Paulson v. Paulson

2026 UT App 108
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
TRISHNA PAULSON ,
Appellee,
v.
C HRISTOPHER PAULSON ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20220914-CA
Filed July 16, 2026
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Christine S. Johnson
The Honorable Jennifer A. Mabey
No. 184400701
Rodney R. Parker, Attorney for Appellant
Julie J. Nelson and Aaron Harris,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES GREGORY K. O RME and JOHN D. LUTHY
concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	Christopher Paulson challenges several of the orders the
trial court issued in the divorce proceedings between him and his
former spouse, Trishna Paulson.1 Specifically, he contests (1) the
exclusion of an expert witness, (2) a number of partial summary
judgment 	decisions 	establishing 	that 	various 	properties 	are
Trishna’s separate property, (3) the denial of his request for
attorney fees, and (4) the denial of his motion to disqualify the
1. Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by their
given 	names, 	with 	no 	disrespect 	intended 	by 	the 	apparent
informality.

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trial judge based on an appearance of bias. While we see no error
in the determinations regarding Trishna’s separate property or
the 	alleged 	bias 	of 	the 	trial 	judge, 	we 	do 	find 	merit 	in
Christopher’s arguments regarding the excluded expert and the
attorney fees request. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in
part, and we remand this case for such further proceedings as are
now appropriate.
BACKGROUND
The Premarital Agreement
¶2 	Christopher and Trishna were married on August 21, 1992.
Prior to their marriage, they signed a premarital agreement (the
Agreement), which was “to be construed and enforced under the
laws of the State of California.”2 The Agreement was entered
based on both the parties’ “desire to define the respective rights
of each in and to the property of the other from and after the
solemnization of the marriage” and the parties’ intention “to limit
the application of the community property laws of the State of
California or of any other community property State or country in
which the parties, from time to time, may reside or be domiciled.”
And one of the initial recitals of the Agreement declared, “It is
mutually desired by the parties hereto that any property acquired
by either of the parties hereto after the solemnization of the
marriage shall be the separate property of the party so acquiring
the same . . . .”
¶3 	Section 3 of the Agreement, entitled “Future Ownership of
Property,” further addressed property that the parties already
2. Although the dates on which the parties’ signatures were
notarized were after the parties’ marriage, the trial court found
that the Agreement was signed before the marriage. And while
Christopher categorizes this as a disputed fact, he concedes for
purposes of this appeal that the Agreement is valid.

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possessed or might acquire after their marriage. One provision in
this section addressed Trishna’s separate property as follows:
The property possessed by Trishna at the time of the
Marriage between her and Christopher is and shall
remain her sole and separate property and shall be
subject 	entirely 	to 	her 	individual 	control 	and
management, both before and after the Marriage, in
the 	same 	manner 	as 	if 	she 	were 	unmarried.
Christopher agrees that he does not [have] and will
not, by reason of the Marriage, acquire any interest
in the property, either for himself, his heirs, assigns,
successors in interest, or creditors, nor does he
[have] nor will he acquire any right in or to the
income, rents, profits, accretions or use of such
property, or any part or portion thereof, arising for
any reason whatsoever . . . .
A separate provision with largely identical language addressed
Christopher’s separate property and Trishna’s lack of interest in
it.
¶4 	Section 3 also addressed future property the parties may
acquire as follows:
All of the property which either of the parties may
hereafter acquire, or to which he or she shall be or
become entitled, either before or after the Marriage,
and the income, rents and profits of and accretions
to all such property, shall be the separate property
of the party so acquiring the same and shall be
subject 	entirely 	to 	the 	individual 	control 	and
management of such party in the same manner as if
he or she were unmarried, and the other party shall
have 	no 	right 	to 	or 	interest 	in 	said 	property
whatsoever. In addition, it is expressly agreed that
all other property acquired by either of the parties

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which would, except for this . . . Agreement, be the
community property of said parties by reason of the
laws of the State of California or any other State or
country in which the parties, from time to time, may
reside, and the income, rents and profits of and
accretions to all such property, shall be the separate
property 	of 	the 	party 	so 	acquiring 	the 	same,
regardless of how said property may be acquired,
except as hereinafter provided.
¶5 	Section 3 further provided that the “sole exception” to the
separate property categorization was “that the cash ‘salary’ each
of them receives shall be considered the community property of
the parties.” The language went on to clarify that “‘bonuses’
received by either party or non-cash compensation of any sort”
would be separate property.
¶6 	Additionally, 	Section 	3 	also 	specified, 	“The 	separate
property of each of the parties hereto shall not be liable for debts
or obligations incurred by the other party, whether arising before
or after the Marriage and whether now known or unknown.”
Section 	3 	instructed 	that 	“separate 	bank 	accounts 	shall 	be
maintained by each of the parties . . . with respect to the separate
property cash of each,” but the Agreement did contemplate a joint
bank account wherein the parties would deposit their community
income and from which they would pay all their living expenses.
¶7 	Section 6 of the Agreement was entitled “Transmutation”
and contained the following provision specifically setting forth
the circumstances whereby a party’s separate property could
become community property:
Except 	as 	otherwise 	provided 	herein,
property 	or 	interests 	now 	owned 	or 	hereafter
acquired by the parties, which by the terms of this
Agreement is classified as the separate property of
one of them, can only become the separate property

Paulson v. Paulson
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of the other or the parties’ community property by
a written instrument executed by the party whose
separate property is thereby reclassified.
¶8 	A financial statement attached to the Agreement listed
Trishna’s net worth at the time of the marriage as $1,803,148, the
bulk of which was attributable to the value of stock she had
received 	from 	her 	employer, 	the 	Koosharem 	Corporation.
Christopher, on the other hand, brought no significant assets into
the marriage.
The Marriage
¶9 	During the marriage, neither party earned a significant
cash salary. However, at various points in the marriage, Trishna
sold portions of her Koosharem Corporation stock “for a total
value 	of 	$21,827,123.” 	Trishna 	“also 	generated 	other 	funds
through real estate investments that she owned.”
¶10 	As anticipated by the Agreement, the parties maintained a
joint account into which their cash salaries were deposited and
from which household expenses were paid. Although Trishna
maintained other bank accounts to facilitate her investment
activities, she also “intermittently deposited” funds from her
separate accounts and funds from her real estate investments into
the joint account.
¶11 	Regarding expenses paid from the joint account, the trial
court later found that “the parties spent $412,380 per year in
household expenses,” which was “approximately $330,000 more
than the highest amount of gross cash salary that the parties
earned in any year between 2005 and 2017.” As a result, the
payment 	of 	the 	household 	expenses 	was 	necessarily
“supplemented 	by 	other 	funds.” 	The 	additional 	funds 	that
Trishna deposited in the joint account “allowed it to be used for
many purchases, including family expenses that were beyond the
parties’ joint salaries, as well as purchases of personal property

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20220914-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 108
and real estate.” And when executing some number of these
purchases, the properties thereby acquired were titled in both
parties’ names. And on some occasions, Trishna put funds into a
trade account with Christopher’s name on it.
¶12 	After twenty-six years of marriage, Trishna petitioned for
divorce in March 2018. Christopher responded, asserting, among
other things, a claim for alimony. Several years of litigation have
followed.
Partial Summary Judgments Regarding Property
¶13 	A significant part of the subsequent litigation addressed
the various assets acquired during the marriage. Trishna filed
sixteen separate motions for partial summary judgment, which
sought rulings that various assets were obtained with Trishna’s
separate property and were therefore not marital property subject
to division upon divorce. Christopher opposed all but two of the
partial summary judgment motions.
¶14 	The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor
of Trishna as to each property. The court determined that there
was no material dispute of fact that each piece of property was,
indeed, Trishna’s separate property. The court did, however,
address several legal arguments in its decisions.
¶15 	The underlying feature creating complexity in the partial
summary judgment determinations was the fact that Trishna had
regularly deposited her personal funds into the parties’ joint bank
account and then, at some point, used amounts from that account
to fund other investments. Based on Trishna’s placement of her
separate funds into the parties’ joint account, Christopher argued
that, pursuant to the Agreement, Trishna was prevented from
claiming that the funds retained their separate property status.
But the trial court rejected this argument as follows:

Paulson v. Paulson
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Because [Trishna] failed to keep her separate funds
separate, [Christopher] argues that she breached the
Agreement and is estopped from claiming that any
funds in the joint accounts were her separate funds.
This argument is summarily rejected. While the
Agreement 	does 	direct 	the 	parties 	to 	maintain
separate funds in separate accounts, that clause does
not include any penalty or waiver provision which
would 	direct 	the 	result 	[Christopher] 	seeks.
[Trishna’s] failure to keep her separate funds in a
separate account necessitates the tracing of her
funds, 	and 	it 	certainly 	has 	complicated 	these
proceedings. But it does not support any waiver or
estoppel argument.
¶16 	In at least some of his objections, Christopher suggested
that the transmutation provision of the Agreement was satisfied
in instances where the acquired property was jointly titled in both
parties’ names or where Trishna’s separate funds were put in an
account with only Christopher’s name. But the court determined
that more was required under the Agreement to change the nature
of Trishna’s separate property and that without a specific writing
acknowledging the reclassification, the ownership of the property
would be unaffected.
¶17 	To address the issue of Trishna’s separate funds being
deposited into the joint account, the trial court, where possible,
directly traced the funds for the purchase of assets back to specific
separate funds that Trishna deposited in the account. And when
such direct tracing was not possible, the court employed an
“exhaustion tracing” methodology, wherein it reasoned that
because the parties’ cash salaries did not cover their household
expenses—a point which Christopher apparently conceded—the
monies with which the properties were purchased must have
necessarily come from additional amounts deposited by Trishna
into the joint account.

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The Alimony Determination
¶18 	On August 3, 2020—seven days after the close of fact
discovery—Christopher filed an expert disclosure revealing his
intent to call a certain financial expert (Expert). The disclosure
specified the following:
[Expert] 	will 	provide 	expert 	opinion
testimony . . . . [Expert] is expected to testify
regarding: the parties’ marital lifestyle, the parties’
financial circumstances at the time of the divorce;
equal division of marital assets and liabilities; the
parties’ current financial circumstances; the parties’
gross and net incomes; the Jones Utah alimony
factors; [and Christopher’s] request for alimony.
After stating that Expert’s qualifications and fee schedule were
provided as attachments, the disclosure set forth the following
additional information regarding Expert’s testimony:
In performing his analysis, [Expert] may rely
on the following documents and/or information:
i. 	Testimony 	and/or 	interviews 	(to 	be
arranged via counsel) of the parties;
ii. The facts as they apply to the factors set
forth in Utah Code [section 81-6-203(6)(b)];
iii. 	The 	parties’ 	financial 	declaration(s)
and/or employment and income information
produced in this case;
iv. Pleadings filed in this case;
v. The parties’ tax documents and returns
produced in this case;

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vi. Analysis and/or expert report of any of
other experts; and
vii. 	Other 	relevant 	market, 	industry 	and
economic data and publications as needed.
¶19 	Believing 	that 	Christopher’s 	expert 	disclosure 	was
deficient under rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Trishna made no election “to depose [Expert] or request an expert
report 	from 	him,” 	“judging 	that 	doing 	so 	would 	cure 	the
deficiencies in [Christopher’s] disclosure.” Instead, two days
later, on August 5, 2020, she moved for summary judgment on the
alimony issue, arguing that Christopher could not “meet the
evidentiary threshold required to present evidence” of his needs
as the recipient spouse.
¶20 	Despite the fact that Trishna had made no election for an
expert report under rule 26, Christopher sent her an expert report
on 	August 	24, 	2020—which 	was 	well 	within 	the 	allowed
timeframe for supplying the report even had Trishna immediately
requested a report in response to the earlier expert disclosure.
Nonetheless, on September 18, 2020, Trishna filed a motion for
sanctions, requesting the exclusion of Expert. And sometime
thereafter, Christopher offered to allow Trishna to depose Expert
as well, since the time for her to elect to do so had since passed.
¶21 	After oral arguments on both motions, the trial court
granted Trishna’s motion for sanctions and her motion for partial
summary judgment in February 2021. The court agreed that
Christopher’s expert disclosure had not satisfied the requirements
of rule 26, and it also determined that the inadequate disclosure
was not harmless, pointing to Trishna’s “strategic decision” to
neither depose Expert nor request an expert report and the fact
that it was then too late to make such an election or to choose to
designate a rebuttal expert. And the trial court further agreed that
without the testimony of Expert, Christopher had “offered no

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 108
evidence regarding his financial need” and was “unable to meet
his burden in seeking alimony.”
Christopher’s Motion to Disqualify
¶22 	Prompted by several adverse rulings, including the partial
summary judgment denying alimony and an unrelated contempt
ruling against Christopher, Christopher’s attorney “tasked a law
clerk . . . to undertake research to determine whether the over[t]
hostility that [the trial judge] ha[d] displayed . . . w[as] grounds to
seek her recusal.” As a result of this inquiry, Christopher’s
attorney discovered that the trial judge had previously retained
an attorney who belonged to the same law firm as Trishna’s
attorney.3 	This 	previous 	representation 	concerned 	a 	critical
opinion column published in a local newspaper in October 2018
that urged readers to vote “no” in the judge’s upcoming retention
election.
¶23 	As a result of these discoveries, Christopher filed a motion
to disqualify the trial judge in July 2021, pointing specifically to a
demand 	letter 	threatening 	litigation 	that 	was 	sent 	to 	the
newspaper by the judge’s attorney in October 2018. Christopher
asserted that because the judge’s attorney and the attorney that
began representing Trishna in May 2019 were members of the
same law firm, this created an appearance of bias.
¶24 	Christopher’s motion was certified to the presiding judge
for determination, pursuant to rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The presiding judge denied the motion, determining
both that the motion was untimely and that “a review of the
motion on its merits also fail[ed] to demonstrate a basis for
disqualification.” Concerning the merits, the presiding judge
3. Although Trishna’s attorney had left this law firm by the time
the 	disqualification 	issue 	arose 	in 	July 	2021, 	he 	had 	been
representing Trishna while employed by this law firm from May
2019 through December 2020.

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reasoned, “Given that the election resulted in [the trial judge]
being retained, it would appear that her representation ended
relatively shortly thereafter, and there is no information before the
[c]ourt to indicate that the representation is ongoing.” And the
presiding judge agreed with an informal advisory opinion by the
Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee that there would be no
reasonable appearance of bias in such a situation—once the
attorney-client relationship had ceased.
The Attorney Fees Determination
¶25 	A trial was held in June 2022 to dispose of the remaining
issues that had not been resolved by way of partial summary
judgment. Relevant to this appeal are the court’s determinations
as to Christopher’s request for an award of attorney fees under
Utah Code section 81-1-203(1). See Utah Code § 81-1-203(1)
(allowing for an award of attorney fees against one party in
certain domestic cases in order “to enable the other party to
prosecute or defend the action”).4
¶26 	In assessing Christopher’s financial need for attorney fees,
the trial court considered several obligations Trishna had paid on
behalf of Christopher over the previous few years while the case
was pending, including insurance premiums, health-care related
expenses, utilities, home maintenance expenses, tax preparation
expenses, credit card payments, and expenses related to the
parties’ minor child. These amounts over that period totaled
$191,165. The court also highlighted that Christopher had been
allowed to live rent-free in the family home for several months
4. At the time that the trial court ruled on Christopher’s request
for attorney fees, this provision was codified as Utah Code section
30-3-3(1). See Utah Code § 30-3-3(1) (2021). But because the
amendments attendant to the subsequent recodification of the
section in no way affect the issues raised on appeal, we reference
and cite the current version of the code for convenience.

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after Trishna filed for divorce, and the court valued that benefit at
$90,000.
¶27 	Next, 	the 	trial 	court 	considered 	funds 	accessible 	to
Christopher while the divorce was pending. These included
$80,000 he spent from one of the bank accounts and $247,000 he
received from the resale of sporting events tickets. The court also
stated that Christopher had received “$337,998 from the sale of [a
piece of real property].” In addition, the court pointed to a classic
car worth over $80,000 that was Christopher’s separate property.
And finally, the court imputed annual income of $54,000 to
Christopher, reasoning that “if he had sought employment,” he
“could have earned an additional $162,000” during the pendency
of the case.
¶28 	Totaling up these amounts, the trial court concluded that
Christopher “had access to, or the opportunity to earn, $1,214,413
in income, available cash, and cash equivalent value during the
same time that he claims he was unable to pay his attorneys.”5 The
court determined that these funds were largely available to pay
his attorneys because Christopher “had no living expenses to
speak of, other than to pay for his own food, his own fuel, his own
cellular phone, and his own travel.” Based on this analysis, the
court determined that Christopher “did have financial resources
5. We recognize that the various amounts enumerated by the trial
court (which are all set forth here, see supra ¶¶ 26–27) are $26,250
short of totaling the $1,214,413 sum reached by the court. This is
likely because the court also considered as funds available to
Christopher the $26,250 in interest payments that he had received
as part of the sale of another piece of real property.
We further note that the court had awarded Trishna this
$26,250 in interest payments, as well as the $337,998 in real estate
sale proceeds listed above, and Christopher had been ordered to
pay Trishna those amounts with interest.

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20220914-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 108
at his disposal to pay [his] attorney fees” and that he was “not
entitled to seek an attorney fee award.”
¶29 	Thereafter, the trial court gave an additional reason for its
conclusion that Christopher was “not entitled to seek an attorney
fee award.” The court reasoned that through the Agreement,
“Christopher ha[d] already agreed that Trishna [would] not use
her separate property to pay for any of his obligations.” Thus, the
court concluded, Christopher had “waived any entitlement that
he would otherwise have to ask [the court] to order Trishna to use
her separate property to pay any obligation that [he] owes to his
lawyers.”
¶30 	Christopher timely appealed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶31 	First, Christopher contests the trial court’s exclusion of
Expert based on a failure to comply with the expert disclosure
requirements of rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. “As
long as it applies the correct law, a court has discretion in
determining 	whether 	disclosure 	is 	complete, 	whether 	later
remedy of nondisclosure or incomplete disclosure is harmless, or
whether good cause exists for any related failure.” Phillips v.
Skabelund, 2021 UT App 2, ¶ 37, 482 P.3d 237.
¶32 	Christopher next challenges multiple legal conclusions
underlying the trial court’s various partial summary judgment
rulings in which the court determined, among other things, that
certain properties were Trishna’s separate property and not
subject to division as part of the marital estate. When we review
such orders, “the trial court’s resolution of the legal issues is
accorded no deference since entitlement to summary judgment is
a question of law.” Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 2003 UT 19, ¶ 5,
70 P.3d 72 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, to the extent these
issues are preserved for appeal, “we determine only whether the

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20220914-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 108
trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the
trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of
material fact.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶33 	Christopher also appeals the trial court’s denial of his
request for attorney fees made pursuant to Utah Code section 81-
1-203(1). “The decision to award or deny attorney fees in domestic
cases is within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will
disturb the decision only if the trial court abuses that discretion.”
Wollsieffer v. Wollsieffer, 2019 UT App 99, ¶ 9, 446 P.3d 84
(quotation simplified).
¶34 	Finally, Christopher challenges the denial of his motion to
disqualify the trial judge. “Whether the district court erred in
declining to disqualify the trial judge on the basis of bias is a
question of law, which we review for correctness.” State v. Boyer,
2020 UT App 23, ¶ 19, 460 P.3d 569.
ANALYSIS
I. Expert Exclusion
¶35 	Christopher argues that the trial court erred by excluding
Expert as a sanction for the failure to comply with the disclosure
requirements of rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He
argues that his disclosure, “although not robust, was adequate
under the circumstances” and that, even if not, any failures were
harmless. We address each argument in turn.
A. 	Compliance with the Requirements of Rule 26
¶36 	Rule 26 provides that the disclosure of a retained expert
must 	include 	the 	following: 	“(i) 	the 	expert’s 	name 	and
qualifications, including a list of all publications authored within
the preceding 10 years, and a list of any other cases in which the
expert has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the

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20220914-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 108
preceding four years, (ii) a brief summary of the opinions to which
the witness is expected to testify, (iii) the facts, data, and other
information specific to the case that will be relied upon by the
witness in forming those opinions, and (iv) the compensation to
be paid for the witness’s study and testimony.” Utah R. Civ. P.
26(a)(4)(A).6 Specific to the required disclosure of expert opinions,
this court explained in RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34,
392 P.3d 956, that adequate disclosure is not accomplished by
providing “broad, conclusory statements” or by simply listing
“general topics on which the expert might opine.” Id. ¶¶ 24, 27
(quotation simplified). Instead, “[d]isclosure of specific facts and
opinions is required so that parties can make better informed
choices about the discovery they want to undertake or, just as
important, what discovery they want to forgo.” Id. ¶ 25.
¶37 	Christopher’s 	expert 	disclosure 	stated, 	“[Expert] 	is
expected to testify regarding: the parties’ marital lifestyle, the
parties’ financial circumstances at the time of the divorce; equal
division of marital assets and liabilities; the parties’ current
financial circumstances; the parties’ gross and net incomes; the
Jones 	Utah 	alimony 	factors; 	[and 	Christopher’s] 	request 	for
alimony.” And as to the information on which Expert’s testimony
would rely, the disclosure listed (1) “Testimony and/or interviews
(to be arranged via counsel) of the parties”; (2) “The facts as they
apply 	to 	the 	factors 	set 	forth 	in 	Utah 	Code 	[section 	81-6-
203(6)(b)]”; 	(3) 	“The 	parties’ 	financial 	declaration(s) 	and/or
employment and income information produced in this case”;
(4) “Pleadings filed in this case”; (5) “The parties’ tax documents
and returns produced in this case”; (6) “Analysis and/or expert
report of any of other experts”; and (7) “Other relevant market,
industry and economic data and publications as needed.” The
trial court, applying RJW Media, determined that Christopher’s
6. Rule 26 has been amended since the time of the expert
disclosure here, but because those amendments are not material
to our analysis, we cite the current version of the rule.

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20220914-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 108
disclosure was deficient both in its failure to provide a summary
of 	opinions 	and 	in 	its 	failure 	to 	provide 	the 	case-specific
information underlying those opinions.
¶38 	The trial court correctly interpreted rule 26 and did not
abuse its discretion by determining that Christopher’s expert
disclosure did not satisfy the requirements of that rule. The
disclosure listed general topics of expected testimony, with no
actual identification of what Expert’s opinions on those topics
were. Indeed, the disclosure consisted of broad statements akin to
the 	those 	specifically 	highlighted 	by 	our 	supreme 	court’s
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure as being
clearly 	inadequate, 	such 	as 	“The 	witness 	will 	testify 	on
causation.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the
2011 amendment. Likewise, the information sources listed were
very general and largely unhelpful in deciphering what opinions
Expert would be providing in the case.
¶39 	On 	appeal, 	in 	opposing 	the 	trial 	court’s 	decision,
Christopher makes no direct argument that his expert disclosure
met the specifically listed requirements of rule 26. Instead, he
attempts to distinguish RJW Media because that case analyzed the
disclosure of a non-retained expert witness, unlike the retained
expert witness in this case. He argues that this distinction is
important because the disclosure of a non-retained expert “may
be 	the 	[opposing] 	party’s 	only 	opportunity 	to 	obtain 	the
information necessary to permit formulation of a response.”
¶40 	We do not agree that the guidance of RJW Media as to the
disclosure of expert opinions is inapplicable to retained experts.
First, the language of the rule requiring disclosure of opinions is
essentially 	the 	same 	for 	retained 	and 	non-retained 	experts.
Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(A) (providing that the disclosure
of a retained expert must include “a brief summary of the
opinions to which the witness is expected to testify”), with id. R.
26(a)(4)(E) (providing that the disclosure of a non-retained expert

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20220914-CA 	17 	2026 UT App 108
must include “a written summary of the facts and opinions to
which the witness is expected to testify”). Second, RJW Media’s
analysis heavily relied on the advisory committee’s note that
addresses the disclosure of expert testimony generally and that
applies to disclosure of both retained and non-retained experts.
See 2017 UT App 34, ¶¶ 22–26. Third, where the RJW Media
analysis does 	specifically 	discuss the 	nature 	of 	non-retained
experts versus retained experts, it does so to recognize “that non-
retained experts may pose challenges for the sponsoring party”
and that, in such a case, “rule 26 insulates against the imposition
of overly specific disclosure requirements in favor of a more
pragmatic, flexible standard.” Id. ¶ 27. Thus, any difference
between the standards for retained and non-retained expert
disclosures actually cuts the other way—that is, it is the non-
retained expert disclosure that involves a more flexible standard.
¶41 	Christopher also argues that his expert disclosure was
adequate because it “apprised Trishna of the subject matter of
[Expert’s] testimony sufficiently to allow Trishna to evaluate the
need for rebuttal experts and the need for a report.” But that is not
the requirement set forth by the rule, which specifically requires
a summary of opinions. Christopher’s disclosure simply did not
meet the requirements of the rule, and any argument he wishes to
make about the disclosure being nonetheless adequate would, at
most, 	be 	addressed 	by 	the 	rule’s 	provision 	regarding
harmlessness.
B. 	Harmlessness
¶42 	Rule 26 provides that “[i]f a party fails to disclose or to
supplement timely a disclosure . . . , that party may not use the
undisclosed witness . . . unless the failure is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure.” Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4). “We
recognize that assessment of harm in this context is a nuanced
matter, and that it is sometimes difficult to tell if a defendant has
really been harmed or is just feigning harm for the purposes of

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	18 	2026 UT App 108
trying to get the plaintiff’s damages claims dismissed on non-
merits grounds prior to trial.” Butler v. Mediaport Ent. Inc., 2022 UT
App 37, ¶ 48, 508 P.3d 619. And we accord discretion to the trial
court on its harmlessness determination because the trial court
“will almost always have a better vantage point than we do to
make such a call.” Id.
¶43 	Christopher argued below that the inadequacies of his
disclosure were harmless under the circumstances, in large part
because he had provided Trishna with a complete expert report
three weeks after his expert disclosure and, in addition, was
willing to allow Trishna to depose Expert after that. Nonetheless,
the trial court determined that Trishna suffered harm from the
inadequate disclosure because she “made the strategic decision”
to respond only by seeking summary judgment on the issue (not
electing either to receive an expert report or to depose Expert, and
not designating her own rebuttal expert) and it was now too late
to take any of those responsive actions anticipated by rule 26.
Notwithstanding the considerable discretion we accord trial
courts on this question, we determine that the trial court exceeded
that discretion on this point under the specific circumstances of
this case.
¶44 	Christopher provided an expert report shortly after his
deficient disclosure—several weeks before Trishna moved for
sanctions under rule 26—and was also willing to allow Trishna to
depose Expert, thus providing her both of the options that she
would normally have under rule 26. “[A] disclosure violation may
cause some harm in the moment, on the day it was made, but if
that harm has been completely ameliorated—on its own, or
through actions of the parties—in the intervening time between
the disclosure and the eventual court hearing on the matter, then
no harm exists at the time the court is asked to make its
determination as to harmlessness.” Al-Imari v. Utah Dep’t of
Transp., 2026 UT App 15, ¶ 44, 586 P.3d 965, petition for cert.
granted, June 11, 2026 (No. 20260261). And any timing extensions

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	19 	2026 UT App 108
that would be necessary to allow Trishna to depose Expert (or to
designate a rebuttal expert) appear quite harmless under the
circumstances 	of 	this 	case. 	At 	this 	point 	in 	the 	divorce
proceedings—August 2020—no trial date had yet been set, and
due to the state-wide court restrictions relating to the COVID-19
pandemic, no trial was expected to commence at any point in the
near future. Indeed, trial was not ultimately able to be held in this
case until June 2022.
¶45 	Thus, we determine that the trial court exceeded the sound
exercise of its discretion in determining that the deficiencies in
Christopher’s expert disclosure harmed Trishna.
C. 	Summary Judgment on Alimony
¶46 	Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
trial court granted summary judgment against Christopher on his
alimony claim because he “offered no evidence regarding his
financial need.” But this conclusion is necessarily impacted by our
determination that the court exceeded the sound exercise of its
discretion in excluding Expert, who Christopher had retained to
testify about alimony. We therefore reverse this partial summary
judgment 	determination 	and 	remand 	the 	case 	for 	further
proceedings on the issue of alimony.
II. Property Determinations
¶47 	Christopher challenges several of the trial court’s summary
judgment rulings establishing that certain property was Trishna’s
separate property. His arguments contain three main assertions:
(1) that Trishna’s failure to keep her separate funds in separate
accounts as required by the Agreement should not be excused,
(2) that the various documents Trishna signed in relation to
property 	satisfied 	the 	transmutation 	requirement 	of 	the
Agreement, and (3) that exhaustion tracing was not appropriately

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	20 	2026 UT App 108
applied to conclude that the property was obtained with Trishna’s
separate funds. We address each in turn.
A. 	Intermingling of Funds
¶48 	Christopher focuses on the language of the Agreement that
provided that, with some enumerated exceptions, “separate bank
accounts [would] be maintained by each of the parties . . . with
respect to the separate property cash of each.” He asserts that this
provision was not followed but, rather, “the parties had treated
their wealth as the property of both,” passing money “in and out
of accounts in joint names.” And Christopher suggests that the
court erred in determining that Trishna’s failure to follow this
provision was, in his words, “inconsequential” and “should be
excused.”
¶49 	The 	trial 	court 	“summarily 	rejected” 	Christopher’s
argument that Trishna was estopped from claiming that any of
the funds in the joint account were her separate property. The
court recognized that the Agreement directed the parties to keep
separate funds in separate accounts, but it also determined that
this provision of the Agreement did “not include any penalty or
waiver provision which would direct the result [Christopher]
seeks.” The court therefore concluded, “[Trishna’s] failure to keep
her separate funds in a separate account necessitates the tracing
of her funds, and it certainly has complicated these proceedings.
But it does not support any waiver or estoppel argument.”
¶50 	Christopher advances no reasoned argument on appeal as
to why this determination was in error and why Trishna’s
placement of her separate funds in their joint account was
sufficient to override and prevent reliance on the transmutation
requirement of the Agreement, which requirement Christopher
concedes “was intended to prevent the accidental reclassification
of property.” That is, he faults the trial court’s decision but
provides no analysis as to why the trial court erred on this point.

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	21 	2026 UT App 108
¶51 	“If an appellant does not meaningfully engage with the
district 	court’s 	reasoning, 	that 	appellant 	falls 	short 	of
demonstrating any error on the part of the district court.” North
Park Holdings LLC v. Duke Rental Co., 2025 UT App 42, ¶ 25, 567
P.3d 1085 (quotation simplified). “To demonstrate district court
error, an appellant must support his [or her] argument with
reasoned analysis based on relevant legal authority.” Yknot Global
Ltd. v. Stellia Ltd., 2016 UT App 132, ¶ 23, 379 P.3d 36; see also Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (“The [appellant’s] argument must explain,
with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority
and the record, why the party should prevail on appeal.”); Big
Game Forever v. Peterson, 2024 UT App 78, ¶ 19, 551 P.3d 411
(“Appellants carry the burden to persuade a reviewing court
through reasoned, supported argument that the district court
committed harmful, reversible error—a burden that necessarily
requires the appellant to address the reasoning and basis of the
district court’s ruling and to explain why that court got it wrong.”
(quotation simplified)). “Where the contentions on appeal are
asserted without the support of legal reasoning or authority, this
court will not assume the appellant’s burden of argument and
research.” Yknot Global Ltd., 2016 UT App 132, ¶ 23 (quotation
simplified). Because Christopher has neither engaged with the
trial court’s reasoning on this issue nor provided reasoned legal
analysis on the issue, we do not consider this argument further.
B. 	Transmutation
¶52 	Christopher also argues that for several items of property,
transmutation was achieved via Trishna “sign[ing] documents
placing the property in question in joint names or in Christopher’s
sole name.” That is, he asserts that such action was sufficient to
satisfy the Agreement’s transmutation provision, which declared
that a party’s separate property could “only become the separate
property of the other or the parties’ community property by a
written 	instrument 	executed 	by 	the 	party 	whose 	separate
property is thereby reclassified.”

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	22 	2026 UT App 108
¶53 	Trishna contends that, for most of the property at issue,
Christopher 	waived 	or 	failed 	to 	preserve 	such 	arguments.
Although Christopher made little effort to pinpoint the precise
locations in the record where he raised this specific issue, we do
at least see that the trial court addressed (in varying depths) and
ruled on the issue in the multiple challenged summary judgment
rulings, which is sufficient to preserve the issue for our review.
See Fort Pierce Indus. Park Phases II, III & IV Owners Ass’n v.
Shakespeare, 2016 UT 28, ¶ 13, 379 P.3d 1218 (“[T]he district court’s
decision to take up the question conclusively overcame any
objection that the issue was not preserved for appeal.”).
¶54 	However, on appeal, Christopher has not engaged with the
reasoning underlying the trial court’s transmutation conclusions
and explained why the court erred in its consideration of the
issue. And as we have explained above, an appellant must
meaningfully engage with the trial court’s decision—providing
reasoned analysis and relevant legal authority—and an appellant
who fails to satisfy this burden will fail to demonstrate trial court
error. See supra ¶ 50.
¶55 	Consistent with the Agreement’s provision stating that the
Agreement was “to be construed and enforced under the laws of
the State of California,” the trial court cited California law stating
that “[a] transmutation of real or personal property is not valid
unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made,
joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest
in the property is adversely affected.” Cal. Fam. Code § 852(a).
And the court further cited California case law clarifying that “to
satisfy the requirement of an ‘express declaration,’ a writing
signed by the adversely affected spouse must expressly state that
the character or ownership of the property at issue is being
changed.” In re Marriage of Bonvino, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 754, 766–67
(Ct. App. 2015) (quotation simplified). The court then reasoned
that the parties had produced only “the expected documentation
incident to the purchase of [the properties]” and that “none of

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	23 	2026 UT App 108
these combine[d] an express declaration that [Trishna] intend[ed]
to transmute her interest in the property with her signature
executing the document.” The court additionally reasoned that
“[g]eneralized statements regarding the transfer of property that
may be prepared incident to other transactions are insufficient” to
transmute property, lest a party “‘slip into a transmutation by
accident.’” (Quoting In re Marriage of Koester, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76,
80 n.5 (Ct. App. 1999).)
¶56 	On 	appeal 	Christopher 	asserts 	that 	the 	trial 	court’s
conclusion was in error, but he fails to engage with the court’s
underlying reasoning and explain why it was in error.7 The
transmutation provision of the Agreement establishes that a
reclassification 	of 	Trishna’s 	property 	requires 	“a 	written
instrument executed by” Trishna. But as to what qualifies as a
written transmutation instrument or what such an instrument
must contain, the Agreement is entirely silent. And Christopher
does not carry his burden to persuade us that, in the face of this
silence, the court erred in relying on California law to identify
7. In his reply brief, Christopher does briefly reference the
California statute upon which the court relied and argue that this
transmutation statute “is inapplicable to transactions in which
property is acquired in joint names from third parties.” But the
authority on which Christopher relies for this proposition clarifies
that this is so because such third-party transactions are not
actually transmutations. See Hanf v. Summers (In re Summers), 278
B.R. 808, 812 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (“A transmutation is an
interspousal transaction or agreement which works a change in the
character 	of 	the 	property.” 	(emphasis 	added) 	(quotation
simplified)), aff’d, 332 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2003). So even accepting
this authority and reasoning, they would ultimately not support
Christopher’s assertion that the transmutation provision of the
Agreement was satisfied here, because none of the documents on
which he relies are interspousal agreements that would even
qualify as transmutations.

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	24 	2026 UT App 108
what qualifies as a written transmutation instrument. Indeed, the
law the court relied on was concerned with preventing accidental
transmutation—a purpose that Christopher acknowledges was
also the intent of the transmutation provision of the Agreement.
And 	considering 	the 	purposes 	of 	the 	Agreement, 	we 	find
unconvincing 	Christopher’s 	bare 	assertion 	that 	the 	parties
intended to “relax[] the statutory requirement” so that any
writing was sufficient to transmute property. Thus, in failing to
engage with the specific reasoning advanced by the trial court,
Christopher has failed to persuade us that the court erred in its
reasoning on this point, and we therefore affirm the court’s
transmutation rulings.
C. 	Exhaustion Tracing
¶57 	Christopher raises issues with the trial court’s adoption of
an “exhaustion tracing” methodology to classify and divide some
of the property acquired during the marriage. He argues that
when 	the 	court 	first 	conducted 	its 	tracing 	analysis 	and
determined that the parties’ living expenses always exceeded
their salaries, the court was looking to the wrong years for its
salary and expense amounts. But Christopher directs us to no
location in the record where he raised such an argument before
the 	trial 	court. 	Indeed, 	in 	the 	court’s 	view, 	Christopher
“acknowledged that the monthly cash salaries of the parties were
exhausted in funding monthly household expenses.”
¶58 	Christopher 	also 	advances 	a 	related 	argument 	that
exhaustion tracing requires “documentary proof that, on the date
a 	disputed 	asset 	was acquired, 	all 	community 	income 	was
exhausted by family expenses,” and that it was error for the trial
court to adopt the “cumulative approach” of tracing promoted by
Trishna that more generally looked to income and expense
amounts over broader periods of time. But again, Christopher
points us to no location in the record below where this argument
was brought to the attention of the trial court and no location in

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	25 	2026 UT App 108
the record where he suggested that the trial court’s finding that
monthly cash salaries were exhausted by monthly household
expenses on a monthly basis would not satisfy the requirement of
showing 	exhaustion 	of 	funds. 	Thus, 	Christopher 	has 	not
preserved his claim of error on this front, and we affirm the trial
court’s various partial summary judgment rulings related to the
distribution of Trishna’s separate property. See State v. Flora, 2020
UT 2, ¶ 9, 459 P.3d 975 (“Under the doctrine of preservation, when
a party fails to raise and argue an issue in the trial court, it has
failed to preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not
typically 	reach 	that 	issue 	absent 	a 	valid 	exception 	to
preservation.” (quotation simplified)).
III. Attorney Fees
¶59 	Christopher contests the trial court’s denial of his request
for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code section 81-1-203(1). He
argues that in a divorce case, an attorney fees award “must be
‘based on evidence of the receiving spouse’s financial need for
attorney fees, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested award.’” (Quoting Morgan v.
Morgan, 	854 	P.2d 	559, 	568 	(Utah 	Ct. 	App. 	1993).) 	And 	he
challenges the trial court’s underlying determination that he had
no financial need for an award of attorney fees. We find merit in
Christopher’s argument.
¶60 	As an initial matter, we agree with Christopher that section
81-1-203(1) is the statute applicable to this situation. The statute
“authorizes courts to award attorney fees and costs in divorce
cases if doing so would enable the other party to prosecute or
defend the action.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 168, 459 P.3d 276
(quotation 	simplified); 	see 	also 	Utah 	Code 	§ 	81-1-203(1)(a)
(authorizing a court to award attorney fees to a spouse to
“prosecute or defend the action” establishing initial divorce
orders). And “such an award must be based on evidence of the
receiving spouse’s financial need, the payor spouse’s ability to

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	26 	2026 UT App 108
pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees.” Dahl, 2015 UT
79, ¶ 168 (quotation simplified). “The award has nothing to do
with whether the assets in dispute are marital [or separate
property].” Krajeski v. Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 54, 565 P.3d 544,
cert. denied, 574 P.3d 519 (Utah 2025).
¶61 	We do not agree with the trial court that the Agreement,
which was entered into in an attempt “to define the [parties’]
respective rights . . . to the property of the other” and “to limit the
application of the community property laws,” can be read so
broadly as to prevent an award of attorney fees to Christopher
under the relevant attorney fees statute. Any award under this
statute would not change the nature of any of Trishna’s separate
property. And such an award would also not be based on any
application of community property law but, instead, on the
court’s equitable power to award fees in order to enable a party to
“defend 	the 	action.” 	Utah 	Code 	§ 	81-1-203(1)(a). 	Thus, 	an
interpretation of the Agreement to disallow fees under the statute
is an overly broad reading.
¶62 	As to the specific issue of the trial court’s assessment of
Christopher’s need for an award of attorney fees, Christopher
argues that the court “engag[ed] in an artificial analysis that
ignored the results of this case and Christopher’s actual inability
to pay his attorneys.” He asserts that certain funds considered by
the court “were not available to pay fees.” We again agree.
¶63 	Several amounts that the trial court considered when
calculating the funds available to Christopher were incorrectly
included in an assessment of Christopher’s ability to pay. First, it
was error for the trial court to both conclude that Christopher had
essentially “no living expenses to speak of” due to Trishna’s
payments while also counting the same money that covered those
expenses as funds that were available to Christopher to pay
attorney fees. Those funds were paid to satisfy Christopher’s
actual expenses and, therefore, were not available to him to pay

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	27 	2026 UT App 108
his attorney fees. Likewise, the rental value of the marital home
was 	not 	an 	amount 	available 	to 	Christopher 	to 	pay 	other
expenses. Although the ability of Christopher to live in the home
during the divorce proceedings had monetary value, that value
was 	satisfying 	Christopher’s 	housing 	expense 	and 	was 	not
somehow available to Christopher to use as payment toward his
attorney fees. Additionally, it was error for the trial court to
consider the funds that Christopher had received that were also
ordered to be paid back to Trishna. These funds were due to
Trishna (with interest) and did not increase Christopher’s ability
to pay his own attorney fees.
¶64 	Thus, the trial court exceeded the sound exercise of its
discretion by considering these items as amounts available to
Christopher for the payment of his attorney fees. We therefore
reverse the denial of Christopher’s request for attorney fees, and
we remand to the trial court for it to reconsider Christopher’s
request 	without 	counting 	any 	of 	the 	foregoing 	amounts as
available to Christopher when determining his financial need for
an award of attorney fees.
IV. Recusal
¶65 	“A judge should be disqualified when circumstances arise
in 	which 	the 	judge’s 	impartiality 	might 	reasonably 	be
questioned.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 49, 459 P.3d 276
(quotation simplified). However, “[j]udges are presumed to be
qualified and a party alleging bias on the part of the judge has the
burden of demonstrating that the judge is not qualified.” Id.
“Moreover, parties claiming bias must demonstrate that the
alleged bias stems from an extrajudicial source,” id.; “adverse
rulings alone are insufficient to establish the existence of judicial
bias,” id. ¶ 52.
¶66 	But even an “appearance of bias may be grounds for
reversal if actual prejudice is shown.” State v. Boyer, 2020 UT App
23, ¶ 77, 460 P.3d 569 (quotation simplified). A judge should be

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	28 	2026 UT App 108
disqualified based on an appearance of bias whenever “the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. ¶ 78.
“The question of a judge’s impartiality is determined by viewing
the question through the eyes of a reasonable person, knowing all
the circumstances.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶67 	Here, Christopher alleged that an appearance of bias
existed with respect to the trial judge because the judge had an
attorney-client relationship with a lawyer that belonged to the
same law firm as did the attorney representing Trishna. The
presiding 	judge 	who 	reviewed 	the 	motion 	to 	disqualify
determined 	both 	that 	the 	motion 	was 	untimely 	and 	that
Christopher 	had 	failed 	to 	show 	an 	appearance 	of 	bias.
Christopher contests both determinations on appeal. But even
assuming, 	without 	deciding, 	that 	the 	presiding 	judge 	was
incorrect regarding the timeliness of Christopher’s motion, we
affirm the presiding judge’s decision because we agree that there
was no appearance of bias in this case. And because we determine
that there was no appearance of bias, we need not examine
whether Christopher was prejudiced.
¶68 	The presiding judge largely based her decision to deny the
motion to recuse on an informal opinion issued by the Utah
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee that addressed “cases in
which the prosecuting attorney is in the same law firm as the
judge’s personal attorney.” See Utah Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Informal Op. No. 99-9 (1999), https://www.utcourts.gov/en/court-
records-publications/publications/judicial-ethics-opinions/ethics-
opinions/1999/99-9.html 	[https://perma.cc/8978-EXZ4]. 	The
opinion looked to the ethics opinions of several other states and
agreed with “the majority of states” that a judge “presiding in a
case involving a member of the law firm of the judge’s attorney
creates 	a 	situation 	in 	which 	the 	judge’s 	impartiality 	might
reasonably 	be 	questioned.” 	Id. 	(quotation 	simplified).
Nonetheless, the opinion concluded,

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	29 	2026 UT App 108
The Committee thinks that, as a general rule,
once 	the 	attorney-client 	relationship 	ceases 	the
judge need not disclose the former relationship
when a member of the former attorney’s law firm
appears. The Committee does not think that a
reasonable person would find an appearance of
bias. First, no on-going relationship with the law
firm exists. Second, the relationship between the
judge and the member of the former attorney’s law
firm is always more tenuous than between the judge
and the judge’s attorney.
Id. While this informal opinion is not binding on this court, we
agree with the advisory committee’s reasoning and conclusions
on this point and choose to apply them to the facts here.
¶69 	Although this case commenced before the issues related to
the 	November 	2018 	retention 	election 	arose, 	Trishna 	was
represented by different counsel during that time frame. The law
firm in question did not become involved in this case until May
2019. And because Christopher has failed to show that the
attorney-client relationship between the trial judge and a different
attorney at the firm was still ongoing at that stage (and it seems it
was not ongoing because it concerned a successful retention
election held six months earlier), we agree with the presiding
judge’s conclusion that the trial judge need not have disclosed the
former relationship at that point. Thus, Christopher has not
established an appearance of bias in this case, and we affirm the
denial of his motion to disqualify.
¶70 	Christopher 	pushes 	back, 	arguing 	that 	the 	situation
addressed by the informal opinion upon which the presiding
judge relied contained “important factual distinctions” from the
situation here. Specifically, he notes that the question posed in
that case was in reference to a justice court judge and not a district
court judge. But we see nothing in the reasoning of the informal

Paulson v. Paulson
20220914-CA 	30 	2026 UT App 108
opinion that suggested that it was in any way limited to justice
court judges. True, the opinion was based on a question presented
in 	reference 	to 	a 	justice 	court 	judge, 	and the 	opinion 	also
acknowledged 	that 	requiring 	disqualification 	“may 	be
problematic in a justice court for which criminal cases are a
significant portion of the caseload.” Id. However, these are the
only references to justice court in the opinion, and the opinion’s
reasoning 	regarding 	what 	does 	and 	does 	not 	result 	in 	an
appearance of bias in no way suggested that it was specific to
justice court judges. See id. Nor do we see any distinguishing
features between justice court and district court that would
suggest there should be a different recusal standard in the district
court.
CONCLUSION
¶71 	Christopher has not carried his burden to demonstrate
error on the part of the trial court in its many summary judgment
awards establishing that certain items of property were Trishna’s
separate 	property. 	We 	therefore 	affirm 	each 	of 	those
determinations. Additionally, we see no error in the presiding
judge’s denial of Christopher’s motion to disqualify the trial
judge, and we therefore also affirm that decision.
¶72 	We do, however, agree with Christopher that the trial court
exceeded its discretion in determining that deficiencies in his
expert disclosure were not harmless. We therefore reverse the
exclusion of Expert and the resulting grant of summary judgment
against 	Christopher as to 	his alimony 	request. 	Further, 	we
determine that the trial court exceeded its discretion in its attorney
fees 	determination, 	and 	we 	reverse 	that 	determination. 	We
therefore 	remand 	this 	case 	for 	further 	proceedings 	and
consideration of the alimony and attorney fees issues as may now
be appropriate.