In re Adoption of R.P...

2024 UT App 149
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
I N THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF R.P. AND S.P.,
PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
S.Z. AND S.Z.,
Appellants,
v.
S.B. AND H.B.,
Appellees.
Opinion
No. 20230120-CA
Filed October 18, 2024
Eighth District Court, Vernal Department
The Honorable Gregory Lamb
No. 222800008
Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Sara Pfrommer, and
Anna Grigsby, Attorneys for Appellants
James K. Tracy, Stacy J. McNeill, Hyrum J.
Bosserman, and KC Hooker,
Attorneys for Appellees
JUDGE JOHN D. L UTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. M ORTENSEN and R YAN D. TENNEY concurred.
LUTHY, Judge:
¶1 	This case concerns the proposed adoption of twelve-year-
old R.P. and ten-year-old S.P. (collectively, the Children). The
Children’s paternal grandmother, S.Z. (Paternal Grandmother),
and 	her 	husband, 	S.Z. 	(Paternal 	Grandfather) 	(collectively,
Paternal 	Grandparents), 	filed 	a 	petition 	for 	adoption,
commencing this case. The Children’s maternal grandmother, S.B.
(Maternal 	Grandmother), 	intervened 	in 	the 	case. 	Maternal
Grandmother 	and 	her 	husband, 	H.B. 	(collectively, 	Maternal

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Grandparents), 	subsequently 	filed 	their 	own 	petition 	for
adoption, commencing a second adoption proceeding. Paternal
Grandmother failed to intervene in that second proceeding, and
due to that failure, Maternal Grandmother filed a motion for
partial summary judgment in this adoption case, asserting that
Paternal Grandmother failed to comply with the Utah Adoption
Act, Utah Code sections 78B-6-101 to -146 (the Adoption Act). The
district court concluded that Paternal Grandparents are barred
from participating in their own adoption proceeding “because
they 	did 	not 	timely 	intervene” 	in 	Maternal 	Grandparents’
adoption proceeding, and it granted partial summary judgment
in 	favor 	of 	Maternal 	Grandparents.1 	Paternal 	Grandmother
challenges the summary judgment ruling, arguing that the district
court’s strict application of the Adoption Act yields an absurd
1. Maternal Grandmother’s motion for partial summary judgment
sought dismissal of Paternal Grandmother’s claims only, noting,
“This is a partial summary judgment motion because it is only
directed to [Paternal Grandmother’s] claims, not the claims of her
co-petitioner, 	[Paternal 	Grandfather].” 	The 	court’s 	summary
judgment order nevertheless addressed Paternal Grandparents
collectively throughout its analysis and concluded, “[Paternal
Grandparents] are barred from participating in this adoption
matter because they did not timely intervene according to the
statutory requirements. Consequently, [Maternal Grandparents’]
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted.” Because only
Paternal Grandmother has petitioned for interlocutory review, we
need not decide whether the court’s ruling amounted to a sua
sponte grant of summary judgment against Paternal Grandfather,
and this appeal resolves only the grant of summary judgment as
to Paternal Grandmother. To the extent that the court’s grant of
summary judgment did apply to Paternal Grandfather, he may
appeal that order upon entry of a final judgment.

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result. We agree with Paternal Grandmother and reverse the grant
of partial summary judgment as to her.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	After the Children lost their parents in a helicopter accident
in 2019, their two grandmothers were appointed as their co-
guardians, 	with 	a 	shared 	visitation 	schedule. 	However, 	the
relationship between the grandmothers was difficult, and in early
2021, 	Paternal 	Grandmother 	petitioned 	the 	district 	court 	to
terminate 	Maternal 	Grandmother 	as 	a 	co-guardian 	of 	the
Children. The district court dismissed Paternal Grandmother’s
termination petition, determining that Paternal Grandmother
(1) “failed to make any allegations . . . or provide any evidence
that [Maternal Grandmother] is unfit or otherwise unsuitable to
serve as guardian”; (2) “failed to provide any evidence showing
that this current arrangement is not in the best interests of the
[C]hildren”; and (3) “failed to allege . . . or provide evidence of the
existence of a substantial and material change in circumstance”
because, although it was “undisputed that communication was
strained” between the grandmothers and that they had “been
involved in litigation” with each other, those conditions were true
prior to their appointments as co-guardians.
¶3 	Shortly 	thereafter, 	in 	November 	2021, 	Paternal
Grandparents filed a petition for adoption of the Children, which
commenced the instant case. As required by statute, Paternal
Grandparents 	served 	notice 	of 	their 	adoption 	petition 	on
Maternal Grandmother. See Utah Code § 78B-6-110(2) (“Notice of
an adoption proceeding shall be served on . . . any legally
appointed custodian or guardian of the adoptee . . . .”). In
response, 	Maternal 	Grandmother 	filed 	a 	timely 	motion 	to
intervene in Paternal Grandparents’ adoption proceeding. See id.
§ 78B-6-110(6)(a) (“A person who has been served with notice of
an adoption proceeding and who wishes to contest the adoption

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shall file a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding . . .
within 30 days . . . .”). The district court eventually granted
Maternal Grandmother’s motion to intervene.
¶4 	Around the same time that Maternal Grandmother moved
to intervene in Paternal Grandparents’ adoption proceeding,
Maternal Grandparents filed their own petition for adoption,
commencing 	a 	second 	adoption 	proceeding. 	This 	second
adoption proceeding was filed in the same court and assigned to
the same judge who was presiding over Paternal Grandparents’
adoption proceeding. Maternal Grandparents served Paternal
Grandmother with notice of their adoption petition, both through
email to Paternal Grandparents’ counsel and through regular mail
to 	Paternal 	Grandmother. 	Each 	notice 	advised 	Paternal
Grandmother as to the statutory result for failing to respond to
the notice and intervene in the adoption proceeding, saying:
If you do not file a Motion to Intervene within 30
days after this notice is served on you, you:
• 	Waive any right to further notice in this
adoption;
• 	Forfeit all rights in relation to the adoptee;
and
• 	Are barred from bringing or maintaining any
action to assert any interest in the adoptee.
See 	generally 	id. 	§ 	78B-6-110(6)(b) 	(setting 	forth 	the 	legal
consequences 	of 	failing 	to 	timely 	intervene 	in 	an 	adoption
proceeding after receiving notice, including being “barred from
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert any
interest in the adoptee”). Nonetheless, Paternal Grandmother did
not 	move 	to 	intervene 	in 	Maternal 	Grandparents’ 	adoption
proceeding.

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¶5 	Maternal Grandmother moved to consolidate the two
adoption proceedings with the earlier guardianship case. And
Paternal Grandparents moved to simply consolidate the two
adoption 	proceedings. 	The 	district 	court 	granted 	Maternal
Grandmother’s 	motion 	and 	transferred 	both 	adoption
proceedings to the judge presiding over the guardianship case.
Almost 	immediately 	after 	receiving 	the 	adoption 	cases, 	the
receiving judge struck the consolidation order, determining that
although he would preside over all three cases, the adoption cases
would proceed as “separate and independent cases.”
¶6 	Following the entry of this order striking the consolidation
order, 	Maternal 	Grandparents 	again 	served 	Paternal
Grandmother with notice of their adoption proceeding, once
more warning Paternal Grandmother of the consequences of
failing 	to 	intervene 	in 	the 	proceeding. 	Again, 	Paternal
Grandmother failed to intervene.
¶7 	As a result, Maternal Grandmother filed a motion for
partial summary judgment in Paternal Grandparents’ adoption
case, arguing that Paternal Grandmother’s adoption petition
should 	be 	dismissed 	with 	prejudice: 	“Because 	[Paternal
Grandmother] has failed to meet the statutory deadlines to
intervene in [Maternal Grandparents’] adoption proceedings, she
has forfeited any rights in the Children and is barred from
bringing or maintaining any action, including these proceedings,
or asserting any interest in the Children.” The district court agreed
and granted partial summary judgement, concluding, “[Paternal
Grandparents] are barred from participating in this adoption
matter 	because 	they 	did 	not 	timely 	intervene 	[in 	Maternal
Grandparents’ adoption proceeding] according to the statutory
requirements.”
¶8 	Paternal Grandmother thereafter petitioned this court for
permission to appeal the interlocutory partial summary judgment
decision, and this court granted that petition.

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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 	Paternal Grandmother challenges the district court’s grant
of partial summary judgment based on its application of the
Adoption Act. “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s legal
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment
for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (cleaned up).
Likewise, “the proper interpretation and application of a statute
is a question of law reviewed for correctness.” State v. Robertson,
2017 UT 27, ¶ 14, 438 P.3d 491 (cleaned up).2
ANALYSIS
¶10 	Paternal Grandmother argues that the district court erred
by strictly applying a provision of the Adoption Act to effectively
dismiss her adoption petition due to her failure to intervene in
Maternal Grandparents’ adoption proceeding. The provision at
issue, 	Utah 	Code 	section 	78B-6-110(6) 	(the 	Intervention
Provision), provides as follows:
(a) A person who has been served with notice of an
adoption proceeding and who wishes to contest the
adoption shall file a motion to intervene in the
adoption proceeding:
2. Paternal Grandmother also argues that the district court
“should not have stricken the consolidation order.” However, this
argument was not raised in Paternal Grandmother’s petition for
interlocutory review, and we therefore do not address it. See
Houghton v. Department of Health, 2005 UT 63, ¶ 16, 125 P.3d 860
(“On interlocutory appeal, we review only those specific issues
presented in the petition.”).

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(i) within 30 days after the day on which the
person 	was 	served 	with 	notice 	of 	the
adoption proceeding;
(ii) setting forth specific relief sought; and
(iii) 	accompanied 	by 	a 	memorandum
specifying 	the 	factual 	and 	legal 	grounds
upon which the motion is based.
(b) A person who fails to fully and strictly comply
with all of the requirements described in Subsection
(6)(a) within 30 days after the day on which the
person was served with notice of the adoption
proceeding:
(i) waives any right to further notice in
connection with the adoption;
(ii) 	forfeits 	all 	rights 	in 	relation 	to 	the
adoptee; and
(iii) is barred from thereafter bringing or
maintaining any action to assert any interest
in the adoptee.
Utah Code § 78B-6-110(6). The “notice of an adoption proceeding”
referred to in the Intervention Provision must be served on a
specific list of individuals, including “any legally appointed
custodian or guardian of the adoptee.” Id. § 78B-6-110(2). The list
does not include grandparents or other extended family members
of the adoptee. See id.
¶11 	“When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain
language and presume that the legislature used each word
advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning.” Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, ¶ 27, 251 P.3d

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810 (cleaned up). Generally, “if the plain meaning of the statute
can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are
needed.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶12 	The plain meaning of the Intervention Provision is clear. It
requires that an individual who receives notice under the statute
of an adoption proceeding and wishes to contest the referenced
adoption must move to intervene in that adoption proceeding
within thirty days of receiving notice. See Utah Code § 78B-6-
110(6)(a); see also Paar v. Stubbs, 2005 UT App 310, ¶ 7, 117 P.3d
1079 (“‘Shall’ is commonly understood to create a mandatory
condition . . . .”). The Intervention Provision also makes clear that
a notice recipient “who fails to fully and strictly comply with” the
intervention 	requirement 	may 	not 	thereafter 	“bring[] 	or
maintain[] any action to assert any interest in the adoptee.” Utah
Code § 78B-6-110(6)(b). We see no ambiguity in the statutory
language; indeed, in their appellate arguments, the parties assert
no ambiguity in the statutory language. Hence, under the plain
language of the Intervention Provision, Paternal Grandmother,
who was served with notice of Maternal Grandparents’ adoption
petition but who did not timely move to intervene in Maternal
Grandparents’ adoption proceeding, would be precluded from
maintaining her own adoption proceeding.
¶13 	“Normally, where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, our analysis ends; our duty is to give effect to that
plain meaning. However, an equally well-settled caveat to the
plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal
language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result.”
In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 1206 (cleaned up); see also
Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1000 (explaining that
the absurdity doctrine “reforms unambiguous statutory language
where the language would lead to an absurd result” (cleaned up)).
And that is what Paternal Grandmother contends here—that

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applying the plain meaning of the Intervention Provision leads to
an absurd and unsupportable result.3
¶14 	Our supreme court “has developed a narrow, exacting
standard for determining whether to apply the absurdity doctrine
and read a statute contrary to its plain meaning.” Bagley, 2016 UT
48, ¶ 28. This standard provides that we will apply the absurdity
doctrine only when “the operation of the plain language is so
overwhelmingly absurd that no rational legislator could have
intended the statute to operate in such a manner.” Id. (cleaned up).
That is, “[t]his standard is satisfied only if the legislature could
not 	reasonably 	have 	intended 	the 	result.” 	Id. 	And 	when
determining 	whether 	the 	legislature 	could 	have 	reasonably
intended the result, we are particularly mindful of “the intent of
the pertinent legislative body,” which is “the guiding star of the
absurd results doctrine.” In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 12. See generally
id. (“Rather than controverting legislative power, the absurd
results doctrine functions to preserve legislative intent when it is
narrowly applied.”). Even under this exacting standard, the
Intervention 	Provision—when 	applied 	to 	the 	particular
circumstances 	of 	this 	case—merits 	modification 	under 	the
absurdity doctrine.
3. Maternal Grandparents argue that Paternal Grandmother’s
absurdity doctrine argument was not raised below and was
therefore not preserved for appeal. Additionally, on appeal,
Paternal Grandmother did not develop her absurdity doctrine
argument until her reply brief. However, because the proper
interpretation and application of the Intervention Provision is
squarely before us, the potential application of the absurdity
doctrine is properly before us as well. See Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT
48, ¶ 26, 387 P.3d 1000 (“Defendant’s absurd result argument does
not raise a wholly new issue. . . . Where the best reading of
[certain] statutes is directly before us on appeal, an absurdity
analysis is an integral extension of our interpretive task.”).

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¶15 	We first identify a circumstance under which application
of the Intervention Provision does not yield an absurd result. That
circumstance is where persons who have not filed their own
adoption petition receive notice that someone else has filed an
adoption 	petition 	and 	then 	fail 	to 	timely 	intervene 	in 	that
adoption proceeding. In such a circumstance, the Intervention
Provision precludes the persons who received notice and failed to
timely intervene from thereafter initiating their own adoption
proceeding. We believe that the legislature could have reasonably
intended 	this 	result. 	The 	legislature 	might 	very 	well 	have
determined to place the interest that adoptive children have in
receiving a prompt and definitive resolution of their familial
status ahead of the remote possibility that a person who is unable
to timely conjure up and act upon a desire to adopt the child might
turn out to be the best adoptive placement for the child.
¶16 	A circumstance more similar to the situation in this case
presents a closer call on the question of whether application of the
Intervention Provision yields an absurd result. That circumstance
is where spouses who are both serving as guardians of the
adoptive children first file their own adoption petition and then
both receive notice that someone else has also initiated an
adoption proceeding and the spouses subsequently fail to timely
intervene in the other adoption proceeding. On the one hand, one
might argue—with some force—that the legislature could have
reasonably intended to require persons filing competing adoption
petitions to promptly intervene in each other’s proceeding—
regardless of which one was commenced first—so that the various
individuals involved in each case, including judges, are aware of
all asserted interests in the children. This is so especially because
it is entirely possible that competing adoption petitions might be
filed in different judicial districts in the state and therefore be
assigned to different judges. On the other hand, one might also
argue—again with some force—that if it really “is the intent and
desire of the Legislature that in every adoption the best interest of

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the child should govern and be of foremost concern in the court’s
determination,” 	Utah 	Code 	§ 	78B-6-102(1), 	then 	that 	same
legislature would not have also reasonably intended to preclude
from consideration for adoption the very types of persons—
namely, those already serving as guardians and who have filed
their own adoption petition—who might very well prove to be the
best adoptive placement for the child. Ultimately, because this is
not the circumstance presented to us here, we need not decide
whether 	application 	of 	the 	Intervention 	Provision 	to 	such
circumstance produces an absurd result.
¶17 	The circumstance presented to us here is one in which
spouses (namely, Paternal Grandparents), one of whom is already
serving as a guardian of the adoptive children, filed an adoption
petition; the spouse entitled to notice of a competing adoption
petition (namely, the guardian spouse, Paternal Grandmother)
then received notice of such a petition; and the spouse entitled to
notice failed to intervene in the competing adoption proceeding.
Strict 	application 	of 	the 	Intervention 	Provision 	in 	this
circumstance requires a ruling that prohibits the guardian spouse
(Paternal Grandmother) from maintaining her adoption petition
while allowing the non-guardian spouse (Paternal Grandfather)
to continue to pursue adoption. We can identify no logical or
principled reason for such a regime, and we do not believe that
our legislature reasonably intended for the Intervention Provision
to operate in this manner.4
4. We are aware that the district court found that both Paternal
Grandmother and Paternal Grandfather were served with notice
of Maternal Grandparents’ adoption proceeding and failed to
intervene in that proceeding. On that basis the court concluded
that 	the 	Intervention 	Provision 	barred 	both 	Paternal
Grandparents 	from 	participating 	in 	their 	own 	adoption
proceeding. Based on the district court’s findings and analysis
(continued…)

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related to Paternal Grandfather, there would be no differential
treatment of Paternal Grandmother and Paternal Grandfather,
thus avoiding the absurd result we identify here. However, there
are two problems with the district court’s findings and analysis in
this regard.
First, 	we 	question 	whether 	Maternal 	Grandmother’s
notice, which was addressed only to Paternal Grandmother, could
properly serve as notice to Paternal Grandfather as well, even if
both Paternal Grandparents lived at the same location when the
notice was served or were both represented by the same attorney
to whom the notice was emailed.
Second, and more importantly, we conclude that the
Intervention Provision does not apply to persons—like Paternal
Grandfather—who are not entitled to the notice mandated by
Utah Code section 78B-6-110. Admittedly, at first blush the
Intervention Provision’s language “[a] person who has been
served with notice of an adoption proceeding” appears to apply
generally to any person who receives notice. Utah Code § 78B-6-
110(6). However, section 78B-6-110 otherwise addresses only
those who are entitled to notice and what they are required to do
to preserve their rights to bring and maintain an adoption
proceeding. Specifically, section 78B-6-110 first sets forth the
persons who must be given notice; grandfathers are not included
in the list. See id. § 78B-6-110(1)–(3). Section 78B-6-110 then
mandates when “[t]he notice required by this section” must be
served and what information “[t]he notice required by this
section” must include. Id. § 78B-6-110(5). It further directs how
“notice under this section shall be made.” Id. § 78B-6-110(7). But
section 78B-6-110 gives no instructions regarding how or when
notice not required by this section must be served or what
information notice not required by this section should include.
Because section 78B-6-110 provides no such guidance—which
guidance would be essential for determining whether a person
(continued…)

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¶18 	In sum, we conclude that application of the plain language
of the Intervention Provision works an absurd result in the
narrow circumstances of this case. We therefore hold that when a
married couple is the first to file an adoption petition and only
one of the spouses is entitled to notice of a subsequently initiated
not entitled to notice has received notice sufficient to trigger the
intervention 	requirement 	of 	the 	Intervention 	Provision—we
conclude that the Intervention Provision is not applicable to
persons who, like Paternal Grandfather, are not entitled to the
notice that section 78B-6-110 mandates. See State v. Maestas, 2002
UT 123, ¶ 54, 63 P.3d 621 (“Each part or section [of a statute]
should be construed in connection with every other part or section
so as to produce a harmonious whole.” (cleaned up)). Thus,
application of the Intervention Provision as written yields in cases
like this the absurd result we have identified, notwithstanding the
district court’s apparent ruling to the contrary.
Moreover, our 	reaching 	the 	issue 	of 	the Intervention
Provision’s 	inapplicability 	to 	persons 	who, 	like 	Paternal
Grandfather, are not entitled to notice under section 78B-6-110 is
appropriate here, despite the fact that Paternal Grandfather has
not appealed the court’s decision as to him, because resolution of
this issue is necessary to the proper resolution of Paternal
Grandmother’s appeal. Cf. In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 40, 472 P.3d
827 	(“[T]he 	parties 	cannot 	force 	a 	court 	into 	a 	strained
interpretation of a statute by the arguments they advance. A
court’s duty is to get the law right and parties cannot push us off
that 	path.”). 	In 	light 	of 	our 	conclusion 	regarding 	the
inapplicability 	of 	the 	Intervention 	Provision 	to 	persons 	not
entitled to notice under section 78B-6-110, the district court would
be well advised, before it issues a final judgment, to revisit the
ruling in its summary judgment order that purports to apply the
Intervention Provision to Paternal Grandfather and thereby bar
his further participation in this matter.

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adoption proceeding, that spouse need not comply with the
intervention requirement of the Intervention Provision.
CONCLUSION
¶19 	Because the absurdity doctrine is triggered under the
narrow circumstances of this case, we hold that the Intervention
Provision does not apply to Paternal Grandmother. Accordingly,
we conclude that the district court erred in granting partial
summary judgment against her, and we remand this matter for
such further proceedings as may now be appropriate.