Laker v. Caras

2023 UT App 125

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHRISTOPHER LAKER,
Appellant,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CARAS, DIRECTOR OF THE DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20220557-CA
Filed October 19, 2023

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robert P. Faust
No. 220901408

Jason A. Schatz, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Andrew Dymek,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY
concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Christopher Laker was arrested on suspicion of drunk
driving. Later, after an administrative hearing, the Driver License
Division determined that Laker had refused the arresting officer’s
request that he submit to a chemical test to determine his blood
alcohol level, and therefore revoked his driver license for a period
of 18 months. The district court reached that same conclusion after
a trial de novo. Laker now appeals, challenging the court’s finding
that he refused a chemical test. We conclude, however, that the
court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence, and
therefore affirm.
Laker v. Caras

BACKGROUND

¶2 One night in November 2021, a Salt Lake City police officer
(Officer) was called to the scene of an automobile accident. 1 Laker
was identified as the driver of the vehicle. Upon his arrival at the
scene, Officer noted the odor of alcohol coming from Laker and
observed that Laker had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes and
was unsteady on his feet. Laker admitted to Officer that he had
been drinking. After Laker exhibited what Officer believed to be
an inordinate number of clues during field sobriety testing,
Officer arrested Laker and transported him via patrol car to the
police station.

¶3 After arriving at the station, but while Laker was still inside
the patrol car, Officer asked Laker to submit to a chemical test to
determine his blood alcohol level. Officer made this request using
a prepared form, and he read the request “verbatim off the form.”
Specifically, Officer informed Laker that he was under arrest on
suspicion of drunk driving, and Officer asked Laker to “submit to
a chemical test to determine the alcohol and/or drug content of
[his] body”; Officer also warned Laker that a positive test result
could “result in denial, suspension, revocation, or disqualification
of [his] driving privilege.” Laker refused Officer’s initial request.

¶4 Following protocol, Officer then began to read Laker a
second warning, again using a prepared form that law
enforcement personnel use in situations in which an arrestee
initially refuses a request to submit to a chemical test; this warning
is known as the “refusal admonition.” Before reading the
admonition, Officer informed Laker that once the admonition had
been read, it would be Laker’s decision “to submit or not submit
to the chemical test,” and he would ask Laker for his “response, if

1. It is unclear from the record what type of accident Laker was
involved in, whether another vehicle was involved, or who
reported the accident to the police.

20220557-CA 2 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

any,” but he thereafter would not “continue” to ask Laker what
his position was. Officer then read Laker the following
admonition, again doing so “verbatim” from the form:

If you refuse the test or fail to follow my
instructions, I must warn you that your driving
privilege may be revoked for 18 months if age 21 or
older, or for 2 years, or until age 21 if you are under
the age of 21; or 36 months, or until age 21 if it is a
second or subsequent license withdrawal for an
alcohol or drug related driving offense, with no
provision for limited driving. You may be subject to
criminal prosecution. In addition, you will be
prohibited from driving with any measurable or
detectable amount of alcohol in your body for a
period of five or ten years, depending on your prior
driving history, and you will be prohibited from
driving a vehicle without an ignition interlock
device installed for a period of three years. I will
make the test results available to you, if you take the
test.

¶5 After receiving the refusal admonition, Laker did not
immediately agree to submit to a test. Instead, he responded by
expressing confusion and concern about the test, and by
requesting to call his mother.2 In response, Officer commented to

2. Much of Officer’s interaction with Laker on the evening in
question was captured on Officer’s body camera, and a recording
of the relevant video was played for the district court during the
trial de novo. However, that video is not contained in the
appellate record presented to us. Our understanding of the
contents of the video, then, comes from the descriptions of it
offered by Officer and by the district court itself. As regards
Laker’s apparent “confusion” following the admonition, the court
(continued…)

20220557-CA 3 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

Laker, while still in the patrol car outside the station, that the
decision about whether “to submit or not to submit” was
“completely up to him,” but that this decision needed to be made
“within a reasonable amount of time.” Officer then explained that
he was going to “take [Laker’s] seatbelt off” and take him into the
station and “lock [him] into” an “Intox room,” events that would
give Laker a few minutes to consider his decision.

¶6 Once inside the Intox room, Officer “secured [Laker] to the
bench” and then stood “in front of” Laker “for probably two
minutes, waiting for” Laker to offer a “yes or a no” to the test
request. Laker offered no response. At that point, Officer
informed Laker he was “going to be in the other room” but would
still be able to see and hear Laker, so if Laker “need[ed] anything
or if [he] ha[d] any further questions” to let Officer know. Without
making any further statements to Laker, Officer marked Laker as
a “refusal” and began drafting a search warrant for a blood draw.
While Officer was away, Laker was “on his phone.”

¶7 By the time Officer returned, he had obtained a warrant to
have Laker’s blood drawn for testing and informed Laker that
they just needed to wait for the phlebotomist who would be
performing the blood draw. Altogether, the intake process lasted
between two and two and a half hours, during which time Laker
never once stated that he would agree to submit to a chemical test.

¶8 Some weeks later, Laker was notified that the Driver
License Division (the Division) intended to revoke his license for
18 months because “a peace officer had reasonable grounds to
believe that [Laker] refused to submit to a chemical test after being
requested and warned by a peace officer.” Following an

remarked, after viewing the video, that it “couldn’t quite hear
from the audio [Laker’s] explanation of what it is that he wasn’t
understanding.” We therefore do not know what Laker was
confused about.

20220557-CA 4 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

administrative hearing, the Division determined that Laker “did
not submit to the [chemical] test” and therefore revoked Laker’s
driving privileges for 18 months.

¶9 Laker then sought judicial review of the Division’s
determination. The district court held a trial de novo to consider
the matter; at that trial, Officer was the only witness to testify. At
the end of the trial, the court took the matter under advisement.

¶10 Later that day, the court issued a written ruling denying
Laker’s petition for relief. The court found that Laker had indeed
refused to submit to a chemical test upon request, noting that “the
law require[s] an immediate request to have the test,” which
immediate consent Laker had not given, and stating that it could
“not find” that Officer’s “waiting for several minutes before
finding a refusal occurred was unreasonable.” Accordingly, the
court declined to disturb the Division’s 18-month revocation of
Laker’s driver license.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Laker now appeals, and challenges the court’s finding that
Laker “refused” to submit to a chemical test. “Our review of a trial
de novo on a driver license suspension is deferential to the
[district] court’s view of the evidence unless the [district] court
has misapplied principles of law or its findings are clearly against
the weight of the evidence.” Decker v. Rolfe, 2008 UT App 70, ¶ 9,
180 P.3d 778 (quotation simplified). In particular, “[t]he
determination that [an arrestee’s] failure to respond to the officer
or to take the test amounts to a refusal is a factual finding which
we will not disturb when supported by substantial evidence.” Lee
v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).

20220557-CA 5 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

ANALYSIS

¶12 Under governing Utah law, “every person who chooses to
drive a vehicle on Utah’s roadways is deemed to have given
implied consent, for driver license purposes, to a chemical test of
their ‘breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids’ for the purpose of
determining their impairment level.” Gukeisen v. Department of
Public Safety, 2020 UT App 32, ¶ 8, 461 P.3d 1146 (quotation
simplified) (quoting Utah Code § 41-6a-520(1)(a)); see also Beck v.
Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1979) (observing that Utah
statutory law “provides that a driver is deemed to have given his
consent” to a chemical “test as a condition to using the highways”
(quotation simplified)). The implied consent statute requires any
officer who, after an arrest, asks a motorist to submit to a chemical
test to “warn [the motorist] that refusal to submit to the test . . .
may result in . . . revocation of the [motorist’s] license to operate a
motor vehicle.” Utah Code § 41-6a-520(2)(a).

¶13 Our law is clear that, once this warning has been given, a
driver must “immediately request” that the officer administer the
test. See id. § 41-6a-520(2)(b)(i); see also Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d
766, 767 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (“[A] driver must affirmatively
agree to submit to a test immediately following clear warning of the
consequences of refusal.” (emphasis added)). A driver who, after
receiving the warning, does not immediately consent to a
chemical test will be deemed to have “refused” the test. See Lee,
722 P.2d at 767 (stating that “refusal is presumed” in the absence
of immediate consent); Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736, 738
(Utah 1984) (stating that “refusal is conclusively presumed”
absent immediate consent).

¶14 Moreover, the immediate consent must be clear and
unequivocal. Indeed, “a motorist can ‘refuse’ a chemical test in
any number of ways, and . . . may be considered to have refused
the test even without actually saying ‘no’ or ‘I refuse.’” Gukeisen,
2020 UT App 32, ¶ 9. A motorist cannot dodge a request for a

20220557-CA 6 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

chemical test “by temporizing, equivocating, or simply remaining
silent,” or even by asking for an attorney. Id. ¶¶ 8–9 (quotation
simplified); see also Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1979)
(stating that the “whole statutory scheme” of the implied consent
law “could be subverted by one who equivocates or remains
silent, and later protests that it was his unexpressed intent to take
the test”). Our law requires motorists asked to submit to a
chemical test to provide the requesting officer with an immediate,
direct answer; officers in this situation are not “required to persist
and continue to repeat the request until such time as the driver
believes that he has achieved a degree of sobriety sufficient to pass
the test.” See Beck, 597 P.2d at 1337.

¶15 In this case, Laker does not contest that Officer had
grounds to request a chemical test. Rather, he challenges the
district court’s finding that Laker’s actions constituted a refusal to
submit to a test. Laker’s argument rests almost entirely on
Officer’s statement that Laker would be afforded a “reasonable
time” to decide whether to submit to a test. Laker also asserts that
Officer was obligated to inform him that a “refusal” included
anything other than immediate consent. The district court rejected
Laker’s position, and so do we, for the following reasons.

¶16 First, Laker had already “refused” the chemical test before
Officer said anything about a “reasonable time.” A motorist who
does not immediately request a test after being provided the
refusal admonition has refused the test. See Utah Code § 41-6a-
520(2)(b)(i); see also Lee, 722 P.2d at 767. And here it is undisputed
that Laker did not immediately request a test after receiving the
refusal admonition. Instead, he expressed confusion and asked to
contact his mother. At that point, Officer hadn’t yet said anything
to Laker about any entitlement to a “reasonable time,” and
therefore that comment cannot serve to erase or nullify Laker’s
failure to provide immediate consent to a chemical test following
the admonition. We therefore agree with the State that Laker “was
conclusively presumed to have refused the test before [Officer]

20220557-CA 7 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

made the ‘reasonable time’ statement.” On that basis alone,
Laker’s petition is infirm.

¶17 But even assuming, for purposes of the discussion, that
Officer’s “reasonable time” statement 3 did somehow operate to
give Laker a reasonable time to make his decision, the district
court’s finding—that Laker actually had a reasonable time to
make a decision and still did not offer his consent—is supported
by substantial evidence.

¶18 Officer made the “reasonable time” statement while Laker
was still in the patrol car, parked outside the police station. After
the statement, Officer unbuckled Laker, escorted him inside the
station to the Intox room, and secured him to a bench there. It is
unclear from the record submitted to us exactly how long this
process took, but it was undoubtedly a few minutes. Then, after
Officer finished securing Laker to a bench in the Intox room, he
stood “in front of” Laker “for probably two minutes, waiting for”
Laker to offer a “yes or a no” to the test request. Still, Laker offered
no response. At that point, Officer informed Laker he was “going
to be in the other room” but would still be able to see and hear
Laker; thus, any request for a chemical test made during this
period of time would have been visible and audible to Officer. But
Laker did not make any request for a test during the time Officer
was in the other room preparing a warrant for a blood draw.

¶19 Due to the absence of the body camera video from our
appellate record, we do not know exactly how long all of this took.

3. In our view, Officer’s “reasonable time” statement—however
well-intentioned—was ill-advised. As noted, it is inaccurate:
motorists must provide an immediate response after receiving the
refusal admonition. In that situation, our law does not provide
motorists with a “reasonable time” to consider whether to submit
to a test. We therefore discourage officers from complicating these
situations by making statements inconsistent with the law.

20220557-CA 8 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

But the district court had the opportunity to view the video, and
therefore had better evidence than we do on this point. “It is an
appellant’s responsibility to include in the record a transcript of
all evidence relevant to a finding or conclusion that is being
challenged on appeal.” In re A. Dean Harding Marital & Family
Trust, 2023 UT App 81, ¶ 85 (quotation simplified). “When an
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, we
presume the regularity of the proceedings below, and when
crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing
portions are presumed to support the action of the [district]
court.” Id. (quotation simplified). Thus, we must presume that the
video supports the district court’s finding; under these
circumstances, we are simply not in a position to second-guess the
court’s finding that Officer afforded Laker a reasonable time to
make a decision about submitting to a chemical test.

¶20 Nevertheless, Laker resists these conclusions by asserting
that his due process rights were violated. 4 In support of his
argument, Laker relies on our supreme court’s statement, given in
Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979), that “[f]airness and due
process require that a person threatened with the loss of his
driver[] license should be afforded an opportunity to make a

4. The State contends that Laker failed to preserve a due process
claim, and it therefore should not be considered on appeal. See
State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443 (“When a party fails
to raise and argue an issue in the [district] court, it has failed to
preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not typically reach
that issue absent a valid exception to preservation.”). A review of
the trial transcript shows that Laker’s argument relied heavily on
Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979), and he urged the court
to rely on the principles outlined therein, particularly those
concerning “fairness and due process.” After considering Laker’s
argument from the trial in its entirety, we are satisfied that he
raised his due process claim sufficiently for us to address it.

20220557-CA 9 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

choice based on a fair explanation of his rights and duties.” 5 Id. at
1334. According to Laker, due process principles required Officer
to specifically explain to Laker that anything other than an
immediate expression of consent would be considered a refusal.
But here, Laker has not borne his burden of demonstrating a
violation of a constitutional right.

¶21 “At its core,” procedural due process guarantees two
things: “reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.” In re
adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 16, 356 P.3d 1215. As we understand
it, Laker’s contention is that he was not given fair “notice” that his
failure to immediately consent to a chemical test would be
considered a refusal under the law. 6 We reject this argument

5. Laker states that Holman “dealt specifically with the substantive
Due Process rights of a driver” under the implied consent law.
But, as the State points out, the issues raised by Laker implicate
procedural due process, not substantive due process. This
distinction is semantic here, however, because we reject Laker’s
claim no matter the label used to describe it.
Moreover, we note that the Holman court was addressing
potential confusion between the requirements of the implied
consent statute and the rights enumerated under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Holman, 598 P.2d at 1332–33.
Following the Holman decision, officers now have at the ready an
additional admonition that is given whenever a motorist attempts
to invoke a right to an attorney following the refusal admonition.
But here, Laker did not attempt to invoke a right to an attorney,
and therefore the concerns at issue in Holman are not implicated.

6. We do not perceive Laker as asserting that he was not afforded
an adequate opportunity to be heard. After all, Laker participated
in two evidentiary hearings in this matter, one at the
administrative level and another in the district court. We therefore
do not further address any such argument.

20220557-CA 10 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

largely because citizens are generally presumed to know what the
law is, and because procedural due process principles generally
do not require law enforcement officers to notify citizens of what
the law is before taking action against them for violation of it.

¶22 It is a “well-accepted maxim that ignorance of the law is no
excuse.” State v. Stewart, 2019 UT 39, ¶ 37, 449 P.3d 59 (quotation
simplified). While “due process places some limits on [the]
exercise” of this general rule, see Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
228 (1957), our supreme court has noted that only in very limited
situations are government officials required to explain the law to
citizens, see Stewart, 2019 UT 39, ¶ 38 (identifying examples of
such situations, including Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
And these rare situations “are exceptions that prove the rule,”
which is that “[u]nless and until the law expressly requires open
announcement and express waiver, we presume an
understanding of the existence of rights guaranteed by the
constitution—and charge parties with the duty of asserting their
rights, while imposing the consequence of forfeiture if they fail to
do so at the time and in the manner required” under the law. Id.;
see also, e.g., United States v. Reddick, 203 F.3d 767, 771 (10th Cir.
2000) (stating that “due process does not require” that a person
have had “actual knowledge of” the requirements of a particular
statute before being convicted of violating it); United States v.
Coccia, 249 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81 (D. Mass. 2003) (“[D]ue process does
not require a defendant to have knowledge of the prohibitions
embodied in [a] federal statute because ignorance of the law does
not excuse criminal liability.”).

¶23 Laker makes no effort, in his appellate briefs, to grapple
with this general rule or to explain why, in this particular
situation, he was entitled to a specific explanation of the meaning
of the term “refusal.” After all, our law—in both statutes and case
law—has for decades defined “refusal” as including anything
other than an “immediate request” for a chemical test. See Utah
Code § 41-6a-520(2)(b)(i); see also Lee, 722 P.2d at 767. Laker cites

20220557-CA 11 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

no authority supporting his argument that he was constitutionally
entitled to specific notice of what “refusal” means under the law,
over and above the notices he already received regarding the
law’s provisions that, if he refused Officer’s request to submit to
a chemical test, there could be consequences. 7

¶24 Finally, in connection with his due process argument,
Laker again points to Officer’s “reasonable time” comment, and
asserts that Officer’s incorrect statement of the law had a negative
effect on his due process rights. But as already noted, even if we
were to assume, for purposes of any discussion, that Laker should
have been given a reasonable time within which to make his
decision, the district court found—supported by substantial
evidence—that he was given a reasonable time. Under these
circumstances, we cannot see how Officer’s comment had any
appreciable impact on Laker’s due process rights.

CONCLUSION

¶25 The district court did not err in determining that Laker had
refused Officer’s request for a chemical test. And the court’s

7. The implied consent statute itself requires law enforcement
officers to “warn” motorists that “refusal to submit” to a request
for a chemical test may have negative consequences, including
revocation of motorists’ driver licenses. See Utah Code § 41-6a-
520(2)(a). But neither that statute, nor any other of which we are
aware, requires officers to further explain what “refusal” means.
In our view, it may be a good idea to add language to the typical
refusal admonition designed to make clear that anything other
than an “immediate request” for a chemical test constitutes a
“refusal.” We encourage law enforcement entities to consider
such an addition. But for the reasons discussed herein, Laker has
not demonstrated that any such addition is constitutionally or
statutorily required.

20220557-CA 12 2023 UT App 125
Laker v. Caras

finding, in the wake of Officer’s incorrect “reasonable time”
statement, that Laker had been afforded a reasonable time to
make his decision was supported by substantial evidence. Finally,
Laker has not borne his appellate burden of demonstrating a
violation of his constitutional due process rights.

¶26 Affirmed.

20220557-CA 13 2023 UT App 125