State v. Rynhart

2005 UT 84
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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State of Utah, No. 20040115
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
F I L E D
Tanja Rynhart,
Defendant and Respondent. November 22, 2005
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First District, Brigham City
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
No. 021100039
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Christine Soltis,
Marian Decker, Asst. Att’ys Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
James M. Retallick, Ogden, for defendant
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Tanja Rynhart was arrested and charged with possession
of a controlled substance after police officers discovered a
small bag of cocaine in her purse. At the time of the discovery,
Rynhart’s purse was in her van, which she had left unattended in
a marsh after driving off the road and crashing through two
fences. Rynhart filed a motion to suppress the cocaine, arguing
that the police officer illegally searched her van in violation
of her rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The State argued that the search was valid
because Rynhart had abandoned her van. Alternatively, it relied
on the emergency aid doctrine. The district court concluded that
the search was not justified under the doctrine of abandonment,
but nonetheless denied Rynhart’s motion, holding that the
emergency aid doctrine applied. Rynhart sought interlocutory
review of the district court’s order with the court of appeals,

No. 20040115 2
which reversed, holding that the search could not be upheld under
either doctrine. Because we conclude that Rynhart abandoned any
reasonable expectation of privacy in her van and purse, we hold
that the search was permissible under the abandonment doctrine.
Accordingly, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
¶2 At 8:30 a.m. on Sunday, January 6, 2002, a Brigham City
police officer was called to the scene of a single-vehicle
accident. Upon arriving, the officer observed that a van, which
was then located in the middle of a privately owned field, had
traveled “over the curb, down an embankment, [and] through two
fences” before coming to rest in the field. Because the tire
tracks were covered with freshly fallen snow, the officer deduced
that the accident occurred prior to the snowfall, which had begun
approximately five hours earlier.
¶3 The officer approached the van and opened a door to
determine whether anyone was still inside. Although the officer
did not see anyone in the van, he did observe a purse, a
briefcase, and a partially consumed bottle of vodka. When he
opened the purse, he discovered a wallet containing nearly $330
in cash, Rynhart’s driver’s license, and “a small bag that had a
white powdery substance in it.”
¶4 The officer attempted to reach Rynhart by phone, but
was unsuccessful. Thereafter, the owner of the field in which
the van had come to rest spoke to the officer, requesting the
van’s removal so that he could begin to repair the damaged
fences. Accordingly, just prior to 10:00 a.m., the officer had
the van towed to a wrecking yard. The officer remained at the
scene for a short time thereafter, but Rynhart did not return.
At approximately 2:00 p.m. that same day, the towing company
notified the officer that Rynhart had arrived to arrange for the
retrieval of her van. The officer met Rynhart at the wrecking
yard and inquired about the small bag found in her purse.
Rynhart admitted that the substance was cocaine. She was
subsequently arrested and charged with possession of a controlled
substance, a second degree felony, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.
¶5 Prior to trial, Rynhart moved to suppress the evidence
seized as a result of the warrantless search of her van and
purse. She argued that the search violated both the United
States and Utah Constitutions because “[t]he officer lacked any
justification to search the vehicle pursuant to any public safety
or warrantless search exception.” The State responded by arguing

3 No. 20040115
that the search was constitutional under either one or both of
two theories: (1) the abandonment doctrine, and (2) the
emergency aid doctrine. Pursuant to State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah
1992), the district court rejected the State’s theory that
Rynhart abandoned her privacy expectation in the van, declaring
that “[t]he apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the
single vehicle nature of the accident all combine to belie the
officer’s imputing an intent to abandon the vehicle.” The
district court upheld the constitutionality of the search,
however, under the emergency aid doctrine.
¶6 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart filed a petition for
interlocutory appeal, which the court of appeals granted. The
court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that the
emergency aid doctrine did not apply. State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT
App 410, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 814. The court of appeals also held that
the search could not be upheld under the abandonment doctrine,
stating that
the State suggests that we should, without
the benefit of a cross-appeal, reverse the
[district] court’s ruling that Rynhart had
not abandoned her expectation of privacy in
her vehicle. Not only does the record offer
scant support for that proposition, it offers
no support whatsoever that Rynhart abandoned
her expectation of privacy in her purse and
the contents thereof, or her wallet and the
contents thereof.
Id. ¶ 9 n.3 (emphasis added).
¶7 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Thorne embraced the
State’s position, concluding that Rynhart had abandoned any
privacy interest she may have had in the van and the purse when
she “left the vehicle, and its contents, illegally parked and
unsecured for several hours following her accident.” Id. ¶ 32.
Additionally, Judge Thorne criticized the rule of law applied by
the majority, as articulated in State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App
256, ¶ 14, 76 P.3d 178, and Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736, which requires
the State to prove by “clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence”
that Rynhart intended to abandon her privacy interest in the
property. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ¶ 24 n.4. According to
Judge Thorne, this “abandonment standard” is flawed and should be
rejected. Id. ¶ 39.

No. 20040115 4
¶8 The State petitioned this court for a writ of
certiorari, presenting the question for review as follows: “Did
[Rynhart] retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in her
minivan and its contents when she left the vehicle wrecked and
unlocked on another’s property without reporting the single-car
accident to either the police or the property owner?” We granted
the State’s petition and have jurisdiction pursuant to section
78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a)
(2002).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 “On certiorari, we review the court of appeals’
decision for correctness, focusing on whether that court
correctly reviewed the [district] court’s decision under the
appropriate standard of review.” Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29,
¶ 8, 116 P.3d 290 (internal quotations omitted). An appellate
court reviews a district court’s decision concerning the
constitutionality of a search and seizure for correctness,
applying no deference to the district court’s legal conclusion.
See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶¶ 7-9, 112 P.3d 507.
¶10 In this case, the court of appeals suggested that the
issue of abandonment was not properly before it because the State
did not file a cross-appeal. But this court has recognized that
an appellate court may affirm the judgment
appealed from if it is sustainable on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the
record, even though such ground or theory
differs from that stated by the [district]
court to be the basis of its ruling or
action, and this is true even though such
ground or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the
lower court, and was not considered or passed
on by the lower court.
First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, ¶ 11,
52 P.3d 1137. Because the doctrine of abandonment was apparent
on the record and was, in fact, considered by the district court
and raised in the State’s brief to the court of appeals, it was
properly before the court of appeals and is properly before us.
ANALYSIS
¶11 The State identifies two alleged deficiencies in the
court of appeals’ analysis. First, the State asserts that the

5 No. 20040115
court of appeals erred when it required the State to prove
abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Second, the State
argues that the court of appeals erred when it applied an
abandonment test that focuses solely on a defendant’s subjective
intent. We address each issue in turn.
¶12 Before beginning our analysis, we pause to note that
“federal Fourth Amendment protections may differ from those
guaranteed our citizens by our state constitution.” Brigham City
v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10, ___ P.3d ___; see also State v.
DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 12, 996 P.2d 546 (“While this court’s
interpretation of article I, section 14 has often paralleled the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, we have stated that we will not hesitate to give the
Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will
more appropriately protect the rights of this state’s
citizens.”). But because neither party has adequately analyzed
the state constitutional claim as an issue separate and distinct
from its federal counterpart, we will not address it. See
Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 14 (“Because we are resolute in our refusal
to take up constitutional issues which have not been properly
preserved, framed and briefed, we are once again foreclosed from
undertaking a principled exploration of the interplay between
federal and state protections of individual rights without the
collaboration of the parties to an appeal.” (citations omitted));
Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, ¶ 75, 73 P.3d 334
(“Without analysis, the court can make no informed decision
regarding whether the state constitutional provision in question
was intended to mirror its federal counterpart, or whether it was
intended to expand the scope of First Amendment guarantees.”).
Accordingly, our analysis in this case turns only on federal
Fourth Amendment principles.
I. BURDEN OF PROOF
¶13 We first address the State’s contention that the court
of appeals erred in applying an incorrect burden of proof. In
its opinion, the court of appeals cited State v. Bissegger, 2003
UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, as its basis for holding that Rynhart
did not abandon her expectation of privacy. State v. Rynhart,
2003 UT App 410, ¶ 9 n.3, 81 P.3d 814. In Bissegger, the court
of appeals held that the State must prove abandonment by “clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence.” 2003 UT App 256, ¶ 14
(citation omitted). The State contends that the court of appeals
departed from traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
applying that burden of proof. We agree.

No. 20040115 6
¶14 When considering whether an individual has abandoned
property for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, it is “critical”
to recognize the “distinction between abandonment in the
property-law sense and abandonment in the constitutional sense.”
City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370 (Minn. 1975),
quoted in 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.6(b), at 671
(4th ed. 2004). “In the law of property, the question . . . is
whether the owner has voluntarily, intentionally, and
unconditionally relinquished his interest in the property so that
another, having acquired possession, may successfully assert his
superior interest.” Id. To prove abandonment in the property
law context, one typically must establish it by clear,
unequivocal, and decisive evidence. See Linscomb v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir. 1952) (“Proof of
abandonment must be made by the one asserting it by clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence.”).
¶15 Conversely,
[i]n the law of search and seizure, . . . the
question is whether the defendant has, in
discarding the property, relinquished his
reasonable expectation of privacy so that its
seizure and search is reasonable within the
limits of the Fourth Amendment. In essence,
what is abandoned is not necessarily the
defendant’s property, but his reasonable
expectation of privacy therein.
Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d at 371 (emphasis added) (citations and
footnote omitted). And whereas in the property law context one
must prove abandonment by clear, unequivocal, and decisive
evidence, the burden of proof in the Fourth Amendment context is
much lower.
¶16 When addressing the burden of proof to be applied in
search and seizure cases, the United States Supreme Court has
declared that “the controlling burden of proof at suppression
hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,
488 (1972) (“[W]e are unconvinced that merely emphasizing the
importance of the values served by exclusionary rules is itself
sufficient demonstration that the Constitution also requires
admissibility to be proved beyond reasonable doubt[] . . . .
[N]o substantial evidence has accumulated that federal rights
have suffered from determining admissibility by a preponderance
of the evidence.” (footnote omitted)).

7 No. 20040115
¶17 We acknowledge that jurisdictions have disagreed on the
appropriate burden of proof to apply in those cases in which the
prosecution raises abandonment in defending the lawfulness of a
search and seizure. Compare Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d
697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965) (“Proof of abandonment must be made by
the one asserting it by clear, unequivocal and decisive
evidence.” (citation omitted)), with United States v. Pitts, 322
F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 2003) (“To demonstrate abandonment, the
government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
. . . the defendant relinquished his property interests in the
item to be searched.”). We conclude, however, that the
distinction between the concept of abandonment in property law
and in the context of the Fourth Amendment supports application
of the burden of proof generally applicable to motions to
suppress. Accordingly, in those instances where the State
defends the legality of a search based on a theory of
abandonment, the State must establish that the defendant
abandoned her expectation of privacy in her property by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Lego, 404 U.S. at 488-89;
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177 n.14.
¶18 We find support for this conclusion in the fact that
the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in evaluating
the standing of an individual seeking to challenge the validity
of a search. See United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1377
(10th Cir. 1997) (“The burden was thus on [the defendant] to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] was personally
aggrieved by the alleged search and seizure because it invaded
[his] subjective expectation of privacy which society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.” (some alterations in original)
(internal quotations omitted)). The doctrine of abandonment, as
applied in search and seizure contexts, “is akin to the issue of
standing because a defendant lacks standing to complain of an
illegal search or seizure of property which has been abandoned.”
United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1997).
In other words, a defendant who has abandoned particular property
has lost any privacy interest in that property and lacks standing
to challenge searches or seizures of that property. The burden
of proof used to evaluate standing should also be applied in
those cases in which the doctrine of abandonment is asserted as a
justification for a warrantless search and seizure.
Consequently, to justify the warrantless search in this case, the
State need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that Rynhart abandoned her expectation of privacy in her van and
purse.
II. THE ABANDONMENT TEST

No. 20040115 8
¶19 Having identified the level of proof by which the State
must establish abandonment, we turn to the elements of the
abandonment test. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. “Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable”
and thus violate the Fourth Amendment “unless undertaken pursuant
to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). But “a warrantless search
or seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment” because an individual who has abandoned her
property voluntarily “forfeit[s] any expectation of privacy” in
that property. United States v. Trimble, 986 F.2d 394, 399 (10th
Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
¶20 In this case, the court of appeals relied on State v.
Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, to support its
conclusion that “Rynhart never ‘voluntarily relinquished a
reasonable expectation of privacy’ and, accordingly, . . . did
not abandon her expectation of privacy in her vehicle or in its
contents.” State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ¶ 9 n.3, 81 P.3d
814 (quoting Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ¶ 14). In Bissegger,
the court of appeals relied on State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992),
in describing the doctrine of abandonment. The Bissegger court
declared: “Determining whether abandonment occurred is
‘primarily a factual question of intent to voluntarily relinquish
a reasonable expectation of privacy.’ Thus, the abandonment
determination involves two inquiries: (1) whether the individual
relinquished a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item; and
(2) whether the relinquishment was voluntary.” 2003 UT App 256,
¶ 14 (quoting Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736). Additionally, in Rowe, the
court of appeals stated that abandonment “is measured from the
vantage point of the defendant, and not the police. It is only
the [defendant’s] state of mind that counts.” 806 P.2d at 736
(alteration in original) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
¶21 The State argues that the court of appeals’ formulation
of this test constitutes error. We agree. The “test of
abandonment subsumes both a subjective and objective component.”
United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, to determine whether the State has established
abandonment, a court must ask whether the property owner has
retained an expectation of privacy in the object that society
would recognize as objectively reasonable. See United States v.
Burbage, 365 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125

9 No. 20040115
S. Ct. 510 (2004); United States v. Austin, 66 F.3d 1115, 1118
(10th Cir. 1995). “‘An expectation of privacy is a question of
intent which may be inferred from words, acts, and other
objective facts.’” Austin, 66 F.3d at 1118 (quoting United
States v. Hernandez, 7 F.3d 944, 947 (10th Cir. 1993)). A
property owner need not intend to permanently relinquish
ownership or possession to forfeit a reasonable expectation of
privacy; she need only leave an item unsecured in a public place.
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); United
States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1994). When
determining whether a property owner has an expectation of
privacy, the property owner’s subjective intent is only one of
the factors to be considered. Ultimately, the test is whether
the external manifestations of the property owner’s intent would
lead a reasonable person to believe that the property owner had
voluntarily abandoned any legitimate privacy interest in the
object or place to be searched.
¶22 Were this a case with disputed facts, we would remand
with instructions that the trier of fact consider the State’s
abandonment defense in light of the legal principles enumerated
herein. Because the facts in this case are not in dispute,
however, we will simply proceed with the analysis.
¶23 Applying the test articulated above, we conclude that
Rynhart had no expectation of privacy in either her van or her
purse. We base this conclusion on the facts available to the
searching officer. In this case, the searching officer was not
confronted with any facts suggesting that Rynhart intended to
retain her privacy interest in her purse or van. Rynhart did not
secure her vehicle, inform either the property owner or the
police of the accident, or take her purse with her when she left
the scene. Instead, she left her purse in the unlocked van for
more than five hours, acknowledging her interest in the property
only after the search had been completed and the van had been
towed to a wrecking yard. Even if Rynhart had intended to retain
an expectation of privacy in her van and purse, we would
nevertheless conclude that she abandoned her property for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment because any such expectation is
not one that society would recognize as objectively reasonable
under the facts presented here. By leaving her van and purse at
the scene of an accident without any indication that she intended
to return, Rynhart rendered any subjective expectation of privacy
objectively unreasonable. We conclude that Rynhart abandoned her
van and purse and, consequently, forfeited any privacy
expectation in those objects. Accordingly, the officer’s search
of her van and purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

No. 20040115 10
CONCLUSION
¶24 We hold that the court of appeals erred in requiring
the State to prove abandonment by clear, unequivocal, and
decisive evidence. The burden of proof applicable in Fourth
Amendment cases in which the State asserts abandonment is the
burden of proof applied to motions to suppress generally--
preponderance of the evidence. The court of appeals further
erred in focusing solely on Rynhart’s subjective intent. The
appropriate test for determining whether a property owner has
relinquished her expectation of privacy subsumes both an
objective and a subjective component. Because we conclude that
Rynhart did not intend to retain any expectation of privacy in
her purse and van and that, even if she had, any such intent was
not objectively reasonable, we hold that the court of appeals
erred in suppressing the evidence obtained through the search of
Rynhart’s van.
¶25 We therefore reverse and remand to the court of appeals
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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¶26 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish’s
opinion.