council operating under the
council-mayor form of government.
¶35 	In so concluding, we do not discount the gravity of the
concerns identified above. 	Rather, we recognize that the

11 We also note that the Marakis analysis may still have
applicability to an action taken by a city council operating
under the council-mayor form of government if, for example, that
action is challenged on the ground that the city council acted
beyond the scope of its legislative authority.
15 	No. 20050101
approach outlined in Marakis has continuing applicability when it
is necessary to determine whether a zoning action taken by a
governing body empowered with both administrative and legislative
authority is best categorized as administrative or legislative. 11
We also recognize that the above-identified policy concerns may
be weighed by the legislature when contemplating the
appropriateness of statutory restraints on the implementation of
the referendum right. 	In this respect, we note that the current
statutory scheme places significant checks on the referendum
power in the form of signature requirements and procedural
hurdles. 	As a result, we are confident that the ability to
exercise the referendum power over the full range of zoning
matters acted upon by a city council organized under the council-
mayor form of government will not wreack havoc upon the smooth
operation of municipalities. 	As noted by Justice Howe, “[i]t
will be only in a very few instances where aggrieved landowners
or citizens will go to the expense and effort of obtaining a
referendum.” 	Wilson, 657 P.2d at 256 (Howe, J., dissenting).
¶36 	The above considerations, coupled with the
unquestionable reality that a bright-line rule establishing which
municipal acts are referable would serve the interests of both
the electorate and municipal governments, lead us to conclude
that all acts taken by a city council in a city organized
pursuant to the council-mayor form of government are necessarily
legislative and subject to referenda. 	Having so concluded, we
now discuss whether Ordinance No. 04-45 is a “land use law,” a
category of laws that the legislature has provided with
heightened protection from the referendum process.
III. 	ORDINANCE NO. 04-45 IS NOT A LAND USE LAW
¶37 	Sandy City contends that, even if Ordinance No. 04-45
is referable, SOC’s referendum petition was still properly
rejected because SOC failed to meet the signature threshold
applicable to referenda on “land use laws.” 	SOC counters that
Ordinance No. 04-45 is not a “land use law,” and that SOC
therefore obtained a sufficient number of signatures to refer the
ordinance to the local voters. 	To resolve the parties’ dispute,
we must determine whether Ordinance No. 04-45 is a “land use
law,” as that term is used in section 20A-7-601(2).

No. 20050101 	16
¶38 	Our “primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain
language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve.” 	Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d
1171 (internal quotation omitted). 	Section 20A-7-601(2) imposes
an increased signature requirement on local voters seeking a
referendum on a “land use law.” 	The statute provides that a
“‘land use law’ includes a land use development code, an
annexation ordinance, and comprehensive zoning ordinances.” 	Utah
Code Ann. § 20A-7-601(2)(a) (Supp. 2004). 	Looking to the
statute’s plain language, we initially point out that Ordinance
No. 04-45 is not “a land use development code” or a
“comprehensive zoning ordinance,” both of which refer to laws
providing near-comprehensive regulation of land use within a
municipality. 	See, e.g., Sandy City, Utah, Municipal Code §§ 15-
01-01 to 15-15-02 (2004) (Sandy City’s Land Development Code);
see also id. § 15-01-03 (2003) (“This Code shall establish Zone
Districts within Sandy City. 	It shall provide regulations within
said districts with respect to the use, location, height of
buildings and structures, the use of land, the size of lots,
yards and other open spaces, and the density of population. . . .
[One purpose of this code is] [t]o establish a system of fair,
comprehensive, consistent and equitable regulations, standards
and procedures for review and approval of all proposed land
development within the City.”); 8 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of
Municipal Corporations § 25.07, at 30 (rev. 3d ed. 2000)
(“Comprehensive zoning is general zoning throughout a
municipality according to a comprehensive plan . . . .”). 	It is
even more clear that Ordinance No. 04-45 is not “an annexation
ordinance,” as it contemplates no annexation whatsoever.
¶39 	However, the reality that Ordinance No. 04-45 does not
fit into any of the three examples of “land use laws” identified
by the legislature does not completely foreclose the possibility
that the ordinance is, nevertheless, a “land use law.” 	The
legislature’s use of the word “includes” indicates that the three
examples listed were not necessarily meant to be exhaustive. 	It
is a basic principle of statutory construction that, when
confronted with a statute that uses a general term subsequently
narrowed by specific examples, “the general term is understood as
restricted to include things of the same kind, class, character,
or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is
something to show a contrary intent.” 	State v. A.T., 2001 UT 82,
¶ 12, 34 P.3d 228. 	The salient features shared by the three
examples listed in the statute are comprehensive scope and
general applicability. 	All three of the examples listed by the
legislature relate to situations in which a municipality has
completed a highly involved undertaking, be it the development of

17 	No. 20050101
a comprehensive zoning scheme or the annexation of property, and
is attempting to finalize that process through a legislative act.
Although even a text amendment to a zoning category can be a
complicated and involved process, we are persuaded that such an
amendment is not of the same character as the comprehensive acts
listed in the statute.
¶40 	We conclude that the legislature did not intend to
include an amendment to a zoning category within the ambit of the
term “land use law.” 	Because SOC obtained 6,425 valid
signatures, well above the applicable ten percent requirement
established by the Utah Code, the Sandy City Recorder improperly
refused to accept SOC’s petition.
CONCLUSION
¶41 	We conclude that the Sandy City Council exercised its
legislative authority when passing Ordinance No. 04-45. 	The Utah
Constitution guarantees residents of Sandy City the right to
refer that legislative action to the local voters. 	Additionally,
we conclude that Ordinance No. 04-45 is not a “land use law,” as
that term is used in section 20A-7-601 of the Utah Code.
Consequently, SOC exceeded statutory requirements for initiating
a referendum by obtaining more than the ten percent signature
threshold mandated by the Utah Code. 	We further hold that the
vested rights doctrine does not operate in the current case to
defeat the referendum right of Sandy City voters. 	As a result,
we hereby order the Sandy City Recorder to accept and file SOC’s
petition for a referendum.
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¶42 	Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant’s
opinion.