Utah County v. Alexanderson

2005 UT 67
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Utah County, No. 20030516
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
George S. Alexanderson and F I L E D
Charles H. Martin,
Defendants and Respondents. October 14, 2005
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Fourth District, Provo
The Honorable Fred D. Howard
No. 970400590
Attorneys: M. Cort Griffin, Provo, for plaintiff
Todd M. Shaughnessy, Tawni J. Sherman,
Salt Lake City, for defendants
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
NEHRING, Justice:
¶1 We took this case on certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals to consider several unresolved issues concerning a
petition for extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, upon closer examination of
the procedural record, we conclude that because Utah County
failed to avail itself of a statutory right to direct appeal to
the district court, the issues that prompted us to grant
certiorari are moot. We hold that, for the reasons explained
below, the rulings of the district court and court of appeals are
invalid and the decision of the Career Service Council is
binding.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 The matters before us in this petition concern process,
not substance. The defendants were Utah County Sheriff’s
deputies who filed a grievance in January 1997 with the Utah
County Career Service Council challenging the county’s promotion

1 We note that the applicable statute was amended in 1999
and subsequently in 2001, but offer no interpretation of the
statute as amended.
No. 20030516 2
procedures. The Council ruled in favor of the deputies. Shortly
thereafter, Utah County filed a petition for extraordinary relief
in the district court pursuant to rule 65B(d)(2)(A) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
¶3 Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) entitles an aggrieved party to
petition the district court for extraordinary relief “where an
. . . administrative agency . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction
or abused its discretion.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A). Such
relief is available “[w]here no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy is available.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Following a
lengthy series of motions and hearings, the trial court granted
the county extraordinary relief, effectively overturning the
Council’s decision.
¶4 The deputies appealed the trial court’s decision to the
Utah Court of Appeals. Applying rule 65B analytical methodology,
the court of appeals concluded that the trial court was too quick
to substitute its judgment for the Council’s and reinstated the
Council’s decision. We granted Utah County’s petition for
certiorari to review whether the court of appeals applied the
proper standard in conducting its rule 65B review, together with
several related issues. However, the unexplained failure of Utah
County to pursue a direct appeal to the district court leaves us
convinced that we should not, and owing to jurisdictional
constraints likely cannot, rule on these issues.
ANALYSIS
I. THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
¶5 Extraordinary relief under rule 65B is available only
“[w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
available.” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). At the time, the County
Personnel Management Act, which establishes and governs county
career service councils, guaranteed that following a council’s
final binding appeals decision, “a right of appeal to the
district court under the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure shall not be abridged.” Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(1)
(1995) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(1)(a)-(d)
(2001)).1 In other words, upon receiving the Council’s
unfavorable ruling, Utah County could have appealed that decision
to the district court.

2 Rule 73(h) limits the time for appealing a judgment from a
city or justice court to one month. Rule 81(d) applies the Rules
of Civil Procedure to administrative proceedings, and Utah
Chiropractic holds that the one month period established in 73(h)
is properly applied to administrative proceedings through 81(d).
3 No. 20030516
¶6 The opportunity to appeal an administrative decision to
the district court constitutes a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1972).
Likewise, “[a]n extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for
general review, and cannot be used as such.” Anderson v. Baker,
296 P.2d 283, 285 (Utah 1956); see also Rammell v. Smith, 560
P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1977). Because Utah County failed to
pursue its available direct appeal, and because a petition for
extraordinary relief cannot be considered an alternative to
appeal, its petition is invalid and no court in this state has
jurisdiction to provide the requested relief.
II. APPEAL NOW BARRED
¶7 While the proper procedure to challenge the Council’s
decision would have been direct appeal to the district court, the
time for Utah County to exercise this right has long since run.
Prior to its 2001 amendment, the Act itself did not contain an
explicit time limitation for appeal, but stated that the appeal
would be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah
Code Ann. § 17-33-4(1) (1995) (current version at Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-33-4(1)(a)-(d) (2001)). When the Act was passed in 1981,
the Rules of Civil Procedure allowed one month after the entry of
a judgment for appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 73(h) (repealed 1985),
Utah R. Civ. P. 81(d); see also Utah Chiropractic Ass’n v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978).2
However, rule 73(h) was repealed in 1985 when the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure were adopted. Rule 73(h) was largely
replaced by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(a), which
provides thirty days for an appeal from an administrative
decision. However, rule 14(a) only mentions appeals from
administrative decisions to the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals, and is silent on appeals to the District Court, which is
what the Act provides. This small gap was erased in 2001, when
section 17-33-4(1) was amended to provide thirty days for an
appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(1)(d)(ii) (2001). Also
instructive is the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, which
provides thirty days for appeal from a final order of a state
administrative agency. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(1)(a) (2004).
However, the Administrative Procedures Act is inapplicable
because the Council is a county agency, and not a state agency.

No. 20030516 4
¶8 The absence of a directly applicable statute does not
mean that Utah County enjoys the right of direct appeal in
perpetuity and can exercise such an appeal now, eight years
following the Council’s decision. Although none of these rules
or statutes expressly assigned a time limit to the right to a
direct appeal granted by section 17-33-4(1), the uniform
appearance of a thirty-day appeal period in every plausibly
applicable provision convinces us that Utah County’s right to
directly appeal the Council’s ruling had a thirty-day life.
Counsel in 1997 looking to appeal a Council decision would
unquestionably reach the same conclusion. Therefore, under the
pre-amendment Act Utah County was required to perfect its direct
appeal within thirty days of the date of the Council’s decision
of June 30, 1997. Because Utah County did not timely appeal, it
forfeited its claim to extraordinary relief.
CONCLUSION
¶9 Due to its failure to exhaust all available avenues of
appeal, extraordinary relief is not available to Utah County.
Furthermore, its right of appeal has since lapsed. Consequently,
the ruling of the Utah County Career Service Council is
unaffected and affirmed.
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¶10 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Parrish concur in Justice Nehring’s
opinion.