State v. Martinez

2019 UT App 166
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
S AUL M ARTINEZ ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20161019-CA
Filed October 18, 2019
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Richard D. McKelvie
No. 151907946
Alexandra S. McCallum, Wojciech S. Nitecki, and
Lacey C. Singleton, Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Nathan D. Anderson, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES K ATE A PPLEBY and R YAN M. HARRIS concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	On a dark and rainy night, Saul Martinez shot at his
wife’s lover on the side of a road in front of an off-duty police
sergeant 	(Sergeant). 	Martinez 	was 	convicted 	of 	attempted
murder, aggravated assault, three counts of felony discharge of a
firearm, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person. Martinez appeals, contending that the trial court erred
when it permitted the jury to hear arguably inadmissible hearsay
testimony. Further, Martinez contends that his convictions for
felony discharge of a firearm should be vacated, arguing that
they should have merged with his attempted murder conviction.
We affirm.

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	2 	2019 UT App 166
BACKGROUND1
¶2 	While driving home to Tooele, Utah, from work one
night, Sergeant noticed a man (Victim) walking in the heavy rain
along the side of the road carrying a gas can. Victim was walking
to his car, which had run out of gas. Sergeant picked up Victim
in his personal, unmarked truck and drove Victim to his car. As
Victim got out of Sergeant’s truck, a white SUV pulled up
behind them. Victim identified the driver as Martinez and told
Sergeant, “This guy wants to kill me.” Sergeant responded,
“What?” Victim again said, “This guy is going to kill me.”
Looking in his side-view mirror, Sergeant saw Martinez get out
of the SUV and walk toward Victim holding a large, silver
handgun. Sergeant yelled at Victim to “get back in the truck.”
Victim jumped into the truck, and as the two men sped away,
Martinez rapidly fired three shots toward Sergeant’s truck. All
three bullets lodged in the passenger side of the truck where
Victim was sitting.
¶3 	Earlier that day, Martinez had borrowed a white SUV
from his neighbor that he never returned. The day after the
shooting, police found the SUV abandoned approximately ten
miles from the scene of the shooting. Martinez was nowhere to
be found at the time, but he was located and arrested four
months later in Los Angeles, California. Martinez was charged
with attempted murder, aggravated assault, use of a firearm by a
restricted person, and three counts of felony discharge of a
firearm.
1. On appeal from a jury verdict, “we recite the facts from the
record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and
present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand
issues raised on appeal.” Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, ¶ 2, 279 P.3d
396 (quotation simplified).

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20161019-CA 	3 	2019 UT App 166
¶4 	At trial, the jury heard testimony that Martinez and his
wife 	(Wife) 	were 	having 	marital 	problems. 	They 	had 	been
together 	for 	sixteen 	years 	and 	had 	a 	daughter 	(Daughter).
Around the same time that the couple began having marital
problems, Victim and Wife developed a friendship that Victim’s
work supervisor and Wife’s brother (Brother-in-law) believed
was 	romantic 	in 	nature, 	though 	Victim 	denied 	such 	a
relationship. Martinez thought that Victim was trying “to steal
[Wife] and [Daughter].” Witnesses at trial testified that on three
separate 	occasions, 	Martinez 	either 	threatened 	Victim 	or
expressed a plan to kill him.
¶5 	Approximately one month before the shooting, Victim,
Wife, Daughter, and others were eating dinner at a friend’s
house. Martinez knocked on the door and let himself in without
waiting 	for 	someone 	to 	answer 	the 	door. 	Martinez 	looked
“upset” and, without saying a word, positioned his fingers in the
shape of a gun, pointed it at Victim for approximately three or
four seconds, and then left with Wife and Daughter.
¶6 	Three 	days 	before 	the 	shooting, 	Victim’s 	co-worker
informed him that Martinez was outside of the restaurant where
they worked, and Victim told his co-worker to “call the police
because [Martinez] had threatened to kill [him].” When Victim
finished 	working, 	Martinez 	was 	still 	outside 	the 	restaurant
speaking 	with 	Victim’s 	supervisor, 	who 	was 	a 	friend 	of
Martinez. Victim approached Martinez and asked him if he was
“looking for [him] to kill [him].” When counsel inquired why
Victim would say that to Martinez, Victim testified, “Because all
the people from Tooele, they were telling me that he was looking
for me . . . to kill me.” Martinez’s counsel objected to the answer
as hearsay. The court overruled the objection, determining that
Victim’s statement was not being “offered for the truth of the
matter asserted.” The prosecutor then repeated his question, and
Victim 	again 	answered, 	“Because 	in 	Tooele 	everybody 	was
telling me that [Martinez] wanted to kill me.” Victim testified

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	4 	2019 UT App 166
that in response to Victim’s inquiry about why he was waiting
for Victim, Martinez replied, “No, not now or here at this
moment, but I know where you . . . live, and sooner or later I will
kill you.”
¶7 	Just hours before the shooting, Martinez told Brother-in-
law that he was planning to kill Victim. Brother-in-law testified
that Martinez had been drinking when he arrived at Brother-in-
law’s home and that Martinez was there “to say goodbye” to
him and his family. Martinez reported that he was going to be
leaving town soon as he “already had everything prepared to be
able to kill [Victim]” because he was not going to let Victim
“steal” 	Wife 	and 	Daughter 	from 	him. 	Martinez 	appeared
“extremely nervous” and told Brother-in-law “that he couldn’t
handle everything that was going on, that he had to end all of
this.” Martinez then showed Brother-in-law his gun and was
“very clear” that he wanted to kill Victim and that the reason he
had the gun was “to do it.” And while Brother-in-law testified
that 	Martinez 	would 	occasionally 	jokingly 	threaten 	to 	kill
people, “that day [he] felt that [Martinez] was serious.”
¶8 	Martinez was convicted on all counts. Martinez moved to
vacate the three counts of felony discharge, arguing that those
convictions should merge with his attempted murder conviction
because Martinez attempted to murder Victim by shooting at
him and that discharging his firearm was therefore part of the
same criminal episode. The trial court denied the motion, and
Martinez appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶9 	Martinez raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that
certain out-of-court statements made by unidentified persons
and admitted at trial were hearsay and that the trial court erred
in allowing the jury to hear Victim’s testimony regarding out-of-
court statements. “In reviewing hearsay rulings, we review legal

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	5 	2019 UT App 166
questions for correctness, factual questions for clear error, and
the final ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion.” State v.
McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶ 14, 302 P.3d 844, aff’d, 2016 UT 3, 365
P.3d 699. If a trial court errs in admitting hearsay, an appellant
will prevail on appeal only upon a showing that there was a
“reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result” absent the
statements. Id. ¶ 41 (quotation simplified).
¶10 	Second, Martinez contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to merge his convictions for felony discharge of a
firearm with his conviction for attempted murder. Merger issues
are questions of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Wilder,
2018 UT 17, ¶ 15, 420 P.3d 1064.
ANALYSIS
I. Hearsay
¶11 	Martinez 	first 	contends 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	in
admitting 	Victim’s 	testimony 	that 	multiple 	unidentified
residents of Tooele relayed to him that Martinez was looking for
Victim 	to 	kill 	him. 	Martinez 	argues 	that 	this 	testimony
was 	inadmissible 	hearsay 	and 	that 	its 	admission 	at 	trial
prejudiced him. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is
offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Utah R. Evid.
801(c). The Utah Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of
hearsay unless the evidence meets one of several exceptions. Id.
R. 802. However, even if hearsay is erroneously admitted, a
challenger must show prejudice to prevail on appeal. State v.
Boyle, 2019 UT App 28, ¶ 16, 440 P.3d 720; see also State v. Vargas,
2001 UT 5, ¶ 48, 20 P.3d 271 (“We will not reverse the trial
court for committing harmless error.” (quotation simplified)).
“[O]ur prejudice analysis asks whether we remain confident that
the verdict would be the same” had the hearsay been excluded.
State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ¶ 31, 365 P.3d 699. To reverse a
jury verdict, it is not enough that there is “a mere possibility” of

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	6 	2019 UT App 166
a different outcome; there must be “a reasonable likelihood that
the error affected the result.” State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶ 37, 243
P.3d 1250 (quotation simplified).
¶12 	At trial, the prosecutor questioned Victim about why
he asked Martinez if he was looking for Victim to kill him.
In response, Victim testified two different times that he was
told 	by 	“everybody” 	and 	“all 	the 	people” 	in 	Tooele 	that
Martinez 	was 	looking 	for 	him 	to 	kill 	him. 	The 	trial 	court
overruled Martinez’s hearsay objection. Martinez argues that
Victim’s two statements were offered for their truth and that
he was prejudiced by their admission. The State argues that
the 	statements 	were 	only 	“offered 	to 	explain 	why 	Victim
confronted Martinez.” For this appeal, we will assume, without
deciding, that Victim’s testimony regarding rumors he heard
from 	unidentified 	Tooele 	residents 	constituted 	inadmissible
hearsay. See Boyle, 2019 UT App 28, ¶ 16. But we conclude that
any error in admitting the statements was not prejudicial in this
case.
¶13 	We consider several factors when determining whether
the admission of hearsay evidence is harmful in a given case.
State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶ 52, 302 P.3d 844, aff’d, 2016
UT 3, 365 P.3d 699.
These 	include 	the 	importance 	of 	the 	witness’s
testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence
of 	evidence 	corroborating 	or 	contradicting 	the
testimony of the witness on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,
and, 	of 	course, 	the 	overall 	strength 	of 	the
prosecution’s case.
Id. (quotation simplified). We “may also consider the degree of
emphasis the prosecution placed on the evidence in presenting
its case.” Id.

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	7 	2019 UT App 166
¶14 	Martinez contends that the admitted hearsay statements
made it more likely that the jury would determine that Martinez
was the person who shot at Victim. He argues that the improper
admission 	of 	the 	hearsay 	statements left 	the 	jury 	with 	the
impression that Martinez had communicated to a large number
of Tooele residents his intent to kill Victim, that his threats
seemed so serious that others felt the need to warn Victim, and
that Martinez had actually taken steps to look for Victim. These
rumors suggested that “the planned pursuit of [Victim] . . . led
Martinez to the crime scene” and undermined Martinez’s theory
that the crime was “a chance encounter involving a random
shooter.” 	Martinez 	concludes 	that 	there 	was 	“a 	reasonable
likelihood that but for the hearsay, the jury would have doubted
that Martinez was the shooter or that he acted with the intent to
kill [Victim].” We are not persuaded. Nearly all the information
communicated in the two hearsay statements was cumulative
and corroborated by other testimony at trial and therefore was
not critical evidence in the State’s overall case.
¶15 	As described above, Martinez threatened Victim when he
rushed into a house looking “upset” and arranged his fingers in
the shape of a gun, pointing it at Victim for approximately three
or 	four 	seconds. 	Three 	days 	before 	the 	shooting, 	Martinez
threatened Victim in front of Victim’s supervisor. Victim asked
Martinez “if [Martinez] was looking for [Victim] to kill [him].”
Martinez replied, “No, not now or here at this moment, but I
know where you . . . live, and sooner or later I will kill you.”
And 	just 	hours 	before 	the 	shooting, 	Martinez 	confided 	in
Brother-in-law that he planned to kill Victim and then proceeded
to show Brother-in-law his gun.2
2. Martinez argues that “the jury had reason to doubt that
Martinez was serious” in telling Brother-in-law that he was
going to kill Victim because “Martinez had jokingly talked about
(continued…)

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	8 	2019 UT App 166
¶16 	We agree with the State that “vague statements from
unknown Tooele residents made at unknown times are not more
believable than Martinez’s own, detailed statements made days
and hours before the shooting.” The supervisor’s and Brother-in-
law’s testimonies are particularly strong evidence because both
had 	personal 	connections 	to 	Martinez. 	Brother-in-law 	in
particular was very specific, stating that Martinez had a gun and
“had everything prepared” to go after Victim mere hours before
the shooting. The State also placed little emphasis on the hearsay
statements from random Tooele residents. Over the course of the
three-day trial, the rumors from Tooele residents came up only
one 	time 	during 	Victim’s 	testimony. 	Neither 	the 	State 	nor
Martinez questioned any other witness about the rumors, and
the State did not refer to those statements during its closing
argument.
¶17 	Additionally, we are not persuaded that the jury would
have interpreted the phrases “everybody” and “all the people”
of 	Tooele 	to 	literally 	mean 	that 	a 	large 	number 	of 	Tooele
residents approached Victim to warn him that Martinez was
looking for him to kill him. A reasonable juror would interpret
those statements as exaggeration. Cf. United States v. Recio, 884
F.3d 230, 238 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that a jury could interpret a
statement that someone “always” carried a gun as exaggerated,
“describing 	a 	pattern 	of 	regularly 	(though 	not 	invariably)
carrying a gun” (quotation simplified)); Troy Group, Inc. v. Tilson,
364 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that clearly
exaggerated, colloquial language “does not lend itself to a literal
(…continued)
killing people before.” While Brother-in-law acknowledged that
Martinez had generally threatened to kill as a way to “play
around with people,” Brother-in-law testified that on “that day
[he] felt that [Martinez] was serious” and that “[i]t was very
clear to [him] that what [Martinez] wanted to do was kill.”

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	9 	2019 UT App 166
interpretation 	by 	the 	average 	reader”). 	And 	we 	are 	not
persuaded that the vague statements from unidentified Tooele
residents carried more weight and credibility with the jury than
the testimony of people who had actual 	relationships with
Martinez. 	The 	State 	also 	presented 	stronger 	evidence
demonstrating that Martinez was the one who shot at Victim
than just the two hearsay statements. Apart from Martinez
making his intentions and plans known to others, Victim saw the
shooter and was “100 percent” certain it was Martinez. Further
evidence showed that Martinez borrowed a white SUV from his
neighbor the day of the shooting, that Victim and Sergeant each
said the shooter was driving a white SUV, that the neighbor’s
SUV was found abandoned the next day, and that Martinez had
seemingly left town the day after the shooting and was later
found in California.
¶18 	To 	reverse 	a 	jury 	verdict 	based 	on 	the 	erroneous
admission of hearsay, an appellant must present more than “a
mere possibility” of a different outcome; he must show “a
reasonable likelihood that the [hearsay] affected the result.”
State 	v. 	Jeffs, 	2010 	UT 	49, 	¶ 	37, 	243 	P.3d 	1250 	(quotation
simplified). 	Without 	the 	two 	hearsay 	statements, 	the 	jury
still would have heard evidence of Martinez’s multiple threats
to kill Victim, Victim’s identification of Martinez at the scene
of the crime, that Martinez borrowed a vehicle the day of
the 	shooting 	that 	matched 	the 	description 	of 	the 	one 	the
shooter was driving, that the vehicle was found abandoned
the day after the shooting, and that Martinez was located in
a different state several months after the shooting. We determine
that any erroneous admission of the two hearsay statements
is not enough to undermine our confidence in the verdict,
and even if the hearsay had been excluded, Martinez has not
shown 	a 	“reasonable 	likelihood 	that 	the 	error 	affected 	the
outcome in the trial court.” See State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134,
¶ 57, 302 P.3d 844 (quotation simplified), aff’d, 2016 UT 3, 365
P.3d 699.

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	10 	2019 UT App 166
II. Merger
¶19 	Martinez 	next 	asserts 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	in
denying 	his 	motion 	to 	vacate 	his 	felony 	discharge-of-a-
firearm 	convictions 	on 	the 	ground 	that 	those 	offenses
should have merged with his attempted murder conviction.
Merger 	is 	a 	legal 	doctrine 	designed 	“to 	protect 	criminal
defendants from being twice punished for committing a single
act that may violate more than one criminal statute.” State v.
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ¶ 17, 55 P.3d 1131. Merger becomes an
issue when “two statutes or two portions of a single statute
proscribe 	certain 	conduct, 	and 	the 	question 	is 	whether 	the
defendant can be punished twice because his conduct violates
both proscriptions.” State v. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, ¶ 4, 103
P.3d 153 (quotation simplified). Utah Code section 76-1-402
provides, “[W]hen the same act of a defendant under a single
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished
in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act
shall be punishable under only one such provision . . . .” Utah
Code 	Ann. 	§ 	76-1-402(1) 	(LexisNexis 	2012). 	Similarly, 	if 	an
offense is a lesser included offense of another charged offense, a
defendant may not be convicted of both offenses. See id. § 76-1-
402(3). Pursuant to these provisions, Martinez argues that he is
entitled 	to 	merger 	of 	his 	attempted 	murder 	and 	felony
discharge-of-a-firearm 	convictions.3 	But 	even 	accepting 	that
section 	76-1-402, 	standing 	alone, 	would 	require 	merger 	of
3. Martinez initially argued another ground for merger—the
common law merger doctrine as described in State v. Finlayson,
2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243. After Martinez filed his brief, our
supreme court issued a decision in State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17,
420 P.3d 1064, overruling Finlayson’s common-law merger test,
id. ¶ 38. Martinez acknowledges in his reply brief that common-
law merger no longer applies, and we do not address this
argument further.

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	11 	2019 UT App 166
Martinez’s 	crimes, 	Martinez’s 	merger 	claim 	ultimately 	fails
because 	the 	Utah 	Code 	expressly 	allows 	cumulative
punishments for felony discharge of a firearm and attempted
murder. See id. § 76-5-203(5)(a).
¶20 	Our supreme court has recognized that “some statutes
operate as ‘enhancement statutes.’” State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88,
¶ 70, 	361 	P.3d 	104. 	Such 	statutes 	“are 	different 	in 	nature
than other criminal statutes because they single out particular
characteristics 	of 	criminal 	conduct 	as 	warranting 	harsher
punishment.” State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 615
(quotation 	simplified). 	“And 	where 	the 	Legislature 	has
designated a statute as an enhancing statute, the merger doctrine
has no effect.” Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 70; see also State v. Alfatlawi,
2006 UT App 511, ¶ 39, 153 P.3d 804 (“[E]nhancement statutes
do 	not 	violate 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment’s 	prohibition 	on
double 	jeopardy 	if 	the 	legislature 	specifically 	authorized
cumulative punishment for a crime committed with a dangerous
weapon.”). 	For 	the 	legislature 	to 	exempt 	an 	offense 	from
operation 	of 	the 	merger 	doctrine, 	the 	plain 	language
and structure of the pertinent statute must provide “an explicit
indication 	of 	legislative 	intent.” 	Bond, 	2015 	UT 	88, 	¶ 	70
(quotation simplified). “Only when such an explicit indication of
legislative intent is present in the specific offense statute will
we consider it appropriate to exempt that statute from operation
of the general merger requirements . . . .” Smith, 2005 UT 57,
¶ 11.
¶21 	Section 	76-5-203 	of 	the 	Utah 	Code 	contains a 	list 	of
“predicate 	offense[s]” 	that 	“do[] 	not 	merge 	with 	the 	crime
of murder.” See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(5)(a). The phrase
“predicate offense” is a defined term, see id. § 76-5-203(1), and
the definition our legislature has chosen for that term includes,
among other things, felony “discharge of a firearm or dangerous
weapon,” id. § 76-5-203(1)(v). A plain reading of this provision
demonstrates that the legislature explicitly indicated its intent to

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	12 	2019 UT App 166
preclude felony discharge of a firearm from merging with a non-
aggravated murder4—or attempted murder—charge.
¶22 	Martinez asserts that the merger provision should be read
as pertaining only to murder charges premised on a felony-
murder theory—not to situations where knowing or intentional
murder is alleged. But merger with respect to felony murder is
addressed separately in section 76-5-203(5)(b), which explicitly
pertains 	to 	circumstances 	where 	a 	person 	“is 	convicted 	of
murder, based on a predicate offense.” Id. § 76-6-203(5)(b). Thus,
construing section 76-5-203(5)(a) as pertaining only to felony
murder would render section 76-5-203(5)(b) superfluous. When
engaging in plain-language analysis of a statute, we “avoid
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous
or inoperative.” Hall v. Utah State Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15,
24 	P.3d 	958. 	Thus, 	we 	cannot 	accept 	Martinez’s 	assertion
regarding the limitations of section 76-5-203(5)(a).
¶23 	Martinez also contends that section 76-5-203(5)(a) does
not apply to attempt crimes, because the statute states that the
enumerated predicate offenses are prohibited from merging with
“murder” and does not explicitly mention attempted murder.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(5)(a). However, “[a]ttempt crimes
are derivatives of completed crimes, and the express language of
both 	the 	completed 	crime 	statute 	and 	the 	attempt 	statute
4. Contemporaneous with this decision, we issued a decision in
State v. Bowden, 2019 UT App 167, in which we held that a
defendant’s 	felony 	discharge-of-a-firearm 	convictions 	should
have merged with his attempted aggravated murder conviction.
Although that result may appear inconsistent with our decision
here, 	differences 	between 	the 	plain 	language 	of 	the 	non-
aggravated murder statute at issue in this case and that of the
aggravated murder statute at issue in Bowden mandate such a
result. See id. ¶ 25 n.6; id. ¶¶ 27–30 (Harris, J., concurring).

State v. Martinez
20161019-CA 	13 	2019 UT App 166
determines the elements of the attempt crime.” State v. Casey,
2003 UT 55, ¶ 13, 82 P.3d 1106. Strictly speaking, there is no
stand-alone attempted murder statute that is separate from the
murder statute. See id. ¶ 43 n.11. Rather, attempted murder is
basically 	an 	incomplete 	offense. 	To 	determine 	whether 	an
attempted murder has been committed, we must look to the
elements of the murder statute and evaluate whether an actor
has 	taken 	a 	“substantial 	step 	toward 	commission 	of 	the
[murder].” See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (LexisNexis 2012);
see also Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶ 13 (“[A] conviction for attempted
murder must satisfy the elements of the murder statute, with the
obvious exception that the murder need not be completed, and
the 	attempt 	statute.”). 	Indeed, 	Martinez 	was 	charged 	with
attempted murder pursuant to section 76-5-203, the murder
statute. 	Because 	both 	murder 	and 	attempted 	murder 	are
evaluated using the same statutory elements, the prohibition
against a predicate offense merging with murder also prevents
that offense from merging with attempted murder. Thus, the
trial court did not err in denying Martinez’s motion to vacate his
felony discharge-of-a-firearm convictions.
CONCLUSION
¶24 	We 	conclude 	that 	the 	trial 	court’s 	admission 	of 	two
hearsay 	statements, 	even 	if 	erroneous, 	did 	not 	prejudice
Martinez. 	Additionally, 	we 	hold 	that 	the 	crime 	of 	felony
discharge 	of 	a 	firearm 	does 	not 	merge 	with 	the 	crime 	of
attempted 	murder. 	Accordingly, 	we 	affirm 	Martinez’s
convictions.