Canteros-Alvarez v. Green

2026 UT App 95

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ESTHER CANTEROS-ALVAREZ,
Appellee,
v.
LUPITA ANGEL GREEN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20241094-CA
Filed June 19, 2026

Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable James D. Gardner
Commissioner Russell Minas
No. 244904978

Kendra M. Brown and Taylor P. Kordsiemon,
Attorneys for Appellant
Taylor P. Webb and Olivia C. Shaughnessy,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.

TENNEY, Judge:

¶1 Esther Canteros-Alvarez obtained a protective order
against Lupita Angel Green, and this protective order was based
on a text that Green had sent that contained what Canteros-
Alvarez regarded as a threat of physical violence. Green now
appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support
the issuance of the protective order. We agree with Green and
vacate the protective order.
Canteros-Alvarez v. Green

BACKGROUND 1

Underlying Events

¶2 Green is Canteros-Alvarez’s older sister. A short time
before the events at issue in this case, Canteros-Alvarez began
using a car that Green owned. Green “absolutely hates” Canteros-
Alvarez’s husband (Husband), and Green became upset when she
found out that Husband had also been driving the car. On July 20,
2024, Green and Canteros-Alvarez had a heated telephone
conversation that spilled over into a text exchange. In one of the
texts, Green wrote the following:

I am pissed off. I pray to God that you swing first so
that I can beat the shit out of you. I wish I could go
back in time and punch you in the face because
that’s the only way that I might have been able to
save you.

Sometime during the telephone conversation or in the texts (the
record is a bit unclear on which), Green also told Canteros-
Alvarez that when their mother died, Green was going to “spread
her ashes all over” Canteros-Alvarez and Husband and that it
would then “take forever” to “get her ashes out of [their] . . . stuff.”
After the July 20 conversation and texts, Canteros-Alvarez
returned the car to Green without incident.

¶3 A short time later, Green informed Canteros-Alvarez that
she was going to be petitioning for guardianship of Canteros-
Alvarez’s son because she thought “he was not safe” with
Canteros-Alvarez. Green soon filed that petition, and a court
commissioner held a hearing on it on September 4. Before the

1. When a party appeals a decision granting a protective order,
“we consider the facts in a light most favorable to the district
court’s ruling, including its findings.” Mota v. Mota, 2016 UT App
201, ¶ 2 n.2, 382 P.3d 1080 (quotation simplified).

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hearing began, Green “confronted” Canteros-Alvarez,
approaching her with a “whole stack of paperwork and a letter
that she wrote to [the commissioner] about why she should get
guardianship of [Canteros-Alvarez’s] son.” Green also told
Husband that Canteros-Alvarez was cheating on him and that
Green was “going to be so happy” when Canteros-Alvarez and
Husband broke up. 2

¶4 Later that same day, Green called police and asked them to
perform a welfare check on Canteros-Alvarez’s son, claiming that
he was “malnourished and in unsafe living conditions.” Officers
arrived, talked to Canteros-Alvarez’s son, looked around the
house, and observed no problem. Officers told Canteros-Alvarez
that it seemed like Green had used her call as a way of
“harass[ing]” Canteros-Alvarez.

¶5 Soon thereafter, Green called the Utah Division of Child
and Family Services (DCFS), claiming that Canteros-Alvarez’s son
was being abused and that the home was unsanitary. This call
resulted in a home visit from DCFS, during which DCFS
determined that things were “perfectly fine.”

¶6 Around this same time, Canteros-Alvarez came to believe
that Green had opened a Facebook account that used Husband’s
driver license photo as the profile picture and displayed his
personal information. Canteros-Alvarez later alleged that law
enforcement was investigating this incident.

The Request for a Protective Order

¶7 On September 6, Canteros-Alvarez filed a request for a
protective order against Green under the Cohabitant Abuse Act

2. It’s unclear from the record in this case what the result of the
guardianship hearing was, but Green informs us in her appellate
brief that she later abandoned her efforts to obtain a guardianship
over Canteros-Alvarez’s son.

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(the Act). 3 In that request, which was filled out using a court form,
Canteros-Alvarez said “the most recent abuse” occurred on
September 4, and she then described her confrontation with Green
at the guardianship hearing as well as Green’s phone call to
police. Canteros-Alvarez also said that Green had previously
“been threatening” to “[p]unch [Canteros-Alvarez] in the face if
that meant she could change [her] mind.” Canteros-Alvarez
additionally referred to the alleged Facebook account and Green’s
call to DCFS. And Canteros-Alvarez claimed that Green had
threatened to call the Utah State Tax Commission and accuse
Canteros-Alvarez and Husband of fraud.

¶8 In a section of the form that asked Canteros-Alvarez to
describe “past abuse,” Canteros-Alvarez stated that on July 20,
Green had “threatened to ‘[p]unch [her] in the face and beat the
shit out of [her].’” Canteros-Alvarez also checked a box indicating
she had “[f]ear of imminent physical harm” and “fear that there
[was] a substantial likelihood of imminent physical harm by
[Green] against” her. Under that box, Canteros-Alvarez wrote
that Green’s “threats have become more erratic and severe
considering the allegations she is threatening to file. She has
already involved law enforcement and claimed this is not going
to stop.”

The Protective Order Hearing

¶9 The district court issued a temporary protective order on
September 10, and the parties then participated in a hearing on
September 24 in front of a court commissioner (the

3. Under the Act, “an individual who is 16 years old or older” and
“resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party”
is considered a “[c]ohabitant.” Utah Code § 78B-7-102(7)(a)(i).
Because the parties in this appeal are sisters who grew up in the
same household, they qualify as “cohabitants,” and neither party
has challenged that point on appeal.

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Commissioner). Canteros-Alvarez and Green each participated in
that hearing pro se.

¶10 At the hearing, Canteros-Alvarez testified about the events
described above. After doing so, she said, “I feel like it’s not going
to stop because [Green] has it in her mind that she’s going to take
my son, and I’m worried.” For her part, Green testified that the
“claims” that she had “threatened” Canteros-Alvarez were
“simply not true.” Green provided the Commissioner with a copy
of the July 20 text message. Green testified that she had been
“actively working to pursue guardianship” of Canteros-Alvarez’s
son, and she asserted that this was “the real reason” that
Canteros-Alvarez was “upset.”

¶11 At one point in the hearing, Canteros-Alvarez was
attempting to introduce a piece of evidence when the
Commissioner emphasized that the question before him was just
“whether there was actual physical abuse or a threat of physical
harm.” In response, Canteros-Alvarez conceded that the only
allegation that showed that there was a threat of physical harm
was the July 20 text message.

¶12 At the close of the hearing, the Commissioner ruled from
the bench. The Commissioner began by quoting language from
the Act providing that “[a]ny cohabitant who has been subjected
to abuse or domestic violence . . . may seek a protective order.”
See Utah Code § 78B-7-602(1). And the Commissioner cited
statutory language defining “abuse” as “intentionally or
knowingly placing another individual in reasonable fear of
imminent physical harm.” See id. § 78B-7-102(1).

¶13 The Commissioner then expressed his view that the only
allegation that could satisfy this standard was the July 20 text
message. In the Commissioner’s view, the “other stuff” that had
been alleged “might be something that potentially” could be at
issue in some other kind of case but not “necessarily for [a]
protective order case.” Addressing the July 20 text, the

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Commissioner observed that “the question” before him
was whether this was “an actual threat . . . to do physical harm
to” Canteros-Alvarez. The Commissioner then expressed his
view that the text “approaches a line here.” Continuing, he
observed that the “question is whether it crosses it. The line
is whether it . . . actually constitutes a threat to do something in
the future.” The Commissioner acknowledged the conditional
nature of the threat, stating that the text was an “expression of
anger” along with “some desire to engage in a physical
altercation, but then it’s . . . conditional.” The Commissioner noted
it was “a difficult proposition where this contingency [was] put in
there.”

¶14 Having made these observations, the Commissioner ruled
that, “by the narrowest of margins,” the text message “crosse[d]
the line” because it was “the kind of thing that would cause
somebody to have fear of physical harm.” The Commissioner
called this “a close call,” but he nevertheless concluded that
Canteros-Alvarez had “met her burden,” and he accordingly
recommended entry of the protective order as requested. Later
that day, the district court accepted the recommendation and
issued the protective order.

¶15 Green did not object to the Commissioner’s
recommendation. Instead, after it was issued, she filed a notice of
appeal challenging “[t]he entire order or judgment, which was
entered on September 24.”

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶16 On appeal, Green argues that there was insufficient
evidence to show that Canteros-Alvarez was ever placed in
reasonable fear of imminent harm. “When an appellant is
essentially challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a
clearly erroneous standard of appellate review applies.” Hedgcock

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v. Hedgcock, 2009 UT App 304, ¶ 9, 221 P.3d 856 (quotation
simplified). 4

ANALYSIS

¶17 A court may issue a protective order under the Act “[i]f it
appears . . . that domestic violence or abuse has occurred” or “that
there is a substantial likelihood domestic violence or abuse will
occur.” Utah Code § 78B-7-603(1). In the ruling at issue, the
Commissioner never referred to domestic violence, instead
focusing on abuse, and the parties have followed suit on appeal.
In challenging the issuance of the protective order, Green’s
principal argument is that there was insufficient evidence to show
that abuse had either occurred or was substantially likely to occur.
We agree.

¶18 Abuse is defined under the Act as “intentionally or
knowingly causing or attempting to cause another individual
physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing another
individual in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm.” Id.
§ 78B-7-102(1). As noted, Canteros-Alvarez never alleged that
Green had actually physically harmed her. Instead, Canteros-
Alvarez alleged that Green had abused her by placing her in fear

4. Rule 108 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the
procedure by which a party can object to the recommendation of
a court commissioner, but as noted, Green did not take advantage
of this procedure to object. We’ve previously held, however, that
“nothing in the plain language of [that] rule . . . makes the filing
of an objection a prerequisite to the filing of an appeal or a
necessary step to preserve any particular challenge to the entry of
the order.” Mota, 2016 UT App 201. Also, we note that the district
court made no independent findings; instead, the findings at issue
on appeal are those made by the Commissioner. Consistent with
this sequence of events, we’ll refer to those as having been made
by the Commissioner throughout this opinion.

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of “imminent physical harm.” Focusing there, we note that one
dictionary defines “imminent” as “ready to take place: happening
soon.” 5 Another dictionary defines “imminent” as “coming or
likely to happen very soon.” 6 Consistent with these definitions,
our supreme court has defined the phrase “imminent danger” as
“an immediate, real threat to one’s safety” that is “impending”
and “about to occur at any moment.” State v. Clara, 2024 UT 10,
¶ 36, 546 P.3d 963 (quotation simplified).

¶19 The supreme court’s decision in State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19,
299 P.3d 1133, is instructive on the proper interpretation of an
element that turns on whether force was “imminent.” There, the
defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault, and on
appeal, the supreme court considered the question of whether the
defendant was entitled to a defense-of-others instruction. See id.
¶¶ 1–2. To receive such an instruction, there needed to be some
evidence that the defendant “reasonably believe[d] that force or a
threat of force [was] necessary to defend . . . a third person against
another person’s imminent use of unlawful force.” Id. ¶ 13
(quotation simplified). The evidence showed that the defendant
had received a phone call from a friend in which the friend
claimed that her boyfriend “had been hurting her.” Id. ¶ 2
(quotation simplified). The defendant then drove to the house
where his friend lived, at which point he confronted and then
stabbed her boyfriend. See id. ¶¶ 3–5. On appeal, the supreme
court concluded that while the initial phone call had suggested
that the defendant’s friend “was in imminent danger at the time of
the call,” it did not support the issuance of the requested
instruction. Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis in original). This was so, in part,
because the defendant had stabbed the victim “some time after

5. Imminent, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/imminent [https://perma.cc/69T4-6R6S].

6. Imminent, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org
/us/dictionary/english/imminent [https://perma.cc/2YSL-LJZG].

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the phone call,” at which point there was no longer any indication
that the friend was still in imminent danger. Id.

¶20 Our recent decision in State v. Farmer, 2025 UT App 57, 569
P.3d 267, cert. denied, 574 P.3d 522 (Utah 2025), sheds further light
on such questions. There, we considered whether the defendant
should have received an instruction on the defense of compulsion.
See id. ¶ 2. Such an instruction required a showing, in part, that
the defendant was “coerced” to act “by the use or threatened
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third
person.” Id. ¶ 55 (quotation simplified). Interpreting that
requirement, we held that “it must appear that the threat had been
communicated to the defendant” that he or another person
“would be subjected to physical force presently.” Id. (quotation
simplified). And we further noted that “a threat directed to some
indefinite time in the future is not an imminent threat for
purposes of the defense of compulsion.” Id. (quotation
simplified).

¶21 Turning to this appeal, we recognize that Berriel and Farmer
addressed the term “imminent” in other statutory contexts, but
we still find these decisions persuasive as to how that same word
should be interpreted for purposes of the Act. And against that
backdrop, we turn to the evidence presented below.

¶22 As noted, the Commissioner based his decision on the July
20 text. In the Commissioner’s view, this text was an “expression
of anger” showing that Green had “some desire to engage in a
physical altercation.” Even accepting that premise, however,
several things stand out to us.

¶23 First, in the text, Green never said that she was actually
going to hit Canteros-Alvarez. Instead, what she said was she
would like to hit her. These are different things.

¶24 Second, on the face of the text, Green expressed that desire
in conditional terms. Again, Green said that she hoped Canteros-

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Alvarez would “swing first so that [she could] beat the shit out of
[her].” In this sense, what she said was that she was not going to
hit Canteros-Alvarez unless Canteros-Alvarez hit her first,
meaning that the threat of violence was dependent on an event
that had not yet happened and might not happen. In our view, the
conditional nature of this statement weakens any suggestion that
the threatened violence was “impending” and “about to occur at
any moment.” Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 36 (quotation simplified).

¶25 Third, because the text was sent while the two were some
distance away from each other, it seems analogous to the situation
involved in Berriel. And again, the supreme court there held that
although the friend told the defendant, over the phone, that she
was under a threat of violence “at the time of the call,” this was
distinguishable from a suggestion that she was still facing an
“imminent” threat of danger at the time of the subsequent
stabbing. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 16 (emphasis omitted).

¶26 Fourth, there was no indication in the record that there was
any history of violence between Canteros-Alvarez and Green,
such that Canteros-Alvarez would have had some contextual
reason to believe, based on past patterns, that physical violence
was in any way imminent. In fact, in the ruling, the Commissioner
noted that he wasn’t “getting a sense [there had] been any actual
physical contact, in terms of violent physical contact between the
parties.” Rather, he observed that the conflict between the sisters
“[had] to do with the acrimony that [was] going on between the
parties with respect to another matter involving guardianship, or
. . . [Green’s] belief that [Canteros-Alvarez] isn’t a good parent”
and her desire “to try to take” Canteros-Alvarez’s son “in some
sort of legal fashion.”

¶27 Pulling all this together, we conclude that Green’s text was
decidedly indefinite as to both (1) whether Green actually
intended to physically harm Canteros-Alvarez, and, if so,
(2) when any such violence would occur. But as noted, the Act

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Canteros-Alvarez v. Green

requires proof of a threat of imminent physical harm. See Utah
Code § 78B-7-102(1). Taking this statutory requirement at face
value, we conclude that this text could not support the issuance
of a protective order. Because the Commissioner’s ruling was
based on this text, we conclude that it should not have been
issued.

CONCLUSION

¶28 For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the protective
order. 7

7. On appeal, Green also challenges the issuance of the protective
order on several other grounds. In light of our conclusion that
Canteros-Alvarez presented insufficient evidence of a necessary
element, we need not address the other arguments.
We also acknowledge that the events Canteros-Alvarez
described were understandably distressing, and our opinion
should not be read to suggest that she had no other legal avenue
available by which she could seek to protect herself from Green’s
actions. But Canteros-Alvarez sought protection under the Act,
and as discussed, the Act requires proof of specific elements. We
simply hold that Canteros-Alvarez did not sufficiently prove that
she faced a reasonable fear of imminent physical harm, which is
what was required for her to obtain relief under the statute she
invoked.

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