Jenkins v. Jenkins

2026 UT App 86

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KRISTINE JENKINS,
Appellee,
v.
EVAN K. JENKINS,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20241206-CA
Filed May 29, 2026

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Kraig Powell
No. 224400152

Steve S. Christensen and Clinton Brimhall,
Attorneys for Appellant
Emily Adams, Mikayla Irvin, and Kristy Hanson,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and JOHN D. LUTHY
concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 After a two-day divorce trial, the district court imputed a
gross monthly income to Evan K. Jenkins and awarded Kristine
Jenkins monthly alimony. 1 Evan now appeals the terms of the
alimony award, arguing that the court abused its discretion in
imputing his income and in crafting the overall award. We affirm.

1. Because the parties share a surname, we will refer to them by
their given names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent
informality.
Jenkins v. Jenkins

BACKGROUND

Procedural History

¶2 Evan and Kristine married in 1999, and Kristine filed for
divorce in January 2022. In her petition, Kristine requested an
award of alimony. Evan filed a counter-petition. Therein, he
claimed that his income for purposes of calculating child support
was “$8,000 gross per month.” But he argued that “[n]either Party
should be awarded alimony.”

¶3 The case proceeded to a two-day bench trial, after which
the district court issued a fifty-four-page ruling setting forth its
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Both parties subsequently
filed posttrial motions, which the court denied. Only two of the
issues before the district court are relevant to this appeal: Evan’s
income and the alimony award. We recount the relevant evidence
and the court’s related findings on both points.

Evan’s Income

¶4 At the time of trial, Evan had been an automobile mechanic
for twenty-five years and had worked at the same shop since
approximately 2010. Evan provided his paystubs and the parties’
joint tax returns for 2019 through 2023 as evidence of income.
According to the pay stubs and tax returns for the years 2019,
2020, and 2021—before Kristine filed for divorce—Evan earned a
gross annual income of $150,434; $142,922; and $146,361,
respectively. But Evan’s gross annual income was significantly
lower in 2022 and 2023—after Kristine filed for divorce—totaling
$96,241 and $100,855, respectively.

¶5 Both parties testified regarding Evan’s income. For her
part, Kristine explained that throughout the marriage, Evan
threatened to lower his income by working less so that Kristine
would not “get any money, his money.” Kristine stated that in
October 2021, she and Evan had an argument, during which Evan

20241206-CA 2 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

“threatened that he wasn’t going to give [her] any money, and
that he wasn’t going to pay alimony.” According to Kristine,
Evan’s coworkers had “advised him to work less so that [she]
would not get any alimony.” And Kristine averred that Evan had
followed through with his threats, noting that Evan’s monthly
pay stubs reflect a “significant drop” in income from October 2021
onward. Given all this, Kristine asked the court to find that Evan
was “voluntarily underemployed” and to calculate Evan’s gross
monthly income “based on the average of his 2019–2021 average
gross monthly incomes.” Using this formula, Kristine requested
that Evan be imputed $13,009 per month in income.

¶6 For his part, Evan conceded that he and Kristine had an
argument in October 2021. But Evan maintained that he never told
Kristine that he was going to stop working or that he would not
pay expenses. Evan testified that he was working full-time and
that he was earning as much as he could earn. He attributed the
decrease in his income to a change of ownership in the company
he worked for, which occurred around the same time as his
argument with Kristine. Evan explained that his new employer
had implemented several changes to its business model that had
negatively impacted his compensation. Additionally, Evan
claimed that Kristine was informed about the sale of the company
approximately one year before it went through and that she had
accompanied him to search for a new job in anticipation of this
change.

¶7 Evan opposed Kristine’s suggestion that the district court
should find him voluntarily underemployed and impute him
income “beyond what he ha[d] been demonstrated to be earning
at [that point],” given that the reduction in income was the fault
of his new employer and “was out of Evan’s control and
involuntary.” Evan requested that the court calculate his income
using his 2023 pay stubs, which reflected an average gross
monthly income of about $8,037.

20241206-CA 3 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

Alimony

¶8 Kristine testified that she had not been employed for the
vast majority of the marriage. She explained that, instead, she
made an agreement with Evan that she would work in the home
raising their four children and “supporting Evan in his career.” In
March 2022, a few months after filing for divorce, Kristine
returned to work part-time as a hair stylist, earning around $14
per hour plus tips. Based on her financial declaration, Kristine
stated that her monthly need was $7,653, and she asserted that
without alimony, her income was not sufficient to meet her need.

¶9 Kristine also testified about difficulties in the marriage. She
stated that Evan did not “respect boundaries or rules” and that
Evan had been unfaithful throughout the marriage. Kristine
recounted details about several of Evan’s extramarital
relationships, including his most recent affair with his massage
therapist. Kristine testified that Evan and the massage therapist
met in 2018 and that since then, Evan had expended significant
funds on her, giving her a car and paying for more than $6,700 in
emergency dental work.

¶10 Lastly, Kristine testified about Evan’s “sexual and financial
abuse.” She explained that “[n]o doesn’t mean no to [Evan],” so if
she refused his request to have sexual intercourse, “he would
force himself onto [her]” or wait until she fell asleep to have sex
with her. Kristine recounted that on one occasion, she had to be
taken to the hospital after Evan “drugged” her and “forced
himself onto [her].” She also stated that Evan had “complete
control” of the family’s finances and would “withhold financial
support in exchange for sex.” According to Kristine, Evan’s
abusive behavior caused her to experience “[i]nsomnia,
depression, anxiety, weight gain, hair loss,” and post-traumatic
stress.

¶11 Based on her need, Evan’s ability to pay, and Evan’s fault
in the breakup of the marriage, Kristine requested a monthly

20241206-CA 4 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

alimony award of $3,147. Kristine cited Evan’s admissions “that
he spent thousands of dollars on extramarital affairs” as a basis
for the district court to find fault.

¶12 Evan admitted engaging in inappropriate behavior with
other women during the course of the marriage. In particular, he
confirmed having a sexual relationship with his massage
therapist, “fondl[ing]” two women over their clothes, and
spending time with another woman. He acknowledged
purchasing various things for the massage therapist—including a
car and dental work—however, he claimed that she had paid him
back for the car and some of the dental work. And although Evan
admitted to being arrested and charged with rape and forcible
sodomy of Kristine following the incident leading to her hospital
visit, he denied drugging her. He likewise denied restricting
Kristine’s access to the family’s finances.

¶13 In light of the evidence presented at trial, Evan requested
that the district court award Kristine monthly alimony in the
amount of $108.99. In so doing, he pushed back on Kristine’s
suggestion that the court should consider fault in awarding
alimony, citing “a lack of testimony or evidence” demonstrating
that Evan’s extramarital relationships “substantially contributed
to the dissolution” of the marriage or that they had a “harmful
effect.” And without such evidence, Evan argued, the court was
“unable to ascertain that ‘fault’ applie[d].”

The District Court’s Rulings

¶14 The district court first addressed the parties’ incomes. As
to Kristine, the court found that she was underemployed and
imputed income to her based on what she could earn if employed
full-time as a hairstylist. And as to Evan, the court found that he
was employed as an auto mechanic, that he had worked for the
same company since 2011, and that he was “the longest-serving
mechanic currently at his workplace.” The court recognized that
in late 2021, Evan’s company changed ownership, that the new

20241206-CA 5 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

owner “changed the business structure,” and that “Evan was not
responsible for, and had no control over, this change.” The court
detailed Evan’s claims about how the changed business policies
had negatively impacted his earnings and explained that while it
found Evan’s testimony about these changes to be “partially
credible,” Evan’s testimony contained “enough ambiguity” to
support a conclusion “that Evan could do more, if he wanted, to
ensure a higher amount of income.” Additionally, the court did
“not doubt” Kristine’s claim that Evan had threatened to
“intentionally start earning less so that she would not be awarded
as much” alimony.

¶15 Based on the foregoing, the district court found that Evan
was “voluntarily underemployed,” as evidenced by his
“precipitous drop in income of more than $50,000 per year from
2021 to 2022, after Kristine filed for divorce.” Nevertheless, the
court disagreed with Kristine’s suggestion “that all of Evan’s drop
in income was due to his decision to engage in voluntary
underemployment.” Thus, the court concluded that it would not
“be accurate or equitable” to impute income to Evan in the
amount suggested by Kristine. Instead, the court calculated
Evan’s gross monthly income based on his highest bi-weekly
earnings from 2023, resulting in the amount of $9,904.

¶16 The district court then considered Kristine’s request for
alimony. The court first examined whether Evan’s conduct
qualified as fault such that it should be considered in awarding
alimony. The court made dozens of factual findings relating to
Evan’s infidelity, and it also found that Evan’s denials were “not
credible.” The court found that Evan’s extramarital affairs “were
a source of great contention between Evan and Kristine,”
specifically noting that “Evan’s use of marital funds to purchase
items for a person with whom he was having an affair
significantly damaged” the marriage. The court found that Evan
had frequently demanded that Kristine have sex with him even if
she did not want to, and that he had “often engaged in sexual

20241206-CA 6 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

intercourse with Kristine without her consent.” Moreover, the
court determined that Evan had used his control of the family’s
finances to manipulate Kristine. Based on all of this, the court
concluded that Evan’s conduct had “substantially contributed to
the breakup of the marriage, meaning Evan’s conduct
constitute[d] fault,” and could therefore be considered by the
court in determining alimony.

¶17 Next, the district court evaluated “the gravity of the harm
caused by [Evan’s] fault.” The court found that Evan’s sexual
infidelity was the “root cause” of the harm to Kristine and to the
parties’ marriage. Specifically, the court found that Evan’s affairs
were “deeply distressing to Kristine,” “were financially damaging
to the marriage,” and caused Evan and Kristine “to lose affection
for each other.” The court further found that “Evan compounded
his fault by using financial leverage to control Kristine.”

¶18 Based on the harm caused by Evan’s fault, the district court
concluded “that it would be inequitable to allow Evan to enjoy the
same standard of living to which he was accustomed during the
marriage.” “In light of the limited funds available to the parties,”
and “in equity and fairness,” the court elected to reduce Evan’s
proposed living expenses “to allow Kristine to enjoy the
accustomed marital standard of living.”

¶19 The district court then proceeded to examine Evan’s
proposed living expenses. The court departed from the default
rules of alimony and reduced Evan’s proposed expenses in
several categories, including rent, food and household supplies,
gasoline, and automobile payment. The court emphasized that
these reductions were not “imposed as a punishment on Evan for
his at-fault conduct.” Rather, the court reiterated, they were
intended “to prevent the inequity to Kristine of having to live at
less than her marital standard of living.” In total, Evan’s
proposed-needs budget was reduced by $1,134, resulting in a
monthly needs budget of $4,908.

20241206-CA 7 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

¶20 The district court also evaluated Kristine’s proposed needs
budget. After finding that some of Kristine’s proposed expenses
were not reasonable in light of the marital standard of living and
reducing those expenses, the court found that Kristine’s total
monthly need was $6,124. The court then concluded that Kristine
had a need for alimony and Evan had the ability to pay it.

¶21 Based on the foregoing calculations, the district court
found that Evan had a monthly surplus of $2,242 available to pay
Kristine alimony and that Kristine had “a deficit of $3,719 in
meeting her needs.” Because Evan’s surplus was insufficient to
cover Kristine’s needs, the court ordered each party to bear one
half of the $1,477 shortfall. Thus, “[c]ombining the $2,242
available as Evan’s excess income and the $738 of his required
shortfall payment,” the court ordered Evan to pay Kristine $2,980
in monthly alimony, with payments to be ongoing for as long as
the marriage had lasted.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶22 Evan raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues the
district court abused its discretion when it imputed income to him
for purposes of calculating alimony. “Courts have broad
discretion to select an appropriate method of assessing a spouse’s
income, including determinations of income imputation. When
challenging an income determination, appellants bear a heavy
burden, and we can properly find abuse of discretion only if no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court.” Merrill v. Merrill, 2024 UT App 125, ¶ 30, 556 P.3d 1070
(quotation simplified).

¶23 Second, Evan argues the district court abused its discretion
in awarding Kristine alimony. “Trial courts have broad latitude in
determining whether to award alimony and in setting the
amount, and we will not lightly disturb a trial court’s alimony
ruling.” Rule v. Rule, 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 11, 402 P.3d 153

20241206-CA 8 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

(quotation simplified). “Therefore, we review alimony awards
under an abuse of discretion standard.” Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT
App 296, ¶ 8, 169 P.3d 765.

ANALYSIS

I. Evan’s Income

¶24 Evan argues the district court abused its discretion when it
imputed his income for purposes of determining alimony. In
particular, he contends the court’s factual findings supporting the
imputation are inadequate and based on speculation.

¶25 District “courts have broad discretion to select an
appropriate method of assessing a spouse’s income, including
determinations of income imputation.” Merrill v. Merrill, 2024 UT
App 125, ¶ 30, 556 P.3d 1070 (quotation simplified). A court does
not abuse its discretion if its decision is supported by adequate
findings and evidence in the record. “Findings are adequate when
they contain sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure
that the district court’s discretionary determination was rationally
based.” Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 22, 379 P.3d 882. We will
not disturb the court’s factual findings “unless they are clearly
erroneous, that is, unless they are in conflict with the clear weight
of the evidence, or this court has a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Fox v. Fox, 2022 UT App 88, ¶ 13,
515 P.3d 481 (quotation simplified).

¶26 “A court may impute income to an underemployed
spouse for purposes of calculating alimony.” Connell v. Connell,
2010 UT App 139, ¶ 16, 233 P.3d 836. Any income imputation must
be based “upon employment potential and probable earnings
considering, to the extent known,” a variety of enumerated

20241206-CA 9 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

factors. Utah Code § 81-6-203(6)(b). 2 These factors include
“employment opportunities,” “work history,” and “prevailing
earnings and job availability for persons of similar backgrounds
in the community.” Id. If a court imputes a greater income, the
court “shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary
basis for the imputation.” Id. § 81-6-203(6)(d).

¶27 After considering all the evidence before it, the district
court found that Evan was voluntarily underemployed; on this
basis the court deemed it appropriate to impute to Evan
additional income for purposes of calculating alimony. Then,
using “Evan’s employment potential and probable earnings,” the
court found that Evan should be imputed additional monthly
income calculated based on his highest 2023 paycheck. Evan
contends the court abused its discretion by imputing him
additional income based on his historical income because the
court made “no concrete findings to establish that [he] is
underemployed” and because the amount of additional income
the court chose to impute was based on speculation. These claims
are belied by the court’s extensive factual findings.

¶28 First, the district court’s determination that Evan was
voluntarily underemployed is supported by adequate findings
and evidence in the record. A spouse is voluntarily
underemployed “when he or she intentionally chooses of his or
her own free will to become . . . underemployed.” Rayner v.
Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 7, 316 P.3d 455 (quotation simplified).
In making this determination, the court must consider “all the
relevant circumstances, and not just whether a [spouse’s] salary
has recently dropped.” Fox, 2022 UT App 88, ¶ 38; see also Utah
Code § 81-6-203(3)(a) (stating that the court “shall use historical

2. Although this statute “addresses imputation for the purposes
of child support, it is also relevant to imputation in the alimony
context.” Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ¶ 14 n.5, 242 P.3d 787.

20241206-CA 10 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

and current earnings to determine whether” a spouse is
underemployed).

¶29 In finding that Evan was voluntarily underemployed, the
district court addressed Evan’s employment history and salary
between 2019 and 2023. The court found that Evan had been
employed in the same position with the same company since 2011
and that he was “the longest-serving mechanic currently at his
workplace.” The court found that Evan’s gross income sharply
dropped in 2022, after Kristine filed for divorce. The court
accepted Evan’s testimony that a change in ownership at his
company in late 2021 resulted in changes to his pay structure.
However, the court also found credible Kristine’s claim that Evan
had threatened to “intentionally start earning less so that she
would not be awarded as much” alimony. Ultimately, the court
concluded that “the reality” about Evan’s drop in income lay
somewhere between the parties’ positions. And based on Evan’s
testimony about the ways in which the business structure at his
company had changed, the court identified several ways in which
Evan could earn more money with his current employer,
including by leveraging his “seniority and value to the company”
to secure more lucrative jobs or by working more efficiently.

¶30 The district court’s findings regarding Evan’s employment
are sufficiently detailed to “disclose the steps” the court took to
reach its ultimate conclusion that he was underemployed. Rayner,
2013 UT App 269, ¶ 11 (quotation simplified). We do not agree
with Evan that there is any disconnect between the court
accepting his testimony that the sale of his company resulted in a
new pay structure that reduced his income and the court finding
that he was voluntarily underemployed. While the new pay
structure might have reduced Evan’s income in general, that does
not preclude a determination that Evan was purposefully not
maximizing his salary under the new structure. Moreover, the
court fully accepted Evan’s testimony that the sale had occurred;
but it also found that not all of Evan’s decreased earnings could

20241206-CA 11 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

be attributed to the sale and that the “precipitous drop in income”
demonstrated that Evan had acted on his threat to reduce his
income and, thus, that he was voluntarily underemployed. The
court was not required to explain why it found Kristine’s
testimony about Evan’s threat more credible than Evan’s
testimony regarding the impact of the sale, and it is not our job to
second guess the court’s credibility determination. 3 See Shuman v.
Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 6, 406 P.3d 258.

¶31 Moreover, the amount of additional income the district
court chose to impute was supported by sufficient evidence and
not merely based on speculation. As already explained, the court
examined Evan’s historical earnings with his current job along
with his “skills, experience, and training,” and found that Evan
could earn substantially more than he was at the time of trial.
Then, based on this evidence, the court found it appropriate to
impute an amount based on Evan’s highest paycheck of 2023 (a
date which was after both Evan’s threat to decrease his income
and the implementation of the new pay structure at his company).
Given that the court considered the statutory factors and relied on
Evan’s actual pay data in the record, we cannot conclude that the
imputation finding was clearly erroneous. See Fox, 2022 UT App
88, ¶ 13.

¶32 In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion with
respect to imputing income to Evan. The court’s findings are
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the court

3. Even if Evan had not made an explicit threat, Kristine would
still have been entitled to consideration that Evan’s significant
drop in income was due to purposeful underemployment. See Fox
v. Fox, 2022 UT App 88, ¶ 39, 515 P.3d 481 (“[A] drop in income
can be an important factor in determining that a spouse is
underemployed.”).

20241206-CA 12 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

reached its conclusion to impute income, and the record contains
evidence supporting the amount the court chose to impute.

II. Alimony and Fault

¶33 Next, Evan challenges the district court’s alimony
determination. He contends the award is inequitable overall and
therefore an abuse of the court’s discretion. We disagree.

¶34 “The overarching aim of a property division, and of the
decree of which it and the alimony award are subsidiary parts, is
to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties.”
Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 48, 452 P.3d 1134 (quotation
simplified). District courts are afforded wide discretion in crafting
an alimony award, so long as they consider the required statutory
factors, see Utah Code § 81-4-502(1). These include “the standard
of living existing during the marriage,” “the financial condition
and needs of the payee,” and “the ability of the payor to provide
support.” Id. § 81-4-502(1)(a)–(b), (d). The court may also
“consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award
alimony and the terms of the alimony.” Id. § 81-4-502(2)(a). A
spouse’s extramarital affair constitutes fault if it “substantially
contributed to the breakup of the marriage.” Id. § 81-4-501(3)(a).

¶35 If, after assessing these factors, the district court “finds that
the receiving spouse is unable to meet [his or] her own needs with
[his or] her own income, the court must then assess whether the
payor spouse’s income, after meeting his [or her] needs, is
sufficient to make up some or all of the shortfall between the
receiving spouse’s needs and income.” Redden v. Redden, 2020 UT
App 22, ¶ 21, 461 P.3d 314 (quotation simplified). In cases where
the parties’ combined resources are not sufficient to meet both
parties’ needs, the court enjoys “broad discretion in dividing the
shortfall and apportioning that burden, so long as the award is
equitable and supported by the findings.” Rule v. Rule, 2017 UT
App 137, ¶ 21, 402 P.3d 153.

20241206-CA 13 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

¶36 The district court in this case properly followed the above
process in awarding Kristine monthly alimony. The court first
addressed the parties’ gross monthly incomes. The court found
that both parties were voluntarily underemployed and imputed
income to each. The court then considered Evan’s fault. After
finding that Evan’s conduct satisfied the statutory definition of
fault, the court identified several ways in which Evan’s fault had
harmed Kristine and the parties’ marriage. These included that
Evan’s affairs were “deeply distressing to Kristine” on an
emotional level and “were financially damaging to the marriage.”
In light of Evan’s fault, the court concluded it would be
appropriate to reduce some of Evan’s proposed living expenses
“to allow Kristine to enjoy the accustomed marital standard of
living.”

¶37 Next, the district court turned to the parties’ proposed-
needs budgets. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court
found that some of Kristine’s proposed expenses were excessive
in light of the marital standard of living and accordingly reduced
those expenses. Regarding Evan’s budget, the court found that his
proposed health insurance expense was excessive in light of the
fact that most of the parties’ children had become adults, and the
court accordingly reduced that expense; however, the court also
made several fault-based reductions to Evan’s otherwise
reasonable expenses. After making these adjustments, the court
determined that Kristine had a deficit of $3,719 in meeting her
needs and that Evan had a surplus of $2,242 available to pay
Kristine alimony. Applying Evan’s surplus to Kristine’s deficit,
the court found that Kristine was still left with a $1,477 shortfall.
The court concluded that “[i]n equity,” Evan and Kristine would
“each bear one-half of this shortfall.” Thus, the court ordered
Evan to pay Kristine $2,980 in alimony.

¶38 Despite the fact that the district court carefully adhered to
the proper procedure when awarding alimony, Evan argues that
the award is unreasonable “because there is not enough money to

20241206-CA 14 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

enable the district court to make fault-based reductions and
because there are not sufficient findings of fact to support the
fault-based reductions anyway.” Evan’s arguments are
unavailing.

¶39 First, much of Evan’s reasonableness argument is premised
on his belief that the district court improperly imputed income to
him. That is, Evan contends the court abused its discretion
because it “split the shortfall after imputing [him] income he does
not have and after arbitrarily slashing his expenses because of the
fault determination.” In essence, it is Evan’s position that the
award is inequitable because the court artificially inflated his
ability to pay alimony through imputation. But because we have
already determined that the court properly imputed income to
Evan, it was not unreasonable or an abuse of discretion for the
court to use that imputed figure when calculating alimony.

¶40 Nor was it unreasonable for the district court to reduce
Evan’s expenses based on his fault. Evan claims that where, as
here, a shortfall exists, it is per se unreasonable for a court to make
fault-based reductions to a party’s reasonable expenses. But this
position is directly at odds with controlling authority. “Although
courts should begin each alimony determination by considering
the parties’ respective economic circumstances with the aim of
equalizing their post-divorce standards of living as nearly as
possible to the standard of living they enjoyed while married,
both our case law and the language of the alimony statute
demonstrate that courts may depart from these default rules
where necessary to achieve a fair and equitable result between the
parties.” Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 47. “[W]here one party’s fault has
harmed the other party, the court may attempt to re-balance the
equities by adjusting the alimony award in favor of the party who
was harmed by that fault.” Id. ¶ 61. So long as the court has
correctly determined that conduct qualifies as fault and entered
sufficient findings regarding the requisite harm caused by the
fault, “we will not disturb the court’s alimony determination

20241206-CA 15 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

unless the factual findings underlying the determination are
insufficient or clearly erroneous, or the resulting alimony award
causes such serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.” Id. ¶ 65.

¶41 As just explained, before setting the alimony award, the
district court thoroughly considered Evan’s conduct, found that
he was substantially at fault for the breakup of the marriage, and
found that his conduct had harmed Kristine and the marriage. 4
Based on the harm caused by Evan’s fault, the court elected to
reduce some of Evan’s proposed living expenses. “[O]nce a court
decides to base a party’s alimony award on a lower standard of
living than he or she enjoyed during marriage, it will inevitably
have to reduce that party’s expected monthly expenses. In
practice, this will require the court to reduce the costs of specific
line items in that person’s budget.” Id. ¶ 77. That is exactly what
the court did here: it carefully combed through Evan’s anticipated
expenses and reduced several of those claimed expenses but did
not eliminate any of them. 5 And the court made clear that these
reductions were not designed to punish Evan for his at-fault
conduct but were instead intended to prevent inequity to Kristine.
Thus, contrary to Evan’s assertions, the court’s fault reductions
were not arbitrary and were supported by adequate findings.

4. Evan does not directly challenge the district court’s fault
determination. Rather, his appellate argument concerns the
supposedly “arbitrary” fault-based reductions.

5. As Evan himself acknowledges, the district court’s budget is
sufficient to cover his basic needs such as housing, food, and
healthcare. Furthermore, the court’s budget provides for a
number of discretionary expenses, including a line-item for
retirement account contributions, which the court awarded
without prompting from Evan.

20241206-CA 16 2026 UT App 86
Jenkins v. Jenkins

Under the deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the
court abused its discretion in determining alimony.

CONCLUSION

¶42 The district court acted within its discretion in imputing
income to Evan and in setting alimony. The court’s
determinations are supported by sufficient factual findings and
are not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm.

20241206-CA 17 2026 UT App 86