State v. Stubbs

2025 UT App 48

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
DYLAN CHRISTIAN STUBBS,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20241146-CA
Filed April 10, 2025

Fifth District Court, Cedar City Department
The Honorable Jeffrey C. Wilcox
Nos. 211500618, 211500619

Wendy M. Brown, Debra M. Nelson, and Benjamin
Miller, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Aubrey Bisbee,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

TENNEY, Judge:

¶1 Dylan Stubbs has been charged with several child sexual
abuse offenses. At a detention hearing in early 2022, the district
court denied Stubbs’s request for bail. In August 2024, Stubbs
moved to modify the earlier order, but the district court declined
to do so. Stubbs now appeals the denial of his motion to modify,
arguing that the court did not comply with several statutory
requirements. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the
court’s denial of Stubbs’s motion and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
State v. Stubbs

BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2021, the State filed charges against Stubbs in
two cases. In the first case, Stubbs was charged with one count of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child based on an incident that
allegedly occurred in 2017. In the second case, Stubbs was charged
with two counts of sodomy on a child based on incidents that
allegedly occurred between 2018 and 2019.

¶3 In January 2022, the district court held a combined
detention hearing on both cases, after which it ordered that Stubbs
should be held without bail. Stubbs did not appeal that decision,
and he has remained incarcerated pending trial ever since.

¶4 In August 2024, Stubbs filed a motion to modify the pretrial
detention order. Under Utah Code section 77-20-207(1), a court
may “modify a pretrial status order” “only upon a showing that
there has been a material change in circumstances.” Through the
course of his briefing and his subsequent oral arguments to the
district court, Stubbs argued that the lengthy amount of time that
he had been detained prior to trial constituted a “material change
in circumstances.” And he further argued that the delays were
attributable to the State based on both prosecutorial decisions and
certain actions taken by the Division of Child and Family Services
(DCFS) during a related investigation.

¶5 Through counsel, Stubbs also made several proffers about
why he believed he would not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community if he were now released pending trial. For example,
Stubbs’s counsel proffered that during the intervening years,
Stubbs “hasn’t done anything wrong. He hasn’t threatened
anyone, and if he wanted to flee he doesn’t have the wherewithal
to do so.” Counsel also proffered that DCFS had initially removed
Stubbs’s children, including the alleged victim in one of the cases,
from the home of their mother, who is Stubbs’s wife, as a result of
the allegations. But he then proffered that there had since been a
“successful reunification” between the children and their mother,

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in part, because “all of the conditions imposed by the [juvenile]
Court had been complied with by Mr. Stubbs.”

¶6 The State opposed the motion to modify the prior
detention order. In response to Stubbs’s arguments regarding
delays caused by DCFS, the State maintained that DCFS is “an
independent agency” and that any delays caused by DCFS were
not “grounds to find a material change in circumstances.” And
although the State admitted that the decision by prosecutors and
the court to handle Stubbs’s two separate cases “in lockstep” may
have contributed to some of the delays, the State stood by that
decision, reasoning that the cases “strengthen each other.” The
State also expressed its view that Stubbs continued to be a danger
to the community. The State listed numerous occasions in which
Stubbs had been accused of or, in some instances allegedly
admitted to, committing sexual abuse. This history, the State
suggested, was reason enough to keep Stubbs detained.

¶7 In September 2024, the district court held a hearing on
Stubbs’s motion to modify. At the close of the hearing, the court
issued a ruling from the bench denying the motion. Starting with
Stubbs’s arguments about the delays in the cases, the court said
that it was “concerned about Mr. Stubbs’ long incarceration.” The
court observed that there had “been some delays perhaps on both
sides,” but it then expressed its view that Stubbs had “no duty” to
move the cases along himself. The court then opined that the cases
had been pending for a “long time,” at which point it stated: “I do
think that looking at this that that may be a mater—that’s a
material change. That’s why I’ve allowed this hearing to go
forward.”

¶8 But the court then observed that this “alone is not a reason
to readdress bail,” so it turned to the other questions involved in
a bail determination. The court started with the question of
whether Stubbs was a flight risk, concluding that he was not. The
court then stated that it was “very concerned . . . about the State’s

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State v. Stubbs

allegations that he is a sexual predator.” The court referenced
several of the allegations that had been made against Stubbs, at
which point it concluded that there had been “credible proffered
evidence” that he “has a propensity to be a sexual predator.” The
court ruled that Stubbs had not “overcome the State’s allegations
that he is a danger to society,” so it accordingly decided to
“continue the no bail” order.

¶9 In October 2024, the court issued a brief written order that
reiterated its conclusions about why it was denying the motion to
modify. There, the court wrote that it had “significant concerns
related to the amount of time that [Stubbs] has remained
incarcerated while these criminal cases have been pending.” The
court wrote that it held “both parties responsible for various
delays,” but it then specifically identified some sources of delay
for which Stubbs was not responsible, including “the untimely
death” of one of Stubbs’s attorneys, as well as delays caused when
a previously assigned judge was appointed to the federal bench.

¶10 The court then wrote that “even if these delays rise to the
level of a ‘material change,’” its “concerns for the safety of the
community are compelling.” It specifically identified one instance
in which Stubbs had apparently admitted to committing some
form of sexual abuse while Stubbs was a juvenile, observing that
this incident informed its “opinion as to the level of risk that
[Stubbs] poses to children within his family as well as the wider
community.” In light of all this, it denied Stubbs’s motion to
modify his pretrial detention status.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶11 Stubbs appeals the denial of his motion to modify. In its
responsive brief, the State argues that this court does not have
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. “Whether [an appellate] court has
jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of law that can be raised

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State v. Stubbs

for the first time on appeal.” Gardiner v. Taufer, 2014 UT 56, ¶ 13,
342 P.3d 269 (quotation simplified).

¶12 As explained below, we agree with Stubbs that we have
jurisdiction, so we address Stubbs’s challenges as well. On that
front, we review a district court’s “determination regarding the
presence or absence of a substantial change in circumstances for
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Groce, 2024 UT App 166, ¶ 18, 560
P.3d 200 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, Mar. 20, 2025 (No.
20250184). “A district court’s determination that there is clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant is a substantial danger is
reviewed deferentially, and this court will reverse that
determination only if it is clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation
simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶13 Under Utah Code section 77-20-201(1), a person “charged
with, or arrested for, a criminal offense shall be admitted to bail
as a matter of right” unless one of several delineated
circumstances exists. One such circumstance is that the person has
been charged with a felony and “there is substantial evidence to
support the charge and the court finds, by clear and convincing
evidence,” that:

(i) the individual would constitute a substantial
danger to any other individual or to the community
after considering available conditions of release that
the court may impose if the individual is released on
bail; or

(ii) the individual is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if the individual is released on bail.

Id. § 77-20-201(1)(c). Under Utah Code section 77-20-207(1), a
court may subsequently “modify a pretrial status order” “only

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State v. Stubbs

upon a showing that there has been a material change in
circumstances.”

¶14 In his opening brief, Stubbs argues that the district court
erred in denying the motion to modify because the court did not
specifically find that Stubbs was a “substantial danger” to
individuals or the community (and, he contends, there was also
no support for such a finding), and he also argues that the court
did not consider “available conditions of release” as part of its
analysis. In its responsive brief, the State argues that we lack
jurisdiction to consider these challenges, and it further argues that
we should not address Stubbs’s arguments because Stubbs did
not establish that there had been a “material change in
circumstances.” Of note, the State does not offer a substantive
response to the arguments presented by Stubbs in his opening
brief. Given the threshold nature of the State’s arguments, we
address them first.

I. Jurisdiction

¶15 The State argues that we lack jurisdiction for two reasons.
We disagree with both.

¶16 First, the State argues that the denial of the modification
motion was not immediately appealable. “As a general rule, an
appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal
from a district court order unless the appeal is taken from a final
order or judgment that ends the controversy between the
litigants.” In re adoption of K.R.S., 2024 UT App 165, ¶ 15, 561 P.3d
229 (quotation simplified); see also Utah R. App. P. 3(a)(1). But the
legislature has created an expedited appeal right for pretrial
detention rulings. Under the statute, if “a magistrate or judge
issues a pretrial status order that orders the individual be
detained during the time the individual awaits trial or other
resolution of criminal charges, the individual has the right to an
expedited appeal of the pretrial status order.” Utah Code § 77-20-
209.

20241146-CA 6 2025 UT App 48
State v. Stubbs

¶17 In the State’s view, this statute allows for an expedited
appeal of an initial decision denying bail, but it doesn’t authorize
an appeal of a ruling that “only denied [a] motion seeking to
change the prior detention order.” (Emphasis in original.) But in
State v. Groce, 2024 UT App 166, 560 P.3d 200, cert. denied, Mar. 20,
2025 (No. 20250184), we recently considered and rejected a similar
argument made by the State about the same statutory language in
question. There, we acknowledged that “there is only one original
pretrial status order.” Id. ¶ 36 (quotation simplified). But we then
held that the reference in section 77-20-209 to “a pretrial status
order” is “broad enough to mean any such pretrial detention
order.” Id. (emphasis added, quotation otherwise simplified).
From there, we held that “a defendant may appeal not only the
original pretrial detention order, but also subsequent orders in
which the court keeps the defendant in pretrial detention.” Id. 1

¶18 This is precisely what happened here. In his motion to
modify, Stubbs asked the district court to revisit the earlier ruling
that detained him pending trial. In denying the motion to modify,
the court ruled from the bench that it would “continue the no bail”
order. Under the principles set forth in Groce, the State’s first
argument thus fails.

¶19 Second, in a rule 24(j) letter the State filed shortly before
oral argument, the State asserts that “this appeal [is] moot”
because of a new ruling that recently appeared on the district

1. In its briefing in this appeal, the State expressed its
disagreement with Groce, but it did not ask us to overrule it. See
generally Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶¶ 19, 22, 345 P.3d 553
(suggesting that precedent can be reconsidered and potentially
overruled when reconsideration has “been explicitly raised by the
parties and adequately argued in their briefs,” and then
identifying factors for Utah appellate courts to consider before
overruling precedent). Under principles of horizontal stare
decisis, Groce is therefore controlling.

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State v. Stubbs

court’s docket. 2 As we explained in Groce, “mootness is a
constitutional principle” that implicates this court’s jurisdiction
over a case, and it “turns on whether the issues and controversy
before the court remain live, and on whether an order granting
the requested relief would still be effective.” 2024 UT App 166,
¶¶ 22, 23 (quotation simplified).

¶20 There’s an initial question about what the ruling at issue
actually was. At the outset, this ruling stated that the “matter
before the court” was Stubbs’s “Motion to Modify his Pretrial
Detention Status,” and it then referenced the same September
2024 hearing that prompted the court’s earlier ruling. Having set
the ruling up in that fashion, the court then set forth a slightly
expanded version of the procedural history for the motion to
modify and the arguments presented by the parties, after which
the court set forth a legal analysis of its reasons for denying the
motion that’s almost a verbatim copy of the legal analysis from
the earlier decision.

¶21 At oral argument in this appeal, both parties expressed
some confusion about why the court issued this ruling. Both
parties agreed that Stubbs did not file a second motion to modify
that would have prompted an additional ruling, and both parties
also agreed that there had not been a new hearing in the interim.
Having reviewed the record ourselves, we likewise see no
indication of any new motion that would have prompted a new
ruling from the court. So far as we can tell, the court appears to
have chosen to reissue its prior ruling, this time with a little bit
more background. And we see no meaningful addition at all in
terms of the court’s analysis.

2. The ruling in question states that it was signed by the district
court on January 13, 2025, but for reasons that are unclear from
the record, it didn’t appear on the district court’s docket until
February 3, 2025.

20241146-CA 8 2025 UT App 48
State v. Stubbs

¶22 The State has provided no authority, and we see none, that
would support the conclusion that the district court’s decision to
reissue a slightly expanded version of its prior ruling would
render this appeal moot. And this is particularly so given that this
is a bail appeal. In Groce, we referred to the “unique nature of such
appeals,” which present “the rather rare scenario in which the
appellate court and the district court are working on the same case
at the same time.” Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. Because of this dynamic, we held
that for purposes of a mootness analysis in a bail appeal, “the
controversy between the[] parties regarding pretrial detention”
will typically “remain[] live” so long as the case has not been
resolved and the defendant remains incarcerated. Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
And this conclusion largely explains why we ultimately held that
a defendant may appeal “not only the original pretrial detention
order, but also subsequent orders in which the court keeps the
defendant in pretrial detention.” Id. ¶ 36.

¶23 In this appeal, Stubbs challenges the court’s denial of his
motion to modify the original detention order on several grounds.
As explained above, even though this is an appeal from a denial
of motion to modify, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over
this appeal. Against that backdrop, we likewise see no reason to
conclude that the district court’s decision to subsequently reissue
a slightly expanded version of its earlier ruling somehow
eliminated the controversy between the parties. We accordingly
reject the State’s suggestion that this appeal is moot.

II. Material Change in Circumstances

¶24 Under Utah Code section 77-20-207(1), “[a] party may
move to modify a pretrial status order” “only upon a showing that
there has been a material change in circumstances.” When a
district court is confronted with such a motion, the request is
“governed by a somewhat different standard, involving not only
the substantial evidence and substantial danger/flight risk inquiry
but also the question of whether there has been a material change

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State v. Stubbs

in circumstances that might warrant a change in pretrial detention
status.” Groce, 2024 UT App 166, ¶ 33 (quotation simplified).

¶25 The State claims that the district court “found no material
change in circumstances to warrant modification” of Stubbs’s
“pretrial detention status” and that the court was thus “correct to
not reach” the additional steps in the inquiry. But the State’s
characterization of what occurred below is at odds with the
record. In the proceedings below, Stubbs argued that the length
of time that he had been detained awaiting trial constituted a
material change in circumstances. At the close of the September
2024 hearing at which the court addressed this motion, the court
observed that it was “concerned about” Stubbs’s “long
incarceration.” The court then said, “I do think that looking at this
that that may be a mater—that’s a material change. That’s why I’ve
allowed this hearing to go forward.” (Emphases added.) From
there, the court then addressed and made rulings on the flight risk
and dangerousness questions.

¶26 The State nevertheless pushes back on two fronts, both of
which it claims support its assertion that the district court
somehow did not find that a material change in circumstances
occurred. We find neither of them persuasive.

¶27 First, the State points out that the court used slightly
different verbiage in the written decision that it issued a month or
so after issuing its oral ruling. In that written decision, the court
stated that it had “significant concerns related to the amount of
time that [Stubbs] has remained incarcerated while these criminal
cases have been pending.” And, as the State points out, the court
then wrote: “However, even if this delay rises [to] the level of a
‘material change,’ this Court finds that concerns for the safety of
the community are compelling.” (Emphasis added.)

¶28 The State places much weight on the “even if,” suggesting
that this phrase was an indication that the court did not actually
find that the delays in the case qualified as a material change in

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State v. Stubbs

circumstances. But we disagree with the State’s reading of the
record. At face value, the court’s use of the phrase “even if” does
not seem to mean that the court was finding that there was not a
material change in circumstances. Instead, even in isolation, we
think the court’s statement can be read as something akin to an
explanation for why the court was denying Stubbs’s request for
relief even though it had ruled in his favor on the change of
circumstances question.

¶29 This reading is appropriate here in light of the record as a
whole. The State does not contend that the oral ruling was
somehow invalid or has no place in our analysis. But again, in the
oral ruling, the court explicitly found that the delay did qualify as
a material change, stating: “I do think that looking at this that that
may be a mater—that’s a material change.” (Emphases added.) If
the court meant to take back that finding in its written decision,
one would expect the court to have said so. But it didn’t. Instead,
in both the oral ruling and again in the written ruling, the court
moved on and addressed the subsequent statutory questions
about whether Stubbs was a flight risk and posed any danger to
the public. The court was plainly aware of how the statutory
scheme operated. And under that scheme, there would have been
no reason for the court to have made those determinations if it
had first concluded that the delays in the case did not qualify as a
material change in circumstances. Thus, given the court’s
statements at the hearing, as well as the overall structure of its
analysis, the result is the same: the court’s “even if” phraseology
is most naturally read here as a transition for its explanation of
why it was denying the motion as a whole, as opposed to
somehow being an unspoken invalidation of a finding about a
material change in circumstances that it had already pointedly
made.

¶30 Second, the State points out that, in the written ruling, the
court wrote that it held “both parties responsible for various
delays.” From this, the State suggests that the court did not

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State v. Stubbs

actually conclude that the delays “constitute[d] a material
change” in circumstances.

¶31 But in that same paragraph, the district court also pointed
out that some of the delays were not attributable to Stubbs. The
court wrote that “[s]ome of these delays are due to the untimely
death of one of [Stubbs’s] attorneys,” and it pointed out that some
other delays were caused when a previously assigned judge was
appointed to the federal bench. And again, the district court then
went beyond the material change step and addressed the
dangerousness step. Thus, even with its apparent belief that
Stubbs was responsible for some of the delays, the court seems to
have contemplated that Stubbs had shown that there were enough
delays for which Stubbs was not responsible that it was
appropriate to find that a material change in circumstances had
occurred—which, again, was the very reason that it could reach
the next steps in the statutory analysis. Indeed, addressing this
very dynamic in the oral ruling, the court stated, “That’s why I’ve
allowed this hearing to go forward.”

¶32 In short, the clearest indication of what the court meant
was what it said, and what it said was that it did “think” that the
delays in the case constituted “a material change.” The remainder
of the court’s analysis (in both the oral and the written rulings) is
consistent with the conclusion that the court believed that this
statutory requirement had been satisfied. We therefore see no
basis for accepting the State’s contention that the district court did
not find that a material change in circumstances had occurred.

III. Stubbs’s Challenges

¶33 In his brief, Stubbs argues that the district court’s denial of
his modification motion was flawed because the court did not find
that Stubbs is a “substantial danger” and there was no support for
such a finding in any event. Stubbs further argues that the court
failed to consider “available conditions of release” as required by
the statute.

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State v. Stubbs

¶34 In its responsive brief, the State does not respond to these
arguments, instead resting solely on its contentions about
jurisdiction and the change in circumstances requirement. “When
an appellee fails to present us with any argument, an appellant
need only establish a prima facie showing of a plausible basis for
reversal. This is a lower standard than the typical burden of
persuasion on appeal.” AL-IN Partners, LLC v. LifeVantage Corp.,
2021 UT 42, ¶ 19, 496 P.3d 76 (quotation simplified). Thus, “when
appellees fail to brief an argument raised by an appellant on
appeal, they do so at their own peril.” State v. Coleman, 2025 UT
App 33, ¶ 14, -- P.3d -- (quotation simplified).

¶35 Of note, we have applied this doctrine on an issue-by-issue
basis. In Musselman v. Keele, for example, the appellee chose to not
respond to the appellant’s substantive arguments, instead
focusing his responsive brief entirely on a jurisdictional issue.
2024 UT App 143, ¶ 19, 559 P.3d 64. After we determined that we
had jurisdiction, we then addressed each of the appellant’s
arguments under the lowered AL-IN standard. Id. ¶¶ 14, 21–30.
We did something similar in Coleman, applying this standard
where the State had made “no effort to engage” with a particular
argument made by the defendant in his brief about how to
interpret the statute in question. 2025 UT App 33, ¶ 14. Because
this is what occurred here as well, we address Stubbs’s arguments
under the lowered AL-IN standard. 3

¶36 Stubbs argues that to satisfy Utah Code section 77-20-
201(1)(c)(i), a district court must expressly find that the defendant
would constitute a “substantial danger” to an individual or the

3. As we’ve indicated before, a decision under the AL-IN standard
resolves the issues for purposes of the present appeal, but it
constitutes a “non-merits decision that is not intended to have any
precedential value.” State v. Coleman, 2025 UT App 33, ¶ 20, -- P.3d
-- (quotation simplified); accord Musselman v. Keele, 2024 UT App
143, ¶ 20 n.4, 559 P.3d 64.

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State v. Stubbs

community if the defendant were released. In the alternative,
Stubbs argues that, even if the district court was not required to
use this exact phrasing, the court below did not implicitly make
such a finding either, given that there was support for his
assertion that he was no longer a substantial danger by the time
of the motion to modify. We need not decide whether a district
court must use these exact words in a bail determination (or, by
extension, in a decision on a motion to modify a prior bail
determination). This is so because we agree that Stubbs has made
a prima facie showing of a plausible basis that there was not a
sufficient finding at all, particularly given the context of Stubbs’s
proffers.

¶37 In its ruling, the district court expressed its concern that
Stubbs might be a “danger” to the community if released. But the
court never found that Stubbs was a “substantial danger,” which
is the statutory standard. See Utah Code § 77-20-201(1)(c)(i)
(emphasis added). And even if it’s legally possible that such a
finding can be implied (which, again, we do not decide), that
extra word must have some meaning. After all, if the legislature
had wanted to condition a bail denial on a finding of mere
“danger” alone, it could have. But it didn’t, thus indicating that
the legislature thought that something more pronounced is
required.

¶38 As discussed throughout this opinion, the driving force
behind Stubbs’s motion and his arguments on appeal was the
length of time that had elapsed since Stubbs was charged and then
initially denied bail. In the proceedings below, Stubbs asserted
that several circumstances had occurred during the intervening
period that, in his view, lowered the risk that he would pose a
danger to others if he were now released. First, Stubbs proffered
that while he was in jail awaiting trial, he had complied with all
jail rules and had not been written up for any kind of infraction.
Second, Stubbs proffered that there had been no allegation during
this period that he had made improper contact with anyone

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State v. Stubbs

(including any victims), thus showing that he’s amenable to the
imposition of any conditions of release. Third, Stubbs asserted
that his lack of dangerousness was demonstrated by his
compliance with several conditions imposed on him by the
juvenile court in a related case during this intervening period.
And finally, Stubbs proffered that after DCFS removed the
children from his wife’s home (including the child who was the
alleged victim in one of the cases), there had since been a
“successful reunification” between the children and Stubbs’s
wife, in part, because Stubbs had “complied with” “all of the
conditions imposed by the [juvenile] Court.” Taken together,
Stubbs asserted that his ongoing good behavior over the course of
this lengthy period of time, including the circumstances that led
DCFS to deem it appropriate to return the children to their
mother’s care (even though she’s still married to Stubbs), was
enough to alter the original calculus as to any danger Stubbs
might pose if he were released pending trial.

¶39 In our view, Stubbs has at least plausibly proffered that
these events might have persuaded the court that, even if Stubbs
posed a “substantial danger” in 2022, he no longer posed the same
degree of danger two and a half years later. We see nothing in the
record showing that the district court definitively grappled with
these particular proffers, nor do we see an indication that the
court said anything that would explicitly or implicitly show that
it thought that, despite these proffers, Stubbs still posed a
substantial danger. But an evaluation of whether a defendant
poses a particular level of danger is highly contextual, and it’s an
evaluation that is best made by the district court in the first
instance. When this limited record is viewed through the prism of
the lowered AL-IN standard, we conclude that Stubbs has made a
sufficient showing to support reversal.

¶40 We accordingly reverse the court’s denial of Stubbs’s
motion to modify, and we remand with instructions for the court
to determine on remand whether Stubbs would present a

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State v. Stubbs

“substantial danger to any other individual or to the community”
if released on bail. Id. 4

CONCLUSION

¶41 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that (1) we
have jurisdiction to consider Stubbs’s challenge to the denial of
his motion to modify the prior pretrial detention order, (2) the
district court did find a material change in circumstances, and (3)
under the lowered AL-IN standard, Stubbs has shown that there
is a plausible basis for reversal based on the district court’s failure
to find (either explicitly or implicitly) that he would constitute a
substantial danger to individuals or the community if he were
released. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of
Stubbs’s motion to modify his pretrial detention status and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

4. In light of our decision to reverse on this basis, we need not
consider Stubbs’s additional challenge, which was that the district
court did not consider “available conditions of release” when
making this determination as required by Utah Code section 77-
20-201(1)(c)(i). Consistent with this statutory requirement, the
district court on remand should, of course, consider any available
conditions of release as part of its analysis.

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