Lomsanidze v. Musayev

2025 UT App 81

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ASLAN LOMSANIDZE,
Appellee,
v.
MEKHTI MUSAYEV,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20231113-CA
Filed May 30, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Laura Scott
The Honorable Barry G. Lawrence
No. 170908230

David O. Drake, Attorney for Appellant
Aslan Lomsanidze, Appellee Pro Se

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Aslan Lomsanidze brought conversion, theft by deception,
unjust enrichment, and breach of contract claims against Mekhti
Musayev after he discovered Musayev had been making
unauthorized withdrawals from and unknown deposits into
Lomsanidze’s bank account. Almost seven years after
Lomsanidze’s initial complaint was filed, a bench trial was held.
The trial court found that Musayev breached his contract with
Lomsanidze and was liable for $82,687.87 in damages. Musayev
now challenges multiple rulings by the trial court. Because we
find no merit to his arguments, we affirm.
Lomsanidze v. Musayev

BACKGROUND 1

Lomsanidze and Musayev’s Contract

¶2 Lomsanidze emigrated to the United States from Russia in
2005 and is unable to read, write, or speak in English with any
degree of competency. He was an experienced autobody
repairman in Russia and worked as an autobody repairman after
moving to the United States. In 2011, Lomsanidze opened his own
autobody shop.

¶3 After opening his shop, Lomsanidze’s friend, Musayev,
began to bring Lomsanidze cars to repair. Musayev speaks both
English and Russian. Musayev was a member of Autobuysale,
LLC (Autobuysale), an entity that repaired and sold cars, along
with two other members. Though all three members of the LLC
shared the same lot and business name and paid utilities and rent
together, each member would purchase his own cars and work
with different body shops to repair the cars and sell them.

¶4 In August 2012, Lomsanidze approached Musayev and
asked if Musayev would buy cars for him “so he could earn some
extra money” by repairing and selling them. Musayev agreed as
long as Lomsanidze promised not to tell the other Autobuysale
members about the arrangement. The following year, Musayev
helped Lomsanidze open his own account at a credit union (the
Account). Lomsanidze designated Musayev as “an authorized
user” of the Account, which allowed Musayev to “transfer money
in and out of the [A]ccount.” After opening the Account, the
parties entered into an oral agreement whereby Musayev would
purchase cars at auction for Lomsanidze using money from the

1. “Following a bench trial, we recite the facts from the record in
the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court and
present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand
issues raised on appeal.” Hillam v. Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, n.2,
554 P.3d 1137 (cleaned up).

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Account, Lomsanidze would repair the cars, and Musayev would
sell them. Lomsanidze testified that the agreement initially
entailed splitting profit from auto sales equally but that after
Lomsanidze sold several cars, the agreement was modified so that
he would pay a flat fee of $200 for Musayev to buy a car and $250
for Musayev to sell the car. Musayev’s version of the agreement
was slightly different, and he testified that Lomsanidze agreed to
let Musayev “borrow” money from the Account to buy cars and
that Musayev agreed to either pay back Lomsanidze directly or
put any money he took back into the Account.

¶5 Lomsanidze testified that he worked on thirty to forty cars
under this arrangement with Musayev. But when Lomsanidze
checked the Account in 2017, he discovered that it was empty.
Lomsanidze learned that the credit union had frozen the Account
after someone stole his checks and tried to use them without his
signature. When Lomsanidze confronted Musayev about what
happened to the money that was in the Account, Musayev
explained that when it was frozen, he transferred the money into
his personal account.

¶6 Believing Musayev had connected the Account with his
personal and Autobuysale accounts, made unauthorized
withdrawals, and deposited unknown amounts into the Account,
Lomsanidze filed a complaint against Musayev and Autobuysale
alleging conversion, theft by deception, unjust enrichment, and
breach of contract. Musayev filed a counterclaim alleging breach
of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). 2
The IIED claim resulted from a letter Lomsanidze’s first counsel
had sent to Musayev, demanding Musayev pay Lomsanidze
$120,000 within two weeks or counsel would file a criminal

2. The complaint was ultimately amended to include all of these
claims.

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complaint against Musayev and a complaint with the Internal
Revenue Service. 3

Motion to Dismiss

¶7 Musayev and Autobuysale (collectively, Defendants) filed
a motion to dismiss. They argued that the case against Musayev
as an individual should be dismissed because Lomsanidze “failed
to aver sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil of the
company.” Defendants argued that Lomsanidze did not allege
sufficient facts to hold Musayev personally liable because there
were no allegations to support piercing the corporate veil with
respect to Autobuysale.

¶8 In opposition, Lomsanidze argued that the motion to
dismiss should be denied because Lomsanidze pleaded multiple
“causes of action directly and personally” against Musayev.
Specifically, the complaint alleged claims against Musayev for
conversion, theft by deception, unjust enrichment, and breach of
contract.

¶9 The trial court denied the motion, determining that
Lomsanidze’s complaint contained multiple causes of action and
factual allegations against Musayev individually and “sufficiently
state[d] claims upon which relief may granted.” Additionally, the
court noted that Lomsanidze represented that he was not
asserting, and would not assert, a “pierce the veil” claim at trial to
find Musayev liable for claims made against Autobuysale.

Motion for Jury Trial

¶10 Approximately five weeks before the bench trial,
Defendants filed a Motion for Late Requested Jury Trial (the Jury

3. This attorney withdrew as Lomsanidze’s counsel several
months after sending this letter and was sanctioned by the Utah
State Bar.

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Motion). In the Jury Motion, Defendants argued that the majority
of Lomsanidze’s motions in the case had been granted while the
majority of Musayev’s motions had been denied. According to
Musayev, some of these denials “significantly prejudiced [their]
discovery rights and the ability to prepare for trial and defend this
case.” As a result, a jury trial was necessary “to avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality at the trial.”

¶11 In response, Lomsanidze argued that “neither party
demanded a jury within 14 days of the filing of the last pleading,”
as required by rule 38(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and,
thus, the parties waived trial by jury. Additionally, Lomsanidze
asserted that a jury trial would prejudice him in numerous ways:
(1) the bench trial was scheduled for four days due to the lack of
jury selection and deliberation, and requiring a jury in the four
day time frame “would not give the parties sufficient time to
present their respective cases”; (2) attorney fees would become
much more costly given the “amount of additional attorney time
and work involved in preparing for a jury, preparing jury
instructions, and the like”; and (3) “granting the motion on the eve
of the currently scheduled trial . . . divert[ed] substantial attorney
time away to jury related preparation” and “away from other
planned trial preparation work.”

¶12 The trial court denied the motion. It declined “to exercise
its discretion to allow a jury trial because Defendants waited until
the eve of trial to request it.” It noted that “granting the request
would result in unnecessary delay and significant prejudice to”
Lomsanidze. In response to Defendants’ contention that a jury
trial was necessary to avoid any appearance of impropriety, the
trial court stated it was “not persuaded that granting a belated
request for a jury trial resolves the issue” because even though the
court would not serve as factfinder, it would make “numerous
evidentiary and other rulings during the course of a trial.” As a
result, the court declined “to allow a belated jury demand as a
‘remedy’ for Defendants’ ‘suspicion’ that [the court’s] ‘prior

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rulings [had been] significantly one-sided.’” The court then
directed Defendants to file an appropriate motion to disqualify if
it had a “good faith basis” for doing so.

Motion to Disqualify the Trial Judge

¶13 Defendants filed a motion to continue the bench trial just a
few days prior to the scheduled trial date due to Defendants’
counsel’s (Counsel) medical issues. This was the second time such
a motion was filed due to Counsel’s medical conditions. Though
the trial court ultimately granted the motion to continue (the
Continuance Ruling), it placed certain conditions on Defendants.
Specifically, it required that Defendants “obtain co-counsel or
standby counsel in the event that [Counsel’s] medical issues
continue or he has new medical issues that interfere with his
ability to prepare for trial or the trial itself.” It required co-counsel
or standby counsel to enter an appearance within fourteen days
of the ruling. The trial court also stated that once a new trial date
was set, a third continuance would not be granted and if
Defendants were “unable to proceed to trial—with or without
counsel—their answer [would] be stricken and their default
[would] be entered.” And the court determined that at the close
of the trial, regardless of whether Lomsanidze prevailed, he
would be entitled to “seek recovery of any taxable costs incurred
in connection with the continuance.”

¶14 In response to the Continuance Ruling, Defendants filed a
motion to disqualify the trial judge. Defendants argued that the
conditions for granting the continuance were “a clear
manifestation of [the judge’s] lack of impartiality.” Defendants
further asserted that the Continuance Ruling was
“unconscionable and prejudicial” because the court “for reasons
unknown/unspecified [was] trying to punish” Counsel.

¶15 In accordance with rule 63(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial judge certified Defendants’ motion to the
presiding judge or his designee for review. See Utah R. Civ. P.

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Lomsanidze v. Musayev

63(c)(1) (“The judge who is the subject of the motion [to
disqualify] must, without further hearing or a response from
another party, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the
motion and affidavit or declaration to a reviewing judge.”). The
judge designated by the presiding judge to review the motion (the
Reviewing Judge) denied it. The Reviewing Judge found that
Defendants did not demonstrate bias by the trial judge because
they did not allege the trial judge had “prior knowledge of
evidentiary facts,” was “related to a party or an attorney, has a
close social or professional relationship with a party or an
attorney,” “was involved in the case at hand before becoming a
Judge,” or had “a financial or property interest that could be
affected by the outcome of the proceeding.” The Reviewing Judge
noted that “when a party disagrees with a judge’s ruling, the
proper avenue of relief is an appeal or mandamus, not
disqualification.” Ultimately, the Reviewing Judge found it was
not unreasonable for the court to have included conditions in the
Continuance Ruling and that the decision to do so “does not
reflect bias, or any other reason for her disqualification.”

¶16 Dissatisfied with both the Continuance Ruling and the
denial of the motion to disqualify, Defendants filed a petition for
extraordinary relief with this court, which was denied.

Bench Trial

¶17 A bench trial was finally held in October and November
2023. At the start of the bench trial, Lomsanidze dismissed all of
his claims against Autobuysale with prejudice because several
days before the trial, it had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

¶18 Lomsanidze was represented by counsel, but Musayev
proceeded pro se after his attorney withdrew. Lomsanidze called
himself and a friend (Friend) as witnesses. Musayev only called
himself as a witness.

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Lomsanidze v. Musayev

¶19 At the close of the trial, the trial court issued oral findings
of fact and conclusions of law. First, the trial court noted that it
did not find Musayev or Lomsanidze “to be entirely credible on
all aspects of their testimony.” However, the court found that it
was “undisputed from the evidence at trial that there was at least
an agreement that any funds that [Musayev] transferred out of the
[A]ccount would be put back into the [A]ccount.” The court found
that Musayev borrowed more money from the Account than he
paid back or returned but that Lomsanidze kept for himself some
of the cars Musayev purchased and, thus, “not every transfer from
[Musayev] to his personal account needed to be paid back.” After
crediting Musayev for several withdrawals that were made at
Lomsanidze’s request, the trial court found that the total “amount
that was withdrawn from the account less the amount that was
put back in the account [was] $82,687.87.”

¶20 The trial court concluded that Musayev breached his oral
contract with Lomsanidze. Specifically, the trial court concluded
that Lomsanidze “performed under the contract by allowing
[Musayev] to borrow money from the [A]ccount, that [Musayev]
breached the contract by failing to repay all of the amounts that
he borrowed and that [Lomsanidze] has suffered damages as a
result of the breach of contract in the amount of $82,687.87.” The
court dismissed the theft by deception claim because it was not
persuaded that a private cause of action exists for such a claim
and, even if there was, Lomsanidze did not meet his evidentiary
burden. The court then dismissed Lomsanidze’s conversion
claim, concluding that the parties had a contract, that the contract
allowed Musayev to use the money in the Account, and that “[t]he
fact that [Musayev] did not repay all of the funds that he
borrowed, [did] not amount to conversion of the funds.” Finally,
the court dismissed Lomsanidze’s unjust enrichment claim
because it had found there was a contract.

¶21 The trial court dismissed Musayev’s breach of contract
counterclaim because Musayev “did not establish at trial that he

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Lomsanidze v. Musayev

loaned any money to [Lomsanidze] or [Lomsanidze] failed to
repay any money.” Consequently, the court also dismissed
Musayev’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing counterclaim as Musayev did not establish a breach of
contract. Finally, the court concluded that even though the letter
sent by Lomsanidze’s attorney was improper because it included
threats of criminal prosecution for a civil dispute, “there was no
evidence to show that the sending of the letter was so outrageous
or intolerable that [Musayev] would be entitled to emotional
distress damages.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶22 Musayev brings several challenges on appeal. First, he
asserts that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss.
“Because a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is a
question of law, the standard of review is correctness.” Moulding
Invs., LLC v. Box Elder County, 2024 UT App 23, ¶ 21, 545 P.3d 781
(cleaned up).

¶23 Second, Musayev asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying the Jury Motion. “The granting or denial of
a jury trial, in the absence of proper procedural requirements, is
within the sound discretion of the trial court,” and therefore “we
will not overturn the trial court’s decision to deny an untimely
jury demand absent an abuse of discretion.” Pete v. Youngblood,
2006 UT App 303, ¶ 9, 141 P.3d 629 (cleaned up).

¶24 Third, Musayev maintains that the trial court erred in
failing to recuse itself. “Whether a trial court erred by failing to
recuse [it]self is a question of law that we review for correctness.”
Camco Constr., Inc. v. Utah Baseball Academy, Inc., 2010 UT 63, ¶ 12,
243 P.3d 1269. Alternatively, he argues that the Reviewing Judge
erred in failing to disqualify the trial court. “We review the denial
of a motion to disqualify a judge for correctness.” Siebach v.

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Lomsanidze v. Musayev

Brigham Young Univ., 2015 UT App 253, ¶ 13, 361 P.3d 130 (cleaned
up).

¶25 Finally, Musayev asserts that there was insufficient
evidence for the trial court to conclude that Musayev personally
breached the oral contract with Lomsanidze and award $82,687.87
in damages. “When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Koehler v. Allen, 2020 UT App 73, ¶ 13, 466 P.3d 738 (cleaned up). 4

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Dismiss

¶26 Musayev asserts that the trial court erred in denying
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the case against him due to
Lomsanidze’s failure to allege facts sufficient to pierce the
corporate veil of Autobuysale. However, it is not necessary to
pierce the corporate veil of an entity when claims are raised
against an individual directly. See Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v.
Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 13, 284 P.3d 630 (noting that the alter ego
theory of liability allows a party to “‘pierce the corporate veil’ and
obtain a judgment against the individual shareholders even when

4. In his brief on appeal, Lomsanidze asks this court for a “re-trial
or an appeal based on several critical issues that warrant further
examination.” But Lomsanidze did not file a notice of cross-
appeal. “Even though appellate courts are generally lenient with
pro se litigants, those litigants must still follow the appellate
rules.” Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, ¶ 27, 312 P.3d 951. Therefore,
these issues are not properly before this court, and we decline to
address them. See Utah R. App. P. 4(d).

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Lomsanidze v. Musayev

the original cause of action arose from a dispute with the
corporate entity”).

¶27 Here, Lomsanidze raised four claims against Musayev
directly: conversion, theft by deception, unjust enrichment, and
breach of contract. Additionally, Lomsanidze informed the trial
court that he was not asserting, and would not assert, a “pierce
the veil” claim at trial to find Musayev liable for the claims made
against Autobuysale. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied
the motion to dismiss.

II. The Jury Motion

¶28 Musayev argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying the Jury Motion. Although Musayev does not contest
that he waived his right to a jury trial, he maintains that he should
nonetheless have been granted a jury trial because the trial court
“did not remain impartial and sided with Lomsanidze while
disparaging [Musayev] and [C]ounsel and denying the majority
of [Musayev’s] motions.” And, according to Musayev, it was
therefore “improper for the request for a jury trial to be denied.”

¶29 Rule 39(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits a
trial court to exercise its discretion and allow a trial by jury where
a party has waived that right. Utah R. Civ. P. 39(b)
(“[N]otwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury . . . ,
the court in its discretion . . . may order a trial by a jury.”). But
“the granting or denial of a jury trial, in the absence of proper
procedural requirements, is within the sound discretion of the
trial court.” Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, ¶ 9, 141 P.3d 629
(cleaned up). And a court abuses its discretion only if its “decision
exceeds the limits of reasonability.” Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT
App 156, ¶ 34, 560 P.3d 151 (cleaned up).

¶30 The trial court cited several reasons for denying the Jury
Motion: (1) “Defendants waited until the eve of trial to request it”;
(2) “granting the request would result in unnecessary delay and

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significant prejudice to” Lomsanidze; and (3) granting the motion
would not resolve Defendants’ chief concern about impartiality
because the trial court would make “numerous evidentiary and
other rulings during the course of a trial.” The trial court’s reasons
were all based on valid concerns raised by the Jury Motion, and
we cannot say that the decision to deny the motion even
approached the limits of reasonableness. Thus, we affirm the trial
court’s denial of the Jury Motion.

III. Motion to Disqualify

¶31 Musayev asserts that the trial court erred in failing to
recuse itself 5 and, alternatively, that the Reviewing Judge erred in
failing to disqualify the trial court. Both of these arguments rely
on the same reasoning, namely that the trial court’s impartiality
was in question based on rulings made in the case, so we address
them as a single argument.

¶32 Our supreme court has explained that Canon 3 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Conduct “provides a nonexhaustive list of
instances where a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, requiring recusal of the judge.” State v. Munguia, 2011
UT 5, ¶ 17, 253 P.3d 1082 (cleaned up).

Bias and prejudice are only improper when they are
personal. A feeling of ill will or, conversely,
favoritism toward one of the parties to a suit are
what constitute disqualifying bias or prejudice. . . .
However, neither bias nor prejudice refers to the

5. Rule 63(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
the judge “must . . . grant[] the motion [to disqualify] or certify[]
the motion . . . to a reviewing judge.” Utah R. Civ. P. 63(c)(1)
(emphasis added). The trial judge thus had to make one of two
choices: grant the motion or certify it to a reviewing judge. The
trial judge chose the latter. Because this was an explicitly
permissible choice, there was no error.

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attitude that a judge may hold about the subject
matter of a lawsuit. The Canon contemplates
disqualification where, for instance, a judge has
prior knowledge of evidentiary facts, is related to a
party or an attorney, has a close social or
professional relationship with a party or an
attorney, was involved in the case at hand before
becoming a judge, or has a financial or property
interest that could be affected by the outcome of the
proceeding. In other words, the bias or prejudice must
usually stem from an extrajudicial source, not from
occurrences in the proceedings before the judge.

Id. (cleaned up).

¶33 Musayev argues that the Reviewing Judge properly cited
the definition outlined above but improperly ignored that the trial
judge showed “favoritism toward one party to a suit and a feeling
of ill will toward another party or attorney.” Thus, he argues, the
claims set forth in the motion were “viable for [the trial judge’s]
disqualification.”

¶34 As a function of our adversarial system of justice, any
decision a judge makes will necessarily result in one party being
dissatisfied. That reality does not demonstrate that a judge has “ill
will” or “favoritism” toward one party over another.

¶35 Here, Defendants were unsatisfied with the trial court’s
rulings in the case, which they felt favored Lomsanidze. But the
Reviewing Judge was correct that “no deduction of bias and
prejudice may be made from adverse rulings by a judge.” In re
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153–54 (Utah 1997) (cleaned up).
And our supreme court has “repeatedly held that adverse rulings
alone are insufficient to establish the existence of judicial bias.”
Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 52, 459 P.3d 276. Thus, Musayev’s
arguments are “wholly without merit.” Id.

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¶36 Musayev also takes issue with the Reviewing Judge
making the ruling on disqualification rather than the presiding
judge. This argument is meritless because all of the judges
involved followed the proper procedure as set forth in rule 63(c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Once a motion to disqualify
a judge has been filed, “the judge who is the subject of the motion
must, without further hearing or a response from another party,
enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and
affidavit or declaration to a reviewing judge.” Utah R. Civ. P.
63(c). “The presiding judge of the court, any judge of the district,
or any judge of a court of like jurisdiction may serve as the
reviewing judge.” Id. Thus, the trial judge properly entered an
order referring the motion to the presiding judge, who properly
referred it to the Reviewing Judge.

¶37 Therefore, we affirm both the trial judge’s order certifying
the motion to disqualify to the presiding judge and the Reviewing
Judge’s denial of the motion.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶38 Finally, Musayev asserts that there was insufficient
evidence for the trial court to conclude that he personally
breached the oral contract with Lomsanidze and is liable for
$82,687.87 in damages. According to Musayev, “[w]hile testimony
showed that a verbal contract may have been loosely formed, no
evidence was presented to show that [Musayev] failed to follow
the terms of the agreement.”

¶39 “When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the
evidence, we must sustain the trial court’s judgment unless it is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Koehler v. Allen, 2020 UT App 73, ¶ 13, 466 P.3d 738 (cleaned up).
And where the sufficiency of the evidence turns on a factfinder’s
determination of witness credibility, “it is the province of the trier
of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will not

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second-guess the trial court where there is a reasonable basis to
support its findings.” Capozzoli v. Madden, 2024 UT App 176, ¶ 36,
561 P.3d 727 (cleaned up). “The presence of contradictory
evidence is generally not sufficient to overturn a verdict, because
the factfinder determines which evidence to believe when
conflicting evidence is presented.” Id. (cleaned up). And “when a
[trial] court evaluates witness credibility in a bench trial, the mere
existence of inconsistencies is not a sufficient basis to question
credibility determinations.” Id. (cleaned up). We therefore
“accord deference to the trial court’s ability and opportunity to
evaluate credibility and demeanor.” Hale v. Big H Constr., Inc.,
2012 UT App 283, ¶ 35, 288 P.3d 1046 (cleaned up).

¶40 Musayev asserts, “While the parties disagreed where some
of the money went, evidence showed money going in and out of
Lomsanidze’s account. Lomsanidze even had a list of vehicles that
[Musayev] had purchased. Although they differed on the
number, [Musayev] at least purchased fourteen (14) vehicles for
Lomsanidze.” But importantly, Musayev admits that the “parties
disagreed [about] where some of the money went.”

¶41 The trial court heard testimony from Lomsanidze, Friend,
and Musayev and considered the bank statements, checks, and
other evidence presented. The trial court, serving as factfinder,
was free to decide whose testimony was more credible. And after
considering all the evidence before it, the trial court found
Lomsanidze was more credible than Musayev, even though it
found neither to be entirely credible. That the trial court made a
necessary credibility determination—thus discounting the
testimony of one or more witnesses—does not mean the evidence
was insufficient. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial
court’s judgment was against the clear weight of the evidence or
that any mistake was made.

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CONCLUSION

¶42 We affirm the trial court’s rulings on the motion to dismiss
and the Jury Motion, as well as its conclusion that Musayev
breached the oral contract with Lomsanidze. We also conclude
that the trial court did not err in failing to recuse itself, nor did the
Reviewing Judge err in denying the motion to disqualify the trial
court. Finally, we decline to address the issues raised by
Lomsanidze because he failed to file a notice of cross-appeal.

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