State v. Allred

2026 UT App 1

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ALLEN MICHAEL ALLRED,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230738-CA
Filed January 2, 2026

First District Court, Logan Department
The Honorable Angela Fonnesbeck
No. 221100513

Brian Craig, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Daniel L. Day,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Allen Michael Allred admitted to sexually abusing his
young stepdaughter on multiple occasions. He pled guilty to
several charges and was sentenced to significant prison sentences.
About four months after he was sentenced, the district court
entered a continuous protective order that barred any contact
whatsoever with not only his stepdaughter but also all other
members of the household, including Allred’s biological children.
Allred opposed these conditions, claiming the scope of the
continuous protective order was not statutorily authorized and
that the proceedings below were defective such that the order
should be vacated. We reject all of Allred’s arguments and affirm.
State v. Allred

BACKGROUND

¶2 Allred is the father of three minor children with his wife,
who is also the mother of Allred’s stepdaughter. Allred called a
sex offender hotline and disclosed that he had sexually abused his
stepdaughter, who was then nine years old. This disclosure
resulted in the State charging Allred with ten counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child. As part of a plea deal, Allred
admitted that he sexually abused his stepdaughter three times
over a one-year period by touching her breasts, genitals, and
buttocks for the purpose of sexual arousal. Ultimately, Allred pled
guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and
the State dismissed the remaining counts.

¶3 Allred received a psychosexual risk assessment (risk
assessment) for sentencing purposes. In that risk assessment, he
stated that he had touched his stepdaughter’s buttocks multiple
times, touched her breasts a few times as they were just starting
to develop, and touched her vaginal area once. He conveyed that
while he “knew it was wrong” and had “no idea why he
offended,” he “could not refrain” from doing it. He indicated that
he had been “trying to get help for a while” to address his aberrant
behavior, including by going to therapy, but he was “not able to
say anything” even though he knew that he “needed help.” He
stated that he had “always been too afraid and ashamed to talk
about his sexual attraction to children.” He further admitted to
having an interest in looking at pornographic images of children
between the ages of ten and fourteen and that he had used the
internet to find images of nude children.

¶4 In preparation for sentencing in December 2022, the district
court reviewed the risk assessment and the presentence
investigation report. The court found the following to be
aggravating factors incident to the abuse Allred inflicted on his
stepdaughter: (1) that the abuse occurred on multiple occasions
over the course of ten months, (2) that Allred committed the abuse
when he enjoyed a position of trust with respect to his

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State v. Allred

stepdaughter, and (3) that Allred manipulated his wife so that he
could “have continuing and additional access to” his
stepdaughter and “opportunities to touch” her. The court
specifically pointed out that Allred had encouraged “the
purchasing of dresses for this child to wear and shaming the child
when the child refused to hug [him] at bedtime or when [he] came
home.” The court stated, “That is the type of manipulation that
this Court takes very seriously. To gain ongoing and additional
access to children for your own purposes, your own sexual
pleasures, it is heinous, Sir, and those are the very types of things
that this Court has been asked to take into consideration for this
grievous sex offense that you perpetrated against a child.” The
court acknowledged as mitigating factors Allred’s minimal
criminal history, his “moderate low” recidivism risk, and the fact
that he voluntarily disclosed the abuse. Taking all the
circumstances into consideration, the court sentenced Allred to
three concurrent prison terms of fifteen years to life.

¶5 About a month after sentencing, Allred’s counsel
withdrew. And in April 2023, the State filed a request for a
continuous protective order (CPO), which the court granted on
May 4, 2023. “[H]aving determined by clear and convincing
evidence” that the stepdaughter had a “reasonable fear of future
harm or abuse,” the court enjoined Allred (1) “from threatening
to commit or committing violence against” the stepdaughter or
any of her family or household members, (2) from communicating
with the stepdaughter “directly, indirectly, or through a third
party,” and (3) from going “within 1,000 feet” of the stepdaughter
or any of her family or household members. The order also
required Allred “to stay away from the residence, school, [and]
place of employment” of the stepdaughter or “any other place”
frequented by the stepdaughter or any of her family or household
members. Before entry of the CPO, Allred was not notified of the
State’s request or his right to request a hearing on it.

¶6 After being served with the CPO on May 17, 2023, Allred
retained new counsel, and, some five days later, he filed a motion

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to modify the CPO. Specifically, Allred requested that the
restrictions on contact with his three biological children be
removed. He pointed out that, as he understood it, the CPO
prohibited him from even writing letters to his biological children
while he was incarcerated and possibly prevented his mother
(their grandmother) from communicating with the children
because such action could be considered communicating
“indirectly, or through a third party,” with his stepdaughter.
Allred proposed that the CPO be modified to allow his biological
children, once of sufficient age, to visit him in prison or
communicate with him through video or phone calls. Another
alternative Allred proposed was to allow contact with his
biological children to resume after his stepdaughter turned
eighteen in 2030. Allred’s motion disclosed that there was a
hearing in a pending divorce proceeding involving his wife set for
August 2023 and that an existing cohabitant abuse protective
order barring contact with his wife, his stepdaughter, and his
three biological children was in place until June 2025.

¶7 Allred appeared with counsel at a hearing on the motion to
modify the CPO on June 21, 2023. Allred argued that the
protective order statute should not be read to allow the court to
prohibit contact with his biological children. Allred also
highlighted what he claimed were several procedural defects with
the CPO: (1) it was issued more than four months after sentencing,
(2) Allred was not represented by counsel when the CPO was
issued, and (3) the CPO was issued before he was provided notice
of his right to a hearing. Finally, Allred argued that the cohabitant
abuse protective order that existed in the divorce case should be
left in place while allowing “the divorce case to run its course.”
He argued against having “a full evidentiary hearing of calling a
bunch of witnesses” in the current matter when making such
factual determinations was “more appropriate” in the context of
the pending divorce case. Given these circumstances, Allred
asked that the CPO be modified to expand the contact he could
have with his biological children.

20230738-CA 4 2026 UT App 1
State v. Allred

¶8 In response, the State defended the CPO’s inclusion of the
biological children by arguing that the protective order statute—
notwithstanding what the State believed was an obvious
typographical error—clearly allowed the court to extend
protections to other household members. In addition, the State
argued that Allred’s “proclivities toward minors, not just his
stepdaughter, but all minors,” put “the entire community at risk.”
The State also asserted that the victim impact statements and the
admissions Allred made during presentencing and the risk
assessment, which were in the record, provided evidence of the
“crippling fear” that had “affected not just the [stepdaughter], but
the entire family.” The State further argued that any procedural
defects underlying the CPO had been remedied by the fact that
Allred was being heard, with counsel, on his motion to modify.

¶9 The district court denied Allred’s motion to modify the
CPO. In so ruling, the court acknowledged that Allred had not
received notice—before entry of the CPO—of his right to request
a hearing. And it expressed concern with the “late timing of the
issuance” of the CPO some four months after sentencing.
However, the court indicated that its concerns were “alleviated”
because Allred did not dispute the legitimacy of the CPO with
respect to his wife and his stepdaughter and because the notice
problem would likely be rectified by the hearing on the motion to
modify. The court also concluded that the statute authorized the
inclusion of Allred’s biological children in the CPO because they
lived in the same household as his stepdaughter.

¶10 Allred later moved for reconsideration, arguing that his
due process and confrontation rights had been violated by the
lack of an evidentiary hearing regarding the CPO. The court
concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary since it had
been able to make a determination based on the facts before it.
Moreover, the court noted that Allred had waived any right to an
evidentiary hearing by not requesting witness examination before
or during the hearing on his motion to modify. Allred appeals.

20230738-CA 5 2026 UT App 1
State v. Allred

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶11 Allred first claims that the district court incorrectly
determined that the continuous protective order statute allows
the inclusion of other household members after conviction. A
district court’s interpretation of a statute presents a question of
law that we review for correctness. State v. Cooke, 2025 UT 6, ¶ 19,
567 P.3d 541.

¶12 Allred’s second assertion is that the district court erred
when it concluded that any defects related to the CPO being
entered more than four months after sentencing and without the
statutorily required notice had been cured by the subsequent
hearing on the motion to modify. The district court’s rulings in
this regard are legal conclusions that we review for correctness.
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

¶13 Third, Allred argues that the district court violated his due
process rights by issuing the CPO without first holding an
evidentiary hearing. “Constitutional issues, including questions
regarding due process, are questions of law that we review for
correctness.” State v. Winter, 2024 UT App 98, ¶ 9, 554 P.3d 355
(cleaned up), cert. denied, 558 P.3d 88 (Utah 2024).

¶14 Allred’s fourth claim is that the district court violated his
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and confrontation when it
entered the CPO without counsel present and without providing
him an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Constitutional
issues present a question of law, which we review for correctness.
Id.

¶15 Allred’s final assertion is that the district court abused its
discretion when it held that clear and convincing evidence
supported barring all contact between him and his biological
children. A district court’s conclusion that clear and convincing
evidence was presented is reviewed deferentially, and this court
will reverse that determination only if that decision is clearly
erroneous. Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 358 P.3d 346.

20230738-CA 6 2026 UT App 1
State v. Allred

ANALYSIS

I. Inclusion of Other Household Members

¶16 Allred argues that the district court erred in interpreting
the continuous protective order statute to allow the CPO to
include other household members. We disagree.

¶17 The district court correctly identified a problem with the
statute in question. In relevant part, at the time, the statute stated,
“[A] continuous protective order is permanent . . . and may
include any order described in Subsection 78B-7-804(3)(c).” Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-7-805(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2022). But subsection
804(3)(c) did not describe any orders. Instead, it addressed notice
procedures and processes. 1 The district court determined that the
cross-reference certainly should have been to subsection
804(3)(d). Unlike subsection 804(3)(c), subsection 804(3)(d)
explicitly addressed—and still addresses—what a continuous
protective order “may include.” Id. § 78B-7-804(3)(d); see also Utah
Code § 78B-7-804(3)(d) (2025). 2 The district court concluded that

1. That subsection provided,
(i) The court shall notify the perpetrator of the
right to request a hearing.
(ii) If the perpetrator requests a hearing under this
Subsection (3)(c), the court shall hold the
hearing at the time determined by the court.
The continuous protective order shall be in
effect while the hearing is being scheduled and
while the hearing is pending.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-804(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2022).

2. That subsection provided,
A continuous protective order is permanent . . . and may
include:
(continued…)

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State v. Allred

the CPO could extend to household members based on its
determination that the statute suffered from the infirmity just
described, noting that the legislature intended to reference
subsection 804(3)(d) instead of subsection 804(3)(c) since “it
would make no sense to say that an order could include [certain]
items and then not point to the section that includes those items.”
The district court’s conclusion was correct.

¶18 Where, as here, a statute’s language yields a meaningless
contextual result, the absurdity doctrine comes into play. Courts
will apply the absurdity doctrine when “the operation of the plain
language is so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational legislator
could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner. This
standard is satisfied only if the legislature could not reasonably
have intended the result.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 28, 387
P.3d 1000 (cleaned up); see also Garfield County v. United States,

(i) an order enjoining the perpetrator from threatening to
commit or committing acts of domestic violence
against the victim or other family or household
member;
(ii) an order prohibiting the perpetrator from harassing,
telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating
with the victim, directly or indirectly;
(iii) an order prohibiting the perpetrator from going to the
victim’s residence, school, place of employment, and
the premises of any of these, or a specified place
frequented regularly by the victim or any designated
family or other household member;
(iv) an order directing the perpetrator to pay restitution to
the victim as may apply, and shall be enforced in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38b, Crime Victims
Restitution Act; and
(v) any other order the court considers necessary to fully
protect the victim and members of the victim’s family
or other household member.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-804(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2022).

20230738-CA 8 2026 UT App 1
State v. Allred

2017 UT 41, ¶ 47, 424 P.3d 46 (Voros, J., dissenting) (“A relatively
non-controversial use of the absurdity doctrine is to correct
obvious linguistic errors, [such as when] the error in the statute is
so unthinkable that any reasonable reader would know
immediately both (1) that it contains a technical or ministerial
mistake, and (2) the correct meaning of the text.” (cleaned up)).

¶19 This standard is met here. Clearly, this is not a matter of
declaring the cross-reference a clerical error because we disagree
with the legislature’s rationale. Rather, this is an instance of
discerning the obvious intent of the legislature because the cross-
reference does not address the matter in the referring statute. It
would be illogical and unreasonable to read the cross-reference in
the enacted statute literally because it does not make sense as it
was written. Indeed, while we are generally “obligated to enforce
the statute as written and give effect to the intention of the
legislature as expressed in the unambiguous words of the
statute,” we need not do so if “there is an obvious error, such as a
typographical error, or [if] application of the literal language of
the statute would produce an absurd result.” Farmers Texas County
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Romo, 250 S.W.3d 527, 539 (Tex. App. 2008); see
also Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 676 n.4 (Ky. 2003)
(concluding that jury instructions “conformed to the obviously
intended meaning of [a] statute” when the enacted statutory
“language [made] no sense and [was] an obvious typographical
error”); Stanton v. Frankel Bros. Realty Co., 158 N.E. 868, 870 (Ohio
1927) (“It is a well-settled rule that courts will not permit a statute
to be defeated on account of a mistake or error, where the
intention of the Legislature can be collected from the whole
statute, or where one word has been erroneously used for another,
and where the context affords means of correction. The strict letter
of a statute must yield to the obvious intent.”). This conclusion is
especially true in the case of something like what we have here:
an obvious error in a cross-reference. See United States v. Coatoam,
245 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that the “very language
of the statute . . . compels our conclusion that Congress intended
. . . to cross-reference readers to a related statute” instead of the

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State v. Allred

statute indicated in the text); King v. Housing Auth., 670 F.2d 952,
954 n.4 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding that a cross-referenced
subsection in the Code of Federal Regulations was a
typographical error because the referenced section did not
concern the material in the referring regulation).

¶20 That the cross-reference in Allred’s case was incorrect is
supported by two compelling considerations. First, the statute
defies logic as written. As the district court correctly noted, it
would make no sense for section 78B-7-805(3)(c) to point to an
obviously irrelevant subsection when the obviously relevant
subsection immediately followed it. We have no reticence
concluding that the legislature intended the cross-reference to
point to subsection 804(3)(d) instead of subsection 804(3)(c). Any
other conclusion runs counter to reason. Second, the error has
since been corrected. Indeed, the intention of the legislature has
been definitively resolved by the latest amendment of the
continuous protective order statute. It now cross-references
subsection 804(3)(d) instead of subsection 804(3)(c). Compare Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-7-805(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2022), with Utah Code
§ 78B-7-805(3)(c) (2025). This corrective amendment closes the
door to any doubt about which section the legislature intended to
cross-reference.

¶21 Given the obvious—and now corrected—error in cross-
referencing an irrelevant subsection, we have no trouble
concluding that the district court’s interpretation was correct.
Accordingly, Allred’s first argument fails.

II. Notice and Delayed Entry

¶22 Allred next complains that the CPO was (1) entered
without proper notice and (2) delayed in entry. He contends that
he should have been notified, before entry of the CPO, of his right
to request a hearing under the provisions of the continuous
protective order statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-805(3)(b)(i)
(LexisNexis 2022) (providing that the “court shall notify the
perpetrator of the right to request a hearing” regarding the

20230738-CA 10 2026 UT App 1
State v. Allred

issuance of a continuous protective order). He further asserts that
the court erred in entering the CPO more than four months after
sentencing; as he interprets the statute, any such order needed to
have been issued at the time of sentencing. See id. § 78B-7-805(3)(a)
(“[T]he court may issue a continuous protective order at the time
of the conviction or sentencing limiting the contact between the
perpetrator and the victim if the court determines by clear and
convincing evidence that the victim has a reasonable fear of future
harm or abuse.”). We are not persuaded. With regard to the notice
issue, Allred has not articulated how he was harmed by these
defects. And with regard to the delayed entry issue, Allred has
not shown that the district court’s statutory interpretation was
incorrect.

A. Notice

¶23 “A mere technical violation of a rule is insufficient to justify
relief without a showing of prejudice.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61,
¶ 42, 342 P.3d 789 (cleaned up); see Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (“Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.”); cf. State v.
Goodrich, 2016 UT App 72, ¶ 20, 372 P.3d 79 (“The failure to
provide . . . notice [in probation violation proceedings] only
constitutes reversible error when lack of notice is prejudicial to the
defendant.”). And an “error is harmless and does not require
reversal if it is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings.” State v. Zimpfer, 2024 UT App 136, ¶ 58, 558 P.3d
111 (cleaned up).

¶24 The district court acknowledged that the CPO lacked the
required notice, and the State conceded the point. But Allred has
never claimed that he did not know he could request a hearing or
that he did not get a hearing. In fact, he requested a hearing to
modify the CPO within five days of when it was served on him.
And the hearing on his motion took place less than a month later.
This timeline shows that Allred was well aware of his right to a

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State v. Allred

hearing and that the court promptly responded to his request.
Given this set of facts, we simply do not see how Allred was
harmed by the initial lack of notice of the State’s CPO request.
And Allred has made no attempt to identify any prejudice he
suffered apart from the violation of the rule. See Goodrich, 2016 UT
App 72, ¶ 24 (concluding that “there [was] no cause for reversal”
and that “the outcome of the proceedings was not affected” even
if the district court erred in providing a defendant notice, because
the defendant was “present,” “aware of the allegations against
him,” and “defended himself against those allegations”); accord
Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
cf. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 42 (“A defendant who actually files an
appeal or has independent knowledge of the right to appeal,
including the relevant filing deadline, has not been prevented
from proceeding with an appeal and suffers no harm.”). Given the
absence of any identifiable harm, this assertion of error fails.

B. Delayed Entry

¶25 As to the delayed entry of the CPO, Allred has not shown
that there was any error in the district court’s entry of the CPO
some four months after sentencing. Indeed, the statutory scheme
allows a court to issue a continuous protective order at times other
than conviction or sentencing: “[I]n addition to the process of
issuing a continuous protective order [at the time of conviction or
sentencing], a district court may issue a continuous protective
order at any time” if the victim petitions for one. Utah Code § 78B-
7-805(5). 3 This statute clearly establishes that there is no
prohibition on issuing a postsentencing CPO. So, while Allred
correctly observes that the court “may” issue a CPO at sentencing,
id. § 78B-7-805(3)(a), a court “may” also issue a CPO at a later time,

3. While this statute refers to the victim petitioning for the
protective order, in fact, “[a]ny interested person may file a
petition for a protective order . . . on behalf of a child who is being
abused or is in imminent danger of being abused by any
individual.” Utah Code § 78B-7-202(1)(a)(i).

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id. § 78B-7-805(5). Moreover, the statute’s use of “may” in
subsection 805(3) is not restrictive, as Allred suggests. Indeed,
Allred reads the statute as “requir[ing] issuance” of the CPO at
the time of sentencing. But he is mistaken because this is not how
“may” works. It is well established that “the term ‘may’ is
generally construed to be permissive and not mandatory and is
generally not interpreted to limit options, but, rather, to clearly
define some of those options.” State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 978
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (cleaned up); accord Sanchez v. State, 2025 UT
App 78, ¶ 12, 571 P.3d 816; State v. Diviney, 2021 UT App 106, ¶ 22,
500 P.3d 883. In other words, the use of “may” indicates that a
court has the option of issuing a CPO at the time of sentencing or
conviction, not that it can do so only at that time or that it cannot
exercise that option at some other time. Accordingly, this claim of
error also misses the mark.

III. Due Process

¶26 Allred next contends that the district court violated his due
process rights by issuing the CPO “without the opportunity for
an evidentiary hearing” in a matter “involving a fundamental
right to sustain a parent-child relationship.” This claim of error is
without merit for several reasons.

¶27 First, Allred has not shown that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing under the circumstances of his case. “A
district court should hold an evidentiary hearing when it cannot
make a determination as to whether a protective order is
appropriate on the face of the pleadings.” Hedgcock v. Hedgcock,
2009 UT App 304, ¶ 13, 221 P.3d 856. At the risk of stating the
obvious, here there was ample evidence supporting the issuance
of the CPO through the guilty plea and sentencing materials,
including Allred’s own admissions in the risk assessment and the
victim impact statements. These materials provided evidence—
the accuracy of which Allred has not challenged—that Allred
presented an ongoing threat to his biological children, that he was
interested in looking at pornographic images of children between

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the ages of ten and fourteen, and that he had an addiction to child
pornography. In particular, Allred’s wife described him as being
untrustworthy, deceitful, manipulative, aggressive, and entitled.
She further revealed, “I believe that he set me up in his asking me
on multiple occasions to buy [his stepdaughter] more dresses.
While a healthy father might see little girls in dresses as precious,
I remember upon first meeting him how much he said he was
hugely attracted when women wore dresses.” Importantly, Allred
has not challenged the accuracy of any of this information, all of
which was before the court when it entered the CPO. See Robinson
v. Robinson, 2010 UT App 96, ¶ 14, 232 P.3d 1081 (“Although
factual disputes ordinarily require a complete evidentiary
hearing, there is simply no need for such a hearing when, as here,
all factual disputes are immaterial to the district court’s
decision.”); see also Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 898 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (“There is no dispute to these facts, and an evidentiary
hearing would be of no benefit.”); cf. Utah Code § 77-18-103(5)(c)
(“If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence
investigation report at the time of sentencing, the matter shall be
considered waived.”). 4

¶28 Second, Allred received the hearing he requested. After
being served with the CPO, Allred promptly retained counsel and
filed a motion to modify. At the hearing, Allred appeared with his
attorney and confirmed that he was ready for oral arguments on
his motion. Allred asserted that the divorce-case protective order
(the one set to expire in 2025) should be allowed “to run its
course” and that “a full evidentiary hearing” would be better
suited in that case. His counsel suggested, “I don’t think this
Court wants to have a full evidentiary hearing of calling a bunch
of witnesses and determining when there’s already pending other
related litigation.” Only after the district court denied his motion

4. While Allred states in his brief that the district court “relied
upon evidence proffered by the State in support” of the CPO that
he “refutes” and “disputes,” he has made no effort to specify any
of those disputations.

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to modify did Allred complain—in his motion for
reconsideration—that he was denied an evidentiary hearing.
Allred cannot complain that the district court did what he asked
of it regarding the evidentiary hearing with respect to the CPO.
Not getting the relief he wanted does not retroactively entitle
Allred to another bite at the apple. By proceeding with arguments
at the motion hearing and indicating that an evidentiary hearing
was more appropriate for the pending divorce proceedings,
Allred waived his right—insofar as any right existed—to cross-
examine witnesses at that hearing.

¶29 For these reasons, Allred’s third assertion of error fails.

IV. Sixth Amendment

¶30 Allred next asserts that his Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel and to confront witnesses were violated. Again, we
disagree.

A. Right to Counsel

¶31 Allred argues that his right to counsel was violated when
the CPO was entered while he did not have counsel. He argues
that the CPO was equivalent to the termination of his parental
rights and—given such significant consequences—constituted a
critical stage of the criminal proceeding. We disagree.

¶32 Even if the right to counsel was somehow triggered in the
CPO proceedings, Allred has not shown how he was prejudiced
by this denial of his perceived right to counsel. Indeed, he has not
even attempted to address the matter in briefing, and this is
almost certainly attributable to the fact that Allred suffered no
prejudice from the absence of counsel at the moment of the CPO’s
entry. Indeed, within a day of being served, Allred obtained
counsel and was later heard on his challenge, where the matter
was litigated and his motion to modify was denied. Moreover,
section 78B-7-805(3)(b) leaves no doubt that the CPO would have
been issued initially regardless of whether Allred had an attorney

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at the time. See Utah Code § 78B-7-805(3)(b)(ii) (“If the perpetrator
requests a hearing under this Subsection (3), the court shall hold
the hearing at the time determined by the court and the
continuous protective order shall be in effect while the hearing is
being scheduled and while the hearing is pending.”). Therefore,
even if Allred was represented by counsel at the time the State
requested the CPO, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that
the issuance of the CPO would have been delayed or that it would
not have taken effect during the time before the hearing. In short,
Allred’s temporary lack of counsel simply had no discernible
effect on the entry of the CPO or its implementation during the
pendency of the hearing.

B. Right to Confrontation

¶33 Allred next asserts that by not allowing him to confront
witnesses during the hearing on his motion to modify the CPO
and by not later allowing him to have the benefit of an evidentiary
hearing, the district court violated his confrontation right. Again,
we disagree.

¶34 Allred cites no authority that the right to confrontation
extends to collateral matters such as a CPO proceeding. Indeed,
“while the Confrontation Clause protects a defendant’s trial right
to confront testimony offered against him to establish his guilt, it
has never extended beyond the confines of a trial.” United States
v. Osmakac, 868 F.3d 937, 956 (11th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up); see also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567 (1974) (“Confrontation and
cross-examination . . . are essential in criminal trials where the
accused, if found guilty, may be subjected to the most serious
deprivations, . . . [b]ut they are not rights universally applicable
to all hearings.”); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 807–08
(11th Cir. 2014) (stating the same proposition and collecting cases
in support).

¶35 In addition, Allred waived his confrontation right when, at
the motion hearing, he indicated that an evidentiary hearing and
the cross-examination of witnesses were more appropriate for the

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State v. Allred

pending divorce proceedings. Hedgcock v. Hedgcock, 2009 UT App
304, ¶ 13, 221 P.3d 856 (stating that nothing “prevents a party from
waiving the right to present evidence at the hearing challenging a
protective order”).

¶36 For these reasons, Allred’s Sixth Amendment claims both
fall short.

V. Evidence Supporting the CPO

¶37 Allred’s final argument is that the district court erred in
concluding that clear and convincing evidence supported barring
all contact between him and his biological children through the
CPO. Allred says the court did not make any specific findings to
establish why he should be entirely prohibited from contact with
his biological children and, in any case, there were less restrictive
means to ensure the children’s safety. Allred’s assertions fall flat
in every respect.

¶38 The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
clear and convincing evidence supported issuing a CPO. There
was compelling evidence that Allred presented a danger to all the
children in the house. Allred had admitted to repeatedly abusing
his stepdaughter over an extended period of time in the family
home where his biological children lived. The risk assessment and
presentence investigation report made clear his sexual interest in
children. Moreover, the evidence showed that Allred had no
reticence to engage in manipulative behavior to satisfy his sexual
interest in children. Accordingly, the evidence of his sexual
interest in children was clear and convincing in view of Allred’s
own admissions and actions. Given this uncontroverted evidence,
we have no trouble concluding that the district court was justified
in determining that his biological children should also be
protected from Allred.

¶39 The less restrictive alternatives that Allred proposes all
involve some sort of limited or supervised communication. But all
these alternatives are plagued by the same infirmity. While it is

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State v. Allred

certainly true that the measures Allred suggests would mitigate
the possibility of direct predatory contact, they do not address the
emotional and mental impact that Allred’s abuse had on the
children and his wife. We simply cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in rejecting these alternatives as unworkable
in light of the harm that Allred had brought to his family.

¶40 For these reasons, we are not persuaded by Allred’s final
claim of error.

CONCLUSION

¶41 Under the applicable statute, the district court did not err
in extending the CPO to include other household members.
Allred was not prejudiced by the initial lack of notice of the
request for the CPO, and the district court did not violate the
statute by entering the CPO more than four months after
sentencing. Nor were Allred’s due process rights, right to counsel,
or confrontation right violated by how the CPO was issued. And
the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
clear and convincing evidence supported the CPO.

¶42 Affirmed.

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