State v. Ireland

1 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5)(c) (Supp. 2005).
2 Id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999) (current version at
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005)).
2006 UT 17
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
State of Utah, 	No. 20050279
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
F I L E D
Jeffrey Don Ireland,
Defendant and Respondent. 	March 10, 2006
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Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Sheila K. McCleve
No. 021902023
Attorneys: 	Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst.
Att’y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Debra M. Nelson, Lisa J. Remal, Salt Lake City, for
defendant
---
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 	For a Utah court to have jurisdiction over a defendant,
the charged offense must have been committed, at least partly,
within the state. 1 	In this case, Jeffrey Don Ireland was charged
with unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance 2 based
exclusively on the fact that he tested positive for the existence
of methamphetamines in his bloodstream. 	We are asked to
determine whether the existence of methamphetamines in Ireland’s

3 Id. § 58-37-2(1)(dd) (1998) (current version at Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ff) (Supp. 2005)).
4 Id. §§ 58-37-1 to -21.
No. 20050279 	2
bloodstream conclusively showed that Ireland possessed or used a
controlled substance within the state.
¶2 	Utah Code section 58-37-2(1)(dd), 3 which defines terms
used in the Utah Controlled Substance Act, 4 includes
“consumption” of a controlled substance within its definition of
“use.” 	The answer to whether the district court had jurisdiction
over Ireland turns on the definition of “consumption.” 	If we
conclude that “consumption” includes the metabolization of a
controlled substance, the existence of methamphetamines in the
bloodstream is itself a violation of the Utah Controlled
Substance Act, and the district court clearly had jurisdiction
over Ireland because that violation occurred within Utah. 	If the
definition of “consumption” is limited to the introduction of a
controlled substance into the body, the existence of
methamphetamines in the bloodstream is not conclusive evidence
that an offense was committed within Utah, and the State must
present additional evidence to establish that the district court
has jurisdiction over the defendant.
¶3 	We conclude that the Legislature did not intend the
term “consumption” to include metabolization of a controlled
substance because it did not explicitly criminalize such
behavior, as it has in related statutes. 	As we conclude that the
Legislature did not intend “consumption” to include the
metabolization of controlled substances, we need not address
Ireland’s argument that criminalizing the metabolization of
controlled substances violates the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
BACKGROUND
¶4 	This case arises from an automobile collision in which
Ireland’s vehicle struck another vehicle, killing its driver.
When police officer Scott Buchanan went to the hospital to
question Ireland about the accident, he noticed that Ireland’s
pupils were constricted, his eyelids were droopy, his movements
were slow and clumsy, he had muscle tremors in his legs, he
swayed from side to side, he complained that his mouth was dry,
and his speech was slow, slurred, and raspy. 	Believing that
these symptoms evidenced narcotic use, Officer Buchanan obtained
a search warrant to test Ireland’s blood. 	A test of the blood
sample, which was taken more than five hours after the accident,

5 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999) (current
version at Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005)).
6 Id. § 41-6-44.6 (Supp. 2001) (current version at Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6a-517 (2005)).
7 State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, ¶ 19, 106 P.3d 753.
8 Id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 	No. 20050279
revealed a methamphetamine level of 0.1 micrograms per milliliter
and a marijuana metabolite level of 6 nanograms per milliliter.
¶5 	Ireland was subsequently charged under Utah Code
section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 5 with unlawful possession or use of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and under section 41-6-
44.6 6 with driving with measurable marijuana in the body, a class
B misdemeanor. 	The State moved for a pretrial ruling on
jurisdiction, arguing that the presence of methamphetamines in
Ireland’s bloodstream conclusively established that Ireland had
possessed or used methamphetamines within the state. 	In so
arguing, the State contended that “consumption” was an ongoing
process of metabolization. 	The district court agreed, construing
“consumption” as the ongoing process in which the body
physiologically metabolizes the substance. 	The court concluded
that Ireland had used a controlled substance within Utah and that
it therefore had jurisdiction. 	Ireland then entered a
conditional plea of guilty to both charges, reserving the right
to appeal the district court’s decision regarding jurisdiction.
¶6 	On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district
court’s jurisdictional conclusion, holding that “consumption” did
not include metabolization but instead was a catchall term
encompassing any form of ingestion. 7 	The court of appeals
reasoned that the list of nouns utilized by the statute—-
“application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or
consumption”—-indicates that “consumption” is a “present tense
nominal describing the introduction of a substance into the body,
and not an ongoing metabolic process.” 8 	In reaching this result,
the court of appeals looked at dictionary definitions of
“consumption,” other sections of the Utah Code that used the term
“metabolite” in connection with controlled substances, statutes
from other states defining consumption narrowly, and cases from
Utah and other states that have defined possession in a way that
does not include the existence of controlled substances in the

9 Id. ¶¶ 10, 12-14.
10 Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
668 (1962)) (second alteration in original).
11 State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699.
12 Id.
13 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5)(c), (8) (Supp. 2005).
14 Id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999) (current version at
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005)).
No. 20050279 	4
bloodstream. 9 	The court of appeals further reasoned that a broad
definition of “consumption” would render the possession or use
subsection unconstitutional because it “would subject ‘status
criminals’ . . . to continuous guilt for possession or use of a
controlled substance, ‘whether or not [they had] ever used or
possessed any narcotics within the State.’” 10
¶7 	We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals’
decision. 	On certiorari, we “review the decision of the court of
appeals and not that of the district court.” 11 	We review the
decision for correctness, granting no deference to the court of
appeals. 12 	We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section
78-2-2(5) (2002).
ANALYSIS
¶8 	In this case, we are asked to determine whether the
district court had jurisdiction over Ireland’s possession or use
charge based exclusively on the fact that methamphetamines were
found in his bloodstream. 	We conclude that the existence of
methamphetamines in the bloodstream alone is insufficient to show
that a defendant violated the possession or use subsection within
the state.
¶9 	In Utah, a judge may determine that the court has
jurisdiction over a defendant if the State shows, by a
preponderance of the evidence, “that the offense was committed
either wholly or partly within the borders of the state.” 13
Subsection (2)(a)(i) (the “possession or use subsection”) of
Utah Code section 58-37-8, which defines violations of the Utah
Controlled Substance Act, makes it an offense for any person to
“knowingly and intentionally . . . possess or use a controlled
substance, unless it was . . . otherwise authorized.” 14
“Possession” or “ use” is defined within the Utah Controlled

15 Id. § 58-37-2(1)(dd) (1998) (current version at Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ff) (Supp. 2005)) (emphasis added).
16 Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 2005 UT 87, ¶ 16, 125 P.3d 945
(internal quotation marks omitted).
17 Id.
18 See supra ¶ 2.
5 	No. 20050279
Substance Act as the “ownership, control, occupancy, holding,
retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application,
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption . . . of
controlled substances.” 15
¶10 	The State argues that the district court had
jurisdiction with respect to Ireland’s possession or use charge
because the existence of a controlled substance in Ireland’s
bloodstream was itself “consumption” of a controlled substance
that occurred within the state. 	Ireland argues that the district
court did not have jurisdiction over his unlawful possession or
use charge because the State failed to offer proof that he
“possess[ed]” or “use[d]” a controlled substance in the State of
Utah. 	In so arguing, Ireland contends that “consumption” does
not include the ongoing process by which the body physiologically
metabolizes the substance, but instead is limited to the act of
introducing a controlled substance into the body.
¶11 	In determining the scope of “consumption,” our “primary
objective” is “to give effect to the legislature’s intent,” which
is “manifested by the language it employed” in the statute. 16
Only if we find the statutory language to be ambiguous may we
turn to secondary principles of statutory construction or look to
the statute’s legislative history. 17
¶12 	As noted above, the statute in question here is section
58-37-2(1)(dd), which includes the “consumption” of controlled
substances within its definition of practices that are unlawful
under the possession or use subsection. 18 	The definition of
“consumption,” however, is not clear from the plain language of
that statute. 	“Consumption” is not defined by the possession or
use subsection nor any section of the Utah Code. 	The dictionary
defines “consumption” as “the act or process of consuming,” which
includes “to do away with completely,” “to spend wastefully,” to
“use up,” “to eat or drink,” “to engage fully” or to “waste or

19 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 249 (10th ed.
1998).
20 See Eaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2005 UT 78, ¶ 9, 125
P.3d 901 (applying canons of statutory construction to determine
legislative intent).
21 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 47:17, at 273-74 (6th ed. 2001).
22 Id. § 47:21, at 295.
No. 20050279 	6
burn away.” 19 	Under this definition, the interpretations
asserted by both the State and Ireland are reasonable. 	On one
hand, the “to eat or drink” definition supports Ireland’s
interpretation that “consumption” is a method of ingestion. 	On
the other hand, the “to waste or burn away” definition supports
the State’s construction that “consumption” includes the
metabolic process.
¶13 	As we conclude that the term “consumption” is
ambiguous, we look to the canons of statutory construction to
determine what meaning the Legislature intended. 20 	Ireland
contends that “consumption” is a catchall term encompassing novel
methods of ingestion. 	In support of this interpretation, Ireland
implicitly relies on the ejusdem generis canon of statutory
construction, which provides that when a statute contains a list
of specific words that relate to a certain type of item and those
words are followed by a general word, the general word should be
“construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” 21 	In
particular, Ireland argues that because each of the terms
preceding “consumption” in the definition of “use”—-application,
inhalation, swallowing, and injection—-describes a method of
introducing a substance into the body, the term “consumption”
must also be a method of introducing substances into the body and
should be construed as a catchall term encompassing any other
method of introducing substances into the body.
¶14 	The State relies, however, on another canon of
statutory construction that requires every word of a statute to
be given effect so that no part of the statute will be
inoperative or superfluous. 	Under this canon, when “the specific
words embrace all the . . . objects of the class designated by
the enumeration, the general words take a meaning beyond the
class.” 22 	The State argues that the enumerated terms preceding
“consumption” exhaust the possible methods of ingestion and that

23 State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ¶ 52, 63 P.3d 621.
24 Singer, supra note 21, § 46:07, at 201 (“The literal
interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it
creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the
legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to allow a
construction which will effectuate the legislative intention.”).
25 See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 90,
¶¶ 7-10, 15 P.3d 1030 (interpreting a statute in accordance with
legislative intent by examining the plain language of the statute
as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject).
26 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-517(2), -520(1)(a)(iii),
-525(2)(c) (2005) (dealing with driving while under the influence
of drugs or alcohol); id. §§ 53-3-220(1)(a)(xiii), -223(1)(a)
(Supp. 2005) (driver licensing); id. §§ 34-41-101(2), -102(2),
34A-2-302(4)(a)(i) (maintaining drug-free workplaces).
27 Utah Code Ann. § 41-60-517 (2005).
7 	No. 20050279
“consumption” must, therefore, mean something additional,
otherwise the term would be superfluous.
¶15 	The State’s reliance on this canon of construction is
misplaced for two reasons. 	First, to apply this canon, we must
find that the terms preceding “consumption” exhaust the possible
methods of introducing a substance into the body. 	Admittedly, it
is difficult to think of methods of ingestion that are not
enumerated in the statutory definition of “use.” 	But at least
one example exists: 	insertion, such as through a suppository.
¶16 	Second, and more fundamentally, the primary goal of
statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. 23 	No
canon of construction can be used to construe a statute in a way
that is inconsistent with legislative intent. 24 	By looking, as
we must, 25 at statutes relating to the same subject as the
possession or use subsection, it is apparent that the Legislature
did not intend “consumption” to include metabolization.
¶17 	Most significantly, the Legislature has explicitly
referred to the existence of controlled substances in the
bloodstream in at least eight other statutes. 26 	Each of these
statutes contains language that refers to the existence of the
drug or metabolites of the drug in the person’s body. 	For
example, under Utah Code section 41-6a-517 27 , it is unlawful for
a person to operate a motor vehicle “if the person has any
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled

28 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2005).
29 Automobile Homicide Amendments, ch. 10, § 1, 2003 Utah
Laws 203, 204; Amendments to Controlled Substance Act, ch. 33,
§ 6, 2003 Utah Laws 302, 315-17; Unlawful Controlled Substances
In Correctional Facilities, ch. 36, § 1, 2004 Utah Laws 182, 182-
84; Drug Offense Penalty Enhancements, ch. 30 § 1, 2005 Utah Laws
390, 390-92.
30 State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, ¶ 23, 79 P.3d 937 (noting
that when a term is not defined by statute and its meaning is
unclear, a court may “look to other jurisdictions with similar
language for guidance”).
31 See Mich. Comp. Laws. § 768.37(3)(b) (2005) (defining
“consumed” as “to have eaten, drunk, ingested, inhaled, injected,
or topically applied, or to have performed any combination of
those actions, or otherwise introduced into the body”); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 475.984(3)(c) (2003) (defining “ingest” as “to consume or
(continued...)
No. 20050279 	8
substance in the person’s body.” 	We assume that, had the
Legislature wanted to include the metabolization of controlled
substances as a violation of the possession or use subsection, it
would have done so explicitly.
¶18 	This assumption is bolstered by the fact that the
Legislature has subsequently amended the very statute now at
issue, Utah Code section 58-37-8, to do precisely that. 	The
statute now explicitly provides that a defendant violates the
possession or use subsection “by knowingly and intentionally
having in his body any measurable amount of a controlled
substance.” 28 	We note that neither party has argued that
subsequent amendments to Utah Code section 58-37-8 29 apply
retroactively to Ireland’s possession or use charge. Our analysis
of the possession or use subsection is accordingly based on the
version of the statute under which Ireland was charged, Utah Code
section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and obviously would likely
be different if we were to interpret the current version of the
statute.
¶19 	Furthermore, defining “consumption” as a method of
introducing controlled substances into the body is consistent
with the definitions of “consumption” applied by other
jurisdictions. 30 	At least five states, via statute or case law,
have limited the definition of “consumption,” or some derivative
thereof, to methods of introducing a controlled substance into
the body. 31 	The State has not presented us with any caselaw or

31 (...continued)
otherwise deliver a controlled substance into the body of a
person”); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(21) (Vernon
2005) (defining “human consumption” as “the injection,
inhalation, ingestion, or application of a substance to or into
the body”); State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (“‘[C]onsume,’ in the context of alcoholic beverages,
means to drink, and . . . once drunk, alcohol is no longer being
consumed.”); State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71, 76 (Wash. 1986)
(“[T]he terms ‘consume’ and ‘possession’ . . . do not include the
stage at which the liquor has already been swallowed but is still
being assimilated by the body.”) superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in State v. Silva, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 297,
*7 n.9; see also State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208, 211 (Kan.
1983) (limiting the definition of “possession or control” as to
not include “[e]vidence of a controlled substance after it is
assimilated in a person’s blood”); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d
466, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (noting in dicta that the trial
court had held “the mere presence of alcohol on the breath or in
the bloodstream does not constitute possession” under a statute
that prohibits any person under the age of 21 from purchasing,
possessing, or consuming alcohol and stating that such a position
is “consistent with well-reasoned decisions from other
jurisdictions which have addressed the issue”).
32 Singer, supra note 21, § 47:17, at 281-82.
33 Id.
9 	No. 20050279
statutes that support including metabolization within the
definition of “consumption.”
¶20 	For these reasons, we conclude that the Legislature
intended “consumption” to be a catchall term encompassing all
methods of introducing controlled substances into the body.
Indeed, it is a “common drafting technique” for a legislature to
list a number of specific terms followed by a general term, which
is intended to encompass items or actions of the same nature as
the enumerated terms. 32 	This technique relieves “the legislature
from spelling out in advance every contingency in which the
statute could apply.” 33
¶21 	Although we conclude that the existence of a controlled
substance in the bloodstream is not itself a violation of the
possession or use subsection, the State may nevertheless present
evidence of a controlled substance in the bloodstream, along with

34 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1) (Supp. 2005) (“A person
is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he
commits . . . if . . . the offense is committed either wholly or
partly within the state . . . .”); id. § 76-1-501(3) (“[T]he
existence of jurisdiction . . . shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.”).
No. 20050279 	10
other evidence, to establish that the district court has
jurisdiction over such a charge. 34
CONCLUSION
¶22 	We conclude that “consumption,” as used in the
possession or use subsection, is a catchall phrase for methods of
introducing a substance into the body. 	It does not include mere
metabolization of the controlled substance. 	Accordingly, we hold
that the existence of any measurable amount or metabolites of
methamphetamines alone is insufficient to show that Ireland
possessed or used a controlled substance within the State of
Utah. 	We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ judgment and
remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
---
¶23 	Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant’s
opinion.