TAYLOR v. HEBER CITY

2026 UT App 84

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TRACY TAYLOR, LINDY REIOUX, AND JOSEPH BARNEY,
Appellants,
v.
HEBER CITY,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20250940-CA
Filed May 29, 2026

Fourth District Court, Heber Department
The Honorable Jennifer A. Mabey
No. 250500025

John T. Gadd, Attorney for Appellants
Jeremy R. Cook and Andrew W. Houlin,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY
concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Tracy Taylor, Lindy Reioux, and Joseph Barney
(collectively, Appellants) filed a ballot referendum application
seeking to overturn a recently passed city ordinance. Heber City
(the City) denied their application as untimely because the
relevant ordinance had passed on December 17, 2024, and
Appellants did not file their application until January 23, 2025—
well past the statutorily imposed deadline. Appellants sought
judicial review of the denial. The district court granted summary
judgment to the City, concluding that Appellants did not timely
file their application as required by the relevant statute. On
appeal, Appellants argue the relevant ordinance was not passed
on December 17, 2024, but was instead passed on January 21, 2025,
Taylor v. Heber City

making their ballot referendum application timely. We disagree
and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

BACKGROUND 1

¶2 At its December 17, 2024 meeting, the Heber City Council
(Council) discussed a proposed ordinance concerning the North
Village Development Annexation (the Ordinance). As proposed,
the Ordinance would have been effective immediately. Following
discussion and public comment on the Ordinance, a council
member made a motion to approve the Ordinance, “contingent”
on the subsequent execution of two development agreements. The
City’s attorney explained that the Ordinance originally contained
language making the Ordinance effective upon approval by the
Council and asked the council member if he intended to amend
that language. In response, the council member “amended his
motion to clarify that the Ordinance would be contingent upon
the approval and execution of” the two development agreements.
The Council then voted on the motion to approve the Ordinance,
which passed with three votes in favor and two against. 2

¶3 The two development agreements were then discussed at
the Council’s meeting on January 21, 2025. Both development

1. “When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we recite
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Burton v. Chen, 2023 UT 14, ¶ 5 n.2, 532 P.3d 1005 (cleaned
up).

2. When the Ordinance was executed in early February 2025, its
final language stated: “This Ordinance shall take effect upon
approval by the City Council and execution by Heber City of both
the Development Agreement for the Harvest Village Mixed Use
Development and the Development Agreement for the North
Village Crossings.”

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Taylor v. Heber City

agreements were approved at this meeting by a vote of four in
favor and one opposed.

¶4 Two days later, on January 23, 2025, Appellants filed a
ballot referendum application seeking to overturn the Ordinance.
The City rejected their application, concluding it was not timely
filed pursuant to Utah Code, which required a referendum
application to be filed within five days of the passage of a local
law. See Utah Code § 20A-7-601(6) (2024). 3 The statute specified
that “[s]ponsors of any referendum petition challenging . . . any
local law passed by a local legislative body shall file the
application before 5 p.m. within five days after the day on which
the local law was passed.” Id. The City determined the Ordinance
was passed by the Council at the December 17, 2024 meeting, and,
therefore, Appellants’ application was filed more than five days
after its passage.

¶5 Appellants then sought judicial review of this denial in the
district court, arguing the City was incorrect when it determined
the Ordinance had passed on December 17, 2024, because the
Ordinance should not have been considered passed until the two
development agreements had been approved on January 21, 2025.
The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the Ordinance
had passed in December and Appellants’ January application was
untimely, so the “City correctly determined that the Application
was not referable to voters.” The district court agreed, concluding
the Ordinance had passed—as the word is used in Utah Code

3. The language of this statute was amended in 2026 and now
reads, “Sponsors of any referendum petition challenging . . . any
local law passed by a local legislative body shall file the
application no later than the first business day that is at least five
days after the day on which the local law was passed.” Utah Code
§ 20A-7-601(6) (2026). We apply the statutory language that was
in effect at the time of the events at issue. See North Fork Special
Serv. Dist. v. Bennion, 2013 UT App 1, ¶ 27, 297 P.3d 624.

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Taylor v. Heber City

section 20A-7-601(6)—on December 17, 2024. The court then
concluded that because the Ordinance had passed in December
2024, Appellants’ application filed in January 2025 was untimely.
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
City.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 Appellants appeal the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the City. We review a grant of summary judgment
for correctness. See, e.g., Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 12, 250 P.3d
56.

ANALYSIS

¶7 Appellants assert the district court erred in determining
the Ordinance passed on December 17, 2024. Based on the
statutory interpretation of the term “passed,” as articulated in
Bissland v. Bankhead, 2007 UT 86, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d 430, they argue
that the Ordinance did not pass until January 21, 2025. According
to Appellants, because the Ordinance was amended at the
December 17 meeting to be contingent upon the execution of the
two development agreements, passage of the Ordinance did not
occur until the Council approved the development agreements on
January 21, 2025.

¶8 The City asserts this argument was not properly preserved
for two reasons: (1) the minutes and video recordings of the
Council meetings cited by Appellants in support of their
argument are not contained in the record and (2) Appellants
argued below that Bissland was inapplicable to this case. We are
unpersuaded by the City’s preservation argument. First, while the
City is correct that the video recordings of the meetings are not
contained in the record, the meeting minutes are contained in the
record. Second, the issue of the Ordinance’s passage date was

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Taylor v. Heber City

clearly “raise[d] . . . before the district court specifically . . . in such
a way that the [district] court ha[d] an opportunity to rule on it.”
True v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 24, 427 P.3d 338
(cleaned up). Under our preservation principles, Appellants are
not limited to the Bissland interpretation they advanced below.
“New arguments, when brought under a properly preserved
issue or theory, do not require an exception to preservation . . . .”
Id. ¶ 32 (cleaned up). Accordingly, Appellants properly preserved
this issue for appeal. 4

¶9 Turning to the merits of the appeal, Appellants are correct
that Bissland articulates Utah’s standard for determining when a
city ordinance was passed. See 2007 UT 86, ¶ 11. There, our
supreme court determined that a city ordinance is considered
“passed” when “the deliberative process required of the . . .
Council” is completed, not when “the last ministerial formality
that must be bestowed on a legislative act” occurs. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.
Here, the Council voted on the Ordinance on December 17, 2024,
and the Ordinance received three votes in favor and two votes in
opposition. The meeting minutes themselves plainly state that the
Ordinance “[p]assed 3–2.” And while the Ordinance was
amended prior to the vote to be “contingent upon the approval
and execution of” the two development agreements, that
contingency did not mean the Ordinance did not pass upon the
Council’s vote. Rather, it simply functioned to delay the

4. Appellants request attorney fees under rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure for the time spent responding to the City’s
preservation argument. We apply sanctions under rule 33 “only
in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right
to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.” Staszkiewicz v. Thomas,
2024 UT App 183, ¶ 23 n.3, 562 P.3d 723 (cleaned up), cert. denied,
568 P.3d 260 (Utah 2025). We decline to impose such fees here
because we do not view the City’s argument as egregious,
particularly where the video recordings of the Council’s meetings
were not in the record on appeal.

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Taylor v. Heber City

Ordinance’s effective date until the execution of the additional
agreements. Thus here, like in Bissland, “passage occurred when
three of the five members of the . . . [C]ouncil voted for the . . .
[O]rdinance.” Id. ¶ 11. Accordingly, the district court correctly
applied Bissland when it determined that the Ordinance passed on
December 17, 2024. Thus, the district court correctly granted
summary judgment to the City because Appellants’ referendum
application was not timely filed. 5

CONCLUSION

¶10 The Ordinance was passed on December 17, 2024, upon the
vote of the Council. Appellants’ ballot referendum application,
filed on January 23, 2025, was therefore untimely. Consequently,
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the
City. Affirmed.

5. We are not unsympathetic to Appellants in this situation. They
were proceeding pro se when they filed the ballot referendum
application, and we can understand why they waited until after
the development agreements were approved to file the
application. But the ballot referendum challenges the Ordinance
and not the development agreements, and thus the application
was required to be filed within five days after the Ordinance
passed on December 17, 2024.

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