In re R.M.

2017 UT App 109
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF R.M. AND S.R.,
PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
A.R.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20170285-CA
Filed July 7, 2017
Third District Juvenile Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable Tupakk A.G. Renteria
No. 1130889
W. Andrew McCullough, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Larry S. Jenkins and Lance D. Rich, Attorneys for
Intervenors M.M. and A.M.
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME, J. F REDERIC VOROS JR ., and
DAVID N. M ORTENSEN .
PER CURIAM:
¶1 	A.R. (Maternal Grandmother) appeals the juvenile court’s
May 29, 2017 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
that dismissed her petition for adoption of R.M. and S.R. We
affirm.

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¶2 	Maternal Grandmother raises two issues on appeal. First,
she claims that the juvenile court erred in finding that she did
not indicate her interest in being considered as an adoptive
placement within 120 days of the shelter hearing. As a result of
this 	finding, 	Maternal 	Grandmother 	was 	not 	entitled 	to 	a
rebuttable presumption that it would be in the best interest of
the children to allow her to adopt them. Second, she claims that
it was not in the best interest of S.R. to remove the child from
Maternal 	Grandmother’s 	home 	and 	place 	her 	in 	another
prospective adoptive home. In support, Maternal Grandmother
states that she had a significant relationship with both children
and was their primary caregiver “for long periods of time.”
¶3 	“[T]o overturn the juvenile court’s decision, the result
must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the
appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435
(brackets, 	citation, 	and 	internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted).
“When 	a 	foundation 	for 	the 	court’s 	decision 	exists 	in 	the
evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of
the evidence.” Id. When an appellant seeks to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile court’s finding
or conclusion, “the appellant must include in the record a
transcript of all evidence relevant to” the challenged finding or
conclusion. Utah R. App. P. 54(b). Absent an adequate record on
appeal, this court cannot address the issues raised and must
“assume the regularity of the proceedings below.” In re K.L.S.,
2015 UT App 51, ¶ 5, 345 P.3d 1281 (per curiam) (citation and
internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	Because 	Maternal
Grandmother did not provide a transcript to support her claims,
this court “must assume that the findings and conclusions are
supported by sufficient evidence.” See id. We review questions of
statutory interpretation for correctness. See In re C.C., 2013 UT
26, ¶ 12, 301 P.3d 1000.
¶4 	The State commenced a child welfare case regarding S.R.
and R.M. in June 2015. Around the time of the petition’s filing,

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S.R. and her mother lived with Maternal Grandmother, and R.M.
and her father lived with her paternal grandmother. Paternity
has not been established for S.R. On July 15, 2015, the juvenile
court held a shelter hearing, which resulted in the children being
placed 	in 	the 	temporary 	custody 	and 	guardianship 	of 	the
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). The children were
allowed to remain 	in their respective 	homes. Following an
August 26, 2015 adjudication of the children as neglected or
abused children within juvenile court jurisdiction, the court set a
permanency 	goal 	of 	reunification 	with 	the 	parents 	with 	a
concurrent goal of adoption. On October 14, 2015, the juvenile
court 	terminated 	reunification 	services 	and 	changed 	the
permanency goal to adoption. With regard to that hearing, the
juvenile court found, “The grandmothers were present in the
courtroom and the court instructed both . . . grandmothers to
complete 	the 	appropriate 	paperwork 	and 	home-study
requirements if they desired to be considered as an option for
adoptive placement for the children.” On May 13, 2016, both
parents relinquished their parental rights. The juvenile court
received three competing adoption petitions, including Maternal
Grandmother’s June 2, 2016 petition. The juvenile court held a
hearing on each petition before granting the adoption petition of
M.M. and A.M., the paternal great aunt and great uncle of R.M.,
and dismissing the other petitions. The juvenile court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law on all three adoption
petitions. We recite the findings and conclusions specifically
relevant to the claims on appeal.1
1. The juvenile court made extensive and detailed findings in
support of its determination that placement in the home of M.M.
and 	A.M. 	for 	adoption 	was 	in 	the 	children’s 	best 	interest.
Because Maternal Grandmother has not challenged any of these
findings and conclusions, it is unnecessary to recite them in this
opinion.

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¶5 	The juvenile court found that it had not received a home
study on Maternal Grandmother’s home even though she “was
instructed on October 14, 2015 to complete the appropriate
paperwork and home study requirements if [she] wanted to be
considered as an option for adoptive placement of the children.”
S.R. lived in Maternal Grandmother’s home from the time of her
birth in November 2012 until she was removed on February 1,
2016, and placed in the prospective adoptive home of M.M. and
A.M. The other child, R.M., lived with Maternal Grandmother
for some period of time, but the exact time was disputed. Only
S.R. 	was 	removed 	from 	Maternal 	Grandmother’s 	home 	on
February 	1, 	2016. 	Maternal 	Grandmother 	was 	the 	only
grandparent who had both children live with her and who was a
caregiver 	for 	both 	children. 	The 	juvenile 	court 	found 	that
Maternal Grandmother’s claim that she had stated at the shelter
hearing 	that 	she 	wanted 	to 	be 	considered 	as 	an 	adoptive
placement was not supported by the audio recording of that
hearing.
¶6 	After 	the 	permanency 	goal 	changed 	to 	adoption 	in
October 	2015, 	R.M.’s 	maternal 	and 	paternal 	families 	each
submitted the names of a couple from their side of the family.
When the maternal and paternal families could not agree on one
prospective 	placement, 	the 	names 	of 	both 	couples 	were
submitted to the DCFS placement committee. The placement
committee selected M.M. and A.M.—the couple proposed by the
paternal family—as the prospective adoptive home supported
for both R.M. and S.R. by DCFS. Only after DCFS decided to
place 	both 	children 	with 	M.M. 	and 	A.M. 	did 	Maternal
Grandmother advise DCFS that she wanted to be considered as
an adoptive placement. Maternal Grandmother believed that
since she was the only petitioner biologically related to both
children, she was a better placement than M.M. and A.M. At the
time of the hearing on her petition, the State had issued Maternal
Grandmother a foster license for two children, effective August
25, 	2016. 	Maternal 	Grandmother 	presented 	testimony 	from

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family, former coworkers, and friends attesting to her suitability
as an adoptive parent and her desire to adopt the children.
¶7 	The juvenile court noted that Utah Code section 78B-6-
133(9)(c) required the court to weigh the best interest of the
children 	uniformly 	between 	petitioners 	if 	more 	than 	one
petitioner satisfied a rebuttable presumption condition. See Utah
Code 	Ann. 	§ 	78B-6-133(9)(c) 	(LexisNexis 	Supp. 	2016). 	The
juvenile court concluded:
[Maternal Grandmother’s] petition has not met the
basic requirement of law to adopt these minor
children. 	Specifically, 	the 	court 	held 	a 	shelter
hearing 	on 	July 	15, 	2015, 	and 	[Maternal
Grandmother] 	was 	present 	but 	did 	not 	file 	a
written 	statement 	with 	the 	court 	within 	the
required 	120 	days. 	[Maternal 	Grandmother]
testified that she made it clear in court on July 15,
2015, 	that 	she 	wanted 	to 	be 	considered 	as 	a
placement for [the children]. The court had an
opportunity to listen to the audio recording from
July 15, 2015, and no such request can be heard on
the recording. [Maternal Grandmother] filed her
petition for adoption on June 2, 2016, well past the
required 120 days.
The court found that Maternal Grandmother’s home did not
present the most stable, secure, and well-rounded long-term
placement for the children and therefore found that it was not in
the children’s best interest for Maternal Grandmother’s adoption
petition 	to 	go 	forward. 	The 	court 	expressed 	concern 	that
Maternal Grandmother might not allow the children to maintain
a connection with the paternal family, given her belief that the
children should be placed only with maternal relatives. The
juvenile 	court 	also 	had 	concerns 	that 	her 	income 	was 	not
sufficient to support two additional individuals.

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¶8 	Maternal Grandmother first claims that the juvenile court
erred “in determining that [she] did not indicate her interest in
placement of the children within 120 days of the shelter hearing,
where at least one of the children was in her physical care, and
the 	other recently 	ha[d] 	been.” 	Maternal 	Grandmother 	also
states, “She actually had the child in her car[e], and the shelter
hearing did not disturb that.” Although Maternal Grandmother
cites section 78B-6-133(9) as legal authority for her position, the
petition 	on 	appeal 	contains 	no 	meaningful 	legal 	or 	factual
analysis supporting her claim.2
¶9 	Utah Code section 78B-6-133(9)(a) provides “a rebuttable
presumption that it is in the best interest of a child to be placed
for adoption with a petitioner” who satisfies the requirements of
the section. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-133(9)(a) (LexisNexis Supp.
2016). First, the petition must have fulfilled the requirements of
the Utah Adoption Act. See id. § 78B-6-133(9)(a)(i). Second, the
petitioner 	must 	be 	a 	person 	“with 	whom 	the 	child 	has
continuously 	resided 	for 	six 	months.” 	See 	id. 	§ 	78B-6-
133(9)(a)(ii)(A). Third, the petitioner must have “filed a written
statement with the court within 120 days after the day on which
the shelter hearing is held, as described in Subsection (8)(a)(iii).”
Id. § 78B-6-133(9)(a)(ii)(B). In turn, subsection 78B-6-133(8)(a)(iii)
requires “a written statement” to be filed with the court within
120 days after the shelter hearing “(A) requesting immediate
2. Amendments to Utah Code section 78B-6-133, effective May
12, 2015, added provisions pertaining to competing petitions for
adoption. Section 78B-6-133(8)(a)(iii) provides that a court “shall
grant a hearing” only to a petitioner who has filed the required
written statement “within 120 days after the day on which the
shelter 	hearing 	is 	held” 	or 	satisfies 	other 	prerequisites 	not
applicable in this case. Although Maternal Grandmother did not
file a written statement with the court as required by statute, the
juvenile court held a hearing on her petition.

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20170285-CA 	7 	2017 UT App 109
placement of the child with the petitioner; and (B) expressing the
petitioner’s 	intention 	of 	adopting 	the 	child.” 	Id. 	§ 	78B-6-
133(8)(a)(iii). There is no dispute that Maternal Grandmother did
not file the written statement required by statute. At the hearing
on her adoption petition, she claimed that she verbally indicated
her intention to adopt the children at the shelter hearing. On
appeal, 	she 	does 	not 	challenge 	the 	juvenile 	court’s 	factual
finding that the recording of the shelter hearing did not support
this 	claim. 	Liberally 	construed, 	Maternal 	Grandmother’s
argument is that because she had physical custody of one of the
children at the time of the shelter hearing and retained custody
after the hearing, any requirement that she indicate her interest
in being an adoptive placement was satisfied in an “actions
speak 	louder 	than 	words” 	sort 	of 	way. 	Given 	the 	specific
statutory 	requirements 	for 	a 	written 	statement, 	Maternal
Grandmother’s position lacks merit, and she was not entitled to
a rebuttable presumption that it was in the children’s best
interest to be placed with her for adoption. In addition, Maternal
Grandmother 	has 	not 	demonstrated 	that 	she 	satisfied 	the
remaining 	prerequisites 	for 	the 	rebuttable 	presumption,
including satisfying the requirements of the Utah Adoption Act.
¶10 	Maternal Grandmother also argues that it was not in the
children’s best interest to be removed from her home and placed
in the prospective adoptive home. Liberally construed, Maternal
Grandmother’s argument 	is that 	the 	decision 	by 	the 	DCFS
placement committee to place both children with M.M. and A.M.
was not in their best interest. This argument does not address
any relevant issue for review of the juvenile court’s decision on
the competing adoption petitions. The juvenile court concluded
that 	only 	M.M. 	and 	A.M. 	were 	entitled 	to 	a 	rebuttable
presumption 	under 	section 	78B-6-133(9)(a). 	“The 	court 	may
consider other factors relevant to the best interest of the child to
determine whether the presumption is rebutted.” Id. § 78B-6-
133(9)(b). Even if this court were to assume that it was not in
S.R.’s best interest to be removed from Maternal Grandmother’s

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20170285-CA 	8 	2017 UT App 109
home 	and 	placed 	in 	the 	prospective 	adoptive 	home, 	that
determination alone would not require a reversal of the juvenile
court’s 	decision 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	competing 	adoption
petitions. The juvenile court made extensive findings supporting
its determination that it was in the children’s best interest to
grant 	the 	adoption 	petition 	of 	M.M. 	and 	A.M. 	Maternal
Grandmother has not challenged any of those findings or the
related conclusions in this appeal. “When a foundation for the
court’s decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may
not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT
82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435.
¶11 	Accordingly, we affirm.