In re Jacobson

2019 UT App 56
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I N THE MATTER OF LANDON K IRK JACOBSON
C HARITY S TILSON ,
Appellant,
v.
LANDON K IRK JACOBSON ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20180018-CA
Filed April 11, 2019
Seventh District Court, Castle Dale Department
The Honorable Douglas B. Thomas
No. 153700010
Joseph C. Rust, Attorney for Appellant
Steve S. Christensen and Clinton R. Brimhall,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE K ATE A PPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES JILL M. POHLMAN and R YAN M. HARRIS concurred.
APPLEBY, Judge:
¶1 	Charity Stilson appeals the district court’s ruling denying
her request for costs and expenses incurred while serving as
Landon Kirk Jacobson’s guardian and conservator. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	In August 2015, Jacobson suffered a severe brain injury in
an accident that also claimed the lives of his wife and one of
their children. The district court appointed Stilson—Jacobson’s
sister—as 	his 	guardian 	and 	conservator. 	Jacobson’s

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20180018-CA 	2 	2019 UT App 56
mother-in-law and Stilson were appointed as co-guardians of
Jacobson’s surviving minor children. In October 2015, the district
court signed an order proposed by Jacobson’s mother-in-law and
Stilson 	that 	terminated 	the 	co-guardianship 	and 	allowed
Jacobson to reassume responsibility for his children.
¶3 	In December 2016, Stilson petitioned the district court to
be reappointed as the children’s guardian. Jacobson responded
by filing a motion for permission to appoint counsel to assist him
in 	opposing 	Stilson’s 	petition. 	Stilson 	filed 	an 	objection 	to
Jacobson’s 	request 	for 	counsel, 	arguing 	that, 	as 	Jacobson’s
guardian and conservator, she was “authorized to represent him
in all legal matters,” and he was therefore “not in a legal position
to employ a lawyer” without her consent.
¶4 	The district court held a hearing to address Stilson’s
petition. At the hearing, the court first explained that “to be
represented by counsel in a court proceeding [is] fundamental”
and denying Jacobson that right would be “a deprivation of due
process.” It then expressed “concerns” that, fourteen months
prior 	to 	her 	petition, 	Stilson 	represented 	to 	the 	court 	that
Jacobson was competent to care for his children, “and now she
wants to come forward and say he is not competent . . . and can’t
be heard on that issue.” Accordingly, the court explained that it
would first determine whether Stilson “should be released” as
Jacobson’s guardian 	and conservator before considering her
petition to be reappointed as the children’s guardian.
¶5 	Stilson 	requested 	a 	“complete 	trial” 	on 	whether 	her
guardianship 	and 	conservatorship 	over 	Jacobson 	should 	be
terminated. In February 2017, Jacobson filed a counter-petition,
asking 	the 	court 	to 	remove 	Stilson 	as 	his 	guardian 	and
conservator. He asserted that his “incapacity [had] terminated”
as 	he 	had 	demonstrated 	by 	“regaining 	his 	driver 	license,
returning to his work on the farm, adequately caring for himself
day to day, and caring for his . . . children for the past 14
months.” He also said that “good cause exists” to remove Stilson

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20180018-CA 	3 	2019 UT App 56
as guardian and conservator because she “is not qualified to act
as conservator” and “[f]riction within the family has arisen due
to [her] appointment.”
¶6 	One week later, Stilson filed a response to Jacobson’s
petition to remove her as his guardian and conservator. She
identified three doctors who had “treated Jacobson since his
accident” and asserted that each of them had “determined that
Jacobson 	does 	not 	have 	the 	capacity 	to 	act 	for 	himself 	in
significant and meaningful matters, either as to his own person
or as to his assets.”
¶7 	In May 2017, Stilson submitted to the district court her
resignation 	as 	Jacobson’s 	guardian 	and 	conservator. 	The
resignation stated that “Stilson’s efforts have unfortunately been
made 	more 	difficult 	than 	they 	needed 	to 	be 	by 	some 	of
Jacobson’s family members” and “[t]his additional burden has
made 	serving 	as 	guardian 	and 	conservator 	now 	virtually
impossible.” But Stilson said she “would strongly argue against”
Jacobson’s 	petition 	to 	terminate 	his 	guardianship 	and
conservatorship 	and 	requested 	that 	the 	court 	appoint 	a
replacement. Around the time Stilson submitted her resignation,
her attorney “represented to the [court] that she desired to
proceed 	as 	an 	interested 	person” 	in 	challenging 	Jacobson’s
petition.
¶8 	One week later, the court held a conference with Stilson,
Jacobson, 	and 	their 	attorneys. 	“[I]n 	light 	of 	[Stilson’s] 	filed
resignation,” the court said it needed to conduct “an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether [Jacobson] still needs a guardian
and/or a conservator.” The court scheduled a two-day hearing
for that purpose.
¶9 	At 	the 	hearing, 	various 	experts 	testified, 	including 	a
neuropsychologist (Dr. E). Dr. E first evaluated Jacobson four
months after the accident. In January 2017, Stilson contacted him
and “expressed concerns about [Jacobson’s] daily functioning,
cognitive functioning, and decision-making” and requested that

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20180018-CA 	4 	2019 UT App 56
he “conduct a comprehensive psychological evaluation.” Dr. E
said that Stilson was “very emotional about the problems and
concerns 	she 	reported” 	and 	his 	impression 	was 	that 	her
“concerns seemed to be over the top.”
¶10 	Over about six weeks, Dr. E gave Jacobson “psychological
counseling and cognitive therapy” and tested his “executive
functioning” and “memory.” He also spoke with Jacobson about
his ability to manage money. Dr. E concluded that Jacobson did
not need a guardian or conservator and could “manage and
provide for his physical health, safety, and self-care.” After
forming his opinion, however, Dr. E “recommended [to Stilson]
that [Jacobson] undergo a neurological assessment conducted by
an independent evaluator.”
¶11 	A clinical and forensic psychologist (Dr. D) testified next.
Stilson’s attorney asked Dr. D to evaluate Jacobson after Dr. E
recommended 	an 	independent 	neurological 	assessment. 	In
forming 	his 	opinion, 	Dr. 	D 	relied 	on 	one 	interview 	with
Jacobson—which 	Stilson 	attended—as 	well 	as 	a 	“collateral
interview” with Stilson. He said he believed Jacobson needed a
guardian and conservator because he “lacked the capacity to
manage his finances and those of his business and children.” Dr.
D had a history of working with Stilson’s attorney’s law firm. He
also worked with Stilson in a personal injury case, in which he
diagnosed 	her 	with 	“somatic 	symptom 	disorder” 	and
“separation anxiety disorder.” Dr. D “described [Stilson] as
being overly concerned about health issues.”
¶12 	Three more experts testified: a neuropsychologist (Dr. S),
a physical medicine and rehabilitation doctor (Dr. L), and a
psychologist (Dr. G). Dr. S recommended that Jacobson “receive
continued assistance with financial and other decisions,” and
Dr. L “opined that [Jacobson] still needs someone to manage his
financial affairs.” But Dr. S “relied almost completely on the
information provided to him by [Stilson],” and when Dr. L and
Dr. D “were asked about [Jacobson’s] abilities absent [Stilson’s]

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20180018-CA 	5 	2019 UT App 56
assertions, 	both 	doctors admitted 	that 	they 	would 	consider
[Jacobson] capable of managing his own affairs without the need
for a guardian or conservator.” Dr. G prepared to testify by
interviewing Jacobson and reviewing his medical and surgical
records as well as the testing Jacobson had completed. He
offered his opinion that Jacobson did not need a guardian or
conservator and “had no cognitive problems that would prevent
him from safeguarding his assets.”
¶13 	After the hearing, the court ruled that Stilson had “failed
to show by even a preponderance of the evidence” that Jacobson
was unable to adequately and appropriately care for himself and
his children. Specifically, although “her concerns may have been
valid immediately after the accident and during the early stages
of 	his 	recovery,” 	they 	“were 	no 	longer 	present 	after 	her
resignation.” 	And 	Stilson’s 	“continued 	concerns 	about
[Jacobson] 	were 	unwarranted 	and 	not 	based 	on 	any 	facts
presented 	to 	the 	Court.” 	The 	court 	then 	issued 	an 	order
terminating Stilson as guardian and conservator, denying her
petition 	to 	appoint 	a 	replacement, 	and 	granting 	Jacobson’s
petition to terminate the guardianship and conservatorship.
¶14 	At the court’s request, Stilson submitted a final guardian
and 	conservator 	accounting. 	She 	requested 	that 	“costs 	and
expenses 	she 	incurred 	in 	her 	role 	as 	guardian 	and
conservator . . . be 	approved 	for 	payment 	from 	[Jacobson’s]
estate.” Those costs and expenses included fees for Dr. D’s
evaluation of Jacobson as well as expert and attorney fees
incurred in litigating whether Jacobson needed a guardian and
conservator. Stilson noted that Jacobson had previously agreed
to pay her “$1500 per month” for her efforts as guardian and
conservator, but her accounting said, “Stilson herewith waives
any such fees for herself which have not been paid.”
¶15 	The district court approved in part and denied in part
Stilson’s request for costs and expenses. The court’s ruling first
noted that conservators may “prosecute and defend actions” and

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20180018-CA 	6 	2019 UT App 56
“employ persons, including attorneys . . . to advise or assist in
the performance of administrative duties.” (Quoting Utah Code
sections 75-5-424(4)(x) and 75-5-424(4)(w).) But it clarified that a
conservator may use funds of the estate only if the conservator is
“acting reasonably in efforts to accomplish the purpose for which the
conservator 	was 	appointed.” 	(Quoting 	Utah 	Code 	section
75-5-424(4).) 	Under 	that 	standard, 	the 	court 	approved
“reasonable costs and attorney fees . . . for work done on
[Jacobson’s] accident case . . . and work done to assist [Stilson] in
her duties managing [Jacobson’s] estate.”
¶16 	The court then concluded that Stilson was “not entitled to
an award of costs and expenses for [Dr. D] in his role as medical
examiner.” 	Although 	the 	court 	acknowledged 	that 	Dr. E
“recommended 	[Jacobson] 	undergo 	an 	independent
neuropsychological 	evaluation,” 	it 	determined 	that 	retaining
Dr. D for that purpose “was wholly unreasonable.” Specifically,
the court found that Dr. D “is neither an independent evaluator
nor even a neuropsychologist.”
¶17 	Next, the court denied Stilson’s request for expert and
attorney fees incurred in opposing “the removal of [Jacobson’s]
guardianship and conservatorship.” It supported this ruling on
two grounds. First, it determined that Stilson did not challenge
Jacobson’s petition “in her capacity as conservator” but only as
an “interested person.” The court said that, at the time of
Stilson’s resignation, her attorney “represented to the court that
she desired to proceed as an interested person and challenge
[Jacobson’s] petition.” And it explained that “[a]n interested
person may only recover costs and expenses in seeking or
defending 	a 	guardianship 	or 	conservatorship 	if 	the 	court
appoints the party or designated individual as guardian or
conservator 	over 	the 	protected 	person.” 	(Citing 	Utah 	Code
sections 75-5-303(2) and 75-5-414.)
¶18 	Second, the court determined that, “[e]ven if [Stilson] had
some duty as conservator,” her opposition to Jacobson’s petition

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20180018-CA 	7 	2019 UT App 56
was not only “unreasonable and contrary to [Jacobson’s] best
interests,” 	but 	it 	was 	“conducted 	in 	bad 	faith.” 	Although
Stilson’s “concerns may have been valid immediately after the
accident and during the early stages of [Jacobson’s] recovery,”
the court found that “those concerns were no longer present
after her resignation” and it was therefore unreasonable for her
to oppose Jacobson’s petition. The court said that Stilson “had
information 	from 	[Dr. 	E], 	which 	was 	not 	based 	on 	her
misrepresentations 	of 	Jacobson’s 	abilities, 	to 	indicate 	that
[Jacobson] was fully capable of managing his own affairs.” And
it was “unreasonable for [Stilson] to over-exaggerate [Jacobson’s]
limitations to his treating physicians, thus causing them to form
unreliable opinions as to his capabilities, and then rely on those
flawed opinions caused by her own misrepresentations to justify
her actions.”
¶19 	The court also found that Dr. D “took [Stilson’s] account
virtually 	at 	her 	word,” 	despite 	having 	diagnosed 	her 	with
“somatic symptom disorder” and “separation anxiety disorder.”
The court’s ruling explained: “somatic symptom disorder . . . is
characterized by complaints of physical illness that either go
beyond the scope of what would be typical for a person with the
same illness or that the person uses to control or manipulate
other people” and “separation anxiety disorder . . . is a persistent
and excessive worry about losing major attachment figures.”
¶20 	After approving or denying Stilson’s various requests, the
court ordered her to reimburse the estate for money she used to
pay costs and attorney fees to which she was not entitled. The
court noted that Stilson had not received her agreed upon
compensation—$1,500 per month—during her final five months
as Jacobson’s guardian and conservator. But it refused to use
that unpaid amount to offset what she owed the estate because
Stilson “waived her claim to receive [that] fee” and “provided no
information 	to 	the 	Court 	regarding 	any 	work 	she 	actually
performed managing [Jacobson’s] estate or his business during
that time period that would indicate this fee was reasonable.”

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20180018-CA 	8 	2019 UT App 56
¶21 	Stilson appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶22 	Stilson appeals the district court’s ruling on her request
for costs and expenses. First, she argues the district court erred
“in denying [her] request for legal and expert fees.” Second, she
argues the court erred in “refusing to apply the unpaid . . . but
agreed upon monthly conservatorship fees as an offset against
those monies which the court ordered [her] to reimburse.”
¶23 	In cases regarding guardianship and conservatorship of
incapacitated adults, “[m]atters of statutory construction are
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness.” In re Vann,
2005 UT App 513, ¶ 8, 128 P.3d 70 (quotation simplified).
“Questions of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard, 	with 	deference 	given 	to 	the 	[district] 	court.” 	Id.
(quotation simplified). And the district court’s “application of
the law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id.
(quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
I. Expert and Attorney Fees
¶24 	Stilson argues that the district court erred in denying her
request for attorney and expert fees. Specifically, she asserts the
Utah Probate Code requires reimbursement of her costs and
expenses for retaining professionals to assist her as Jacobson’s
guardian 	and 	conservator. 	As 	explained 	below, 	we 	reject
Stilson’s arguments.
¶25 	In Utah, a conservator, “acting reasonably in efforts to
accomplish 	the 	purpose 	for 	which 	the 	conservator 	was
appointed, may use the funds of the estate . . . [to] prosecute or
defend actions, claims, or proceedings . . . for the protection of

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20180018-CA 	9 	2019 UT App 56
estate assets and of the conservator in the performance of the
conservator’s 	duties.” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	75-5-424(4)(x)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2018) (emphasis added). And a conservator
may “employ persons, including attorneys . . . or agents . . . to
advise or assist in the performance of administrative duties.” Id.
§ 75-5-424(4)(w)(i). To ensure that guardians and conservators
fulfill their duties to the protected person, however, the Probate
Code requires them to provide accountings to be “examined and
approved 	by 	the 	court.” 	Id. 	§ 	75-5-417(2) 	(providing 	the
accounting duties of conservators); see also id. § 75-5-312(v)(A)–
(E) (providing the accounting duties of guardians). Given these
provisions, we agree with Stilson that she was authorized to use
estate funds for reasonable efforts to accomplish the purpose for
which she was appointed. See id. § 75-5-424(4).
¶26 	The district court denied Stilson’s request for two types of
costs and expenses: (1) fees for Dr. D’s medical evaluation of
Jacobson, and (2) attorney and expert fees that Stilson incurred
in opposing Jacobson’s petition to terminate the guardianship
and conservatorship. We discuss each in turn.
A. 	Dr. D’s Fees
¶27 	Stilson argues that the district court erred in determining
Dr. D’s medical examination fees were “unreasonable.” We
disagree.
¶28 	“Reasonable” means “[f]air, proper, or moderate under
the 	circumstances.” 	Reasonable, 	Black’s 	Law 	Dictionary
(9th ed. 2009). 	Whether 	a 	person 	acted 	reasonably 	under 	a
specific set of circumstances generally is a question of fact. See,
e.g., Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d
1273, 1279 (Utah 1998) (“[T]he finder of fact must determine
whether, given the particular circumstances, a reasonable person
would have researched the property’s title record.”); Andreini v.
Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993) (“The point at which a
person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a
legal injury is a question of fact.”); Estate of Keenan v. Colorado

In re Jacobson
20180018-CA 	10 	2019 UT App 56
State Bank & Trust, 252 P.3d 539, 546–47 (Colo. App. 2011)
(determining that whether a conservator acted reasonably in
opposing 	a 	protected 	person’s 	motion 	to 	terminate 	the
conservatorship—and is therefore entitled to reimbursement for
fees—is a question of fact).
¶29 	“Questions 	of 	fact 	are 	reviewed 	under 	the 	clearly
erroneous standard, with deference given to the [district] court.”
In re Vann, 2005 UT App 513, ¶ 8, 128 P.3d 70 (quotation
simplified). Under that standard, we will disturb the district
court’s finding only if it “is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Grimm v. DxNA LLC, 2018 UT App 115,
¶ 12, 427 P.3d 571 (quotation simplified); see also Conservatorship
of Lefkowitz, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299, 302 (Ct. App. 1996) (overturning
a decision that a conservator acted reasonably and in good faith
in 	unsuccessfully 	opposing 	a 	petition 	to 	remove 	the
conservatorship—and was therefore entitled to compensation–
when there was “no substantial evidence in the record” to
support that decision).
¶30 	Here, after Dr. E evaluated Jacobson, he recommended
that 	Stilson 	arrange 	an 	independent 	neuropsychological
evaluation. The court determined that retaining Dr. D to perform
this 	evaluation 	was 	unreasonable 	because 	he 	is 	not 	a
neuropsychologist and, given his previous dealings with Stilson
and her attorney, was not an independent evaluator. Stilson does
not 	contest 	these 	findings, 	and 	we 	note 	that 	the 	evidence
supports them.
¶31 	Given 	those 	facts, 	we 	cannot 	say 	the 	court 	erred 	in
determining 	that 	retaining 	Dr. 	D to evaluate 	Jacobson 	was
unreasonable. Indeed, hiring a doctor who does not possess the
qualifications necessary to provide a reliable, objective opinion
as to a protected person’s abilities does not seem “fair and
proper 	under 	the 	circumstances.” 	Reasonable, 	Black’s 	Law
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Thus, because Stilson was entitled to

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20180018-CA 	11 	2019 UT App 56
use estate funds for only reasonable efforts to accomplish the
purpose for which she was appointed, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-5-424(4)(x), we affirm the district court’s decision to deny
Stilson’s request for Dr. D’s examination fees.
B. 	Expenses for Challenging Jacobson’s Petition
¶32 	Stilson argues that the district court erred in denying her
request for attorney and expert fees incurred in challenging
Jacobson’s 	petition 	to 	terminate 	the 	guardianship 	and
conservatorship. We disagree.
¶33 	She first asserts it was improper to treat her “as only an
interested 	person,” 	citing 	Utah 	Code 	sections 	75-5-307 	and
75-5-415. These provisions establish that, before accepting the
resignation of a guardian or conservator, courts must hold a
hearing 	to 	determine 	whether 	the 	guardianship 	or
conservatorship should be terminated and whether the court
should appoint a replacement guardian or conservator. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 75-5-307(3), 75-5-415(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018).
Pending the outcome of such a hearing, the resigning guardian
or conservator generally will not be removed. See id.
¶34 	We take no issue with Stilson’s assertions in this regard.
But the district court denied her request for expenses because it
determined 	that 	Stilson 	was 	not 	acting 	in 	her 	capacity 	as
conservator when she continued to seek a replacement guardian
and conservator. The court supported this conclusion by finding
that, at the time Stilson submitted her resignation, her counsel
“represented to the court that she desired to proceed as an
interested 	person.” Notably, Stilson 	does not 	challenge this
finding. Instead, she seems to argue that, as a matter of law, a
guardian 	or 	conservator 	cannot 	participate 	in 	a 	proceeding
regarding 	the 	protected 	person 	in 	any 	capacity 	other 	than
guardian or conservator. We are not persuaded.
¶35 	The relevant provisions of the Probate Code support a
broad 	interpretation 	of 	the 	term 	“interested 	person.” 	For

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20180018-CA 	12 	2019 UT App 56
example, 	Utah 	Code 	section 	75-5-303 	allows 	“any 	person
interested in the incapacitated person’s welfare . . . [to] petition
for 	. 	. 	. 	appointment 	of 	a 	guardian.” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann.
§ 75-5-303(1). And section 75-5-404 establishes that “any person
who 	is 	interested 	in 	[another’s] 	estate, 	affairs, 	or 	welfare,
including his parent, guardian, or custodian, or any person who
would be adversely affected by lack of effective management of
his property and affairs may petition for the appointment of a
conservator 	or 	for 	other 	appropriate 	protective 	order.” 	Id.
§ 75-5-404(1) (Michie 1993) (emphasis added).
¶36 	Stilson provides no authority to support her assertion that
a guardian or conservator cannot choose to proceed as an
interested 	person 	in 	pursuing 	a 	petition 	to 	appoint 	a
replacement guardian or conservator over the protected person.
And considering the broad language in sections 75-5-303 and
75-5-404, we conclude that Stilson was entitled to proceed solely
as an interested person—as opposed to as Jacobson’s guardian
and conservator. See R.P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, ¶ 15, 320
P.3d 	1084 	(explaining 	that 	this 	court 	“look[s] 	to 	the 	plain
language of the statute” to determine “the legislature’s intent
and purpose” (quotation simplified)).
¶37 	Stilson claims the district court “made clear throughout
the 	proceedings 	that 	[she] 	was 	the 	guardian/conservator 	of
[Jacobson].” As discussed above, there is no dispute that Stilson
was Jacobson’s guardian and conservator until the district court
issued its order removing her from those positions. And because
Stilson does not contest that her attorney told the court she was
electing to continue solely as an interested person, we cannot say
the court erred in determining she was acting in that capacity.
¶38 	An interested person who petitions the court to appoint a
guardian or conservator is entitled to attorney fees and court
costs only if the petition is successful. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 75-5-414, 75-5-303(2)(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). We therefore
affirm the district court’s decision to deny Stilson’s request for

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20180018-CA 	13 	2019 UT App 56
expenses incurred in opposing Jacobson’s petition to terminate
the guardianship and conservatorship on the ground that Stilson
was not acting in her capacity as guardian or conservator.
¶39 	The district court’s decision not to award Stilson her
attorney 	fees 	and 	costs 	incurred 	in 	challenging 	Jacobson’s
petition to terminate the guardianship and conservatorship can
be affirmed on an alternative ground: even if Stilson was acting
in her capacity as guardian or conservator in mounting that
challenge, the district court found that Stilson’s efforts were
unreasonable, and that finding is not clearly erroneous.
¶40 	As previously discussed, see supra Part I.A., whether a
person acted reasonably under a particular set of circumstances
is a question of fact. See, e.g., Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty
West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Utah 1998). We will not
disturb the district court’s finding unless it “is against the clear
weight 	of 	the 	evidence, 	or 	if 	we 	otherwise 	reach 	a 	firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Grimm v. DxNA LLC,
2018 UT App 115, ¶ 12, 427 P.3d 571 (quotation simplified).
¶41 	After reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, we
conclude the court’s finding is not against the clear weight of the
evidence. In early 2017, Dr. E told Stilson that Jacobson “had the
ability to care for himself and his children and manage his own
financial affairs.” The district court found Dr. E’s testimony
“accurate and credible,” in part, because he “did not rely on
[Stilson’s] assertions” in reaching his opinion. On appeal, we
grant deference to the district court’s assessment of credibility.
Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 11, 271 P.3d 837. The
evidence therefore supports the court’s finding that Stilson “had
information from Dr. E . . . to indicate that [Jacobson] was fully
capable of managing his own affairs.” Yet she continued to
litigate 	Jacobson’s 	incapacity 	and 	request 	a 	replacement
guardian and conservator.
¶42 	Further, the court found that Stilson “over-exaggerate[d]
[Jacobson’s] limitations to his treating physicians, thus causing

In re Jacobson
20180018-CA 	14 	2019 UT App 56
them 	to 	form 	unreliable 	opinions 	as 	to 	his 	capabilities.”
The 	evidence 	also 	supports 	this 	finding. 	Notably, 	Stilson
does not contest that, when Dr. D and Dr. L “were asked
about [Jacobson’s] abilities absent [Stilson’s] assertions, [they]
admitted 	that 	they 	would 	consider 	[Jacobson] 	capable 	of
managing his own affairs without the need for a guardian or
conservator.”
¶43 	We also note the court’s finding—which Stilson does not
contest—that 	Dr. 	D 	had 	previously 	diagnosed 	Stilson 	with
“somatic symptom disorder” and “separation anxiety disorder.”
As the court said in its ruling, “somatic symptom disorder . . . is
characterized by complaints of physical illness that either go
beyond the scope of what would be typical for a person with the
same illness or that the person uses to control or manipulate
other 	people,” 	and 	“separation 	anxiety 	disorder 	. 	. 	. 	is 	a
persistent and excessive worry about losing major attachment
figures.” These findings support the court’s determination that
Stilson’s opposition to Jacobson’s petition was motivated by
concerns that were “unwarranted,” “meritless,” and “not based
on any facts presented to the court.”
¶44 	Stilson argues that, because she was “only interested in
[Jacobson’s] well-being,” denying her request for fees “unfairly
punishes [her] for trying to protect her brother and his estate.”
We make no conclusion regarding Stilson’s intentions, but we
note 	that 	the 	district 	court 	found 	she 	acted 	in 	bad 	faith.
Regardless of Stilson’s subjective intent, however, conservators
may use the funds of the protected person’s estate only to the
extent that their actions are reasonable. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-5-424(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). And even if actions are
made 	in 	“good faith,” 	they 	may 	nonetheless 	be 	objectively
unreasonable. See Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d
299, 302 (Ct. App. 1996) (determining that “a conservator is
entitled to compensation for . . . opposing a petition for his or her
removal as conservator only if” the opposition is in “good-faith”
and “objectively reasonable”).

In re Jacobson
20180018-CA 	15 	2019 UT App 56
¶45 	In sum, we affirm—on both grounds upon which the
court 	ruled—the 	district 	court’s 	decision 	to 	deny 	Stilson’s
request for attorney and expert fees incurred in challenging
Jacobson’s 	petition 	to 	terminate 	his 	guardianship 	and
conservatorship.1
II. Stilson’s Waived Compensation
¶46 	Stilson argues that the court erred in “refusing to apply
the unpaid . . . but agreed upon monthly conservatorship fees as
an offset against those monies which the court ordered [her] to
reimburse.” She supports this argument with Utah Code section
75-5-414, which provides: “If not otherwise compensated for
services rendered,” a conservator “appointed in a protective
proceeding is entitled to reasonable compensation from the
estate.” Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-414 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018).
¶47 	Here, Jacobson agreed to pay Stilson $1500 per month for
her services. In her accounting to the district court, however, she
expressly waived any such compensation that she had not yet
received. Stilson concedes she made this waiver, but she argues
that enforcing it “unfairly punishes” her. We disagree.
¶48 	In its ruling, the court not only found that Stilson waived
her 	agreed 	upon 	compensation, 	but 	it 	also 	found 	that 	she
“provided no information to the Court regarding any work she
actually 	performed 	in 	managing 	[Jacobson’s] 	estate 	or 	his
1. In a related argument, Stilson asserts that the district court
erred 	in 	ordering 	her 	to 	reimburse 	Jacobson’s 	estate. 	We
disagree. “Any question of liability between the estate and the
conservator individually may be determined in a proceeding for
accounting, . . . or other appropriate proceeding or action.”
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-429(4) (Michie 1993). Because Stilson
used more estate funds than she was entitled to use, the court
did not err in requiring her to reimburse the estate.

In re Jacobson
20180018-CA 	16 	2019 UT App 56
business during [the relevant] time period that would indicate
this fee was reasonable.” Stilson attempts to contest this finding
by asserting that she “continued to perform her duties up to and
even beyond her termination as conservator” as demonstrated
by her “full accounting” to the district court. But the court
considered and ruled on Stilson’s accounting, awarding her
reasonable 	costs 	incurred 	in 	her 	duties 	as 	guardian 	and
conservator. Stilson provides nothing more than bare assertions
to support her claim that she provided guardian or conservator
services during the relevant period that would have entitled her
to “reasonable compensation” from the estate. See id.
¶49 	In short, we affirm the district court’s refusal to credit
Stilson for her previously agreed upon compensation because
(1) Stilson waived it, and (2) she has failed to show that the
district 	court 	erred 	in 	determining 	she 	was 	not 	otherwise
entitled to it for services rendered.
CONCLUSION
¶50 	We affirm the district court’s ruling on Stilson’s request
for 	costs 	and 	expenses 	incurred 	while 	she 	was 	Jacobson’s
guardian and conservator.