State v. Lyman

2026 UT App 115
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
A SAEL PAUL LYMAN ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240894-CA
Filed July 30, 2026
Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable James D. Gardner
No. 231904629
Nathalie S. Skibine, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Daniel W. Boyer,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES R YAN D. TENNEY and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	Asael Paul Lyman was convicted of negligently operating
a vehicle resulting in death, driving under the influence, failure to
stay in one lane, speeding, and failure to obey a traffic control
device. He now appeals his conviction of negligently operating a
vehicle resulting in death. He argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict and his motion to arrest
judgment, both based on an assertion of insufficient evidence
presented by the State. He also raises challenges regarding jury
instructions and regarding the court’s refusal to allow certain
testimony by his son. We disagree as to each argument and
therefore affirm Lyman’s conviction.

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 115
BACKGROUND
The Collision
¶2 	Lyman, an admitted alcoholic, usually drank three to four
tumbler glasses (each three to four fingers full) of whiskey every
night. At about 3:30 a.m. on December 1, 2022, Lyman briefly
awoke to let his dogs outside, had yet another glass of whiskey
(beyond his customary drinks from the prior evening), and then
returned to bed. Lyman arose later that morning at about 8:00
a.m., and then he left at about 11:30 a.m. in his truck to pick up his
grandson from kindergarten. But on his way back home after
retrieving his grandson, Lyman collided with another vehicle.
¶3 	Lyman was travelling northbound on Bangerter Highway,
which had a posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour, and
proceeded to take the 9000 South off-ramp near his home.
Lyman’s truck moved into the left lane of the off-ramp, passed the
vehicle that had been immediately in front of him, veered back
into the right lane, and then made contact with the concrete
barrier to the right side of the off-ramp. Lyman’s truck then
straightened out and proceeded forward toward the end of the
off-ramp, where there was a low concrete divider separating the
lanes, forcing either a left or right turn, and where the traffic lights
were currently red. Lyman’s truck nonetheless proceeded over
the concrete divider into the intersection and collided with
another truck, sending that truck flying off the road, through a
chain link fence, and into a shed.
¶4 	A tow truck driver who had witnessed the crash and called
911 approached Lyman’s truck to see if he needed medical
attention. The tow truck driver found Lyman conscious and asked
if he needed medical attention, but Lyman simply shook his head
“no.” The tow truck driver asked if Lyman’s grandson, who was
“crying hysterically” in the back seat, needed medical attention,
and Lyman again simply shook his head.

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 115
¶5 	The first officer to arrive at the scene approached the truck
Lyman had hit and tried to make contact with its driver. Although
the driver was initially making some movement and noise, he was
losing a large amount of blood and never gave any response to
the officer. Because of the smashed nature of the truck, the roof
had to be cut off before the driver could be extracted. The driver
was pronounced dead at the scene.
¶6 	When paramedics arrived and approached Lyman, he was
“conscious, breathing, and alert,” which one paramedic found “a
little bit surprising” considering the “massive impact” of the
collision. The paramedic also characterized Lyman as “very calm”
and “almost relaxed.” Lyman complained of sternum pain, and
after 	the 	paramedic 	completed 	a 	full-body 	assessment, 	he
determined further evaluation was necessary, and both Lyman
and his grandson were transported to the hospital. The grandson
suffered only minor injuries, but further examination of Lyman
revealed several broken ribs, a broken sternum, and a collapsed
lung. It was also discovered that Lyman was in atrial fibrillation,
and doctors eventually had to shock his heart to get it back into a
normal rhythm.1 Police obtained a blood sample from Lyman,
which revealed that he had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.12
grams.
¶7 	A later examination of the event data recorded by the
airbag control module of Lyman’s truck showed that Lyman was
“travelling 84 miles an hour at the top of the off-ramp,” that “[t]he
accelerator was at 100 percent,” that the truck increased in speed
1. Atrial fibrillation “is an irregular and often very rapid heart
rhythm.” Atrial Fibrillation, Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org
/diseases-conditions/atrial-fibrillation/symptoms-causes/syc-20350624
[https://perma.cc/5KXB-RTYT]. 	“During 	atrial 	fibrillation, 	the
heart’s upper chambers . . . beat chaotically and irregularly” and
“out of sync with the lower heart chambers.” Id. “Episodes of
atrial fibrillation may come and go, or they may be constant.” Id.

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 115
to 97 miles an hour before hitting the concrete barrier, that after
hitting the barrier “a little bit of [steering] input” registered and
the accelerator was completely released, and that the truck “was
traveling 89 miles an hour” a few seconds later at the time of the
fatal impact.
¶8 	As a result of the collision, Lyman was charged with
negligently operating a vehicle resulting in death, driving under
the influence, failure to stay in one lane, speeding, and failure to
obey a traffic control device.2
The Trial
¶9 	The case against Lyman proceeded to trial. During its
opening statement, the State asserted that the victim was dead
because Lyman “chose to get behind the wheel while he was
drunk,” “chose to speed down Bangerter [Highway],” and “chose
to head down that off-ramp, cross that red light and kill” the
victim. The defense in its opening, on the other hand, asserted that
although Lyman’s blood alcohol concentration was “over the
limit,” the victim’s death “was not the result of Mr. Lyman
operating a vehicle in a negligent manner” but, instead, “was the
result of a cardiac . . . or heart-related event” that “was not
foreseeable.”
¶10 	The State then proceeded to call witnesses who testified to
and elaborated upon the facts stated above. These included
multiple eyewitnesses of the accident, as well as various experts.
¶11 	One 	expert 	called 	by 	the 	State 	was 	an 	accident
reconstructionist who had analyzed the event data captured by
the 	airbag 	control 	module 	in 	Lyman’s 	truck. 	The 	accident
reconstructionist testified that automobile manufacturers “make
it difficult to push” the accelerator down “at 100 percent,”
2. The State also initially charged Lyman with reckless driving,
but this charge was later dismissed with prejudice.

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 115
requiring a person “to bend your foot and push it as hard as you
can,” and that therefore this takes “a conscious action” and “there
has to be input by the driver.” He reiterated, “It’s not something
that’s designed to be something that could be done accidentally.”
He further explained that the steering input that registered after
the 	contact 	with 	the 	concrete 	barrier 	was 	consistent 	with
overcorrecting, gaining control of the vehicle, and continuing on
a straightened path, and that in his opinion, such input “wouldn’t
be consistent with someone who [was] unconscious.”
¶12 	The State also called a cardiologist to testify. He testified
that while atrial fibrillation is “very common,” it is “very rare” for
atrial fibrillation alone to make someone lose consciousness. He
further testified that in those rare cases where atrial fibrillation
does cause a loss of consciousness, it is much more likely a case of
paroxysmal atrial fibrillation, that is, atrial fibrillation that “was
coming and going,” as opposed to the persistent atrial fibrillation
from which Lyman was suffering. The cardiologist also stated that
“there was no evidence of associated other issues” with Lyman’s
heart that could have combined with the atrial fibrillation to cause
Lyman to lose consciousness.
¶13 	At the end of the State’s presentation of its case, Lyman
moved 	for 	a 	directed 	verdict 	on 	the 	charge 	of 	negligently
operating a vehicle resulting in death, arguing that the State had
failed to “present[] [a] prima facie case to go to the jury.” The trial
court denied the motion, determining that there was “sufficient
evidence presented from which a jury acting reasonably could
convict” Lyman of each of the charged offenses.
¶14 	The defense then presented its case. The defense called its
own accident reconstructionist, whose view of the event data
differed from that of the State’s reconstruction expert. This
accident reconstructionist testified that the steering events that
registered 	after 	impact 	with 	the 	concrete 	barrier 	were 	“so
incredibly small” and “fairly repeated” that they were consistent

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 115
with “the tires interacting with the barrier and the electronic
stability control being engaged” and did not “indicate meaningful
driver input.” He also pointed out that the brake pedal was not
engaged when Lyman hit the concrete barrier, and he then stated
that “it’s extremely uncommon for somebody to not go and hit the
brakes once some type of an impact event occurs.” The accident
reconstructionist 	further 	testified 	that 	it 	was 	“theoretically
possible” that a driver who was “limp and unconscious” could be
applying full pressure to the accelerator so long as the driver was
“positioned very close to the dash and . . . ha[d] their foot in that
position 	already” 	or 	if, 	while 	unconscious, 	the 	driver 	was
experiencing a sustained leg contraction during a seizure or other
medical event.
¶15 	The defense also called its own cardiologist, who held
opinions differing from those of the State’s medical expert. This
cardiologist testified that “due to an issue related to [Lyman’s]
atrial 	fibrillation,” 	Lyman 	“likely 	experienced 	loss 	of
consciousness due to a pause in his heart rate that led to reduced
blood flow to his brain and caused him to pass out.” When
questioned 	as 	to 	how 	many 	of 	his 	patients 	with 	atrial
fibrillation had experienced passing out, he responded that it
was “a common occurrence.” But he also testified that of all the
people with atrial fibrillation, “the minority of them . . . pass out,”
and 	he 	agreed 	that 	losing 	consciousness 	was 	“much 	more
common” with paroxysmal (as opposed to persistent) atrial
fibrillation. This cardiologist further testified that it is possible for
a person who loses consciousness due to atrial fibrillation to also
experience a seizure related to the pause in heartbeat that can
stiffen the body.
¶16 	Lyman took the stand in his defense. He testified that with
some frequency, he was asked to pick up his grandson from
kindergarten and keep him until the child’s parents were done
with work. Lyman also related that on the morning of the
accident, he felt like he “was all right” when he left to pick up his

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 115
grandson and he did not notice any symptoms of intoxication. As
to the accident itself, Lyman testified that the last thing he
remembered was talking to his grandson about stopping to pick
up chicken nuggets, with this conversation occurring as they were
heading toward the off-ramp. Lyman said the last thing that
crossed his mind was that he needed to be in the left lane of the
off-ramp so that he could turn left to go to the fast food restaurant
and 	that 	this 	was 	just 	something 	he 	knew 	“automatically”
because he had “done it so many times because that’s the way
home.” His next memory, Lyman recounted, was of a paramedic
standing next to his vehicle after the accident, asking him
questions.
¶17 	Lyman’s son—the father of the grandson involved in the
accident—also briefly testified. He stated that although Lyman
was an alcoholic, he was not “a daytime drinker.” Lyman’s son
then began to testify regarding Lyman’s relationship with his
grandchildren and his frequent attendance at their sporting
events. At this point, the State objected on relevance grounds.
During an ensuing bench conference, the trial court expressed its
concern that the questions might be going “too far afield,” and
defense counsel explained that he only had a few more questions
left and that those questions would address Lyman “picking [his
grandson] up from kindergarten, child care, and taking care of
him on a regular basis”—specifically, that Lyman had made the
same drive “a couple hundred times and there ha[d] never been
any issues.” The State argued that such testimony would not be
relevant 	and 	would 	amount 	to 	inappropriate 	propensity
evidence. The court agreed that the testimony was not relevant
and that “even if it was relevant, . . . the probative value would be
substantially outweighed” due to the fact that the testimony
would essentially be “propensity evidence.”
¶18 	At the end of the defense’s case, the trial court instructed
the jury. Each side had previously proposed a jury instruction
addressing a loss of consciousness. The instruction proposed by

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	8 	2026 UT App 115
Lyman read as follows: “A person is not negligent if he is stricken
by a sudden unforeseeable medical condition that rendered him
incapable 	of 	controlling 	his 	vehicle.” 	The 	State’s 	proposed
instruction, on the other hand, would have told the jury that
Lyman’s assertion of an unforeseen medical condition was “an
affirmative defense” and that, “[a]s such, [Lyman bore] the
burden 	of 	establishing 	that 	the 	alleged 	unforeseen 	medical
condition constitute[d] the sole proximate cause of the accident
and the resulting death.” The court declined to give either
proposed 	instruction, 	reasoning 	that 	neither 	was 	based 	on
established Utah law. But the court did instead provide its own
instruction addressing intervening causes generally:
The proximate cause of an injury or death is
that cause, which in the natural and continuous
sequence, and which is unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in
operation the factors that accomplish the injury.
An 	intervening 	cause 	is 	an 	independent
event, not reasonably foreseeable, that completely
breaks the connection between fault and injury.
. . . .
The mere fact that an unfortunate and fatal
accident happened in which [Lyman] was involved,
considered alone, does not prove and does not
support an inference that [he] is guilty of the crimes
charged.
¶19 	The jury instructions also included instructions listing the
elements of the charged crimes. The elements instruction for the
charge of negligently operating a vehicle resulting in death listed
the elements as follows: (1) Lyman, (2) “[o]perated a vehicle in a

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 115
negligent manner causing the death of” the victim, and (3) “[h]ad
sufficient alcohol in his body such that a subsequent chemical test
showed a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or
greater at the time of the test.” And the next jury instruction stated
“that ‘negligence’ means failing to exercise that degree of care
which reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or
similar circumstances.” Additionally relevant to this appeal is an
instruction—made 	over 	Lyman’s 	objection 	and 	placed
immediately following the elements instruction for the speeding
count—that stated as follows: “Any speed in excess of the posted
55 MPH speed limit at the intersection of Bangerter Highway and
9000 South is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable
or prudent and that it is unlawful.”
¶20 	The jury convicted Lyman as charged. Lyman then moved
to arrest judgment for the verdict on the charge of negligently
operating a vehicle resulting in death. The trial court denied the
motion, again determining that the State had “presented sufficient
evidence from which the jury could have concluded that [Lyman]
negligently operated a vehicle causing the death of” the victim.
Lyman 	timely 	appealed, 	asking 	this 	court 	to 	reverse 	his
conviction of negligently operating a vehicle resulting in death
and remand his case for a new trial on that count.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶21 	Lyman first challenges the trial court’s denials of his
motion for directed verdict and his motion to arrest judgment,
both of which were based on an argument that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that the collision was the result of
negligence. “We review a [trial] court’s grant or denial of a motion
for directed verdict and to arrest judgment for correctness.” State
v. Stricklan, 2020 UT 65, ¶ 30, 477 P.3d 1251. “We will uphold a
denial of the motion for directed verdict based on an insufficiency
of the evidence claim, if, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the State, some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 115
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶22 	Next, Lyman argues that the trial court erred in declining
to give his proposed jury instruction regarding an unforeseeable
medical condition, arguing that this instruction was “a necessary
clarification to provide the jury.” “If the jury instructions are
legally 	correct, 	the 	precise 	wording 	and 	specificity 	of 	jury
instructions is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” State
v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 45, 582 P.3d 772 (quotation simplified). And
“[w]hether to give an additional clarifying instruction is the type
of decision that falls within a [trial] court’s discretion.” Id. ¶ 47.
“Jury 	instruction 	issues 	that 	fall 	within 	the 	[trial] 	court’s
discretion will, of course, be subject to an abuse of discretion
standard.” Id. ¶ 45.
¶23 	Lyman also asserts that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that any speed over 55 miles per hour “is prima facie
evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent” and that this
instruction 	“unconstitutionally 	shift[ed] 	the 	burden 	to 	the
defense.” “The propriety of a jury instruction presents a question
of law which we review for correctness.” State v. Crowley, 2014 UT
App 33, ¶ 4, 320 P.3d 677 (quotation simplified).
¶24 	Finally, 	Lyman 	asserts 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	in
sustaining an objection to his son’s testimony that Lyman had
made the drive to pick up his grandson hundreds of times before
with no issue. “The appropriate standard of review for a [trial]
court’s 	decision 	to 	admit 	or 	exclude 	evidence 	is 	abuse 	of
discretion. . . . If the [trial] court applies the correct legal standard,
it abuses its discretion only when its decision to admit or exclude
evidence is beyond the limits of reasonability.” State v. Green, 2023
UT 10, ¶ 43, 532 P.3d 930 (quotation simplified).

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 115
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶25 	Lyman argues that the trial court should have granted his
motion for directed verdict and his motion to arrest judgment
based 	on 	the 	insufficiency 	of 	the 	evidence 	to 	support 	a
determination that the collision was the result of his negligence.
The bar that Lyman must clear to succeed on these arguments on
appeal is significant. “A defendant seeking a directed verdict
must show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, no evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime.” State v. Stricklan, 2020 UT 65, ¶ 30, 477 P.3d 1251
(quotation simplified). “Similarly, we reverse the denial of a
motion to arrest judgment only if the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element.” Id.
¶ 31 (quotation simplified).
¶26 	Lyman’s argument hinges on his assertion that the State’s
evidence failed to “prove it was not a ‘real possibility’ that Lyman
lost consciousness.” The State responds by asserting that (1) it
presented evidence sufficient to show that Lyman did not lose
consciousness and (2) even if the jury believed that Lyman did lose
consciousness, there was sufficient evidence showing that Lyman
was driving negligently before he lost consciousness and that this
negligent driving was the proximate cause of the victim’s death.
We agree with the State’s argument on both fronts.
¶27 	First, the State presented sufficient evidence that, when
seen in the light most favorable to the State, would support a
reasonable jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Lyman
did not lose consciousness. It was essentially uncontested that
Lyman was travelling nearly 30 miles over the speed limit as he
entered the off-ramp, had the accelerator pressed completely to

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 115
the floor, turned abruptly in front of another vehicle, reached a
speed 	of 	97 	miles 	per 	hour, 	swiped 	a 	concrete 	barrier,
straightened out, ran over a concrete divider to go straight when
a turn was required, ran a red light, and then hit the victim’s truck
at 89 miles per hour, sending it flying off the road. It was also
uncontested that at the time of the collision, Lyman had a blood
alcohol concentration of more than double the legal limit. The
State additionally presented expert testimony that fully pressing
down the accelerator would require conscious effort and that
event data recorded by Lyman’s truck indicated that Lyman
overcorrected and straightened out his truck after swiping the
concrete 	barrier—actions 	that 	would 	support 	a 	reasonable
inference that Lyman did not pass out as he negotiated the off-
ramp. And the State’s medical expert further testified that it was
“very rare” for atrial fibrillation alone to make someone lose
consciousness—particularly the type of atrial fibrillation that
Lyman was experiencing.
¶28 	Lyman pushes back, asserting that the evidence presented
by the State did not “rule out the real possibility that Lyman lost
consciousness.” But disproving such a possibility is not required;
the jury needed to be firmly convinced that Lyman was guilty of
the crimes charged, and it could have come to that conviction even
if the State’s witnesses did not definitely rule out a possibility the
defense suggested. See State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ¶ 37, 116 P.3d
305 (“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you
firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. There are very few
things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in
criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes
every possible doubt.” (quotation simplified)). Thus, the State was
not required to conclusively disprove the defense’s theory of the
case 	to 	obtain 	a 	conviction. 	And 	whether 	the 	theoretical
possibility presented by the defense was a “real possibility” under
the facts of this case—that is, a possibility that prevented the jury
from being firmly convinced of Lyman’s guilt—is a question
solely for the jury.

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 115
¶29 	Second, we agree that even if the jury was ultimately
persuaded 	by 	the 	defense’s 	argument 	that 	Lyman 	lost
consciousness 	due 	to 	atrial 	fibrillation, 	that 	is 	not 	entirely
inconsistent with a finding that Lyman’s negligent driving caused
the victim’s death. In other words, the jury could have considered
that Lyman entered the off-ramp going nearly 30 miles over the
highway speed limit while still accelerating at full throttle, and it
could have then reasonably concluded that but for such negligent
driving, the victim would not have died. That is, the jury could
have 	concluded 	that 	had 	Lyman 	been 	driving 	in 	a 	more
reasonable manner as he exited, his later loss of consciousness
would not have led to such a tragic result.
¶30 	Under either possibility, the State presented sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lyman negligently operated a vehicle
resulting in death. And the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, was not so inconclusive that a
reasonable juror must have had a reasonable doubt as to Lyman’s
negligence.
II. The Proposed Jury Instruction Regarding an Unforeseeable
Medical Condition
¶31 	Lyman next argues that the trial court erred in declining to
instruct the jury regarding an unforeseeable medical condition.
While he does not argue that the jury instructions given by the
court were legally incorrect, he does assert that the instructions
were ambiguous and in need of further clarification. In his view,
without his requested instruction there were multiple ways
“reasonable jurors could have believed [his] defense but still
convicted based on a reasonable but incorrect understanding of
the law.” We disagree with this assessment.
¶32 	As an initial matter, we agree that each jury instruction
must correctly state the law and that the instructions as a whole
must also be correct. That is, the interaction between multiple

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 115
legally correct jury instructions should not create confusion for
the jury. See State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶ 23, 285 P.3d 1183
(“[A]lthough neither instruction was incorrect as a matter of law,
using them together with no explanation or clarification as to their
applicability created the potential for confusion and could have
misled the jury.”). But we do not agree that the jury instructions
here resulted in the confusion that Lyman argues was present.
¶33 	Lyman argues that “[t]he instructions left ambiguous the
question 	of 	whether 	Lyman’s 	negligence 	had 	to 	cause 	the
[victim’s] death or whether it was enough that his” operation of a
vehicle caused the death. Lyman asserts that the jury could have
thought his “driving caused the accident” just because “his truck
crashed into” the victim’s truck, even if the jury was convinced
that his undiagnosed medical condition caused the accident. But
the elements instruction given to the jury clearly stated that the
State was required to prove that Lyman “[o]perated a vehicle in a
negligent manner causing the death of” the victim. (Emphasis
added.) This statement clearly conveyed that simply being behind
the 	wheel 	did 	not 	alone 	meet 	the 	elements 	of 	negligently
operating a vehicle resulting in death. Moreover, part of the
intervening-cause jury instruction given by the trial court further
clarified this point: “The mere fact that an unfortunate and fatal
accident happened in which [Lyman] was involved, considered
alone, does not prove and does not support an inference that [he]
is guilty of the crimes charged.”
¶34 	Lyman also argues that the jury could have determined
that simply driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the
legal limit was enough to satisfy the negligence requirement. But
again, the elements instruction specified that a guilty verdict
required a finding that Lyman “[o]perated a vehicle in a negligent
manner causing the death of” the victim and that Lyman “[h]ad
sufficient alcohol in his body such that a subsequent chemical test
showed a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or
greater at the time of the test.” Thus, the jury was clearly

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 115
instructed that these were distinct and separate required findings
for a conviction and that the State needed to prove the required
negligence in operating a vehicle that caused a death.
¶35 	The real issue here is whether the trial court was required
to instruct the jury regarding the defense Lyman wanted to
assert—that his undiagnosed medical condition, as opposed to
any conscious and negligent driving, was the true cause of the
collision. 	And 	the 	court’s 	instruction 	on 	intervening 	causes
sufficiently stated the law on this point and allowed Lyman to
argue his theory of the case. The instruction explained that “[t]he
proximate cause of an injury or death is that cause, which in the
natural and continuous sequence, and which is unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.” (Emphasis added.) And the
instruction told the jury that “[a]n intervening cause is an
independent event, not reasonably foreseeable, that completely
breaks the connection between fault and injury.” Thus, if the jury
was 	convinced 	that 	Lyman 	lost 	consciousness 	due 	to 	his
undiagnosed atrial fibrillation and that this broke any connection
between his prior driving and the collision, this instruction
correctly and adequately told the jury that Lyman’s driving was
not a proximate cause of the victim’s death.
¶36 	Thus, this is not a case where the jury instructions as given
“may have confused the jury’s understanding” and allowed them
to convict based on an incorrect understanding of the law.
Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶ 19. Moreover, the instruction proposed
by Lyman was not a complete statement of the law. His requested
instruction stated, “A person is not negligent if he is stricken by a
sudden 	unforeseeable 	medical 	condition 	that 	rendered 	him
incapable of controlling his vehicle.” This would have suggested
to the jury that had an undiagnosed medical condition caused
Lyman to pass out, negligence could not be found in this case. But
the law as to intervening causes is more nuanced than that, and it
is entirely possible that a driver’s prior negligent driving before a

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 115
medical issue reveals itself is of such a nature that the medical
issue is insufficient to break the causal chain between the prior
negligent 	driving 	and 	the 	accident. 	See 	57A 	Am. 	Jur. 	2d
Negligence § 555 (“In order to become a superseding cause or to
insulate a prior negligent actor from liability, an intervening cause
must be one which breaks the sequence or causal chain or
connection between the original negligent or wrongful act and the
injury, 	so 	that 	the 	intervening 	cause 	may 	be 	regarded 	as
independent of the original act in producing the injury. However,
the 	mere 	occurrence 	of 	an 	intervening 	cause 	does 	not
automatically break the chain of causation stemming from the
original tortious conduct.” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Richmond v.
Bateman, 2024 UT App 103, ¶ 40, 554 P.3d 341 (“There can be
concurrent proximate causes of an injury[,] and . . . the latter fault
of one actor should not blot out the consequences of the former,
when both were concurrent causes of the accident.” (quotation
simplified)). Thus, we agree with the trial court that Lyman’s
instruction was not based on established Utah law.
¶37 	Considering all this, the trial court did not exceed its
discretion in refusing to give Lyman’s requested jury instruction
or in instructing the jury as it did on intervening causes generally.
III. The Jury Instruction Regarding Prima Facie Evidence
¶38 	Lyman also challenges the jury instruction that read, “Any
speed 	in 	excess of 	the 	posted 	55 	MPH 	speed 	limit 	at 	the
intersection of Bangerter Highway and 9000 South is prima facie
evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is
unlawful.” He acknowledges that this language is taken from
Utah statute. See Utah Code § 41-6a-601(3). But he relies on prior
case law to argue that, as a jury instruction, the language
“create[d] 	an 	unconstitutional 	mandatory 	presumption 	in
violation of [his] due process rights.” State v. Crowley, 2014 UT
App 33, ¶ 13, 320 P.3d 677; see also State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321,
326 (Utah 1985) (considering a jury instruction “that possession of

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	17 	2026 UT App 115
recently 	stolen 	property, 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	satisfactory
explanation, is ‘prima facie’ evidence of theft by the person in
possession of the property,” and determining that the instruction
was unconstitutional because it created “a mandatory rebuttable
presumption”).
¶39 	We recognize that the use of the term “prima facie” in the
challenged instruction was problematic because, as this court has
previously explained, this term “refers to the standard by which
the trial court—not the jury—determines whether the evidence
presented warrants submission to the jury” and “in criminal cases
where the burden remains on the State throughout the case, the
jury should not be involved in such considerations.” Crowley, 2014
UT 	App 	33, 	¶ 	10 	(quotation 	simplified). 	Without 	further
explanation, such language does not simply allow “a permissive
inference” but, instead, creates “an unconstitutional mandatory
presumption” in favor of the State. Id. ¶ 13.
¶40 	We 	also 	recognize 	that 	although 	this 	instruction
immediately followed the instruction with the elements of the
speeding 	charge 	and 	was 	apparently 	meant 	to 	provide
information only for that charge (a conviction that Lyman does
not challenge on appeal), the use of the “reasonable and prudent”
phrase in both this challenged instruction and the separate
instruction defining negligence might have caused the jury to tie
the information about prima facie evidence to the negligence
determination underlying the negligent operation charge (the
conviction that Lyman does challenge on appeal). That is, we take
Lyman’s point that this may have created a burden-shifting effect
that extended beyond the speeding charge.
¶41 	Nonetheless, under the facts of this case, we conclude that
instructing the jury in this way was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See generally State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ¶ 30, 325 P.3d
855 (“To hold a constitutional error harmless, we must be able to
declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	18 	2026 UT App 115
doubt.” (quotation simplified)). We have previously found a
similarly flawed jury instruction harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt when “the State’s case against [the defendant] did not rely
heavily on the presumption contained in the erroneous jury
instruction” and “[e]ven without the . . . presumption, the State’s
case against [the defendant] was strong.” Id. ¶ 32. And we are
convinced that both of these are features of the instant case and
support a harmlessness determination here.
¶42 	First, the State made no suggestion at trial that simply
because Lyman had been driving over 55 miles per hour as he
exited from Bangerter Highway that he must have been negligent;
instead, the assertion was that “he was negligent the moment he
was going 84 with 100 percent throttle on Bangerter [Highway]”
and also when he continued down the off-ramp “from 84 to 97
miles per hour with . . . 100 percent throttle on the gas pedal.” Nor
was there any suggestion of a presumption of negligence; instead,
the 	only 	presumption 	discussed 	at 	trial 	was 	Lyman’s
presumption of innocence.
¶43 	Second, the State’s case against Lyman was strong (which
is perhaps also the reason why the State made no argument in
reliance 	on 	a 	speeding 	presumption). 	The 	State 	presented
substantial evidence of Lyman’s negligence beyond a speed limit
violation. The State’s evidence supported that Lyman was going
nearly 30 miles over the speed limit as he exited the highway, that
he continued to travel at full throttle for several more seconds as
he continued down the off-ramp, that he swerved in front of
another vehicle, that he hit a concrete barrier, that he eventually
straightened out his truck and proceeded over the concrete
divider and into the intersection against a red light, that his atrial
fibrillation was unlikely to have rendered him unconscious, and
that his blood alcohol concentration was over twice the legal limit.
Considering “the robustness of the State’s case,” id., we conclude
that instructing the jury as the trial court did was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt under the circumstances here.

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	19 	2026 UT App 115
IV. Lyman’s Son’s Testimony
¶44 	Lyman contests the trial court’s ruling sustaining the
State’s objection to his son’s anticipated testimony that Lyman
had made the drive to pick up his grandson hundreds of times
before without incident. Lyman’s argument regarding this ruling
primarily focuses on the court’s characterization of the testimony
as propensity evidence. But it is clear that the court was also in
agreement with the State’s relevance argument, and we therefore
affirm on this reasoning alone without addressing the additional
reasoning the court discussed regarding propensity.
¶45 	The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that evidence is
relevant when “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is
of consequence in determining the action.” Utah R. Evid. 401. The
rules also provide that evidence that does not meet this standard
“is not admissible.” Id. R. 402. And we cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion in excluding Lyman’s son’s testimony
on this ground.
¶46 	Lyman 	asserts 	that 	his 	son’s 	testimony 	“was 	highly
probative to show that Lyman knew the intersection well and
would have anticipated the speed limit, the light, and the turn-
only lane.” And while that may be true, Lyman’s familiarity with
the off-ramp and the intersection was simply not a fact “of
consequence 	in 	determining” 	whether 	Lyman 	negligently
operated his vehicle on the day of the accident. Id. R. 401.
Uncontested 	evidence 	clearly 	showed 	that 	the 	maneuvers
Lyman’s truck made in traversing the off-ramp did not match
those of a reasonable driver navigating a familiar intersection.
However, neither side asserted that the reason for this disparity
was 	Lyman’s 	unfamiliarity 	with 	the 	intersection—the 	State
argued that the disparity was due to Lyman’s intoxicated driving,
and 	the 	defense 	argued 	that 	the 	disparity 	was 	due 	to
unconsciousness brought on by Lyman’s unforeseen medical

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	20 	2026 UT App 115
condition. And where testimony regarding Lyman’s familiarity
with the intersection would not have made either of these asserted
positions more or less likely, it would not have been relevant.
¶47 	Additionally, even if the testimony the defense wanted to
present 	was 	somehow 	minimally 	probative, 	it 	was 	largely
cumulative 	of 	statements 	Lyman 	himself 	made 	in 	his 	own
testimony. He testified that he had frequently been asked to pick
up his grandson from kindergarten and keep him until the child’s
parents were done with work. Lyman also testified that he
“automatically” knew which lane he needed to be in when he was
exiting the highway because he had “done it so many times
because that’s the way home.” The jury would therefore have
already 	understood 	from 	Lyman’s 	testimony 	and 	from 	the
nearness of his home to the intersection that he was familiar with
the off-ramp and intersection. Thus, Lyman’s son’s testimony
would have provided evidence of which the jury had already
been made aware.
¶48 	Considering these points, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion 	in 	sustaining 	the 	objection 	to 	Lyman’s 	son’s
testimony—that is, its decision was not “beyond the limits of
reasonability.” State v. Green, 2023 UT 10, ¶ 43, 532 P.3d 930
(quotation simplified).3
3. Lyman additionally advances a cumulative error argument.
“Cumulative error refers to a number of errors which prejudice a
defendant’s right to a fair trial. It is used when a single error may
not constitute grounds for reversal, but many errors, when taken
collectively, do.” State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶ 39,
428 P.3d 1038 (quotation simplified). Because we have determined
probable error as to only one of the arguments advanced in
Lyman’s appeal, see supra Part III, there are not multiple errors to
cumulate. Thus, this doctrine is inapplicable here, and we do not
address it further.

State v. Lyman
20240894-CA 	21 	2026 UT App 115
CONCLUSION
¶49 	The trial court did not err in denying either Lyman’s
motion for directed verdict or his motion to arrest judgment. Nor
did the court abuse its discretion in refusing Lyman’s proposed
jury instruction regarding an unforeseeable medical condition.
And although the court may have erred in allowing the jury to be
instructed 	regarding 	prima 	facie 	evidence 	of 	speeding, 	we
determine that any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Additionally, the court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding 	Lyman’s 	son’s 	testimony 	regarding 	Lyman’s
familiarity with the intersection where the collision occurred. We
therefore affirm.