In re J.A.A. (M.A. v. State)

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 136
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.A., J.C.A., J.J.A., AND
J.E.A., PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
N.A.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20140224-CA
Filed June 12, 2014
Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Sherene T. Dillon
No. 1070651
Carol Mortensen, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 N.A. (Mother) appeals the order terminating her parental
rights to her children. We affirm.

In re J.A.A.
20140224-CA 2 2014 UT App 136
¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision, the
result must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the
appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). We “review the juvenile
court’s factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous
standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous when, in light of the evidence
supporting the finding, it is against the clear weight of the
evidence. Id. Therefore, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s
decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not engage
in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.
¶3 The juvenile court concluded that several grounds
supported termination of Mother’s parental rights. Pursuant to
Utah Code section 78A-6-507, the finding of a single enumerated
ground will support the termination of parental rights. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012). Therefore, it is sufficient
if the evidence supports any of the grounds for termination found
by the juvenile court. The court found that the children had been
abused and neglected by Mother, see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(b), and that
Mother is an unfit or incompetent parent, see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(c).
The court further found that the children had been in an out-of-
home placement under the supervision of the court and the
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), see id.
§ 78A-6-507(1)(d)(i); that Mother had “substantially neglected,
willfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the
circumstances that caused the children to be in an out-of-home
placement,” see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(ii); and that “there is a
substantial likelihood that [Mother] will not be capable of
exercising proper and effective parental care in the near future,” see
id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(iii). The court also found that Mother failed in
her parental adjustment because she had been unable or unwilling
within a reasonable time to substantially correct the circumstances,
conduct, or conditions that led to placement of the children outside
the home notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts

In re J.A.A.
20140224-CA 3 2014 UT App 136
of DCFS. See id. § 78A-6-507(1)(e). Finally, the court found that it
was in the best interests of the children that parental rights be
terminated. Mother’s petition on appeal challenges only the finding
that she is an unfit parent. Because the evidence supports one or
more of the remaining unchallenged grounds, even a successful
challenge to the unfitness determination would not support
reversal.
¶4 Mother claims that the juvenile court “failed to recognize”
the education and insight she gained during the case. However, the
detailed findings demonstrate the court’s careful consideration of
Mother’s participation in services. Mother did not timely
commence or complete her services, and her service providers did
not support a recommendation that the children could be safely
returned to Mother’s custody over one year after removal. The
provider who performed Mother’s psychological evaluation opined
that the children could not safely return to Mother because they
would be exposed to her erratic behavior and further concluded
that Mother would require intensive therapy for a year or more to
become an adequate parent. Similarly, Mother’s therapist did not
recommend a return of the children to Mother’s custody at the time
of trial and testified that Mother would require at least eight to
twelve additional months of individual therapy and that Mother
and her husband would require the same amount of family and
marriage counseling. Although Mother completed parenting
classes, the instructor testified that Mother did not internalize or
implement what she learned. Mother completed domestic violence
counseling, but the court found that completion came too late in
the case to make it safe to return the children. The court also noted
that Mother reported no domestic violence to her own counselor
but that she shortly thereafter reported to her husband’s counselor
that his anger issues and behavior had not changed. The juvenile
court found that while Mother completed parenting classes,
domestic violence treatment, and a psychological assessment,
“there is little evidence that [Mother] internalized the material or
that she is in any way ready for her children to safely be returned
to her.” Mother’s claim that the juvenile court failed to recognize

In re J.A.A.
20140224-CA 4 2014 UT App 136
her progress demonstrates only that she disagrees with the
conclusions that the juvenile court drew from the facts before it.
The juvenile court’s findings amply supported the ground for
termination under section 78A-6-507(1)(d) by demonstrating that
Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused
the children to be in an out-of-home placement and there was a
substantial likelihood that she would not be capable of exercising
proper and effective parental care in the near future. Similarly, the
findings support the determination that Mother had failed in her
parental adjustment.
¶5 Mother’s claim that the best interests findings are
insufficiently supported rests largely upon the fact that the children
had multiple foster placements, which the juvenile court found was
not in their best interests. The juvenile court also found that DCFS
might have done more to avoid having those placements fail.
Mother complains that DCFS was not held accountable for failing
to provide appropriate services to avoid disruption of the foster
placements. Nevertheless, Mother’s arguments do not demonstrate
that the juvenile court erred in determining that it was in the best
interests of the children to terminate her parental rights.
¶6 Mother claims that the juvenile court failed to take into
account the children’s wishes to return home. This is based upon
her assertion that multiple sources testified the children wished to
return home. The evidence does not fully support that claim.
J.C.A.’s foster parents testified that he told them he wanted to
return home. However, his therapist testified that J.C.A. wanted to
stay with his foster family and have permanency there and that he
has never expressed a desire to return home. The prior therapist for
all of the children testified that only J.A.A., who is the oldest child,
wanted to return home and that none of the other children
expressed a desire to go home. Because J.A.A. is more than twelve
years old, his consent to adoption is required. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-120(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). The juvenile court’s
detailed findings demonstrate that it gave careful consideration to
J.A.A.’s desire to return home and also considered the alternative

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20140224-CA 5 2014 UT App 136
of leaving parental rights in place. However, the court found that
J.A.A. could not be safely returned home as of the time of trial and
that as long as parental rights remained in place, J.A.A. would
continue to feel a need to return home. The court found that J.A.A.
was adoptable and could find permanency in an adoptive home in
the future. Even if one or more children hoped to return home, the
evidence amply supports the best interests determination and the
related finding that they were in appropriate placements that met
their needs. The argument that the juvenile court failed to
appropriately weigh the children’s wishes is not persuasive.
Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that DCFS ensured the
foster families would continue to support sibling contact.
¶7 Because “a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the
evidence,” we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating
Mother’s parental rights. See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d
435.