Price City v. Buck

2025 UT App 129
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
PRICE C ITY ,1
Appellee,
v.
JESSICA LYNN BUCK,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20230749-CA
Filed August 28, 2025
Seventh District Court, Price Department
The Honorable Jeremiah Humes
No. 221700145
K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Attorney for Appellant
Christian B. Bryner and Dominique Kiahtipes,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. O RME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES R YAN D. TENNEY and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
1. The information commencing this case described the charged
crime as retail theft, a “Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of
Section 76-6-602, Utah Code.” Thus, prosecution of the offense,
handled by the Carbon County Attorney, should apparently have
been in the name of the State of Utah, rather than in the name of
Price City. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-5 (LexisNexis 2017) (“A
criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be
prosecuted in the name of the state of Utah.”). We employ the
caption consistently used by the trial court and the parties in this
case and note that the practice of listing a municipality as the
prosecuting entity in misdemeanor cases is rather common, albeit
seemingly at odds with the mandate of section 77-1-5.

Price City v. Buck
20230749-CA 	2 	2025 UT App 129
ORME, Judge:
¶1 	Jessica Lynn Buck appeals her conviction for retail theft.
She argues that her trial counsel (Counsel) provided ineffective
assistance in forgoing a hearing to evaluate her competency to be
sentenced. Buck also argues that after she was deemed competent
to proceed to sentencing by an evaluator, the trial court plainly
erred by not sua sponte overturning her conviction and ordering
a new trial in which her competence could be evaluated in the first
instance. We disagree with both of Buck’s claims and affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Buck was found guilty of retail theft after “skip-scanning”
two cartloads of groceries. After trial but before sentencing,
Counsel petitioned for an inquiry into Buck’s competence to
proceed, requesting an evaluation of her “mental health and
capacity . . . to rationally understand the proceedings against her
and to reasonably assist in her own defense.” The prosecutor
stipulated to the petition, and the trial court ordered Buck to be
evaluated, 	directing 	Counsel 	to 	provide 	the 	evaluator
“information and materials relevant to a determination of [Buck’s]
competency, including the charging document, arrest or incident
reports pertaining to the charged offense, known criminal history
information, and known prior mental health evaluations and
treatments.”
¶3 	In her report, the competency evaluator indicated that she
had spoken to Counsel about his concerns with Buck’s insistence
“that she is innocent and [Buck’s] claims that the person shown in
the video surveillance footage [of the theft] is not her.” The
evaluator further noted that Buck “endorsed beliefs about her
case that are inconsistent with the information provided by”
Counsel and that throughout the interview, she “continued to
hold 	inaccurate 	beliefs 	about 	the 	justice 	system.” 	But 	the
evaluator nonetheless concluded that Buck “demonstrated a

Price City v. Buck
20230749-CA 	3 	2025 UT App 129
rational and factual understanding of the charges, allegations,
range of possible penalties, and adversarial nature of the court
proceedings.” The evaluator concluded that Buck “was able to
understand, 	integrate, 	and 	communicate 	relevant 	legal
information”; was “able to identify and discuss risks and benefits
of various legal options”; and appeared “able to consult with her
attorney, assist in her defense, and testify.” Thus, the evaluator
opined that Buck was “competent to proceed.”
¶4 	At Buck’s sentencing hearing, the court reviewed the
competency evaluator’s report and asked whether either party
wished “to present any additional evidence” at “a hearing on that
report.” When both the prosecutor and Counsel indicated they
did not, the court concluded that Buck was competent to proceed
and sentenced her to a suspended jail term and probation.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶5 	On appeal, Buck argues that Counsel provided ineffective
assistance in “waiving” a competency hearing at which the
competency evaluator could be subpoenaed to testify. “When a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time
on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must
decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Galindo, 2019 UT
App 171, ¶ 6, 452 P.3d 519 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 462
P.3d 803 (Utah 2020).
¶6 	Buck also argues that the trial court erred in not ordering,
sua sponte, a new trial in which her competency to stand trial
could be assessed in the first instance. “On direct appeal, claims
that the trial court failed to sua sponte evaluate a defendant’s
competency are reviewed for plain error.” State v. Anderson, 2024
UT App 65, ¶ 15, 549 P.3d 101, cert. denied, 554 P.3d 1098 (Utah
2024). “Plain error is a question of law reviewed for correctness.”

Price City v. Buck
20230749-CA 	4 	2025 UT App 129
State v. Deprey, 2024 UT App 190, ¶ 18, 562 P.3d 1246 (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 564 P.3d 961 (Utah 2025).
ANALYSIS
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶7 	Buck argues that Counsel provided ineffective assistance
in “waiving” a competency hearing prior to sentencing. To
demonstrate ineffective assistance, Buck must show “(1) that
Counsel’s performance was deficient,” meaning it “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness,” and “(2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense,” or, in other words, that
there is “a reasonable probability that the case would have had a
different outcome absent Counsel’s deficient performance.” State
v. Anderson, 2024 UT App 65, ¶ 24, 549 P.3d 101 (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 554 P.3d 1098 (Utah 2024). Because failure
to establish either prong is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance,
we are free to resolve the claim under either prong. See id.
¶8 	“It is well established that due process requires that a
defendant 	be 	mentally 	competent 	to 	stand 	trial.” 	Id. 	¶ 	19
(quotation simplified). A defendant is incompetent where she is
“either (1) unable to have a rational and factual understanding of
the proceedings . . . or of the punishment specified for the offense
charged or (2) unable to consult with . . . counsel and to participate
in the proceedings . . . with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶9 	A 	defense 	attorney 	with 	a 	bona 	fide 	doubt 	as 	to 	a
defendant’s 	competence 	may 	file 	a 	competency 	petition, 	as
Counsel did here. “But we have previously acknowledged that
counsel 	does 	not 	perform 	deficiently 	by 	failing 	to 	file 	a
competency petition if counsel had no basis to suspect the
defendant was incompetent.” Id. ¶ 33 (quotation simplified). Cf.
United 	States 	v. 	Dubrule, 	822 	F.3d 	866, 	881 	(6th 	Cir. 	2016)

Price City v. Buck
20230749-CA 	5 	2025 UT App 129
(“Counsel’s failure to request the trial court to order a hearing or
evaluation on the issue of the defendant’s competency might
render counsel’s performance objectively unreasonable, provided
there are sufficient indicia of incompetence to give objectively
reasonable 	counsel 	reason 	to 	doubt 	the 	defendant’s
competency.”) (quotation simplified). That logic applies here too.
¶10 	Counsel filed a post-trial competency petition based on
Buck’s insistence “that she is innocent and [Buck’s] claims that the
person shown in the video surveillance footage is not her.” But
“even the fact that a person is mentally ill, displays bizarre,
volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a history of mental illness,
does not mean that he or she is incompetent to stand trial,”
provided the person has “a rational and factual understanding of
the proceedings . . . or of the punishment specified for the offense
charged,” and has the ability to consult with counsel and “to
participate in the proceedings . . . with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding.” State v. Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, ¶ 18,
428 P.3d 36 (quotation simplified). And despite being aware of
Counsel’s concerns and despite her own observations of Buck’s
inconsistent and inaccurate beliefs, the competency evaluator
determined that Buck was competent to proceed to sentencing.
¶11 	It was reasonable for Counsel to rely on the evaluator’s
report. See Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, ¶ 23, 20 P.3d 382 (holding
“that it was a reasonable exercise of professional judgment for . . .
counsel to rely on the experts’ unanimous conclusion that [the
defendant’s] behavior did not make him incompetent to stand
trial” and thus “it was reasonable for defense counsel to forego
the competency hearing”). See also State v. Galindo, 2019 UT App
171, ¶ 13, 452 P.3d 519 (concluding that because two psychologists
found 	the 	defendant 	competent, 	defense 	counsel 	“exercised
reasonable 	professional 	judgment” 	in 	stipulating 	to 	the
defendant’s competence), cert. denied, 462 P.3d 803 (Utah 2020).
And because the report addressed his concerns but still found
Buck competent, it was reasonable for Counsel not to request a

Price City v. Buck
20230749-CA 	6 	2025 UT App 129
hearing at which he would provide evidence that would likely be
merely cumulative of the report.
¶12 	Buck 	also 	faults 	Counsel 	for 	failing 	to 	request 	a
competency hearing because, at the hearing, he could have
cross-examined the competency evaluator about her report. But
Buck does not specify what Counsel should have asked the
evaluator 	during 	cross-examination. 	Indeed, 	the 	evaluator’s
report 	was 	thorough 	and 	specifically 	addressed 	Counsel’s
articulated concerns.
¶13 	In sum, Counsel was “in the best position to determine
whether” Buck’s competence was “suspect.” State v. Wolf, 2014 UT
App 18, ¶ 31, 319 P.3d 757 (quotation simplified). Without any
other evidence to offer at a competency hearing beyond what was
already addressed in the evaluator’s report or a specific basis on
which he could have cross-examined the evaluator at such a
hearing—and no such basis is articulated on appeal—Counsel did
not perform deficiently in not requesting a hearing. Buck’s
ineffective assistance claim thus fails.
II. Plain Error
¶14 	Buck also argues that the concerns Counsel raised in the
pre-sentencing 	competency 	petition 	cast 	doubt 	on 	her
competence at trial such that the court should have sua sponte
ordered a new trial to evaluate her competence in the first
instance. “To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish
that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.”
State v. Anderson, 2024 UT App 65, ¶ 15, 549 P.3d 101 (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 554 P.3d 1098 (Utah 2024). Here, there was
no obvious error.
¶15 	“Competency is assessed contemporaneously, at a present
moment in time, and previous mental health issues are not

Price City v. Buck
20230749-CA 	7 	2025 UT App 129
necessarily indicative of present incompetency.” State v. Biebinger,
2018 UT App 123, ¶ 21, 428 P.3d 36. It stands to reason that the
reverse is also true: present incompetence is not necessarily
indicative of past incompetence. Indeed, “our supreme court—as
well as the United States Supreme Court—has ruled that a
defendant’s competency cannot be retrospectively determined.”
State v. Wolf, 2014 UT App 18, ¶ 34, 319 P.3d 757. See id. (“No
matter how well-intentioned the effort, we fail to see how the trial
court could, on the basis of the record before it, adequately
determine whether the defendant was competent three years
earlier.”) (quotation simplified).
¶16 	Moreover, even if present incompetence could be used to
demonstrate past incompetence, the competency evaluator here
concluded that Buck had, as of the time of the evaluation, a
“rational and factual understanding of the charges, allegations,
range of possible penalties, and adversarial nature of the court
proceedings”; 	“was 	able 	to 	understand, 	integrate, 	and
communicate relevant legal information”; and appeared “able to
consult with her attorney, assist in her defense, and testify”—in
short, that she was competent. Buck does not point to any
evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the court did not err, let
alone 	obviously 	so, 	in 	not 	vacating 	Buck’s 	conviction 	and
ordering a new trial to evaluate her competence.
CONCLUSION
¶17 	Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not
requesting a competency hearing. Nor did the trial court plainly
err in not sua sponte ordering a new trial. We thus affirm Buck’s
conviction.