Lebaron v. Doctors and Merchants Credit

2024 UT App 42

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

HEATHER LEBARON,
Appellant,
v.
DOCTORS AND MERCHANTS CREDIT, INC.,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20210518-CA
Filed March 28, 2024

Fifth District Court, Cedar City Department
The Honorable Matthew L. Bell
No. 200500113

Daniel M. Baczynski, Attorney for Appellant
Gregory M. Constantino, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH concurred. 1
JUSTICE JILL M. POHLMAN concurred in part
and dissented in part, with opinion. 2

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Heather LeBaron challenges the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Doctors and Merchants Credit, Inc.
(Doctors), resulting in dismissal of her complaint with

1. Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as
authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(7).

2. Justice Jill M. Pohlman began her work on this case as a member
of the Utah Court of Appeals. She became a member of the Utah
Supreme Court thereafter and completed her work on this case
sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See generally
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 3-108(4).
LeBaron v. Doctors

prejudice. LeBaron’s complaint alleged that Doctors brought a
prior collection action while it was unregistered under the Utah
Collection Agency Act (UCAA), see generally Utah Code Ann.
§§ 12-1-1 to -11 (LexisNexis 2022), and that its doing so
constituted “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” in
violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, and the Utah Consumer
Sales Practices Act (UCSPA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-4 to -23
(LexisNexis 2022). 3 The complaint also included multiple state
law claims and a request for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief.

¶2 Because our recent decisions in Fell v. Alco Capital Group
LLC, 2023 UT App 127, 538 P.3d 1249, cert. denied, No. 20231126,
2024 WL 966976 (Utah Feb. 23, 2024), and Meneses v. Salander
Enterprises LLC, 2023 UT App 117, 537 P.3d 643, cert. denied, No.
20231068, 2024 WL 966975 (Utah Jan. 2, 2024), conclusively resolve
LeBaron’s UCSPA and other state law claims, we affirm the
district court’s decision pertaining to those claims. But FDCPA
claims were not presented in Fell or Meneses and so require our
consideration in the posture of this appeal. Ultimately, we affirm
the court’s decision on this issue as well.

3. “With the exception of its final section—which authorizes
creditors to recover collection fees in addition to other amounts
owed by a debtor—the UCAA was recently repealed.” Meneses v.
Salander Enters. LLC, 2023 UT App 117, ¶ 3 n.1, 537 P.3d 643, cert.
denied, No. 20231068, 2024 WL 966975 (Utah Jan. 2, 2024). For
convenience, we cite the UCAA provisions in effect immediately
prior to this repeal.

20210518-CA 2 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

BACKGROUND 4

Doctors’ Collection Case

¶3 LeBaron executed a contract to pay for medical services she
received. The debt went unpaid, and the right to payment was
assigned to Doctors in 2019. In pursuit of collection, Doctors
retained legal counsel, who informed LeBaron via letter that he
had been retained to collect the balance owed. The letter
further indicated that the “law firm collects debt” and that the
letter “is from a debt collector,” who could sue to collect the
outstanding balance if it remained unpaid. Doctors later
acknowledged that during this time and due to its own
inadvertence, its UCAA registration had lapsed and it was not
then registered with the State of Utah as a debt collection agency
under the UCAA. 5

4. “In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, we
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and recite the
facts accordingly.” Ockey v. Club Jam, 2014 UT App 126, ¶ 2 n.2,
328 P.3d 880 (quotation simplified).

5. Section 1 of the UCAA provided,
No person shall conduct a collection agency,
collection bureau, or collection office in this state, or
engage in this state in the business of soliciting the
right to collect or receive payment for another of any
account, bill, or other indebtedness, or advertise for
or solicit in print the right to collect or receive
payment for another of any account, bill, or other
indebtedness, unless at the time of conducting the
collection agency, collection bureau, collection
(continued…)

20210518-CA 3 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

¶4 Some four months later, in 2020, Doctors served LeBaron
with its collection complaint, which it concurrently filed with the
district court. 6 In due course, Doctors moved for the entry of a
default judgment, which LeBaron did not resist. Thus,
considering the complaint and LeBaron’s choice not to contest it,
the district court granted Doctors’ motion and entered a default
judgment against LeBaron on April 6, 2020.

LeBaron’s Complaint

¶5 A mere three months after entry of the default judgment,
and having made no effort to set the default judgment aside,
LeBaron filed a complaint against Doctors commencing the
current action. The complaint asserted that Doctors pursued its
prior collection action “without the legal right or collection
agency license to do so” and sought civil remedies based on the

office, or collection business, or of advertising or
soliciting, that person or the person for whom he
may be acting as agent, is registered with the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code and
has on file a good and sufficient bond . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 12-1-1 (LexisNexis 2022). Sections 2 and 3 of the
UCAA provided that “[t]he bond shall be for the sum of $10,000,
payable to the state of Utah” and “shall be for the term of one year
from the date thereof, unless the Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code and the person giving the same shall agree on
a longer period.” Id. §§ 12-1-2(1), -3.

6. When Doctors filed its complaint, it was still not registered as a
collection agency.

20210518-CA 4 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

FDCPA, the UCSPA, and other state law theories. 7 Doctors moved
for summary judgment, and the district court held a hearing on
the motion.

¶6 Both at the hearing and in its motion for summary
judgment, Doctors argued, first, that LeBaron’s contention that
Doctors had not complied with the UCAA did not establish a
private right of action under the UCSPA or support her other state
law claims; second, that LeBaron’s FDCPA claim was barred
because Doctors’ UCAA violation was innocuous under FDCPA
jurisprudence; and finally, that all of LeBaron’s claims should be
dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata—specifically the
theory of claim preclusion—because LeBaron “could and should
have” raised all of her claims as defenses in Doctors’ recently
concluded collection case but she chose not to do so.

¶7 The court ruled from the bench, later memorializing its
ruling in a written decision and an accompanying order. The court
first addressed the UCSPA claim and determined that there were
insufficient facts to show that Doctors knowingly or intentionally
misled LeBaron regarding its registration status as a collection
agency. In its written ruling, the court concluded that a violation
of the UCAA, “with nothing more,” did not provide a private
right of action under the UCSPA or give rise to LeBaron’s other
state law claims. Thus, the court dismissed the UCSPA claim and
the other state law claims with prejudice.

¶8 Next, the court addressed LeBaron’s FDCPA claim, noting
that it struggled to see any “actual injury.” The court stated that

7. Because the facts central to LeBaron’s state law claims,
including her claim under the UCSPA, are on essentially the same
footing as the claims dealt with in our recent opinions in Meneses
and Fell, we forgo a detailed discussion of these claims.

20210518-CA 5 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

Doctors’ registration status was “the relevant fact that’s central to
[LeBaron’s] claim” and that LeBaron’s FDCPA claim arose when
Doctors filed suit in its prior collection case. Following these
comments, the court indicated that it was persuaded by Federal
District Judge Ted Stewart’s analysis of this issue in McMurray v.
Forsythe Financial, LLC, No. 1:20-CV-8 TS, 2021 WL 83265 (D. Utah
Jan. 11, 2021), aff‘d, No. 21-4014, 2023 WL 5938580 (10th Cir. Sept.
12, 2023), and noted that while the duration of Doctors’
unregistered status may have been an issue of factual dispute,
“whether it was six weeks or a year, if they weren’t registered,
that fact existed. And that’s really the central fact.” The court
further noted that LeBaron’s FDCPA claim arose “[a]s soon as”
Doctors filed its complaint in its collection case and, thus,
LeBaron’s claims in this case should have been raised as claims or
defenses in the collection case.

¶9 From the bench, the court concluded that “claim preclusion
carries the day here” and dismissed the FDCPA claim along with
LeBaron’s other claims. The court’s written decision held that
because Doctors’ unregistered status “existed well before” it filed
the collection action, “this is not a situation where a claim
develops after the initial complaint is filed.” Instead, “it was the
filing of the complaint in” the collection case “that makes up
[LeBaron’s] claims here,” and they therefore “could have and
should have been brought in the earlier action.” The court
further held that claim preclusion applied because “successful
prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial
judgment or would impair rights established in the initial
action.” Based on these conclusions, the court dismissed
LeBaron’s FDCPA claim, along with the rest of her claims, with
prejudice.

20210518-CA 6 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 LeBaron appeals the district court’s summary judgment
entered against her. “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Johnson v. Schnabel, 2023 UT App 102, ¶ 13, 536
P.3d 1147 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. The UCSPA Claim

¶11 As noted, we have recently dealt with this same issue, on
the same procedural footing and presented by the same attorneys.
See Fell v. Alco Cap. Group LLC, 2023 UT App 127, 538 P.3d 1249,
cert. denied, No. 20231126, 2024 WL 966976 (Utah Feb. 23, 2024);
Meneses v. Salander Enters. LLC, 2023 UT App 117, 537 P.3d 643,
cert. denied, No. 20231068, 2024 WL 966975 (Utah Jan. 2, 2024). Two
different panels of this court reached the same conclusion, namely
that a UCAA registration violation, without more, is not
actionable under the UCSPA and does not give rise to other state
law claims. We adopt our prior analysis outlined in those cases
and affirm the district court’s ruling in the case at hand with
respect to the UCSPA claim and the other state law claims.

II. The FDCPA Claim

¶12 Unlike the appellants in Fell and Meneses, LeBaron also
included in her complaint an FDCPA claim, contending that “[b]y
filing debt collection lawsuits without a license, Doctors took

20210518-CA 7 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

action it could not legally take in violation of the FDCPA.” 8
Regarding that claim, LeBaron does not argue for some different
resolution when considering her claim through the lens of the
FDCPA, as opposed to the UCSPA. On the contrary, she argues
that “[w]here the UCSPA prohibits the exact same conduct as the
FDCPA, and it is intended to marry federal and state consumer
rights,” “a deceptive and unconscionable act for purposes of the
FDCPA should similarly create a cause of action under the
UCSPA.” She contends that “both statutes prohibit the same
practices within the debt collection context.” 9 Thus, LeBaron’s
position in this appeal—and it is the position she asserted
below 10—means that, for purposes of this case at least, our

8. Although not a basis for the district court’s decision, Doctors
contends that LeBaron lacks standing to pursue her FDCPA claim.
Doctors suggests this as an alternative basis on which we can
affirm the district court’s judgment. Doctors later characterizes
the argument as “the District Court did not have standing to
consider LeBaron’s complaint.” We are not persuaded by this
argument, and we decline to affirm on this basis.

9. Counsel for LeBaron took the same position in another recent
case where he included an FDCPA claim. See Pace v. Link Debt
Recovery LLC, 2024 UT App 4, ¶ 32, 542 P.3d 979 (noting that the
appellant asserted that “both statutes prohibit the same practices
within the debt collection context, at least regarding deceptive
and unconscionable acts”) (quotation simplified), petition for cert.
filed, Mar. 12, 2024 (20240251).

10. In her memorandum opposing Doctors’ motion for summary
judgment, LeBaron rejected the notion that the FDCPA and the
UCSPA reached different conduct. She said, “No such distinction
exists which would allow the FDCPA to premise liability on
unlicensed collection actions but not the UCSPA.”

20210518-CA 8 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

decisions in Fell and Meneses necessarily foreclose her FDCPA
claim as well as her state claims. She has not preserved for appeal
any argument that her FDCPA claim has viability distinct from
her UCSPA claim. And on this basis, we affirm the dismissal of
her FDCPA claim.

CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Doctors and against LeBaron.

POHLMAN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part):

¶14 I agree with the majority’s analysis in Part I regarding
LeBaron’s state law claims, and I concur in the affirmance of their
dismissal. But I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis
in Part II regarding LeBaron’s claim under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). That claim was not dismissed
by the district court on its merits; rather, it was dismissed on claim
preclusion grounds. In affirming the dismissal of the claim on an
alternative ground, I believe my colleagues have imposed a
burden on LeBaron that she was not required to carry and have
misconstrued her assertion regarding the relationship between
her FDCPA claim and her claim under the Utah Consumer Sales
Practices Act (UCSPA). I also believe that the district court erred
in concluding that LeBaron’s FDCPA claim is precluded, and thus
I would reverse the court’s summary judgment decision
dismissing that claim.

20210518-CA 9 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

I. The Merits of LeBaron’s FDCPA Claim

¶15 Doctors moved for summary judgment on the entirety of
LeBaron’s complaint, arguing that her claims were procedurally
barred and failed on their merits. The district court had no trouble
concluding that LeBaron’s state law claims lacked merit, but it
viewed Doctors’ substantive challenge to the FDCPA claim as a
“closer call.” The court ultimately declined to address the merits
of that claim and instead dismissed it on the basis that it was
procedurally barred by the claim preclusion doctrine.

¶16 On appeal, LeBaron challenges the district court’s
dismissal of her FDCPA claim on that procedural ground. In
response, Doctors defends the court’s ruling, while offering
alternative grounds for affirmance. Specifically, Doctors argues
that even if the court erred in applying the claim preclusion
doctrine, LeBaron’s claim is barred by issue preclusion. Doctors
also invites us to dismiss the FDCPA claim on the alternative basis
that LeBaron lacks standing. See supra note 8. Notably, Doctors
does not invite us to affirm the dismissal of the FDCPA claim on
the claim’s merits.

¶17 Although the viability of the merits of LeBaron’s FDCPA
claim was neither reached by the district court nor raised by
Doctors as an alternative ground for affirmance, the majority
affirms the dismissal of the claim on the alternative ground that
LeBaron “does not argue for some different resolution when
considering her claim through the lens of the FDCPA, as opposed
to the UCSPA.” See supra ¶ 12. I cannot endorse this resolution for
two reasons.

¶18 First, I believe the majority faults LeBaron for not making
an argument that she had no obligation to make on appeal. As the
appellant, LeBaron appropriately challenged the district court’s
singular basis for dismissing her FDCPA claim. See Bad Ass Coffee

20210518-CA 10 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

Co. of Hawaii v. Royal Aloha Int’l LLC, 2020 UT App 122, ¶ 48, 473
P.3d 624 (describing an appellant’s burden to demonstrate error
in the district court’s reasoning). Specifically, she challenged the
court’s conclusion that her claim was procedurally barred. But it
was not her burden to affirmatively demonstrate the substantive
viability of her FDCPA claim or to show that it is distinct from her
UCSPA claim. This is particularly true where Doctors did not
invite us to resolve LeBaron’s challenge to the district court’s
ruling on this alternative basis, leaving her with no opportunity
to address the majority’s rationale.

¶19 In reaching this conclusion, I recognize that a reviewing
court has the prerogative to affirm a judgment “on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such
ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee.”
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (quotation
simplified). And if it were apparent on this record that LeBaron’s
claim failed as a matter of law, perhaps I would feel differently
about the majority’s resolution. But where its resolution is not a
substantive one and is based on a purported deficiency in
LeBaron’s briefing, I cannot assent.

¶20 Second, I disagree with the majority’s resolution because I
don’t share its interpretation of LeBaron’s assertions regarding
the relationship between her FDCPA claim and UCSPA claim.

¶21 In concluding that LeBaron’s FDCPA claim fails because
her UCSPA claim fails, the majority relies on an assertion LeBaron
made in defense of her UCSPA claim. See supra ¶ 12. The majority
quotes LeBaron’s opening brief, where she states that because
“the UCSPA prohibits the exact same conduct as the FDCPA, and
it is intended to marry federal and state consumer rights, a

20210518-CA 11 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

deceptive and unconscionable act for purposes of the FDCPA
should similarly create a cause of action under the UCSPA.” See
supra ¶ 12.

¶22 Unlike the majority, I do not read this statement as a
concession that if the court determines LeBaron’s UCSPA claim
fails on its merits, then her FDCPA claim necessarily fails. Rather,
I read it as expressing the inverse: that if certain conduct is
deemed to violate the FDCPA, then that same conduct should be
deemed to violate the UCSPA. After all, in defending the merits
of her UCSPA claim, LeBaron takes the position that because both
the FDCPA and the UCSPA prohibit deceptive and
unconscionable conduct, we should conclude that acts deemed
deceptive and unconscionable by federal courts under the FDCPA
are likewise actionable under the UCSPA. But LeBaron did not
argue that if we were to reject her invitation to extend the
reasoning of the federal courts to the UCSPA, we should conclude
that her FDCPA claim fails.

¶23 Further, I’m disinclined to adopt the majority’s
interpretation of LeBaron’s statement because I suspect if she had
an opportunity to address that interpretation, she would explain
that her assertion regarding similarities between the FDCPA and
the UCSPA was made in the context of describing their shared
prohibition of deceptive and unconscionable conduct and did not
apply to the FDCPA in its entirety.

¶24 Indeed, in Fell v. Alco Capital Group LLC, this very panel
recognized that “the FDCPA and the UCSPA get at slightly
different conduct.” 2023 UT App 127, ¶ 23, 538 P.3d 1249
(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 2024 WL 966976 (Utah 2024).
Although both statutes generally prohibit deceptive and
unconscionable acts, compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, with Utah Code
Ann. § 13-11-2(2) (LexisNexis 2022), “[a] key difference between

20210518-CA 12 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

the FDCPA and the UCSPA is that the FDCPA proscribes ‘[t]he
threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not
intended to be taken,’” Fell, 2023 UT App 127, ¶ 23 n.10 (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5)); see also id. (“[A] violation of the UCAA may
be sufficient to support a claim under the FDCPA, but a violation
of the UCAA is not per se sufficient to support a claim under the
UCSPA.”). As part of her FDCPA claim, LeBaron expressly
invokes subsection 1692e(5), for which there is no corresponding
prohibition in the UCSPA, and I don’t take her assertion of
similarity to waive this part of her claim. 11

¶25 Finally, even if LeBaron’s statement could be read as
conceding that the entirety of her FDCPA claim rises and falls
with the fate of her UCSPA claim, I am reluctant to resolve any
ambiguity against her given that the district court—to whom the
statements were made—apparently did not view it that way. As
the majority notes, LeBaron made a similar statement in her
summary judgment briefing. See supra note 10. Despite that, the
district court elected to resolve the FDCPA claim on procedural
grounds, stating that it thought the merits of the FDCPA claim
presented a “closer call” than the state law claims. Had the court
viewed LeBaron as equating her state and federal claims for all

11. The majority also refers to a similar statement LeBaron’s
counsel apparently made in a different case while representing
different plaintiffs. See supra note 9 (quoting Pace v. Link Debt
Recovery LLC, 2024 UT App 4, ¶ 32, 542 P.3d 979, petition for cert.
filed, Mar. 12, 2024 (No. 20240251)). I would not hold a statement
made on behalf of a different party against LeBaron, but I note
that even it illustrates that her counsel’s assertion of similarity
between the FDCPA and the UCSPA was directed specifically at
their shared prohibition of deceptive and unconscionable acts.

20210518-CA 13 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

purposes, it should have had no trouble dismissing both sets of
claims on the same ground.

II. Claim Preclusion

¶26 Because I part ways with my colleagues on their alternative
ground to affirm the dismissal of LeBaron’s FDCPA claim, I must
consider her challenge to the district court’s conclusion that her
claim is precluded. 12 As explained below, I conclude that the court
erred in applying the claim preclusion doctrine, and I would
reverse its summary judgment decision dismissing that claim.

¶27 The claim preclusion doctrine is “premised on the principle
that a controversy should be adjudicated only once.” Nebeker v.
Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 23, 34 P.3d 180 (quotation
simplified). For the doctrine to apply, the party seeking preclusion
must satisfy a three-part test. Mack v. Utah State Dep’t of Com., 2009
UT 47, ¶ 29, 221 P.3d 194. The second element of that test—the
only element at issue in this appeal—requires that the challenged
claim was raised or “could and should have been raised” in a
prior action. Id. (quotation simplified).

¶28 In assessing that element, Utah courts apply the
transactional test found in section 24 of the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments. Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC, 2012 UT 38, ¶ 13, 284
P.3d 622. The test provides that “claims or causes of action are the
same as those brought or that could have been brought in the first
action if they arise from the same operative facts, or in other
words from the same transaction.” Daz Mgmt., LLC v. Honnen
Equip. Co., 2022 UT 15, ¶ 57, 508 P.3d 84 (quotation simplified).
While “no single factor is determinative,” courts may consider

12. The district court’s claim preclusion determination presents a
question of law reviewed for correctness. Haik v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 2017 UT 14, ¶ 7, 393 P.3d 285.

20210518-CA 14 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

“whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation,
whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations.” 13 Id.
(quotation simplified).

¶29 Here, the district court concluded that LeBaron’s FDCPA
claim could and should have been raised in Doctors’ debt
collection suit because the complaint filed in that suit “provides
the basis for” and “makes up” LeBaron’s FDCPA claim. In
reaching that conclusion, the court followed the lead of a decision
from Utah’s federal district court, a decision that has been
subsequently affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in an unpublished
(and non-precedential) order. See McMurray v. Forsythe Fin., LLC,
No. 1:20-cv-00008-TS, 2021 WL 83265, at *4–5 (D. Utah Jan. 11,
2021) (concluding that the claim preclusion doctrine barred the
plaintiff’s UCSPA and FDCPA claims because those claims arose
out of the defendant’s efforts to collect the plaintiff’s debt), aff’d,
No. 21-4014, 2023 WL 5938580 (10th Cir. Sept. 12, 2023). In my
view, both the federal district court and the Tenth Circuit

13. The parties on appeal apply the claim preclusion doctrine, but
in the district court, Doctors invoked rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which governs compulsory counterclaims. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(A) (requiring a party to assert a claim that,
among other things, exists “at the time of service” and that “arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party’s claim”). I question whether the preclusion
issue is more appropriately analyzed under rule 13(a) given that
LeBaron was the defendant in the debt collection action. But
because the district court applied a traditional claim preclusion
analysis without reference to rule 13(a) and because I believe
applying rule 13(a) to LeBaron’s claim would produce the same
result, I analyze LeBaron’s claim under the claim preclusion
doctrine.

20210518-CA 15 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

misapplied Utah’s claim preclusion test by asking only whether
the subsequent claim arose out of the first action and by not
accounting for the relevant factors under the transactional test.

¶30 In its claim against LeBaron, Doctors alleged that LeBaron
contracted for goods or services, received those goods or services,
and refused to make payment for those goods or services. In
contrast, in LeBaron’s claim against Doctors for an alleged
violation of the FDCPA, she alleged that Doctors many months
later filed a debt collection lawsuit against her without a license.
Although LeBaron’s claim against Doctors would not exist but for
Doctors’ debt collection lawsuit, the historical facts relevant to the
parties’ respective claims are not “related in time, space, origin, or
motivation” and do not form “a convenient trial unit.” See Daz
Mgmt., 2022 UT 15, ¶ 57 (quotation simplified). Instead, the
circumstances giving rise to LeBaron’s debt are separate and
distinct from, and depend on different witnesses and evidence
than, the circumstances surrounding Doctors’ collection activities
and licensing status. The two claims are undeniably connected,
but that does not mean that they arise from the same operative
facts. Thus, I would conclude that the transactional test that forms
the foundation for the second element of Utah’s claim preclusion
doctrine was not satisfied and that the district court erred in
concluding otherwise. 14

14. Although the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in
McMurray, at least two other federal district court judges in Utah
concluded that Utah’s transactional test was not satisfied under
similar facts. See Chamberlain v. Crown Asset Mgmt., 608 F. Supp.
3d 1091, 1102–03 (D. Utah 2022); Cotte v. CVI SGP Acquisition Trust,
No. 2:21-cv-00299-JNP-DAO, 2022 WL 464307, at *4–5 (D. Utah
Feb. 15, 2022). And as the Cotte court observed, “a number of
(continued…)

20210518-CA 16 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

¶31 Finally, in concluding that LeBaron’s FDCPA claim was
precluded, the district court also determined that LeBaron could
not bring her claim because she sought relief that would nullify
Doctors’ earlier judgment. The court’s analysis appears to be
premised on a doctrine articulated in section 22(2)(b) of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, a doctrine that Utah courts
have not expressly adopted. See Cotte v. CVI SGP Acquisition Trust,
No. 2:21-cv-00299-JNP-DAO, 2022 WL 464307, at *6 (D. Utah Feb.
15, 2022). The doctrine provides,

A defendant who may interpose a claim as a
counterclaim in an action but fails to do so is
precluded, after the rendition of judgment in that
action, from maintaining an action on the claim if . . .
[t]he relationship between the counterclaim and the
plaintiff’s claim is such that successful prosecution
of the second action would nullify the initial
judgment or would impair rights established in the
initial action.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22(2)(b) (Am. L. Inst. 1982).

¶32 LeBaron challenges the court’s adoption of this doctrine
and contends that it is contrary to Utah law. LeBaron argues that
in “automatically” barring her suit based on her request to void a
judgment, the district court “neuter[ed] [her] ability to pursue an
independent action for relief from judgment” under rule 60 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule recognizes a Utah court’s
inherent authority “to entertain an independent action to relieve

courts” have similarly concluded that FDCPA claims like the one
asserted by LeBaron are not compulsory counterclaims because
they do not arise out of the same transaction as the original debt.
Cotte, 2022 WL 464307, at *5 n.6 (citing cases).

20210518-CA 17 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

a party from a judgment.” Utah R. Civ. P. 60(d). Doctors does not
address LeBaron’s argument, leaving it unrebutted on appeal.

¶33 LeBaron’s argument is plausible on its face. Utah has not
adopted section 22(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, and its strict application appears to conflict with the
plain language of rule 60 and with related Utah authority, both of
which recognize a court’s inherent authority to relieve a party
from a judgment under certain circumstances. See St. Pierre v.
Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982) (“Indeed, Rule 60(b)
expressly recognizes and preserves the court’s historic powers to
relieve a party from the operations of an unconscionable
judgment or order.”); see also Jensen v. Cannon, 2020 UT App 124,
¶ 32, 473 P.3d 637 (“The availability of an independent action
flows from a court’s historic powers to relieve a party from
judgment . . . .” (quotation simplified)). And because Doctors does
not address the argument, I would conclude that LeBaron has
satisfied her appellate burden for purposes of this case by
presenting a plausible basis for reversal. See Utah Dep’t of Transp.
v. Coalt, Inc., 2020 UT 58, ¶ 45, 472 P.3d 942 (“An appellant bears
the burden of persuasion on appeal. But a court may rule in favor
of an appellant for purposes of that case if the appellee
inadequately briefs an argument and the appellant provides a
plausible basis for reversal.” (quotation simplified)). Thus,
without reaching the merits, I would accept LeBaron’s argument
that the district court erred in adopting section 22(2)(b) of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments and in categorically
dismissing LeBaron’s FDCPA claim on that basis without first
considering the court’s inherent authority to hear the claim. 15

15. Whether LeBaron could receive equitable relief under the
FDCPA is not a question I must answer, but I note that without
(continued…)

20210518-CA 18 2024 UT App 42
LeBaron v. Doctors

¶34 In sum, I would hold that LeBaron’s FDCPA claim is not
precluded under Utah’s claim preclusion doctrine and that the
court erred in applying section 22(2)(b) of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments as an additional reason to dismiss the
FDCPA claim. For these reasons, I would reverse the district
court’s dismissal of the claim and remand the matter for further
proceedings.

her state law claims, LeBaron’s relief on remand likely would be
limited. See Cotte, 2022 WL 464307, at *7 (stating that the FDCPA
“provides for civil liability, including actual damages and
additional damages up to $1,000 for an individual or up to
$500,000 for a class action,” but that “equitable relief is not
available to an individual under the civil liability section of the
FDCPA” (quotation simplified)).

20210518-CA 19 2024 UT App 42