ROA General v. Salt Lake City

2025 UT App 122

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

R.O.A. GENERAL INC.,
Appellee,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230838-CA
Filed August 14, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robert P. Faust
No. 190902263

Samantha J. Slark, Attorney for Appellant
Troy L. Booher, LaShel Shaw, Leslie Van Frank, and
Bradley M. Strassberg, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 This dispute—over a billboard in Salt Lake City—has a
lengthy history. Beginning in 2014, the owner of the billboard,
Outfront Media, LLC, formerly CBS Outdoor, LLC (CBS), was
twice denied permission by Salt Lake City Corporation (the City)
to relocate the billboard. 1 After the City’s second denial was

1. CBS later “transferred all of its rights, title and interest in” the
billboard to R.O.A. General Inc. and moved for R.O.A. General to
be substituted in as the plaintiff in this case in place of CBS. The
motion was granted. As we did in a previous appeal in this
matter, we will, “[f]or simplicity, . . . refer to these entities as CBS
throughout this opinion.” R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
2022 UT App 141, ¶ 2 n.2, 525 P.3d 100.
R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

affirmed on appeal in Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
2017 UT 74, 416 P.3d 389, CBS brought this inverse condemnation
action in the district court, alleging that it was statutorily entitled
to just compensation for the value of the billboard because of the
City’s denial of its second relocation request. CBS also requested
a declaratory judgment that the City was estopped from denying
such compensation.

¶2 The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that the
billboard did not qualify for compensation under the relevant
statutes. CBS opposed the City’s motion but did not file one of its
own. The district court denied the City’s motion and, at the same
time, granted summary judgment in favor of CBS, concluding that
the supreme court had already ruled in Outfront Media that CBS
was entitled to compensation and, separately, that the City was
estopped from denying compensation. The parties then stipulated
to the entry of judgment in favor of CBS for $325,000, with the City
reserving the right to appeal the court’s summary judgment
ruling, which it did.

¶3 In resolving that appeal, this court concluded that the
supreme court had not ruled in Outfront Media that CBS was
entitled to compensation. See R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 2022 UT App 141, ¶¶ 18‒25, 525 P.3d 100. We also
determined that because CBS had not filed its own summary
judgment motion with factual averments supported by material
in the record, the district court had erred in concluding as a matter
of law—on the record at that time—that the City was estopped
from denying compensation. See id. ¶¶ 26‒34, 38. We then
remanded the case for the district court to address in the first
instance the City’s statutory arguments for why it was not
required to pay compensation for the billboard. See id. ¶ 39.

¶4 On remand, both sides moved for summary judgment. In
its motion, the City again articulated its arguments for why it was
not statutorily required to pay compensation, and it contended
that it was not estopped from denying compensation. CBS, on the

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

other hand, argued in its motion that it was entitled to
compensation under a plain reading of the relevant statutes and
that the City was estopped from asserting its arguments to the
contrary. The district court again granted summary judgment in
favor of CBS, ruling as a matter of law that under the undisputed
facts and relevant statutory scheme, the City was required to
compensate CBS for the billboard, and it ordered judgment in
favor of CBS for the previously stipulated amount of $325,000. The
City again appeals, arguing that in two respects the district court
misinterpreted the relevant statutes as requiring the City to pay
compensation. We reject one of the City’s statutory interpretation
arguments, and we conclude that the City is estopped from
making the other. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of CBS.

BACKGROUND 2

Billboard Law Overview

¶5 By ordinance, the City prohibits the construction within its
limits of additional billboards beyond the number already in
existence. See Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(C). However, it
allows for limited relocation of existing billboards through its
billboard banking system. See id. § 21A.46.160(E)‒(T), (CC). Under
that system, a billboard owner who demolishes a qualifying
billboard may receive “billboard credits” in a “billboard bank
account.” Id. § 21A.46.160(E). The owner may then use those
credits to build a new billboard that meets certain design and
location criteria, see id. § 21A.46.160(F)‒(T), or the owner may “sell

2. “In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, we
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and recite the
facts accordingly.” M.A. v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah,
2020 UT App 177, n.1, 479 P.3d 1152 (cleaned up).

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

or otherwise transfer” the banked credits to another person, id.
§ 21A.46.160(H).

¶6 Several provisions of state code in effect at the times
relevant to this case required the City to permit relocation or
modification of existing billboards in additional circumstances,
even though such relocation or modification was not allowed by
the City’s ordinances. 3 For example, under the version of Utah
Code section 72-7-510.5 then in effect, if the “view and
readability” of a billboard became obstructed by highway
improvements, the owner could move the billboard “to a point
within 500 feet of its prior location,” even if the new location did
not comply with the location criteria of the City’s code. Utah Code
§ 72-7-510.5 (2014). Alternatively, the owner could “adjust the
height” of the billboard at its original location, even if the new
height did not comply with the City’s design criteria. Id. We have
previously referred to an application to move or alter a billboard
under section 72-7-510.5 as a “Title 72 application,” R.O.A. Gen.
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2022 UT App 141, ¶ 2, 525 P.3d 100, and
we will continue to use that nomenclature here.

¶7 Additionally, under the version of Utah Code section 10-
9a-511(3)(c) then in effect, a billboard owner could ask the City to
waive its ordinances and allow relocation of any billboard from
its existing location to a mutually acceptable different location
within the City. Utah Code § 10-9a-511(3)(c) (2014). If the City did
not agree to grant the request after ninety days and the owner’s
requested new location was (1) in a commercial, industrial, or
manufacturing zone, (2) within one mile of the original location,
(3) at least 500 feet from any existing freeway-facing billboard,
and (4) at least 300 feet from any existing non-freeway-facing
billboard, then the City would be deemed “to have initiated the
acquisition of [the billboard] by eminent domain” and would be

3. The applicable provisions of state code remain in effect, but they
have been revised in material ways. Accordingly, we cite the
versions in effect at the time of the events relevant to this case.

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required to pay just compensation. Id. §§ 10-9a-511(3)(c)(ii), 10-9a-
513(2)(a), (2)(d). We have previously referred to an application to
relocate a billboard under section 10-9a-511(3)(c) as a “Section 511
request.” R.O.A. Gen., 2022 UT App 141, ¶ 4. And again, we will
employ the same usage here.

¶8 Construction of a new billboard under any of the foregoing
scenarios required a “new billboard construction permit” from
the City, which could be obtained by “fil[ing] an application on a
form provided by [the City’s] zoning administrator.” Salt Lake
City Code § 21A.46.160(L).

CBS and Corner Property Apply to Relocate Billboards

¶9 In 2014, CBS owned a billboard that was within the City,
adjacent to the I-15 freeway, and on land it leased from Corner
Property, LC. Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017 UT
74, ¶ 6, 416 P.3d 389. “In the fall of 2014, CBS’s lease from Corner
Property was about to expire, so CBS sought a means for
relocating its billboard.” Id. On October 20, 2014, it applied to the
City for permission to move its billboard to “an adjacent lot” and
to “increase its billboard’s height.” Id. CBS made this request
“[p]ursuant to Utah Code [s]ection 72-7-510.5,” attaching a copy
of that code section to its application. Shortly after submitting its
Title 72 application and acting pursuant to a permit, CBS
demolished its billboard in order to vacate Corner Property’s
land.

¶10 At about the same time, Corner Property wanted to
relocate a billboard it owned to the property it had been leasing
to CBS. On October 31, 2014, it applied to the City for permission
to do just that. Although it is unclear from Corner Property’s
application which statute it relied on in making its relocation
request, the City treated Corner Property’s application as a
Section 511 request.

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¶11 “The City could not grant both CBS’s and Corner
Property’s requests to relocate, because state law prohibits
freeway-oriented billboards from being located within 500 feet of
each other” and the two proposed new locations were “within
that spacing restriction.” Outfront Media, 2017 UT 74, ¶ 8 (citing
Utah Code § 72-7-505(3) 4). Additionally, Corner Property’s
request “failed to satisfy the spacing requirements” of Utah Code
section 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv) because its billboard’s original location
and the proposed new location were more than a mile apart, “so
the City [was] free to deny [Corner Property’s request] without
paying just compensation.” Id.

The City Denies CBS’s Title 72 Application

¶12 On December 4, 2014, the City sent a letter to CBS denying
its Title 72 application. In that letter, the City stated that it
understood “that as of the date of [the] letter, the [s]ign ha[d] been
demolished.” The City then explained that it was denying the
application because, in its assessment, the view and readability of
CBS’s billboard had not become obstructed by new highway
improvements. The City also stated its opinion that Utah Code
section 72-7-510.5 allowed the owner of an obstructed billboard to
“either relocate [a sign] or adjust the [s]ign’s height in the current
location” but not both. It then further explained that because
CBS’s billboard had been demolished, “CBS’s sole remedy [was]
to relocate the [s]ign to the proposed new location . . . since a
height increase at the current location [was] no longer possible.”
The City also stated, however, that because the proposed new
location for CBS’s billboard “similarly parallel[ed] the freeway,”
the “claims of obstruction” that CBS had made regarding “the
current [s]ign location [would] likely occur in the new location
and [would] similarly be disputed by the City.” For all of these
reasons, the City denied CBS’s Title 72 application to relocate and
increase the height of its billboard. The letter informed CBS that

4. Utah Code section 72-7-505 has not been materially amended
since the parties submitted their relocation requests.

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because it had made its request under state law, “no City
administrative appeal” would be available but that CBS could
“seek review of [the City’s] decision as provided for by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.” The City then ended the letter as
follows:

If CBS prefers to modify its application to either
(a) bank the billboard credits for the now
demolished [s]ign . . . or (b) request to relocate the
[s]ign under Utah Code [section] 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i),
please submit the appropriate modified request.
Please be advised, however, that the City reserves
the right to condemn the [s]ign under Utah Code
[section] 10-9a-513(2).

¶13 Notwithstanding the City’s statement that no
administrative appeal would be available for its denial of CBS’s
Title 72 application, CBS attempted to initiate an administrative
appeal. In response, on December 18, 2014, the City sent CBS
another letter, again informing it that the City would “not hear
CBS’s administrative appeal” and that, instead, CBS could “seek
review of the City’s denial of the request to raise and relocate [its
sign] as provided for by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.” Then
the City concluded as follows:

As stated in [the City’s] letter to you dated
December 4, 2014, if CBS prefers to modify its
application to either bank its billboard credits . . . or
request to relocate the sign under Utah Code
[section] 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i), the City will consider a
modified request. However, the City reserves its
rights under Utah Code [section] 10-9a-513(2)(a).

20230838-CA 7 2025 UT App 122
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CBS Seeks District Court Review of the Denial of Its
Title 72 Application

¶14 At this point, rather than bank billboard credits or modify
its Title 72 application, CBS sought district court review of the
City’s denial of the application. As part of the district court
proceedings, CBS sought and obtained a temporary restraining
order prohibiting the City from issuing a permit “within 500 feet
of the real property” where CBS desired to reconstruct its
billboard. Subsequently, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction to the same effect, which prevented the City from
acting on Corner Property’s request to relocate its own billboard
“until further order of the [c]ourt.” Eventually, on cross motions
for summary judgment, the district court affirmed the City’s
denial of CBS’s Title 72 application, agreeing with the City that
CBS could not both relocate and increase the height of its billboard
under section 72-7-510.5 and ordering dismissal of the district
court action.

CBS Modifies Its Application into a Section 511 Request; the City
Denies CBS’s Section 511 Request and Grants Corner Property’s
Competing Request

¶15 Having lost in the district court on review of the City’s
denial of its Title 72 application, CBS then “accepted [the City’s
earlier] invitation to modify its relocation request.” Outfront
Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017 UT 74, ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 389.
CBS’s modified request did not rely on Utah Code section 72-7-
510.5 but, instead, “conformed to the requirements of Utah Code
section 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i).” Id.

¶16 The City soon denied CBS’s Section 511 request to relocate
its billboard to the property adjacent to Corner Property’s parcel
and, on the same day, granted Corner Property’s request to move
its billboard to the parcel it had previously rented to CBS. See id.
¶¶ 9‒10. The City’s letter denying CBS’s Section 511 request

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identified CBS’s modified application by the same application
number the City had assigned to CBS’s original application.

¶17 In its denial letter, the City said that “its reason for denying
CBS’s [Section 511] request was that the requested [new] location
fell within a gateway under the City’s zoning ordinances, and the
ordinance prohibit[ed] construction of a billboard in a gateway
area.” Id. ¶ 9. “The City acknowledged that it had authority . . . to
waive this zoning ordinance, but it informed CBS that it was
unwilling to do so because it ‘has a longstanding policy in favor
of retiring and removing billboards as the opportunity to do so
arises.’” Id. And in this instance, the City noted, denial of CBS’s
application and approval of Corner Property’s application created
a net reduction in the number of billboards in the City. See id. ¶ 10.

CBS Appeals the Denial of Its Section 511 Request to the City’s Land
Use Hearing Officer

¶18 CBS sought review of the City’s denial of its Section 511
request and approval of Corner Property’s Section 511 request
“before the City’s appeal authority, a land use hearing officer.” Id.
¶ 11. CBS asserted that the City’s denial of its request “was illegal,
and was arbitrary and/or capricious.” In its written response, the
City asserted that it had “statutory discretion to deny applications
to relocate billboards as long as it [was] willing to pay the
property owner just compensation as it ha[d] consistently
represented to CBS it [would] do here.” In oral argument before
the hearing officer, the City stated, “CBS submitted an application
to the City under [section 10-9a-511(3)(c)]. The City exercised its
discretion and decided not to waive [its] ordinance in this
circumstance, and [it] denied CBS’s application and elected to pay
just compensation for that decision.” Later, in response to written
questions from the hearing officer, the City said that if it “exercises
its discretion and declines to allow a billboard to relocate, it has to
pay just compensation to the billboard owner.” Ultimately, the
hearing officer upheld the City’s denial of CBS’s Section 511
request and grant of Corner Property’s Section 511 request. See id.

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CBS Appeals the Denial of Its Section 511 Request to the District
Court and the Supreme Court

¶19 CBS sought district court review of the hearing officer’s
decision. “The district court rejected CBS’s arguments and
concluded that the City’s decisions were not arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal, and affirmed the decision.” Id. It therefore “upheld the
City’s decisions to deny CBS’s request and approve Corner
Property’s.” Id. CBS then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court,
arguing, among other things, “that if a relocation denial would
trigger just compensation under” Utah Code section 10-9a-
513(2)(a), “then the relocation is mandated by State law, and the
City must approve the relocation request.” Id. ¶ 14 (cleaned up);
see id. ¶¶ 11, 13–15. The supreme court disagreed and on October
23, 2017, issued an opinion affirming the district court’s decision.
In that opinion, the court explained that Utah Code section 10-9a-
513(2)(a) “does not mandate relocation of any billboard; it simply
specifies circumstances where just compensation must be paid if
relocation is denied.” Id. ¶ 37; see id. ¶ 46. The court continued,
“The statute gives the municipality the option of permitting the
relocation, or denying it and paying just compensation.” Id. ¶ 37.

CBS Demands Compensation and the City Rejects the Demand

¶20 In November 2018, following issuance of the supreme
court’s decision in Outfront Media, CBS wrote a letter demanding
that the City begin the process of compensating CBS for its
billboard under Utah Code sections 10-9a-511(3)(c) and 10-9a-
513(2)(a). The City responded with a letter of its own, notifying
CBS that it had “determined [that] the denial of CBS’s section 511
application does not fit the narrow circumstance set forth in
section 513(2)(a)(iv) and no compensation is owed.” The City
contended as follows:

Utah Code § 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv) only requires
payment of just compensation if a municipality
“prevents” a billboard owner from “relocating” a

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billboard and only where certain billboard spacing
and other requirements are met. The term “relocate”
is commonly understood to mean moving
something from one location to another location.
Thus, to even begin to qualify for just compensation
under section 513(2)(a)(iv), CBS was required to
have a billboard in existence at the time it made its
section 511 application. CBS cannot meet this
requirement. CBS was evicted from the [Corner
Property parcel] by the landowner and demolished
its billboard pursuant to that eviction more than
nine months before it submitted a section 511
application to the City. Thus, CBS’s section 511
application does not meet the plain language
requirements of Utah Code § 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv) and
no compensation is owed for the denial of that
application.

CBS Sues the City for Compensation

¶21 Upon the City’s denial of compensation for CBS’s
billboard, CBS sued the City. The City moved for summary
judgment, pressing, among other things, the same argument it
had articulated in its letter denying compensation—namely, that
“CBS cannot satisfy the requirements of [Utah Code section 10-9a-
513(2)(a)(iv)] because CBS did not have a billboard to relocate
when it requested relocation” under section 10-9a-511(3)(c)
because, by then, it had demolished its billboard. The City also
argued that CBS’s Section 511 request did “not qualify for
compensation under the statute for the additional reason that the
application requests relocation within 500 feet of the site of
another potential billboard”—namely, the one Corner Property
had sought to relocate to its parcel. CBS opposed the motion,
arguing that “the City [had] made its decision years ago to pay
just compensation rather than grant [CBS’s] relocation

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application.” Thus, CBS argued, judicial estoppel and equitable
estoppel “[p]reclude[d] the City’s [n]ew [a]rguments.”

¶22 The district court denied the City’s motion for summary
judgment, reasoning that the supreme court had already ruled—
in CBS’s prior appeal, Outfront Media—that “while the City was
allowed to deny [CBS’s] relocation application, such denial
required compensation.” The district court further reasoned that
none of the arguments made by the City in its summary judgment
motion were “ever provided as [a] basis for denying CBS’s
relocation application” and, accordingly, that “the City [was]
estoppe[d] from relying on new reasons to reject CBS’s relocation
application in an effort to avoid paying just compensation.”

¶23 After the district court issued its decision, the parties
stipulated that the value of the demolished billboard was
$325,000. They then jointly moved for the entry of judgment in
favor of CBS “in the amount of $325,000 as just compensation for
the City’s denial of” CBS’s Section 511 request to relocate the
billboard, with the City reserving the right to appeal the court’s
ruling requiring the City to pay just compensation. The court
entered a judgment of $325,000 in favor of CBS.

The City Appeals

¶24 The City then appealed that judgment to this court. We
reversed, concluding “that the district court [had] incorrectly
interpreted Outfront Media as [having] decid[ed] that CBS was
entitled to compensation under the specific circumstances of this
case.” R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2022 UT App 141,
¶ 25, 525 P.3d 100. We further concluded that on the record before
us then, CBS had failed (in its memorandum opposing the City’s
summary judgment motion) to establish as a matter of law that
either equitable estoppel or judicial estoppel applied to bar the
City’s denial of compensation. Id. ¶¶ 31–34. Finally, we declined
to reach the City’s two statutory arguments—namely, that CBS is
not entitled to compensation under Utah Code section 10-9a-

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513(2)(a)(iv), “first, because two companies requested a permit for
the same location and, second, because CBS did not have an
existing billboard to relocate when it submitted the Section 511
request.” Id. ¶ 39 (cleaned up). While the City had made these
arguments in its summary judgment motion, the district court did
not address them because it concluded that the decision in
Outfront Media already required the City to pay compensation. See
id. ¶ 25. “Mindful that we are a court of review, not of first view,
and because we [believed there] would [be] value [in receiving]
the district court’s analysis, we remand[ed] for the district court
to consider the merits of the City’s statutory arguments” in the
first instance. Id. ¶ 39 (cleaned up).

CBS Prevails on Remand

¶25 On remand, both parties moved for summary judgment. In
its motion, the City again argued that under Utah’s “statutory
relocation and compensation scheme,” CBS “does not qualify for
compensation” because (1) “it requested to relocate a billboard to
essentially the same location as another billboard” and (2) “it
demolished its billboard ten months before it submitted a section
511 request to relocate the billboard.”

¶26 In its motion, CBS disputed the City’s statutory arguments
and also contended that, in any event, the City was estopped from
making those arguments. In support of its estoppel theory, CBS
noted (among other things) that “despite the demolition of [CBS’s
billboard],” the City had repeatedly informed CBS that it could
“modify its application to either (a) bank the billboard credits for
the now demolished [s]ign . . . or (b) request to relocate the
sign under Utah Code [section] 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i).” CBS also
submitted a declaration from its vice president averring that it
had “relied on the City’s repeated assurances” by choosing not to
timely “bank and use its billboard credits” and, instead, to appeal
the denial of its Title 72 application and then file a Section 511
request.

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¶27 The district court denied the City’s summary judgment
motion and granted CBS’s. It determined as a matter of law under
the undisputed facts that CBS had met all the requirements for
compensation under Utah Code sections 10-9a-511(3)(c) and 10-
9a-513(2)(a)(iv). It explained that because “the Corner Property
sign was not ‘existing’ [on the Corner Property parcel] at the time
[CBS] filed its relocation request,” there was “no factual support
for the argument that another billboard existed” too close to the
location onto which CBS wanted to relocate its billboard. And the
district court saw “nothing absurd about interpreting the statutes
at issue here according to their plain meaning” on this point.
Regarding the City’s argument that CBS did not qualify for
compensation because it had demolished its billboard before it
submitted its Section 511 request, the court concluded that this
argument was “belie[d] by the facts.” The court then noted that
the City’s December 4, 2014 letter denying CBS’s initial “request
to relocate and increase the height of the [b]illboard . . . [had]
acknowledged that the [b]illboard had been demolished” and
nevertheless “invit[ed] [CBS] to ‘modify its application to . . .
request to relocate the sign under Utah Code [section] 10-9a-
511(3)(c)(i)’” and, “[p]er the City’s own records, [CBS’s]
application was always maintained by the City [under] the same
permit request number[].” Finally, the court ruled that, in any
event, “nothing in [Utah Code section 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv)]
require[d] that a billboard remain in place during the entirety of
the process whereby an applicant seeks approval of relocation.”
The court then entered a judgment requiring the City to
compensate CBS $325,000 for its billboard. The City again appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶28 The City challenges the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, contending that the court erred in determining as a
matter of law that “Utah Code sections 10-9a-511 and 513
require[d] the City to pay just compensation.” “An appellate court
reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or

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denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,
¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (cleaned up). Likewise, “the proper
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law
reviewed for correctness.” State v. Robertson, 2017 UT 27, ¶ 14, 438
P.3d 491 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶29 The City asserts that the district court erred in two respects
in interpreting Utah Code sections 10-9a-511(3)(c) and 10-9a-
513(2)(a)(iv). 5 The City’s first contention is that interpreting these

5. The version of section 10-9a-511(3)(c) in effect when CBS
submitted its Section 511 request provided as follows:

(i) Notwithstanding a prohibition in its zoning
ordinance, a municipality may permit a billboard
owner to relocate the billboard within the
municipality’s boundaries to a location that is
mutually acceptable to the municipality and the
billboard owner.

(ii) If the municipality and billboard owner cannot
agree to a mutually acceptable location within 90
days after the owner submits a written request to
relocate the billboard, the provisions of Subsection
10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv) apply.

Utah Code § 10-9a-511(3)(c) (2014). And the version of section 10-
9a-513(2)(a)(iv) then in effect read as follows:

A municipality is considered to have initiated the
acquisition of a billboard structure by eminent
(continued…)

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provisions to “require a municipality to pay compensation to
unsuccessful applicants when it receives multiple applications for
a single permit” yields a “patently absurd” result. Its second
contention is that these provisions “limit[] payment of
compensation to billboard owners [who] have existing billboards
capable of being relocated” and that because CBS “submitted its
Section 511 request . . . after it demolished its billboard,” it did not

domain if the municipality prevent[ed] a billboard
owner from . . . relocating a billboard into any
commercial, industrial, or manufacturing zone
within the municipality’s boundaries, if:
(A) the relocated billboard is:
(I) within 5,280 feet of its previous location;
and
(II) no closer than:
(Aa) 300 feet from an off-premise sign
existing on the same side of the street or
highway; or
(Bb) if the street or highway is an
interstate . . . highway . . . , [500 feet from]
an off-premise sign existing on the same
side of the interstate . . . highway; and
(B) (I) the billboard owner has submitted a
written request under Subsection 10-9a-
511(3)(c); and
(II) the municipality and billboard owner are
unable to agree, within the time provided in
Subsection 10-9a-511(3)(c), to a mutually
acceptable location . . . .

Id. § 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv) (2014).

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

meet “the threshold requirement of having an existing billboard.”
We address each of these contentions in turn.

I. Multiple Applicants for a Single Permit

¶30 The City’s first contention is that it is not statutorily
required to compensate an unsuccessful applicant when it
receives multiple Section 511 requests to relocate a billboard to
essentially the same location. Under the version of Utah Code
section 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv) then in effect, the City was not required
to compensate a billboard owner for denying a request to relocate
if the proposed new location was within 500 feet from “an off-
premise sign existing on the same side of [an] interstate . . .
highway.” Utah Code § 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv)(A)(II)(Bb) (2014). It is
undisputed that when CBS submitted its Section 511 request to
relocate its sign, no sign existed on the same side of I-15 within
500 feet of the proposed new location. The City acknowledges that
“the plain language” of section 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv) “make[s] clear
[that] a municipality is not required to pay compensation if it
denies a request to relocate a billboard to a freeway-facing
location that is within 500 feet of an existing billboard.” But it
asserts that “[t]o avoid otherwise absurd results, the same
conclusion must be reached where a municipality is in receipt of
multiple applications for the same location or locations that are
within 500 feet of each other.”

¶31 “Our caselaw recognizes two different interpretive tools
concerning absurdity.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27, 387 P.3d
1000 (cleaned up). “The first—the absurd consequences canon—
merely resolves an ambiguity [in a statute] by choosing the
reading that avoids absurd results.” Id. (cleaned up). “The
second—the absurdity doctrine—reforms unambiguous statutory
language where the language would lead to an absurd result.” Id.
(cleaned up). The City asserts that the version of section 10-9a-
513(2)(a)(iv) then in effect was ambiguous, and it asks us to apply
the absurd consequences canon to resolve the purported
ambiguity. The City further contends that if we determine the

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statute to be unambiguous, we should apply the absurdity
doctrine and reform the plain meaning of the statute. We are not
persuaded by either argument.

¶32 As noted, for the absurd consequences canon to apply, the
statute at issue must be ambiguous. See id. “A statute is considered
ambiguous if its terms remain susceptible to two or more
reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain
language analysis.” State v. Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 11, 478
P.3d 1048 (cleaned up). The relevant portion of section 10-9a-
513(2)(a)(iv) stated that a municipality need not pay
compensation when it denied a Section 511 request if the
proposed new location for the billboard was within 500 feet of “an
off-premise sign existing on the same side of the interstate.” Utah
Code § 10-9a-513(2)(a)(iv)(A)(II)(Bb) (2014) (emphasis added).
The City acknowledges that one reasonable interpretation of this
provision is that the word “existing” modifies “sign” and that
under that interpretation, a sign must already “exist” too close to
the proposed new location for the City to be able to deny the
request and not pay compensation. The City contends, however,
that there is another reasonable interpretation of this provision—
specifically, that “existing” instead modifies “on the same side of
the interstate.” Under this interpretation, the City asserts, there
need not be an “existing billboard” for the City to be able to deny
a Section 511 request and not pay compensation. Instead, there
need only be a competing application that proposes a relocation
site “existing on the same side of the interstate” and within 500
feet of the proposed site in the denied request. This alternative
interpretation, however, is not reasonable.

¶33 “As [our supreme] court has previously stated, an
application of elementary rules of punctuation and grammar is
useful in the legal interpretation of a text.” Prisbrey v. Bloomington
Water Co., 2003 UT 56, ¶ 17, 82 P.3d 1119 (cleaned up). In the
phrase “an off-premise sign existing on the same side of the
interstate,” the word “existing” is a present participle that
functions as an adjective. See Participle, Merriam-Webster,

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https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/participle [https://
perma.cc/WG8H-RCFE] (defining “participle” as a “verbal form
that has the function of an adjective and at the same time shows
such verbal features as tense”). Moreover, “existing” and the
prepositional phrase that follows it—namely, “on the same side
of the interstate”—combine to form a participial phrase that, in its
entirety, modifies the noun “sign.” See Matt Ellis, Participial
Phrases: How They Work, With Examples, Grammarly (Nov. 13,
2023), https://www.grammarly.com/blog/grammar/participial-
phrases/ [https://perma.cc/YX7Y-ZMND] (“A participial phrase is
a type of modifier that uses the participle form of a verb to
describe a noun. . . . Participial phrases also include other words
besides the participle—such as prepositional phrases . . . .”). Thus,
this provision plainly means that a municipality may deny a
Section 511 request and not compensate the applicant if a sign in
too-close proximity is already “existing on the same side of the
interstate.” Any other interpretation lacks grammatical support.
See Nielsen v. Retirement Board, 2019 UT App 89, ¶ 16, 443 P.3d 1264
(rejecting an asserted statutory “interpretation because it [was]
contrary to proper grammar and usage”). And because this
provision has only one plain meaning, it is not ambiguous and we
have no occasion to apply the absurd consequences canon. See
Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27.

¶34 In the alternative, the City asks us to apply the absurdity
doctrine, which, as already noted, “reforms unambiguous
statutory language where the language would lead to an absurd
result.” Id. (cleaned up). The City requests that we reform the
statute to expand the concept of an “existing billboard” to include
a “proposed billboard.” If reformed in this way, the statute would
have allowed the City to deny a Section 511 request without
paying compensation if a competing request proposed to relocate
another billboard to the same side of the freeway and within 500
feet of the other requested relocation site.

¶35 Our supreme court “has developed a narrow, exacting
standard for determining whether to apply the absurdity doctrine

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

and read a statute contrary to its plain meaning.” Id. ¶ 28. Under
this standard, we may “not apply the absurdity doctrine unless
the operation of the plain language is so overwhelmingly absurd
that no rational legislator could have intended the statute to
operate in such a manner.” Id. (cleaned up). “This standard is
satisfied only if the legislature could not reasonably have
intended the result.” Id.

¶36 The City observes that here, “[w]hen proposing this
billboard relocation and compensation scheme, the sponsoring
legislator explained [that the purpose of the scheme] was to
protect the property rights of a billboard owner that was required
to move [its billboard] because of development or an expiring
lease [but] was barred [from doing so] by municipal ordinance.”
(Emphasis added.) The City then argues that “to read ‘existing
billboards’ to exclude ‘proposed billboards’ would blatantly
controvert the express purpose of the statute” because the express
purpose of the statute was “to require compensation where a
billboard is prevented from relocating under a provision of
municipal ordinance, not when relocation is impermissible under a
provision of state code.” But the fact that a statute’s plain terms
accomplish more than the general purpose identified by a sole
legislator summarizing the enacting legislation does not mean
that the plain language yields an absurd result. More is required
to trigger the absurdity doctrine.

¶37 The City also asserts that in situations like the one here—
where it received competing Section 511 requests “for essentially
the same location” and “State law prohibited it from granting
both”—rational legislators would not make a municipality “liable
for the statutory consequence of denying” one of the competing
requests. We are not persuaded. The City itself “has a
longstanding policy in favor of retiring and removing billboards
as the opportunity to do so arises.” In the same vein, rational
legislators might want to incentivize the removal of billboards by
providing a mechanism whereby billboard owners who are
willing to remove their billboards can readily receive public

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

payment for doing so. One such mechanism is precisely the one
set forth under the plain terms of this statute. Moreover, the same
rational legislators might very well choose to require the
municipality that directly benefits from the billboards’ removal to
make the incentive payment. Thus, because the legislature could
have reasonably intended the result of the plain statutory
language at issue here, we decline to apply the absurdity doctrine.

¶38 For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err in
concluding that Corner Property’s competing Section 511 request
did not preclude CBS’s right to compensation when the City
denied its Section 511 request.

II. Relocation of a Demolished Billboard

¶39 The City next contends that the billboard relocation statute
limits payment of compensation for rejected Section 511 requests
“to billboard owners [who] have existing billboards capable of
being relocated” and that because CBS “submitted its Section 511
request . . . after it demolished its billboard,” it did not meet “the
threshold requirement of having an existing billboard.” We do not
address this statutory argument. Instead, we conclude that
equitable estoppel bars the City from relying on this argument to
deny compensation to CBS.

¶40 Equitable estoppel has three elements:

first, a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted;
next, reasonable action or inaction by the other party
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party’s
statement, admission, act[,] or failure to act; and,
third, injury to the second party that would result
from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure
to act.

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2022 UT App 141, ¶ 28, 525
P.3d 100 (cleaned up). This doctrine “is usually reserved for
extreme cases.” Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, our supreme court has
explained that “the usual rules of estoppel do not apply against
the government . . . and courts must be cautious in applying
equitable estoppel against the State.” 6 Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of
Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 35, 368 P.3d 846 (cleaned up). “Accordingly,
estoppel is applied against the [S]tate only if necessary to prevent
manifest injustice, and the exercise of governmental powers will
not be impaired as a result.” Id. (cleaned up). Notwithstanding
these limitations, we determine that equitable estoppel applies
under the undisputed facts of this case. Before articulating our
equitable estoppel analysis, however, we address the propriety of
our reliance on that doctrine generally.

¶41 We addressed CBS’s equitable estoppel argument in the
prior appeal in this case. See R.O.A. Gen., 2022 UT App 141, ¶¶ 28,
30‒33. There we observed that on the record before us then, CBS’s
factual assertions related to equitable estoppel were “just
allegations” and not supported by “record citations to affidavits
or other evidence that might establish that CBS, in fact,” relied to
its detriment on the City’s representations. Id. ¶¶ 31‒33. Thus, we
held that the district court “erred in determining that estoppel
prevented the City from raising its statutory arguments in its
motion for summary judgment.” Id. ¶ 38. On that basis, we
“vacate[d] the court’s judgment and order denying the City’s
summary judgment motion, and we remand[ed] for further

6. Because the City derives its authority from the State, this
principle applies to municipalities. See generally State v.
Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Utah 1980) (“Local governments,
as subdivisions of the State, exercise those powers granted to
them by the State Legislature . . . .”); Wadsworth v. Santaquin City,
28 P.2d 161, 167 (Utah 1933) (“[T]he power or authority which a
municipality possesses in this state is derived from the
Legislature.”).

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

proceedings.” Id. ¶ 40. The City now argues that it was “error for
the district court, on remand, to contradict the direct mandate of
this Court and consider [CBS’s] re-argument of this already
decided issue.” The City further asserts that we “should not
revisit this decided issue” either, to prevent CBS from having “a
‘second bite at the evidentiary apple.’” (Quoting Keiter v. Keiter,
2010 UT App 169, ¶ 28, 235 P.3d 782.)

¶42 However, the district court did not contradict our mandate,
which expressly allowed for additional proceedings on remand
and did not preclude new motions for summary judgment. We
therefore see no error by the district court in considering on
remand CBS’s summary judgment motion. See State v. Blake, 2025
UT 21, ¶ 29 (“A reversal of a trial court order invalidates that order
but does not prohibit further proceedings unless the reversing
court expressly states otherwise.”).

¶43 As for the City’s second-bite-at-the-evidentiary-apple
argument, unlike the case the City cites for support, this is not an
appeal following trial. See Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 1 (noting
that the appeal challenged “the adequacy of the factual findings
and the sufficiency of the evidence”). Prior to trial, a second-bite-
at-the-evidentiary-apple argument implicates the discovery rules.
See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (providing timing and other
requirements for the disclosure of evidence). And the City has not
demonstrated that under those rules the evidence CBS submitted
on remand in support of its summary judgment motion is not
properly part of the record. See infra note 7. We therefore proceed
to address CBS’s equitable estoppel argument on the record now
before us.

A. Statement by One Party that Is Inconsistent with a Claim
Later Asserted

¶44 Equitable estoppel first requires “a statement, admission,
act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted.” R.O.A. General, 2022 UT App 141, ¶ 28 (cleaned up).

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

And our supreme court observed in Monarrez v. Utah Department
of Transportation, 2016 UT 10, 368 P.3d 846, that “the few cases in
which Utah courts have permitted estoppel against the
government have involved very specific written representations.”
Id. ¶ 36 (cleaned up). For example, the Monarrez court noted that
in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d
689 (Utah 1979), the Liquor Control Commission was estopped
“from denying a liquor license on the ground that the applicant
had failed to comply with a specific siting requirement” because
“the applicant had previously sought guidance from the
Commission on how to comply with the siting requirement and
the Commission, after reviewing surveys of the proposed site, had
sent a letter to the applicant stating that the applicant had satisfied
the requirement.” 2016 UT 10, ¶ 36 (cleaned up). The Monarrez
court also cited Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d
671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), where this court “estopped the Utah
State Retirement Board from denying over six years of service
credit to a former employee,” because “the employee, prior to
retiring, had sought guidance from the Utah State Retirement
Office as to whether certain service credits would be counted
toward his retirement benefits” and, in response, the office “sent
the employee a letter stating that the service credits would be
posted to his account and that he would not need to purchase
them.” 2016 UT 10, ¶ 36 (cleaned up). The Monarrez court
concluded that “in both cases, estoppel was warranted because
there were very clear, well-substantiated representations by
government entities that were directly contradicted by those
entities’ subsequent actions.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶45 A contrasting example is Monarrez itself. There, a motorist
was injured when he was “forced to stop suddenly near a
construction crew on a Utah road.” Id. ¶ 1. He filed a notice of
claim against the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT)
pursuant to the governmental immunity act. Id. After the date his
claim was deemed denied based on the lack of a response from
UDOT, UDOT sent him a letter explaining that it had “completed

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

an investigation of [the] claim and had concluded that [it was] not
liable for [the alleged] damages.” Id. ¶ 3 (cleaned up).
Accordingly, the letter stated, “[W]e respectfully deny your
claim.” Id. It “also contained a clause stating that the letter [did]
‘not constitute a waiver of any of the provisions or requirements
of the Governmental Immunity Act.’” Id.

¶46 The motorist filed a lawsuit against UDOT more than one
year after the date his notice of claim was deemed denied but less
than one year from the date of UDOT’s denial letter. Id. ¶ 4. UDOT
successfully defended by asserting that the motorist’s claim was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which required a
claimant to bring an action “within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period has expired.” Id.
(cleaned up). On appeal, the motorist argued that UDOT’s letter
denying his claim was “an act inconsistent with UDOT’s later
assertion of the limitations defense” and that UDOT should be
estopped from arguing that the limitation period started to run
any earlier than the date of its denial letter. Id. ¶ 35. The supreme
court concluded, however, that UDOT was not estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations because its written statement to
the motorist—namely, “we respectfully deny your claim”—was
“neither a very specific nor a very clear . . . representation that
UDOT would not later assert the statute of limitations defense.”
Id. ¶ 38 (cleaned up).

¶47 Here, the City did not simply “respectfully deny” CBS’s
request as UDOT did the motorist’s claim in Monarrez. Rather, in
its December 4, 2014 letter, the City acknowledged that “as of the
date of [that] letter, [CBS’s] [s]ign ha[d] been demolished,” yet it
told CBS in writing that it could “modify its application to either
(a) bank the billboard credits for the now demolished [s]ign . . . or
(b) request to relocate the [s]ign under Utah Code [section] 10-9a-
511(3)(c)(i).” Then in its December 18, 2014 letter, the City
referenced the earlier letter and again wrote that if CBS
“prefer[red] to modify its application to either bank its billboard
credits . . . or request to relocate the sign under Utah Code

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

[section] 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i), the City [would] consider a modified
request.” Like the Liquor Control Commission’s statement that
the applicant in that case had satisfied the applicable siting
requirement and the Retirement Board’s representation that the
employee there would not need to purchase certain service
credits, the City’s December 2014 letters contained a very specific
written representation—namely, that notwithstanding the earlier
demolition of CBS’s billboard, the City would accept a Section 511
request to relocate that billboard.

¶48 Admittedly, the City’s December 18 letter said that it was
“reserv[ing] its rights under Utah Code [section] 10-9a-513(2)(a),”
and a right that the City now claims it had under section 10-9a-
513(2)(a) is a right to not pay compensation if the billboard in
question has already been demolished. But we do not read the
December 18 letter as reserving a right to deny compensation
based on the billboard’s demolition. The City expressly
acknowledged in both December 2014 letters that the billboard
had been demolished before it invited CBS to modify its
application into a Section 511 request. That invitation would have
been meaningless if the December 18 letter is read as reserving a
right to deny—on the basis that the billboard had been
demolished—the very Section 511 request it was nonetheless
inviting. And we do not believe the City intended to extend a
meaningless invitation or that CBS should have understood it as
such.

¶49 We also recognize that the December 2014 letters each first
informed CBS of its appeal right and then said that “[i]f CBS
prefer[red] to modify its application,” it could. To the extent that
this phrasing might be read as presenting an option for CBS to
either appeal the denial of its Title 72 application or modify its
request but not do both, such a reading is foreclosed by the City’s
subsequent communications. Specifically, when CBS modified its
application into a Section 511 request, the City did not deny the
Section 511 request on the basis that CBS had demolished its
billboard. Instead, it denied the Section 511 request on the basis

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

that CBS wanted to relocate its billboard into a gateway area. The
City assigned CBS’s Section 511 request the same application
number it had given to CBS’s Title 72 application, apparently
treating the Section 511 request as relating back to when the Title
72 application was filed. Moreover, during CBS’s administrative
appeal of the denial of its Section 511 request, the City told the
hearing officer that it had “consistently represented to CBS” that
it would compensate CBS for its billboard; that although it had
denied CBS’s application, it had “elected to pay just compensation
for that decision”; and that when it “declines to allow a billboard
to relocate, it has to pay just compensation to the billboard
owner.” These statements at that stage of the proceedings are
squarely at odds with the notion that the City’s invitation for CBS
to modify its application was conditioned on CBS forgoing an
appeal of the denial of its Title 72 application. We therefore do not
read the December 2014 letters as presenting to CBS such an
either-or condition.

¶50 In sum, we conclude that the City’s December 2014
letters—particularly as reinforced by the City’s later statements
over the next two years—contain specific, written statements that
it would accept a Section 511 request to relocate CBS’s billboard
despite the billboard’s prior demolition. And these statements are
inconsistent with the City’s current claim that it could lawfully
deny compensation based on CBS having demolished the
billboard prior to submitting its Section 511 request.

B. Reasonable Action or Inaction

¶51 To establish equitable estoppel, CBS “must next
demonstrate that [it] acted prudently and reasonably relied on”
the City’s representations. Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
2007 UT 28, ¶ 32, 158 P.3d 1088. “When a party knows or should
have known reliance would be in error, the party cannot
reasonably rely on the [representation] as a matter of law.” Id. This
is not a subjective test, but rather the question is “what would a

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reasonable person conclude under these circumstances.” Id. ¶ 34
(cleaned up).

¶52 On remand from the City’s prior appeal, CBS submitted a
declaration from its vice president in support of its motion for
summary judgment stating that CBS “relied on the City’s
repeated assurances that it would receive compensation” if it
modified its application and filed a Section 511 request. The vice
president declared that if the City had “informed [CBS] that its
relocation application did not qualify for compensation pursuant
to Utah Code [section] 10-9a-513,” then CBS “could have asked
the City to bank and use its billboard credits as allowed by City
ordinances” rather than pursue appeals that extended beyond the
time allowed for using billboard credits following demolition of a
qualifying sign. See generally Salt Lake City Code § 21A.46.160(E),
(G) (stating that “[a]fter a nonconforming billboard is demolished
pursuant to a permit . . . , the city shall create a billboard bank
account for the billboard owner” that “show[s] the date of the
removal,” and that generally “[a]ny billboard credits not used
within thirty six (36) months of their creation shall expire and be
of no further value”). Although the City “[d]isputed” these facts
in its opposition to CBS’s motion for summary judgment, it did so
only by characterizing them as “argument” and “irrelevant.” The
City did not respond with any citations to material in the record
as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 See Utah R. Civ.

7. The City asserted in a footnote that the declaration of CBS’s vice
president was “improper and should be stricken.” But a party
may not move to strike evidence as part of an opposition
memorandum. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(n) (“A party who objects to
evidence in another party’s motion or memorandum may not
move to strike that evidence.”). Rather, a “party may object that
the material cited to support or dispute a fact [relied on in a
summary judgment motion] cannot be presented in a form that
would be admissible in evidence.” Id. R. 56(c)(2). Thus, the City’s
(continued…)

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

P. 56(a)(2) (“[A] memorandum opposing [a] motion [for summary
judgment] must include a verbatim restatement of each of the
moving party’s facts that is disputed with an explanation of the
grounds for the dispute supported by citing to materials in the
record . . . .”). Thus, these facts, which demonstrate CBS’s reliance
on the City’s invitation, are deemed admitted. See id. R. 56(a)(4).

¶53 Additionally, for the reasons outlined above as to why the
City’s December 2014 letters contained unqualified invitations for
CBS to modify its Title 72 application into a Section 511 request
despite the prior demolition of its billboard, see supra ¶¶ 47‒49,
we conclude that CBS’s reliance on that invitation was reasonable.
Stated simply, it was objectively reasonable for CBS to proceed
down a path the City expressly invited it to take. See Celebrity Club,
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm’n, 602 P.2d 689, 691, 694‒95 (Utah
1979); Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Board, 795 P.2d 671, 672–73, 678
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

attempt to strike the declaration was improper. See Deeter v. Deeter
(In re Estate of Deeter), 2020 UT App 65, ¶ 22, 464 P.3d 1164
(Mortensen, J., concurring) (stating that “the current rule, wisely,
bans [the] practice” of “includ[ing] motions to strike in the context
of summary judgment when a party allegedly relied upon
inadmissible evidence”). Additionally, the City’s appellate
challenge to CBS’s use of its vice president’s declaration is
inadequately briefed because it consists of a single sentence,
unaccompanied by citation to authority, asserting simply that the
declaration was untimely. See Seamons v. Brandley, 2011 UT App
434, ¶ 6, 268 P.3d 195 (explaining that an issue is inadequately
briefed if it “fails to contain the requisite legal analysis based upon
relevant authority”). For these reasons, we deem the declaration
to be properly part of the record.

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R.O.A. General v. Salt Lake City

C. Injury that Would Result from Allowing a Party to
Contradict or Repudiate a Statement

¶54 Finally, to establish equitable estoppel, CBS must show
that injury will result from allowing the City to contradict or
repudiate its invitation for CBS to modify its application into a
Section 511 request despite the prior demolition of its billboard.
See R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2022 UT App 141, ¶ 28,
525 P.3d 100. CBS has made that showing. By reasonably relying
on the City’s invitation, CBS lost the opportunity to use billboard
credits as compensation for the loss of its billboard. We therefore
determine that CBS has demonstrated injury.

¶55 Because CBS has satisfied each of the elements of equitable
estoppel, we conclude that the City is estopped from denying
compensation to CBS on the basis that it demolished its billboard
prior to modifying its Title 72 application into a Section 511
request.

CONCLUSION

¶56 The district court did not err in concluding that a
municipality may be required to pay compensation to an
unsuccessful applicant when it receives multiple Section 511
requests for essentially the same location. And on the record
before us, the City is barred by equitable estoppel from denying
compensation to CBS on the basis that it demolished its billboard
prior to submitting its Section 511 request. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of CBS.

20230838-CA 30 2025 UT App 122