State v. McManigal

2025 UT App 192
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
R YAN LYNN M CM ANIGAL,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20230917-CA
Filed December 26, 2025
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Matthew Bates
No. 201908298
Bradley J. Henderson and Stephen W. Howard,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Ginger Jarvis,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. O RME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.
ORME, Judge:
¶1 	Following an intense standoff with police, Ryan Lynn
McManigal was arrested and charged with, in relevant part, 9
counts of possession of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). A
jury convicted him on 6 of those counts. McManigal challenges
those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict and that the alleged failure to
adequately define a WMD for the jury constituted plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree and affirm his
convictions.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	2 	2025 UT App 192
BACKGROUND1
The Events Leading to Arrest
¶2 	In July 2020, the manager of a South Jordan restaurant—
located across the street from McManigal’s residence—alerted
police to text messages McManigal intended for him but which
were mistakenly sent to a manager of a different location of the
same restaurant chain. In those messages, McManigal threatened
to shoot or harm those inside the South Jordan restaurant. When
police officers subsequently knocked on McManigal’s door to
issue a trespass notice, they conversed with McManigal for about
10 minutes through a small opening in his front door. McManigal
told the officers that the restaurant employees and certain South
Jordan police officers were intentionally “antagonizing” him with
their headlights “to drive him crazy.” He also stated that some
South Jordan police officers were colluding with a judge “to go
after his inheritance” and that they “were using drones and other
means to stalk him.” McManigal then directed the officers at his
door to visit his Facebook page where he said he would post “all
of the evidence” supporting his claims. McManigal refused to sign
the trespass notice but indicated that he understood that he was
not allowed onto the restaurant property.
¶3 	Following this interaction, one of the officers (Officer)
visited McManigal’s public Facebook page. He found a comment
made by McManigal stating, “I feel much better after shooting out
the streetlight last night.” A check of the area confirmed that there
was a broken streetlight “just on the corner of” the restaurant
property. McManigal’s Facebook page also contained comments
referencing mass shootings and being “armed to the teeth.” In one
comment, McManigal stated, “It’s looking like I might be getting
1. “On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict and present conflicting evidence
only as necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v.
Amboh, 2023 UT App 150, n.1, 541 P.3d 299 (quotation simplified).

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	3 	2025 UT App 192
into a confrontation tonight because I’d rather die than live my
life on my knees.”
¶4 	Because, 	in 	Officer’s 	assessment, 	McManigal’s 	online
activity strongly suggested the presence of “some type of mental
health ideology crisis,” Officer arranged for a crisis outreach team
to call McManigal to perform an assessment. During the phone
call, 	which 	was 	recorded 	and 	lasted 	roughly 	10 	minutes,
McManigal made statements mirroring those on his Facebook
page. Among other things, he claimed he was being “gang stalked
by” 	the 	restaurant’s 	employees 	and 	that 	“a 	network” 	was
targeting him to deprive him of his inheritance. He mentioned
that his house was “completely fortified” and that he was
“heavily armed.” He further stated that he did not “want to die”
but he also did not “want to live in a world that’s so corrupt” and
that if he had to, he would let anyone who came after him “have
it” and “take a few out on [his] way.”
¶5 	Because McManigal’s sister and aunt each had an active
protective 	order 	against 	McManigal 	prohibiting 	him 	from
possessing “guns or other weapons,” this conversation was
sufficient for law enforcement to obtain a warrant to search his
residence for weapons. But when police officers attempted to
execute the warrant, McManigal refused them entry. Following
crisis negotiation, McManigal fired a weapon inside his house and
announced, “I just shot my fridge that has the shit in it.” This
prompted the police SWAT team to intervene, and McManigal
fired shots as they approached, narrowly missing some officers
and striking police vehicles. Ultimately, police were able to breach
the door of McManigal’s home with an armored vehicle and place
him in custody.2
2. For his actions during the standoff, McManigal was convicted
on two counts of assault on a peace officer. Because McManigal
does not appeal those convictions, we give only a cursory
recounting of the events surrounding them.

State v. McManigal
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¶6 	While in custody, McManigal told police that he was
storing triacetone triperoxide (TATP)—an explosive powder—in
his downstairs bathroom and in his garage refrigerator. He stated
that he had made the TATP “to take matters into his own hands”
because people were trying to “screw him out of his inheritance.”
He indicated that if all the TATP in his house exploded, it would
“take out this whole block.” McManigal further disclosed that he
was storing a liquid explosive, methyl ethyl ketone peroxide
(MEKP), in his kitchen refrigerator. McManigal advised against
taking “the cork off” the bottle of MEKP because “that shit is
fucking crazy.” He stated that he had manufactured the MEKP
because he “got mad.”
¶7 	Inside McManigal’s house, police indeed found a bottle of
MEKP in his kitchen refrigerator, a bucket of TATP in his garage
refrigerator, and more TATP in a bin in his downstairs bathroom.
In the garage, police also found 7 “switches or ignition-type
devices.” And in the bathroom, they also observed a cooler,
mixing implements, and “some product” on the floor. A “flame
test” performed outside the house on some of the powder on a
spatula found in the bathroom confirmed that it was TATP.
Because “TATP is very sensitive to heat, shock, and friction,”
bomb squad members did not pass the threshold of the bathroom
out of fear of setting off the TATP on the floor.
¶8 	Based on a rough estimate of the amount of explosives
found 	in 	the 	house,3 everyone 	within 	a 	900-foot 	radius 	of
McManigal’s 	home, 	some 	600 	people, 	were 	evacuated,4 	a
multi-jurisdictional bomb squad was called, and the FBI was
3. 	At 	trial, 	testimony 	regarding 	the 	estimated 	amount 	of
explosives found in the house varied between 20 and 50 pounds.
4. A few of the neighboring houses had already been evacuated in
advance 	of 	the 	warrant’s 	execution. 	Those 	evacuated 	also
included 	people 	at 	the 	South 	Jordan 	restaurant 	and 	other
businesses across the street from McManigal’s house.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	5 	2025 UT App 192
consulted. Various barriers and protective measures were put in
place to shield adjacent homes. Using “bomb squad robots,” the
bucket of TATP and bottle of MEKP were removed from their
respective refrigerators. A robot operator testified at trial that he
feared that if the bucket of TATP was dropped or “swung too
hard, the friction and the impact might have detonated the
material inside.” The bomb squad then conducted a controlled
detonation 	of 	the 	retrieved 	TATP 	in 	a 	horse-shoe 	shaped
“sandbag bunker” they had constructed in the driveway that was
designed to direct the pressure from the explosion upwards into
the air. The MEKP was detonated in a hole dug in the front yard.
Because the robots could not safely retrieve the TATP from the
downstairs bathroom, the bomb squad decided to detonate that
explosive 	inside 	the 	home 	after 	employing 	extensive 	safety
measures. The detonations caused some of the sandbags forming
the bunker to be thrown between 25 to 30 feet. There was also
considerable damage to the interior of McManigal’s home. There
was no damage to the neighboring houses other than a “piece of
siding” that fell off one house, and “it was easily put back up.”
¶9 	A 	few months later, McManigal’s cousin 	accidentally
caused another explosion in the house while sweeping in the
basement, 	severely 	injuring 	himself. 	The 	house 	was 	later
demolished.
The Trial
¶10 	As relevant to this appeal, the State charged McManigal
with 9 counts of possession or use of a WMD—all first-degree
felonies.
¶11 	At trial, several experts testified regarding the explosives.
A member of the FBI’s explosives unit testified that TATP is “very
unstable and unpredictable.” He stated that TATP is categorized
as an “improvised primary high explosive,” meaning that it
produces an explosion moving faster than the speed of sound and
“is extremely sensitive to different forms of energy input.” He

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	6 	2025 UT App 192
further testified that depending on purity, density, and particle
size, the power of TATP ranges between 50% and 70% of that of
TNT. 	When 	asked 	whether 	TATP 	is 	“capable 	of 	causing
widespread death or serious bodily injury to multiple victims,”
the agent responded, “I would say that all explosives in the proper
amount have the capability to cause death, injury, or destruction.”
¶12 	Another member of the FBI’s explosives unit testified that
all the components were present to make the 7 devices found in
the garage “actionable IEDs.”5 He further opined that if “fully
loaded with TATP or MEKP,” each device was capable of causing
“widespread death or serious bodily injury to multiple victims.”
¶13 	The bomb squad commander of the Salt Lake County
Unified Fire Authority testified that if a person slipped in the
downstairs bathroom, the friction of the fall could have detonated
the TATP on the floor, setting off the explosives throughout the
house and igniting 200 gallons of diesel fuel that McManigal had
been storing just outside of the garage. He opined that the results
of such an explosion would have been “catastrophic” as the “large
detonation with ignitable liquid in large quantity next to it”
would have likely “damaged most of the [adjacent] homes,”
endangering the residents. He also testified that the 7 devices
found in the garage “all had components consistent with” an IED.
¶14 	At the close of evidence, defense counsel moved for a
directed verdict on all charges, arguing that there was no evidence
that any of the items found in McManigal’s house, including the
TATP and MEKP, constituted WMDs under the relevant statute.
The trial court denied the motion, stating that evidence was
presented that McManigal designed “seven different items” that,
based on expert testimony, were capable of causing “serious
bodily injury to multiple people.” The court also pointed to
evidence that McManigal possessed TATP and MEKP, which
5. IED is an acronym for “improvised explosive device.”

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	7 	2025 UT App 192
“were explosives that when combined with those seven triggers
were capable of causing serious bodily injury to multiple people.”
¶15 	The jury convicted McManigal on 6 of the possession of a
WMD counts and acquitted him on the remaining 3. Based on the
verdict form, the convictions were for possession of the TATP and
5 devices, while the acquittals were for possession of the MEKP
and 	the 	two 	remaining 	devices. 	McManigal 	appeals 	his 	6
convictions.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶16 	McManigal raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict because (1) the TATP and corresponding devices he was
convicted of possessing did not satisfy the statutory definition of
a WMD and (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
establish an element of the charged offenses. “We review a trial
court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict for correctness.”
State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 21, 345 P.3d 1168. See also State v.
Francis, 2012 UT App 215, ¶ 3, 284 P.3d 720 (stating that statutory
interpretation is a question of law reviewed for correctness). And
“when an appellant challenges the denial of a motion for a
directed verdict based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the
applicable standard of review is highly deferential,” meaning we
will uphold the trial court’s denial “if, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the State, some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT
App 9, ¶ 32, 366 P.3d 884 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379
P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016).
¶17 	Second, 	McManigal 	contends 	that 	the 	jury 	was
inadequately instructed on the statutory definition of a WMD.
Because this issue was not preserved for appeal, he asks us to
review it for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	8 	2025 UT App 192
“Claims for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel
present questions of law, which we evaluate for correctness.” State
v. Samora, 2022 UT App 7, ¶ 16, 504 P.3d 195, cert. denied, 525 P.3d
1254 (Utah 2022).
ANALYSIS
I. The Directed Verdict Motion
¶18 	McManigal’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his
directed verdict motion is two-fold. First, he argues that a
“conventional 	explosive,” 	such 	as 	TATP, 	cannot 	satisfy 	the
statutory definition of a WMD. Second, he argues that, in any
event, insufficient evidence was presented to establish that the
explosives 	in 	his 	possession 	were 	capable 	of 	causing
“widespread” death or serious bodily injury to multiple victims.
We address each argument in turn.
A. 	Statutory Definition of a WMD
¶19 	McManigal argues that the explosives he was convicted of
possessing do not satisfy the statutory definition of a WMD. He
asserts 	that 	the 	TATP 	and 	its 	corresponding 	devices 	are
“[e]xplosive, chemical, or incendiary device[s]” or “[e]xplosive,
chemical, or incendiary parts,” as defined in Utah Code section
76-10-306(1) (hereafter section 306) and governed by Part 3 of
Chapter 10, Title 76 (hereafter Part 3). And, he contends that as
such, the TATP and devices—and explosives more generally—
cannot 	satisfy 	section 	76-10-401(6)’s 	(hereafter 	section 	401)
definition of a WMD, which is governed by Part 4 of the same
chapter (hereafter Part 4).6
6. The statutes at issue have since been amended and renumbered.
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-15-210, -301 (LexisNexis Supp. 2025).
Unless otherwise indicated, we cite the version of the Utah Code
in effect at the time of McManigal’s violation of those statutes.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	9 	2025 UT App 192
¶20 	Subsection 401(6)(a) defines a WMD as follows:
(i) any item or instrumentality that is designed or
intended to cause widespread death or serious
bodily injury to multiple victims;
(ii) any item or instrumentality that is designed or
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
through the release, dissemination, or impact of
toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;
(iii) any disease organism, including any biological
agent, toxin, or vector which is used or intended to
be used as a weapon;
(iv) any item or instrumentality that is designed to
release 	radiation 	or 	radioactivity 	at 	a 	level
dangerous 	to 	human 	life 	and 	that 	is 	used 	or
intended to be used as a weapon; or
(v) any substance or material or combination which
has been prepared or altered for use in the creation
of 	a 	weapon 	described 	in 	Subsections 	(6)(a)(i)
through (iv).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-401(6)(a) (LexisNexis 2017). Subsection
401(6)(b) expressly excludes from the definition of a WMD
“firearms or rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition, reloading
components, or muzzleloading equipment.” Id. § 76-10-401(6)(b).
¶21 	At issue here is whether an explosive, as defined in
subsection 	306(1),7 	could 	under 	certain 	circumstances 	also
7. It is undisputed that the TATP and corresponding ignition
devices found in McManigal’s house otherwise satisfy subsection
306(1)’s definition of an “[e]xplosive, chemical, or incendiary
device” or “[e]xplosive, chemical, or incendiary parts.”

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	10 	2025 UT App 192
constitute 	a 	WMD 	under 	subsection 	401(6)(a)(i). 	When
interpreting a statute, a court’s “primary goal . . . is to ascertain
the legislature’s intent,” the best evidence of which “is the plain
language of the statute itself.” McKitrick v. Gibson, 2024 UT 1, ¶ 31,
541 P.3d 949 (quotation simplified). In so doing, we “presume that
the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” Turner v. Staker
& 	Parson 	Cos., 	2012 	UT 	30, 	¶ 	12, 	284 	P.3d 	600 	(quotation
simplified). Accordingly, “wherever possible, we give effect to
every word of a statute, avoiding any interpretation which
renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous.”
Id. (quotation simplified). And “when the meaning of a statute can
be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are
needed.” Brindley v. Logan City, 2023 UT App 46, ¶ 22, 530 P.3d
557 (quotation simplified). See Oliver v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2017
UT 39, ¶ 19, 424 P.3d 22 (stating that under the “plain meaning
approach” employed by Utah courts, “we need not look beyond
the statute’s text to secondary considerations—such as legislative
history or the canon that we interpret statutes to avoid absurd
results—unless there is ambiguity in the statute”) (quotation
simplified).
¶22 	McManigal 	argues 	that 	subsection 	401(6)(a)(i)—which
defines a WMD as “any item or instrumentality that is designed
or intended to cause widespread death or serious bodily injury to
multiple victims”—is a catchall provision that, when viewed
together 	with 	subsections 	401(6)(a)(ii)–(iv), 	“should 	be
understood as being limited to radiological, toxicological, and
biological 	weapons”—and 	not 	as 	including 	conventional
explosives—under the interpretative canon of ejusdem generis.8
8. The ejusdem generis canon of statutory interpretation “posits
that general catchall terms appearing at the beginning or end of
an exemplary statutory list are understood to be informed by the
content of the terms of the list.” State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, ¶ 18,
322 P.3d 719. More specifically, “it declares that in order to give
(continued…)

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	11 	2025 UT App 192
He also points to section 401’s legislative history and its inclusion
of additional definitions of “Biological agent,” “Toxin,” “Vector,”
and “Delivery system” (which contemplates the dissemination of
“a biological agent, toxin, or vector”), see Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-401(1), (2), (4) (5), and its lack of definition of “explosive,”
as supportive of his interpretation. Lastly, he asserts that “[t]o
interpret 	Part 	4 	as 	including 	conventional 	explosives 	in 	its
definition of a WMD would render entirely superfluous the most
significant criminal provisions of Part 3 relating to the unlawful
possession of conventional explosives, explosive devices, and
explosive parts.” We are unpersuaded.
¶23 	McManigal’s contention that subsection 401(6)(a)(i) was
intended 	to 	be 	“limited 	to 	radiological, 	toxicological, 	and
biological weapons” is belied by a number of provisions in both
Part 4 and Part 3. As an initial matter, subsection 401(6)(a)(i)’s
position as first on the list—rather than last, as catchall provisions
tend to be—particularly when viewed in conjunction with other
provisions hereinafter discussed, suggests that the subsection
defines a standalone variant of a WMD and is not limited by
subsections 401(6)(a)(ii)–(iv). This conclusion is further supported
by section 76-10-402, which states,
A 	person 	who 	without 	lawful 	authority
intentionally 	or 	knowingly 	manufactures,
possesses, sells, delivers, displays, uses, attempts to
use, solicits the use of, or conspires to use a weapon
of mass destruction or a delivery system for a
weapon 	of 	mass 	destruction, 	including 	any
biological agent, toxin, vector, or delivery system as
meaning to the general term, the general term is understood as
restricted to include things of the same kind, class, character, or
nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is something
to show a contrary intent.” Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards
& Training Council, 2025 UT 7, ¶ 23, 567 P.3d 576 (quotation
simplified).

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	12 	2025 UT App 192
those terms are defined in this section, is guilty of a
first degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-402 (LexisNexis 2017) (emphasis added).
Our Legislature has directed that when used in statutes, the term
“‘including’ means that the items listed are not an exclusive list,
unless the word ‘only’ or similar language is used to expressly
indicate that the list is an exclusive list.” Id. § 68-3-12(1)(f) (2021).
Our Supreme Court has also “similarly recognized that the term
is routinely construed as introducing a non-exclusive, exemplary
list.” Larry H. Miller Theatres, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2024
UT 8, ¶ 23, 545 P.3d 266 (quotation simplified). Accordingly,
section 76-10-402’s use of the term “including” indicates our
Legislature’s 	intent 	that 	“biological 	agent, 	toxin, 	vector, 	or
delivery system” is not an exhaustive list of what may constitute
a WMD.
¶24 	Furthermore, several provisions of section 306 expressly
state that explosive, chemical, or incendiary devices or parts are
not under the exclusive purview of Part 3. Subsections 306(3)–(6)
each prohibit specific actions and set forth corresponding felony
classifications 	relating 	to 	explosive, 	chemical, 	or 	incendiary
devices or parts. But each subsection also clarifies that it applies
“under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Part 4,
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” thereby giving precedence to Part
4, 	should 	it 	apply. 	See 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	76-10-306(3)–(6)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2017). Section 306 thus expressly contemplates
that an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device or part could
constitute a WMD under certain circumstances.
¶25 	Lastly, subsection 401(6)(b) expressly excludes from the
definition 	of 	a 	WMD 	“firearms 	or 	rifle, 	pistol, 	or 	shotgun
ammunition, 	reloading 	components, 	or 	muzzleloading
equipment.” It is worth noting that if our Legislature intended
only 	chemical 	or 	radioactive 	devices—and 	not 	explosive
devices—to 	amount 	to 	WMDs 	under 	certain 	circumstances,
subsection 401(6)(b) could have easily been expanded to also

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	13 	2025 UT App 192
exclude explosives from the definition, particularly given the
references 	in 	subsections 	306(3)–(6) 	to 	Part 	4. 	Cf. 	Jensen 	v.
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2018 UT 27, ¶ 25, 424 P.3d 885 (“We
generally 	assume 	that 	each 	term 	in 	the 	statute 	was 	used
advisedly, and sometimes find that the use of a term elsewhere
shows that the Legislature knows how to use those terms, and
would have used them again if it intended the same effect.”)
(quotation simplified).
¶26 	For these reasons, we conclude that based on the plain
language of the relevant statutes, subsection 401(6)(a)(i) defines a
standalone variant of a WMD that could include “conventional
explosives” in certain circumstances, specifically, when such
explosives are “designed or intended to cause widespread death
or serious bodily injury to multiple victims.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-401(6)(a)(i). Accordingly, we reject this suggested ground
for reversal of the trial court’s directed verdict ruling.
B. 	Evidence of “Widespread” Death or Serious Bodily Injury
¶27 	McManigal alternatively argues that insufficient evidence
was presented at trial to establish that the explosives in his
possession were “designed or intended to cause widespread death
or serious bodily injury to multiple victims.” See Utah Code Ann.
§ 	76-10-401(6)(a)(i) 	(LexisNexis 	2017) 	(emphasis 	added). 	He
asserts that the destructive power of the explosives is not a
speculative 	matter 	in 	this 	case 	because 	they 	were 	actually
detonated and “[t]he combined force of the explosions was not
sufficient to cause widespread damage, death, or injury” because
“no one was injured or killed in the explosions detonated by
police”9 and the resulting damage was limited to the interior of
9. Although it is true that no one was injured during the controlled
detonation of the explosives, McManigal overlooks that his cousin
was severely injured a few months later by merely sweeping some
of the TATP powder that remained behind on the floor.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	14 	2025 UT App 192
his house and very minor damage to only one neighboring
house.10
¶28 	But 	a 	controlled 	detonation 	conducted 	by 	a
multijurisdictional 	team 	of 	experts 	trained 	in 	disposing 	of
explosives in the safest manner possible after evacuating the area
and employing extensive safety measures is not determinative of
the true extent of the death or serious bodily injury McManigal’s
stockpile of TATP and ignition devices could have inflicted.
Several 	experts 	testified 	regarding 	the 	potential 	danger 	the
explosive material posed. As an initial matter, based on a rough
estimate of the amount of explosive material in the house, it was
determined that the safe zone was outside a 900-foot radius from
the house and approximately 600 people were evacuated as a
result. One member of the FBI’s explosives unit testified that the
devices found in the house were each capable of being “actionable
IEDs” and that if “fully loaded with TATP,” each device was
capable of causing “widespread death or serious bodily injury to
multiple victims.”
¶29 	The bomb squad commander of Salt Lake County’s Unified
Fire Authority also testified that accidental detonation of the
TATP on the bathroom floor in the basement would have been
enough to set off the explosives throughout the house, resulting
in a “large detonation” that would have been sufficient to reach
the 200 gallons of diesel fuel stored outside the garage. Although
the commander’s estimation that the resulting explosions would
be “catastrophic” for the neighborhood also took ignition of the
fuel into consideration, this testimony is sufficient to establish that
explosions 	originating 	within 	the 	house 	would 	have 	been
10. McManigal also contends that insufficient evidence supported
a finding that he “possessed any radiological or toxicological
materials, or biological agent, toxin, or vector.” But for the reasons
discussed in Part I.A above, the statutory definition of a WMD is
not limited to the interpretation advanced by McManigal on
appeal.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	15 	2025 UT App 192
sufficient to, at the very least, extend beyond the house itself.
Furthermore, even the controlled detonation of the explosives in
the basement—conducted after bomb squad robots removed the
TATP and MEKP from the kitchen and garage refrigerators—
caused 	severe 	damage 	to the interior of the 	house. 	Lastly,
McManigal’s admission to police that detonation of all the TATP
in his house would “take out this whole block” is highly probative
of how “widespread” he “designed or intended” the explosives’
reach to be.
¶30 	Ample evidence was thus presented from which a jury
could find that the TATP and devices were “designed or intended
to cause widespread death or serious bodily injury to multiple
victims.” Id. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
McManigal’s directed verdict motion on this basis.11
11. We note that while we affirm the trial court’s denial of the
directed verdict motion, the court’s analysis was somewhat wide
of the mark. That is, the court’s analysis was focused on whether
the State presented evidence regarding whether the TATP and
devices were designed to “cause serious bodily injury to multiple
people.” But under subsection 401(6)(a)(i), the court’s focus
should have been on, with our emphasis, whether the explosives
were designed or intended to cause “widespread death or serious
bodily injury to multiple people.” The court’s analysis suggests a
statutory interpretation limiting “widespread” to “death” and not
also 	applying 	it 	to 	“serious 	bodily 	injury.” 	But 	such 	an
interpretation would assume an intent by our Legislature to place
widespread death on par with serious bodily injury occurring to
multiple people near each other. We are of the view that our
Legislature 	intended 	for 	the 	clause’s 	two 	categories 	to 	be
reconciled with each other by having them each identify a
designed or intended result that includes multiple victims over a
diffuse area.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	16 	2025 UT App 192
II. Jury Instruction
¶31 	Jury Instruction 42 defined a WMD by copying the text of
subsections 76-10-401(6)(a)(i), (6)(a)(v), and (6)(b), as follows:
“Weapon of Mass Destruction” means:
1. any item or instrumentality that is designed or
intended to cause widespread death or serious
bodily injury to multiple victims; or
2. any substance or material or combination which
has been prepared or altered for use in the creation
of a [WMD].
[WMD] does not include firearms or rifle, pistol, or
shotgun 	ammunition, 	reloading 	components, 	or
muzzleloading equipment.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-401(6) (LexisNexis 2017). McManigal
argues that this definition of a WMD was inadequate, constituting
plain error by the trial court.12
¶32 	“To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish
that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to
12. 	McManigal 	also 	asserts 	that 	his 	defense 	counsel 	was
ineffective for not objecting to Instruction 42. But his argument
wholly 	omits 	any 	discussion 	of 	whether 	failure 	to 	object
constituted deficient performance—an essential element of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See State v. Moore, 2025 UT
App 26, ¶¶ 28, 31, 566 P.3d 69 (stating that failure to establish
either the deficient performance or prejudice prong “is fatal to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim”) (quotation simplified),
cert. denied, 570 P.3d 658 (Utah 2025). Accordingly, McManigal has
not carried his burden on appeal on this issue, and we do not
address it further. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 9, 194 P.3d 903.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	17 	2025 UT App 192
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” State v. Johnson, 2017
UT 76, ¶ 20, 416 P.3d 443 (quotation simplified). As relevant here,
“for an error to be obvious to the trial court, the party arguing for
the exception to preservation must show that the law governing
the error was clear, or plainly settled, at the time the alleged error
was made.” Id. ¶ 21 (quotation simplified).
¶33 	McManigal 	faults 	Instruction 	42 	for 	not 	defining
“widespread” and for not including the full text of subsection
401(6). 	Although 	“widespread” 	is 	not 	statutorily 	defined,
McManigal asserts that it should have been defined in the context
of 	subsections 	401(6)(a)(ii)–(iv), 	which 	were 	excluded 	from
Instruction 42—i.e., “‘toxic or poisonous chemicals,’ ‘disease
organism, including any biological agent,’ or a ‘toxin, radiation,
or radioactivity.’” See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-401(6)(a)(ii)–(iv).
That is, he argues, it should have been defined in terms of what is
considered “widespread” for those specific instrumentalities.
Relatedly, McManigal asserts that Instruction 42 should have also
included the text of subsections 401(6)(a)(ii)–(iv) “so that the jury
would 	understand 	that 	the 	widespread 	instrumentality 	in
subsection [401(6)(a)(i)] should cover an area similar to” that of
the instrumentalities covered in the excluded subsections. But in
Part 	I.A 	of 	this 	opinion, 	we 	rejected 	this 	interpretation 	of
subsection 	401(6)(a)(i), 	concluding 	that 	based 	on 	the 	plain
language of the relevant statutes, subsection 401(6)(a)(i) was
intended to define a standalone variant of a WMD. Accordingly,
failure 	to 	include 	McManigal’s 	proffered 	definition 	of
“widespread” did not constitute error, much less obvious error.
And 	the 	exclusion 	of 	subsections 	401(6)(a)(ii)–(iv) 	from 	the
instruction likewise was not error as they define variants of
WMDs that were not at issue in this case.
¶34 	Generally 	speaking, “non-technical 	words 	of 	ordinary
meaning should not be elaborated upon in the instructions given
by the court. It is presumed that jurors have ordinary intelligence
and understand the meaning of ordinary words.” State v. Frausto,
2002 UT App 259, ¶ 19, 53 P.3d 486 (quotation simplified), cert.

State v. McManigal
20230917-CA 	18 	2025 UT App 192
denied, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 2002). “In contrast, an instruction
defining a term is necessary when the term has a technical legal
meaning so different from its ordinary meaning that the jury,
without further explanation, would misunderstand its import in
relation to the factual circumstances.” State v. Ekstrom, 2013 UT
App 271, ¶ 15, 316 P.3d 435 (quotation simplified). The term
“widespread” is well within the ken of a person of ordinary
intelligence. 	For 	this 	reason, 	the 	lack 	of 	a 	definition 	of
“widespread” in the jury instructions also did not constitute
obvious error.
¶35 	In sum, we reject McManigal’s claims of error relating to
Instruction 42. Accordingly, the trial court did not plainly err in
providing that instruction to the jury.
CONCLUSION
¶36 	The trial court correctly denied McManigal’s directed
verdict motion. The court also did not plainly err in instructing
the jury on the definition of a WMD.
¶37 	Affirmed.