San Juan County Coalition v. San Juan County

2023 UT App 12

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NORTHERN SAN JUAN COUNTY COALITION,
Appellant and Cross-appellee,
v.
SAN JUAN COUNTY,
Appellee,

LOVE’S TRAVEL STOPS & COUNTRY STORES,
Intervenor, Appellee, and Cross-appellant.

Opinion
No. 20210235-CA
Filed February 2, 2023

Seventh District Court, Monticello Department
The Honorable Don Torgerson
No. 200700010

Matthew A. Steward and Shaunda L. McNeill,
Attorneys for Appellant and Cross-appellee
Barton H. Kunz II, Alex J. Goble, and Kendall G.
Laws, Attorneys for Appellee
Matthew J. Ball and Jeffery A. Balls, Attorneys for
Intervenor, Appellee, and Cross-appellant

SENIOR JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred. 1

APPLEBY, Senior Judge:

¶1 The Northern San Juan County Coalition (the Coalition)
appeals the district court’s dismissal of its petition for review. The
district court determined that it did not have subject matter

1. Senior Judge Kate Appleby sat by special assignment as
authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(7).
Northern San Juan County Coalition v. San Juan County

jurisdiction to hear the petition because of the Coalition’s failure
to exhaust its administrative remedies in its challenge to a land
use decision by San Juan County (the County) approving a
planned travel stop of Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores
(Love’s). In response, Love’s cross-appeals the district court’s
preliminary determination that the Coalition had standing to file
its petition. We affirm the court’s decision as it relates to the cross-
appeal but reverse its decision on each of the points raised by the
Coalition’s appeal.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Because of increased development in Spanish Valley (in
northern San Juan County), the County retained a community
planning firm to create a new area plan, and the plan was adopted
in April 2018. As new zoning ordinances were created to
implement the plan, the planning commission considered a
possible development moratorium. The moratorium was first
proposed on April 16, 2019, but its adoption was postponed as the
result of a county official’s request and other procedural delays.

¶3 Love’s, having been alerted to the impending moratorium,
submitted a sketch plan application for a commercial
development on May 3, 2019. The proposed development was a
travel center on approximately thirteen acres of land, including a
convenience store, a drive-through fast food restaurant, gas
pumps, ninety automobile parking spaces, and fifty-three truck
parking spaces. The County responded on May 10 (the May 10
Letter), acknowledging receipt of the application and stating,
“Under San Juan County’s code, this proposal is for a commercial
development in a commercial zone so there is nothing additional
that Love’s needs to do at this time.”

¶4 Before Love’s plan was approved, there was “active
community involvement” and “substantial public clamor about
the possibility of a Travel Stop in Spanish Valley.” The Coalition

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emerged in this milieu when, on March 23, 2019, Carolyn Dailey,
a community member, sent an email to neighbors and other
community members announcing the Coalition’s formation, with
the purpose “to have our voice heard in our county government.”
The Coalition held its first meeting in early April and continued
to meet regularly. On May 21, the County held a commissioners’
meeting at which Dailey spoke on the Coalition’s behalf in
support of the proposed development moratorium. Dailey also
spoke out against “a Love’s truck stop with 53 diesel truck
parking slots to be built within 25 feet of residential
neighborhoods.” The County thereafter adopted the moratorium
at this meeting.

¶5 On June 6, Dailey emailed the interim county
administrator, asking whether Love’s would be subject to the
moratorium and asking, “We would also like to know whether
Love’s was able to get applications, fees, etc[.] rushed through the
process to be issued a permit before the Moratorium deadline—
or tell me who to contact to get that information?” The following
day, June 7, the administrator responded,

According to the County Planning and Zoning staff,
[Love’s] applied for the permit to have the truck
stop there and they engaged in substantial activities
in anticipation of the development long before the
moratorium was in place (I found references to the
truck stop in news articles published in March). So
they’re likely vested in that sense.

The San Juan County zoning code . . . reads
so permissively that it is tough to see how that kind
of use would not be permitted there with the current
zoning language.

I think the best person to talk with is
probably Brian Torgerson with [the Utah School and
Institutional Trust Lands Administration] at this

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point, but I will continue to learn about the situation
as well.

¶6 This response prompted Jeannie Bondio, another Coalition
member, to file a request with the County pursuant to the
Government Records Access and Management Act (the GRAMA
Request). Bondio filed her request on June 11 and asked the
County to provide any permit applications submitted by Love’s,
any County determination or evaluation of such applications, any
fees paid, and all communications between the County and
Love’s regarding the proposed travel stop.

¶7 The County responded to the GRAMA Request on June 26.
Although the response did not provide all documents requested,
it produced Love’s sketch plan application and the May 10 Letter.
This was the first date upon which the Coalition had actual notice
of any approval expressed by the County.

¶8 Ten days later, on July 6, Bondio sent a letter (the Bondio
Letter) to the San Juan County Commission (the Commission)
following up on the GRAMA Request. She first addressed the
dearth of records she received in response to her broad request.
She then specifically referenced zoning ordinances with which
Love’s sketch plan application failed to comply. She concluded
her letter with a request that the Commission “investigate this
matter immediately[] and issue a decision” as to whether Love’s
sketch plan had been determined to be in compliance with
existing zoning ordinances and whether the application was
“deemed complete.”

¶9 After months with no response from the Commission, the
Coalition retained counsel and sent a letter to the Commission on
December 16, asking it to hold a hearing to address the issues
raised in the Bondio Letter. Upon further prompting, the County
eventually responded to counsel on March 13, 2020, explaining
that the Commission would not hold a hearing on the matter

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because the Coalition had failed to appeal within ten days of the
May 10 Letter.

¶10 The Coalition petitioned the Seventh District Court,
seeking review of the matter. Upon the County’s request, Love’s
was joined as a necessary party to the action. Eventually, the
Coalition and the County filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, with the Coalition arguing that the undisputed facts
showed the County did not follow the law in approving Love’s
plan and the County arguing, in part, that the Coalition lacked
standing because it did not exhaust its administrative remedies.
Around this same time, Love’s filed a motion to dismiss, also
arguing that the Coalition failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies and additionally asserting that the Coalition lacked
associational standing.

¶11 After a hearing, the district court granted the County’s
motion for summary judgment and Love’s motion to dismiss. The
court determined that the Coalition had associational standing to
bring its claims but had not exhausted its administrative remedies
because (1) the Coalition could not rely on the Bondio Letter as an
appeal on its behalf since it was not sent in a representative
capacity, (2) the Bondio Letter was not an appeal in any event, and
(3) the Bondio Letter was untimely. The court therefore concluded
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Coalition now
appeals each of the determinations regarding the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and Love’s cross-appeals, challenging
the court’s determination as to associational standing.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶12 The Coalition challenges several aspects of the district
court’s dismissal of its claims, specifically, those determinations
as to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. “Whether a court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to a party’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is a question of law, reviewed for

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correctness.” Republic Outdoor Advert., LC v. Utah Dep’t of Transp.,
2011 UT App 198, ¶ 12, 258 P.3d 619 (quotation simplified).

¶13 Love’s challenges the district court’s determination as it
relates to whether the Coalition had associational standing to
pursue its claims. “When evaluating standing at the motion-to-
dismiss stage, the question of standing is primarily a question of
law, which we review for correctness.” In re John Edward Phillips
Family Living Trust, 2022 UT App 12, ¶ 22, 505 P.3d 1127
(quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A. Representative Capacity

¶14 The district court determined that the Coalition did not
exhaust its administrative remedies because it could not rely on
the Bondio Letter as an appeal to the Commission. The court,
citing Utah’s assumed name statute, reasoned that this was so
because “at the time of the Bondio Letter, the Coalition was not
authorized by Utah law to transact any business as an association
and could not designate an agent.” The court also determined that
the Bondio Letter was not an appeal by the Coalition because it
“did not transact business in the name of the Coalition” and
because “an undisclosed agency relationship does not meet the
Zoning Ordinance’s requirement that the person affected file the
appeal.” The Coalition argues that the assumed name statute did
not prevent Bondio from acting as an agent when she sent the
letter and that she did not need to disclose her agency relationship
to act on behalf of the Coalition. We agree.

¶15 Utah’s assumed name statute provides that “[a] person
who carries on, conducts, or transacts business in this state under
an assumed name, whether that business is carried on, conducted,
or transacted as an individual, association, partnership,

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corporation, or otherwise,” shall file a certificate with the State
within thirty days “after the time of commencing to carry on,
conduct, or transact the business.” Utah Code § 42-2-5(2), (3).
Although the Coalition filed a certificate to satisfy this statute
before it filed its petition in the district court, it had not done so at
the time the Bondio Letter was sent to the Commission. The
Coalition argues that this failure has no effect on whether Bondio
and other Coalition members could act as agents for the Coalition.
Love’s responds that the Coalition’s interpretation “would render
the statute meaningless by making compliance with a
purportedly mandatory statute entirely voluntary (and depriving
Utah’s citizens of the protection the statute is obviously intended
to provide).” We disagree.

¶16 The assumed name statute “is primarily for the
convenience of the public rather than protection of the public.”
Platt v. Locke, 358 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah 1961) (quotation simplified).
The penalties for noncompliance with the statute are identified as
(1) a prohibition of maintaining any action in the Utah courts and
(2) a possible assessment of a late filing fee. See Utah Code § 42-2-
10. Although failure to comply with the statute prohibits an
aggrieved party from maintaining an action in court, it does not
prohibit such a party from challenging a land use decision with
the appropriate local appeal authority. And “it is generally
recognized that the legislature in passing [the assumed name
statute] did not intend, in addition to subjecting the offender to an
express penalty, also to impose the additional penalty of refusing
[the offender] any relief on the contract or transactions entered
into without compliance with the statute.” Platt, 358 P.2d at 98
(quotation simplified); see also Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western
States Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977) (“This court has
not applied the general rule of denying relief to unlicensed
persons . . . inflexibly or too broadly.”); cf. Olsen v. Reese, 200 P.2d
733, 736 (Utah 1948) (“The authorities are fairly uniform to the
effect that failure to obtain a license which is required by a statute
enacted solely for revenue purposes does not render contracts
made by the offending party void. On the other hand, contracts

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made by an unlicensed contractor when in violation of a statute
passed for the protection of the public are held to be void and
unenforceable.”). Thus, although the Coalition could not, at the
time the Bondio Letter was sent, maintain an action in court, it
could (and did) appeal to the Commission.

¶17 Furthermore, even when an entity fails to timely file the
required certificate, our case law is clear that such oversight can
be cured upon filing. See Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Distrib., Inc.,
593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979) (“[The plaintiff]’s early failure to
comply with the assumed name statute does not disqualify it as a
plaintiff in this suit. The only sanction associated with non-
compliance is denial of the non-complying entity’s access to the
courts, and that sanction is removed on compliance.” (emphasis
added)); Elite Legacy Corp. v. Schvaneveldt, 2016 UT App 228, ¶ 53,
391 P.3d 222 (relying on precedent where an entity “conducted
business under an unregistered, assumed name” and where we
held that this fact did not “make the complaint a nullity on its
face” (quotation simplified)); Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste
Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Service Dist., 1999 UT App 136,
¶ 15, 979 P.2d 363 (determining that an unincorporated
association that had never filed under the assumed name statute
“could have cured the deficiencies in the complaint by filing”).
Thus, the interpretation advanced by Love’s is far too restrictive.

¶18 We now turn to the question of whether Bondio could have
been acting on behalf of the Coalition when her letter used the
first-person pronoun “I” instead of “we” and made no reference
to the Coalition. An agent can act on behalf of an entity even when
the agent “acts in his own name without disclosing his principal,”
and “this is true even though the third person dealing with the
agent did not learn of the existence of the principal until after the
[action] was completed.” Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110
(Utah 1992) (quotation simplified). Thus, the question is not
whether the County could discern from the Bondio Letter that it
was sent on behalf of the Coalition but, rather, whether it was
actually sent on the Coalition’s behalf.

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¶19 Ample record evidence demonstrates that the Bondio
Letter was sent on the Coalition’s behalf. First, there is evidence
that the GRAMA Request (which the Bondio Letter addressed)
was made in a representative capacity. The day after the GRAMA
Request was sent, the Coalition held a meeting, the notes from
which reflect that “we have made a GRAMA request” and that
the results of that request “will determine our strategy.” And
when the response to the GRAMA Request was received, it was
promptly circulated among Coalition members. Next, the Bondio
Letter itself was circulated on the Coalition listserv the same
morning it was sent to the Commission. Finally, there is evidence
that Bondio worked with other members of the Coalition in
preparing both the GRAMA Request and the resulting Bondio
Letter.

¶20 Thus, because the late filing under the assumed name
statute did not prevent the formation of an agency relationship
between the Coalition and Bondio, and because there is evidence
supporting the Coalition’s assertions that Bondio was acting on
its behalf when she sent the Bondio Letter, the district court’s
determination that the Coalition did not file the appeal is
erroneous.

B. Requirements of an Appeal

¶21 The relevant county ordinance provides that “any person
affected by the land use authority’s decision applying a land use
ordinance may . . . appeal that decision to the Appeal Authority
by alleging there is error in any order, requirement, decision, or
determination made by the land use authority in the decision
applying the land use ordinance.” San Juan County, Utah, Zoning
Ordinance § 2-2(2) (2011); see also Utah Code § 17-27a-703(1). The
district court determined that the Bondio Letter did not identify
the land use decision being appealed or an error made by the
decision. We disagree.

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¶22 The Bondio Letter begins by expressing frustration with
the apparent “shell game” going on in relation to the travel stop
and the County’s reluctance to reveal the truth. In support of this,
the letter discusses the GRAMA Request being answered by
production of only (1) the sketch plan application and (2) the May
10 Letter stating “there is nothing additional that Love’s needs to
do at this time.” The Bondio Letter notes that no documents were
provided showing any determination that Love’s application was
complete or showing any evaluation of the application. The
Bondio Letter goes on to elaborate on two zoning ordinance
sections that were not followed according to the information
disclosed, concluding that “[t]he ‘sketch plan application’ Love’s
submitted on May 3 does not appear to comply with the
requirements of the existing San Juan County Zoning Ordinance,
specifically sections 12-2 and 12-4,” and that the application was
therefore not complete before the moratorium became effective.
The Bondio Letter’s final section, captioned “Conclusion and
Request,” states,

The County must comply with its own Zoning
Ordinance. I request that the County Commission
investigate this matter immediately, and issue a
decision as to whether:

1. Love’s ‘sketch plan application’ has been
determined by the County to be in compliance with
its existing Zoning Ordinance; and

2. The Commission considers Love’s sketch
plan application to be a land use application that has
been ‘deemed complete’ as of the effective date of
the Temporary Moratorium Ordinance as well [as]
Utah Code 17-27a-5[0]8.

The Bondio Letter concludes, “I look forward to your response
soon.”

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¶23 Thus, the Bondio Letter did mention Love’s sketch plan
application, the May 10 Letter stating the position that nothing
more was required, and the specific ordinances that the County
allegedly violated in relation to such a position. And the Bondio
Letter asked the Commission to review the matter and “issue a
decision” on it. Under the facts of this case, we determine that this
was sufficient to constitute an appeal under the appeal ordinance.
See San Juan County, Utah, Zoning Ordinance § 2-2(2) (2011).

¶24 Both Love’s and the County find fault with the Bondio
Letter’s failure to specifically include the word “appeal” or to
request a hearing. But they provide no authority indicating that
those specific words are required. 2 And to the extent that the
Bondio Letter was not more specific in singling out the May 10
Letter as the County’s erroneous decision, that is largely the result
of its expressed (and understandable) uncertainty that the May 10
Letter—hardly the paradigm of clarity itself—was intended to
function as a land use decision. Nonetheless, the Bondio Letter
raised the May 10 Letter’s language that nothing more was
required and argued against that proposition, pointing to the
specific ordinances that it argued would render such a position
erroneous, and asked the Commission to investigate and “issue a
decision” on the matter. Thus, the Bondio Letter clearly
challenged the assertion of the May 10 Letter.

¶25 In sum, because the Bondio Letter referred to the May 10
Letter and specified which ordinances were inconsistent with the
position expressed therein, the Bondio Letter met the
requirements for an appeal under the related ordinances.

2. Love’s also argues that because the Bondio Letter was
submitted via email to the county administrator, it does not satisfy
the requirement that an appeal “must be filed in writing to the
County Administrator,” see San Juan County, Utah, Zoning
Ordinance § 2-2(2)(a) (2011). But this contention is not supported
by any authority or reasoned analysis, and we decline to consider
it further.

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Therefore, the district court’s determination to the contrary is
erroneous.

C. Timeliness

¶26 The parties agree that the relevant ordinance requires
anyone appealing a land use decision in San Juan County to
submit the appeal “within ten (10) calendar days of the issuance
of the written decision applying the land use ordinance.” San Juan
County, Utah, Zoning Ordinance § 2-2(2)(a) (2011). And they
recognize that the appeal window does not begin with the
issuance of the land use decision but, rather, when the appealing
party “receive[s] actual or constructive notice of the issuance of
[the land use decision].” Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, ¶ 25, 200
P.3d 182.

¶27 The Coalition argues that it was not until the June 26
response to the GRAMA Request that the Coalition received
actual notice of the County’s May 10 Letter, which is the decision
relevant to this case. The Coalition therefore argues that its appeal
was timely, having been filed on July 6, just ten days after receipt
of the response to the GRAMA Request. Although the Coalition
recognizes the concept of constructive notice, it contends that the
events relied on by the district court would not have provided
earlier constructive notice of the County’s decision. We agree.

¶28 The district court concluded that three events gave the
Coalition earlier constructive notice of the County’s decision.
First, the court relied on the “substantial public clamor” about the
possibility of the truck stop being approved and the “active
community involvement” on the matter, including involvement
by members of the Coalition. Second, the court pointed to
comments Dailey made during a public meeting on May 21 that
referred to specific details from the truck stop project, and the
court inferred from these comments that the Coalition knew by

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that date that Love’s had submitted an application. 3 Third, the
court relied on the interim county administrator’s June 7 email
stating that Love’s “had applied for the permit after ‘substantial
activities in anticipation of the development,’ and [was] ‘likely
vested.’” But we agree with the Coalition that none of these events
constituted constructive notice that a decision on the application
had been made.

¶29 In Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, 200 P.3d 182, the Utah
Supreme Court discussed the constructive notice that would start
running the time to appeal. The supreme court stated, “Generally,
if a party does not receive actual notice of the issuance of the
permit, the party receives constructive notice that a building
permit has been issued when construction begins.” Id. ¶ 27. But
this is not the only way constructive notice can occur. Id. For
example, “the permit holder may devise some method of his own
for ensuring that members of the public will be chargeable with
knowledge of the permit and his building intentions, such as
posting a visible and informative sign on the property prior to
construction.” Id. (quotation simplified). That is, after a
transparent action that would clearly convey to affected parties
that a decision has been made, those parties will be chargeable
with knowledge of the land use decision. Either way, the permit
holder has “the responsibility of providing notice of the permit’s
issuance, whether it be by beginning construction or by some other
means.” Id. ¶ 34 (emphasis added).

¶30 But the events relied upon by the district court were not
such actions. They did not clearly put the Coalition on notice that
a decision had been made. Unlike the start of construction that
would communicate that a building permit must have been
acquired, the actions here—public clamor, knowledge of an

3. The Coalition does not accept this inference drawn by the court.
But because we disagree with the district court’s timeliness
determination, we need not further address the validity of this
inference.

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application, and being informed that Love’s was “likely” vested
as a result of the activities it had taken in anticipation of
approval—do not clearly indicate that the County had made a
decision. And because the short ten-day appeal period starts
running upon receipt of constructive notice, see id. ¶ 24, it cannot
be the case that alerting a party to events that typically occur prior
to a land use decision being made qualifies as constructive notice
of the subsequent decision itself. Indeed, if we allowed notice of
an application’s pending or submitted status to constitute
constructive notice, it could “effectively strip[] potentially
aggrieved parties of their right to appeal.” See id. This is because
whenever a party became aware of an application’s existence
more than ten days before a county acted on the application, then
the ten-day appeals period would have commenced and would
have completely run before there even existed any decision to
appeal. 4

¶31 Thus, we do not agree that knowledge of precursor events
indicating an impending land use decision is sufficient to
constitute constructive notice of the issuance of that land use
decision. Instead, the time for the Coalition to file its appeal began
to run with receipt of the GRAMA response on June 26, thus
making its July 6 appeal timely. The district court’s determination
to the contrary was erroneous.

4. To the extent Love’s argues that the June 7 email constitutes not
just notice that an application had been filed, but also notice that
it had been approved, we disagree. The language of the email is
unlike the “visible and informative sign” that the Fox court opined
would convey constructive notice. See Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85,
¶ 27, 200 P.3d 182 (quotation simplified). Instead, the language of
this email was vague and uncertain, stating only that Love’s was
“likely vested” and hypothesizing that it was unlikely the
proposed use “would not be permitted,” and then directing
Dailey where to obtain more information. That language clearly
suggests that a decision had not yet been made.

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II. Associational Standing

¶32 Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides,
“When two or more persons associated in any business either as
a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a
corporation, transact such business under a common name, . . .
they may sue or be sued by such common name.” Utah R. Civ. P.
17(d). Love’s contests the district court’s determination that the
Coalition could appropriately bring suit under this rule,
specifically challenging whether the Coalition transacted
business, as required by the rule.

¶33 As an initial matter, we agree with the Coalition that Love’s
defines “transacted business” far too narrowly when it argues that
the Coalition did not transact business because it “does not claim
to have ever contracted with anyone, acquired or transferred any
asset, spent any money or purchased any service.” The factors
relevant to determine whether an entity has “transacted business”
depend heavily on the type of business in which the entity
typically engages. So although the factors in a for-profit company
likely will include many activities with economic implications, the
relevant factors will be different for a non-profit association with
other organizational goals.

¶34 For example, in a previous case we determined that
“an unincorporated, voluntary environmental watch-dog
association” met the requirements of rule 17(d) where it had
“act[ed] under a common name for several years in monitoring and
working to improve air quality in Davis County.” Graham v. Davis
County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Service Dist.,
1999 UT App 136, ¶ 12, 979 P.2d 363 (emphasis added). And even
in a case involving a bank—an entity whose business clearly
revolved around financial transactions—one factor the court
listed as relevant was decidedly non-financial: “how the business
holds itself out to the public.” Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895
P.2d 839, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), aff’d, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996).

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Thus, more factors are relevant to whether an entity “transacted
business” than simply those involving financial transactions.

¶35 In its determination of standing, the district court noted,

There is evidence in the litigation record that the
Coalition has engaged in fundraising efforts. Its
efforts have expanded and it is involved with
general development in the Spanish Valley. The
efforts reflect its stated purpose of community
activism and advocacy. And it filed its assumed
name designation with the State on the day it filed
for judicial review. Considering all of the Coalition’s
activities by the time this case was filed, the court is
persuaded that the Coalition could sue as an
association . . . .

Love’s takes issue with this conclusion and argues that there was
no record evidence supporting the court’s observation that the
Coalition engaged in fundraising.

¶36 Although there are at least some record references to the
Coalition’s fundraising, many other facts in the record support the
district court’s ultimate conclusion that the Coalition had
standing to bring its claims. Specifically, there is evidence that the
Coalition conducted many activities to transact its business of
“hav[ing] our voice heard in our county government,” such as
holding frequent meetings, recruiting members, “monitoring
planning and zoning developments in the County, attending and
speaking at County Commission and Planning and Zoning
Commission meetings,” “organizing [public] letter-writing
campaigns, meeting individually with public officials and
planning consultants, and engaging with the media on news
stories and sending Letters to the Editor.” These activities show
that the Coalition transacted business under a common name, and
they support the district court’s standing determination. We

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therefore decline to disturb the district court’s standing
determination. 5

CONCLUSION

¶37 We disagree with the district court on each aspect of its
determination as to the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Bondio Letter was an adequate, timely filed appeal on the
Coalition’s behalf. We therefore reverse the court’s summary
judgment and dismissal, and we remand for further proceedings.

¶38 As to Love’s cross-appeal, we agree with the district court
that the Coalition had associational standing to pursue its claims
on appeal. We therefore decline to disturb this portion of the
district court’s decision.

5. The County also argues that there can be “no basis for
associational standing” where there exists no single member of
the Coalition that both filed an appeal of and was adversely
affected by the county’s decision. See generally Utah Code § 17-
27a-801(1)–(2) (requiring an “adversely affected party” to exhaust
administrative remedies before challenging a land use decision in
district court). But as discussed above, see supra Part I.A, the
Bondio letter was an appeal on behalf of the Coalition; thus, the
Coalition filed the appeal. And the Coalition also has standing as an
adversely affected party because at least one of its members owns
property adjoining the land intended for the travel stop. See Utah
Code § 17-27a-103(2) (including in the definition of “adversely
affected party” a person who “owns real property adjoining the
property that is the subject of a land use application or land use
decision”); Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board,
2006 UT 74, ¶ 21, 148 P.3d 960 (“An association . . . has standing if
its individual members have standing and the participation of the
individual members is not necessary to the resolution of the
case.”). Thus, this argument is not well taken.

20210235-CA 17 2023 UT App 12