State v. Hassan

2026 UT App 132
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
HAYDAR M OHAMED H ASSAN ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240292-CA
Filed August 27, 2026
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Amber M. Mettler
No. 211908801
Erick Grange, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Marian Decker,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE JOHN D. L UTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER and R YAN M. HARRIS
concurred.
LUTHY, Judge:
¶1 	Haydar Mohamed Hassan was convicted on multiple
charges for sexually abusing his stepdaughter, Anisa,1 over the
course of several years. He asserts on appeal that his trial counsel
(Counsel) provided ineffective assistance in various ways and
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting bodycam
footage of a police interview conducted at Anisa’s high school.
None of his contentions are availing, so we affirm.
1. A pseudonym.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 132
BACKGROUND2
Hassan Becomes Anisa’s Stepfather and Sexually Abuses Her After
They Move to Utah
¶2 	Hassan met Anisa’s mother (Mother) while both were
Somali refugees in a refugee camp in Kenya. At that time, Mother
was divorced with three children—Anisa, Anisa’s older half-sister
(Sister), and Anisa’s older brother. Mother’s uncle arranged for
Mother’s marriage to Hassan, although she later stated that she
“didn’t even want to marry him.” In 2004, Hassan and Mother
moved from Kenya to Salt Lake City with Mother’s three oldest
children and two younger children she then shared with Hassan.
¶3 	The family continued to grow, and when Anisa was in the
third grade, the family moved to Magna. One day in the family’s
Magna house, Anisa and two siblings were “picking [Hassan’s]
chest hair”—“a mandatory thing [the kids] had to do”—when
Hassan sexually abused Anisa. He had told the children to sit and
lie next to him in his bed in the master bedroom and “pick at his
chest hair,” and while they did this, he “insert[ed] his fingers
inside [Anisa’s] vagina.” Anisa wore a gown that was “very open
at the bottom,” providing “very easy access,” so Hassan was able
to touch her inappropriately without removing her clothing.
Neither Hassan nor Anisa said anything while Hassan had his
fingers inside her vagina, and he kept his hand there for “two
minutes or less.” This touching made Anisa feel “weird” and “so
uncomfortable.” After Hassan removed his hand, the children
continued “picking his chest hair” until they had finished. Mother
was also in the room during this time, but she was sitting on a
2. “When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and
all 	reasonable 	inferences 	drawn 	therefrom 	in 	a 	light 	most
favorable to the verdict, and we recite the facts accordingly.” State
v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, n.1, 453 P.3d 657 (cleaned up). In so
doing, “we present conflicting evidence only when necessary to
understand issues raised on appeal.” Id. (cleaned up).

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 132
mattress on the floor while the bed Hassan and the children were
on “was very high,” so Anisa was not sure Mother saw the
touching.
The Family Moves to West Valley City, Where Hassan Continues to
Sexually Abuse Anisa
¶4 	When 	Anisa 	was 	in 	sixth 	grade, 	the 	family—now
comprising twelve children—moved to West Valley City. One
day while living there, Hassan made a “hand gesture telling
[Anisa] to come downstairs,” so Anisa went into the basement,
where he “was waiting for” her. They went into the laundry room,
and Hassan “pulled his pants down and then . . . had [Anisa]
pull[] [her] pants down.” Hassan “bent [Anisa] over at [a] table”
that was in the room. He stood behind Anisa and had her “touch[]
his penis to pull it out,” and she felt “[h]is penis touching the back
of [her] butt.” Then she felt his “slimy and wet” “penis inserting
in [her] vagina from the back.” Neither Anisa nor Hassan said
anything while his penis was inside her. Hassan then “had [her]
pull[] up [her] pants and . . . told [her] to go back upstairs.”
¶5 	On a different day, while Mother was cooking in the
kitchen, Hassan gestured to Anisa to come to him. He took her to
the master bedroom, where he “pulled [her] pants down and then
laid [her] down” on his bed. He “rubbed his penis on [her]
vagina.” He did not do this for long—“[i]t was . . . fast so he
wouldn’t be caught . . . [and] so that nobody would come in.”
The Family Moves Again and the Abuse Persists
¶6 	When Anisa was in ninth or tenth grade, the family moved
to a different house in West Valley City. While Anisa was in high
school, Hassan would sometimes check her out of school, take her
on a drive, and force her “to touch his private part.” She would be
“sitting in the passenger’s seat[,] and he would grab [her] hand
and . . . put [it] by his penis,” sometimes under the clothing and
sometimes over it. He would “guide [her] and make [her] . . . feel
on his penis” by “squeezing it” and “stuff like that.” He would

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 132
also sometimes touch Anisa inappropriately in the car, including
once when he parked next to a restaurant, gave Anisa his phone
“to distract [her], and then . . . just [did] what he wanted to do,”
which included “insert[ing] his fingers in [her] vagina.” It “[f]elt
really disgusting, real weird” to Anisa. Anisa remained silent
during the incident, as did Hassan. These instances when Hassan
made Anisa touch his penis or molested her in the car happened
“[a] lot.”
Mother Discloses the Abuse to a Community Elder
¶7 	Anisa had been scared to tell Mother about the abuse
because she “felt like [Mother] wasn’t going to believe [her] and
[Mother] didn’t want to hear” about the abuse. But at some point,
Sister and Anisa together told Mother that Hassan had sexually
abused them.3 Mother “went and complained to an elder in the
community” (Elder).4 Elder “told [her,] ‘This is very, very ugly.
3. Sister testified at trial that Hassan sexually abused her as well.
See infra ¶ 14.
4. It appears that elders play an important role in the traditional
system 	of 	Somali 	customary 	justice, 	including 	in 	Somali
communities within the United States. See Brenton D. Peterson
& Manar Zaki, Sababi Inst., Reforming Somali Customary Justice:
Pathways to Adapting Xeer Procedures and Practices 4 (Dec. 15, 2023),
https://kpsrl.org/sites/kpsrl/files/2024-02/Reforming%20Somali%
20Xeer%20-%20Practices%20and%20Procedures.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/78AS-8Q78] (“The Somali system of customary justice, xeer,
plays a central role in Somali society, offering a vital avenue for
dispute resolution. Coexisting with formal state-backed courts,
xeer operates through clan elders who draw on precedent, Sharia
law, and bilateral oral agreements between clans to adjudicate
disputes and prescribe resolutions.”); Kamal Suleiman et al.,
Strategies and Sacrifices of Family Caregiving in the Somali-American
Community: A Qualitative Study, 24 BMC Health Servs. Rsch. art.
(continued…)

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 132
Do not talk about it. We will talk amongst ourselves.’” Mother
“told him [she would] call the police and tell them, but he told
[her] not to do” that and said the community elders would handle
the situation. Eventually, other elders informed Mother that Elder
had died, and the issue was “just dropped.”
Anisa Discloses the Abuse to a School Counselor
¶8 	In 2016, while Anisa was in twelfth grade, Hassan attended
a meeting with Anisa’s school counselor (Counselor) to discuss
why Anisa was failing some of her classes. Mother was not
present at the meeting. Anisa was upset to see Hassan at her
school—she “hated him because of the things he would do to
[her]” and believed that his actions were the reason she was
struggling in school. After Hassan left, Anisa told Counselor that
she 	hated 	Hassan. 	Counselor 	asked 	why, 	and 	Anisa 	said,
“Because he sexually abuses me at home.” Counselor reported to
on-campus police that she had received a report of abuse at
Anisa’s home, and two officers came to the office to interview
Anisa. During this interview, she did not answer their questions
and instead remained silent, later stating that she was feeling
“[v]ery sad and emotional . . . [b]ecause [of] what [she] had told”
Counselor.
¶9 	That night, police went to the family’s house. Hassan was
not home at the time. Mother said Anisa “was lying,” which made
Anisa feel “[u]nwanted” and “[w]eird.”
1186 (Oct. 4, 2024), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11
453006/ [https://perma.cc/J5BP-3JRL] (“Research on older Somalis
in Canada and the US has revealed that even in their new North
American 	communities, 	Somali 	elders 	have 	relied 	on 	their
positions as counselors, decision-makers, and leaders to feel
purpose and fulfillment in their old age.”).

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 132
Anisa Moves to Pittsburgh, Visits Utah Some Years Later, and Reports
the Abuse to Police
¶10 	A protective order was issued against Hassan for Anisa,
and Hassan did not return to the family’s house for a time. But a
week or two later, Anisa learned that Hassan planned to “come
back home,” so her extended family arranged for her to move in
with her biological father in Pittsburgh. After she moved, Anisa
“cut [Hassan] off completely from [her] life.”
¶11 	Several years later, after Anisa had married and had a
child, she visited Utah to celebrate her daughter’s third birthday.
Anisa “wanted to visit [her] siblings and [Mother], but [she]
couldn’t go to [their] house because [Hassan] was always present
there,” and she refused to see him or allow him to see her
daughter. Hassan would not allow Mother or the siblings to use
the family car to visit Anisa. Anisa “got . . . mad” that her family
was not permitted to attend her daughter’s birthday party, and
she argued with Mother and Sister “because they kept listening to
what [Hassan] had to say” and would not come see her.
¶12 	When Anisa returned to Pittsburgh, she decided she was
ready “to go forward with” reporting the abuse, and in 2021 she
reached out to police in Pittsburgh to file a report. Anisa’s report
led to Hassan being charged in Utah in August 2021 with several
crimes. 	As 	relevant 	here, 	the 	State 	charged 	Hassan 	with
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, rape of a child, object rape,
and aggravated kidnapping.5
5. Originally, the State charged Hassan with five other counts, but
at trial, after the State rested, it voluntarily dismissed those
counts.
The jury acquitted Hassan of the aggravated kidnapping
charge. Because the evidence forming the basis of that charge did
not yield a conviction but is nevertheless relevant to an issue on
appeal, we recite it separately below.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 132
The Case Goes to Trial, Where Sister Testifies that Hassan Sexually
Abused Her as a Child
¶13 	The case proceeded to a two-day jury trial, held in May
2023. During the trial, Anisa, Sister, Counselor, and Mother
(through an interpreter) testified in accordance with the facts
related above. The detective who investigated Anisa’s report in
2021 (Detective) also testified. Additionally, the State called as an
expert witness a forensic-services manager with the Children’s
Justice Center, who testified about the reasons children delay
disclosing sexual abuse.
¶14 	In addition to testifying about Anisa’s circumstance, Sister
testified that Hassan had also sexually abused her when she was
a child. She stated that one night in the family’s Salt Lake City
house when she was nine or ten, she was asleep in her bedroom
when Hassan came into her bedroom, touched her “[e]verywhere
[on her] body,” and “penetrate[d] her genitalia” “[w]ith his
penis.” Sister said she “couldn’t say anything” because he was
covering her mouth so that she “couldn’t scream.” She recounted
that Hassan did not say anything to her during this time. She said
that she eventually pushed Hassan and he got off of her, and that
she then “start[ed] screaming” and heard footsteps coming from
Mother’s room. Mother also testified about this incident, saying
that Hassan was leaving Sister’s bedroom when she arrived.
Mother stated that she saw him “holding onto his clothes” and
she “started talking to him angrily,” asking him what was going
on. She said he replied, “I am sorry. It is not going to happen
again. I apologize.” But Sister testified that Hassan sexually
abused her at night in her bedroom “[m]ore than one time.”
¶15 	Hassan testified in his own defense (also through an
interpreter). He categorically denied sexually abusing Sister or
Anisa. When asked to explain why Anisa might fabricate these
allegations, Hassan explained that beginning in sixth grade, Anisa
“started being late at the school [and] doing other undesirable
things at the school” and that this was the source of “anger and

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	8 	2026 UT App 132
. . . problems” between the two. Regarding Sister, Hassan testified
that she had returned to live with him and Mother after getting a
divorce, that she had come “back with [a] different attitude, with
[a] severe change in personality,” and that they had experienced
difficulties since that time. When asked to explain why Mother
might have lied about seeing him coming out of Sister’s room,
Hassan said, “This is what I think, I am suspecting . . . [that] she
was told that I have a wife in Africa. And that is really what is
driving her rage. And that she’s suspected I am . . . with another
woman in Africa, and she wants to basically punish me for that.”
Anisa Testifies About the Timing of the Laundry Room Incident
¶16 	During Anisa’s testimony, when she was discussing the
timing of the incidents at the family’s first West Valley City house,
the following exchange occurred:
Prosecutor: 	These incidents that you just testified
about at the West Valley house, the
incident in the laundry room and the
incident in the bedroom, do you recall
which grade you were in?
Anisa: 	It was about seventh grade.
Prosecutor: 	Do you recall how old you were at that
time?
Anisa: 	No.
Prosecutor: 	Do you remember when you turned
fourteen years old?
Anisa: 	No, I just remember grades. . . .
Prosecutor: 	Do you remember which grade you
were in when you turned fourteen?

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 132
Anisa: 	I was in, I believe, seventh or eighth
grade.
¶17 	On 	cross-examination, 	the 	following 	related 	exchange
occurred:
Counsel: 	Now, I would like to return to the
point in time that’s about the seventh
grade. And I’ll represent to you that
seventh graders are twelve and turn
thirteen typically, traditionally during
their 	seventh 	grade 	year. 	So 	that
would have been about 2011. Is that
correct?
Anisa: 	I don’t know what year it would have
been.
Counsel: 	Okay. But you don’t believe that’s
inaccurate, the 2011/2012 school year?
Anisa: 	I believe that’s accurate.
¶18 	Anisa also testified that she was born in December 1998
and that she began kindergarten in the fall of 2004. And Hassan
testified, “Whenever I have to go to the school where she was
seventh grade, sixth grade, she would be eleven years old, twelve
years old.”
The Timing of Mother’s Disclosure to Elder Is Discussed
¶19 	The prosecutor also sought to clarify the timing of Mother’s
disclosure to Elder in relation to Anisa’s disclosure to Counselor.
When referring to Mother’s disclosure to Elder, Anisa said,
[Mother] had called the . . . preacher or something,
or counselor, like more of a counselor for them, but
he was a . . . preacher. So she has called him and she

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 132
told him what we’ve told her because it was me and
[Sister], we told her at the same time. And then she
called the counselor, the . . . preacher, and then she
told what happened to us.
¶20 	Then the following exchange occurred:
Prosecutor: 	So when you first told your mom and
the preacher, counselor got involved,
do you remember speaking to the
police at that time?
Anisa: 	Yeah.
Prosecutor: 	Where was that?
Anisa: 	Where?
Prosecutor: 	Where did you speak to the police?
Anisa: 	At my high school.
Prosecutor: 	Okay. Was this after the meeting with
the counselor?
Anisa: 	Yes, 	the 	counselor 	has 	called 	the
police to speak to me.
The court: 	Just, which counselor are we speaking
of? Are you going to clarify?
Prosecutor: 	Yeah, so I want to clarify. You spoke
earlier about the . . . preacher, so your
mom went to a . . . preacher—
Anisa: 	On the call.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 132
Prosecutor: 	Okay. After that, or in the immediate
aftermath of that, did you speak to the
police?
Anisa: 	Yes.
Prosecutor: 	Where?
Anisa: 	At my mom’s house.
Prosecutor: 	Was this before or after the meeting
with your counselor at school?
Anisa: 	After.
Prosecutor: 	So the meeting with the counselor at
school happened before?
Anisa: 	I’m sorry. What?
Prosecutor: 	The 	meeting 	with 	your 	school
counselor, was it before or after the
preacher became involved?
Anisa: 	It was before.
Prosecutor: 	So the meeting with the counselor at
school came before?
Anisa: 	After.
Prosecutor: 	Sorry. I want to be clear. The meeting
with your counselor at school, at [your
high school], was that before or after
the preacher became involved?
Anisa: 	That was after.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 132
Prosecutor: 	So the preacher was involved before?
Anisa: 	Yes.
Prosecutor: 	And then how much time elapsed
before the meeting with the counselor
at school?
Anisa: 	How much time—
Prosecutor: 	Was it a short amount of time or a long
period of time, do you remember?
Anisa: 	With the counselor?
Prosecutor: 	How 	much 	time 	elapsed 	between
when the preacher became involved
and the meeting with the counselor at
your school?
Anisa: 	Long.
Prosecutor: 	More than a few weeks?
Anisa: 	Like a year later.
Anisa Uses the Phrase “Frame Him”
¶21 	After discussing Anisa’s 2021 report to the Pittsburgh
police, the prosecutor asked Anisa, “[A]t what point did you feel
that 	you 	were 	able to 	come 	forward 	and 	talk 	about 	what
happened? Do you remember when that was?” Anisa replied, “To
[Mother] and [Counselor and Elder], that was the point. But like
to actually frame him and get my justice was after my third
birthday party for my daughter.” The following exchange then
took place:

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 132
Prosecutor: 	And when you say the episode with
the birthday party upset you, it made
you angry?
Anisa: 	Because they will listen to him. And
like he would not allow them to, like,
take the car come visit me, stuff like
that while I was there.
Prosecutor: 	At 	any 	point 	did 	you 	ever 	lie 	to
anyone about what Mr. Hassan had
done to you?
Anisa: 	Never. No.
Prosecutor: 	Have you ever fabricated anything
that Mr. Hassan did to you?
Anisa: 	No.
The State Plays Bodycam Footage of Anisa’s Police Interview at School
¶22 	During Anisa’s testimony, the State sought to introduce
bodycam footage taken when police interviewed Anisa at her
high school after she disclosed to Counselor that Hassan was
sexually abusing her. The video, which is about eight and a half
minutes long, depicts a private office wherein a man (believed to
be Anisa’s principal) sits behind a desk and Anisa sits in a chair
in front of the desk. Two male police officers enter the room, one
officer shakes Anisa’s hand, and the officers sit off to the side of
Anisa and the principal (to her left and his right). One officer
begins asking Anisa questions, including whether she met with
Counselor that day and whether she has concerns about the
wellbeing of her siblings. Anisa does not audibly respond to the
officer’s questions. The officer twice says he cannot help Anisa if
she will not talk to him. After the second time the officer says this,
Anisa shifts her body toward the empty wall on her right and uses

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 132
her headscarf to cover the side of her face that is toward the men.
The officer continues to try to get Anisa to respond, but she sits
silently. A couple of minutes into the video, Anisa takes a tissue
from a box on the desk and wipes at her face, which is still covered
by the headscarf. Toward the end of the video, the officer leans
forward and the bodycam briefly captures Anisa’s leg bouncing.
¶23 	Defense 	counsel 	(Counsel) 	objected 	to 	the 	video’s
admission under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, arguing
that it had no probative value because it was uncontested that
officers came to interview Anisa after she disclosed sexual abuse
to Counselor and she did not answer the officers’ questions. Thus,
Counsel 	argued, 	“[i]t 	just 	shows 	emotionality.” 	The 	State
responded that the video was probative of Anisa’s emotional state
in 2016 and would allow “the jury to understand how conflicted
and how difficult the situation was for [Anisa].” The State argued
that the video had further significant probative value in light of
Hassan’s 	allegation 	that 	Anisa 	was 	fabricating 	these 	claims
because she was angry at him “for other reasons.” The trial court
agreed with the State, ruling that the video was probative to rebut
Hassan’s fabrication defense. The court also stated that the case
itself was emotional and that the video was not “more emotional
than what [the jury had] already heard.” Thus, the court did not
believe there was “really any prejudice at all, let alone unfair
prejudice.” The court admitted the video.
Witnesses Testify About the Incident Giving Rise to the Aggravated
Kidnapping Charge
¶24 	In addition to the incidents described above, Anisa testified
regarding another incident—the one that formed the basis for the
aggravated kidnapping charge. Anisa said that when she was in
seventh grade, she had a boyfriend and on one occasion went to
spend the night at his house but Hassan found out and brought
her home. She testified that once she was home, Hassan and
Mother took her upstairs to their bedroom and yelled at her. Anisa
recounted that Hassan got a rope, made her sit in a “squat

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 132
position,” and tied her hands and feet together with the rope. She
said, “And then he told my siblings to go get the knife to threaten
to slice my throat. . . . And then when they said that and
everything, I got scared and I ran downstairs.” The prosecutor
asked, “When you said you ran downstairs, what did that look
like?” Anisa responded, “I managed to get the rope out of my
hands ‘cause it wasn’t tied very tightly, and I ran downstairs.” The
prosecutor followed up, “How about the rope on your feet?”
Anisa replied, “[I]t was . . . kind of still on me, but like I still, like,
got out and ran downstairs.” Anisa said that “they chased [her]
downstairs” and caught her, that “they stripped [her] to [her]
underwear[] and . . . bra,” and that Hassan started hitting her with
a belt until she “got numb.” She claimed that Hassan “ordered
[her] siblings to start beating [her],” which she said they did by
“repeatedly punching [her] in the face . . . and hitting [her] with
the belt to the point where [her] eye got swollen and [she] couldn’t
see.” She said she did not go to school “for like a week” after this
incident “because [her] eyes were so swollen and [she] had a black
eye” that was “big and fat.” She explained that Hassan took her
to a doctor about a week after the incident because her eye was
still swollen but that Hassan “told [her] to lie to the doctor and
say that one of [her] siblings just elbowed [her] in the eye when
[they] were playing around,” which she did. Anisa testified that
the 	“school 	cop” 	“took 	pictures 	of 	[her] 	abuse,” 	and 	she
acknowledged that social workers conducted an investigation
after this incident.
¶25 	Counsel asked Sister “whether there was a time when
[Anisa] was in the seventh grade that there was a conflict
[between Anisa, Mother, and Hassan] over a boyfriend,” and
Sister 	said 	there 	was. 	Counsel 	also 	asked 	whether 	Sister
remembered Anisa having a black eye; Sister said she did, but she
testified that Anisa got the black eye from a fight Anisa and Sister
got into. When asked if Hassan hit Anisa, causing the black eye,
Sister replied, “I don’t remember that part.” She also said she did
not remember whether there was an incident where Hassan
threatened to cut Anisa with a knife or forced her to strip to her

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 132
underwear and had the siblings beat her. But she did recall Anisa
coming to her and saying that Hassan was “punching her.” Sister
also remembered that Anisa disclosed that Hassan was “touching
[her] body” and “forcing [her] to do something that [she did not]
want to do.”
¶26 	Mother, too, testified about the incident regarding the
boyfriend and about Anisa’s black eye. Regarding the boyfriend
incident, she admitted that Anisa was bound with a rope,
recounting, “We used the rope so we [could] keep her away from
that young man.” When asked who tied Anisa up, Mother said it
was Sister, explaining that Mother was pregnant at the time and
Sister said she did not want Mother to lose the child or get hurt
while arguing with Anisa. Mother said that Sister tied Anisa up
for “a short time” and that they told Anisa to avoid the boy and
focus on her schooling. But Mother did not recall any threat of a
knife or Hassan telling the other children to beat Anisa. Of the
black eye, she said, “That injury came from [Anisa] having a fight
with [Sister].”
¶27 	Detective testified that there was a Division of Child and
Family Services (DCFS) report filed in 2012 that “mentioned abuse
and a black eye,” though it did not mention a threat with a knife.
He also said there were medical reports from 2012 about a black
eye. He did not recall seeing any photographs with the reports.
Witnesses Express Confusion About a Statement Attributed to Anisa
¶28 	Detective was asked about a note in the 2021 police report,
which said that Anisa told police “that the stepdaughter of Mr.
Hassan who was abused is now deceased.” Detective replied that
this 	note 	was 	not 	his 	and 	that 	he 	“was 	confused 	by 	that
statement.” He testified that he had spoken to Anisa himself
during the investigation and that she had not said anything to him
about anyone being deceased.
¶29 	Anisa was also asked about this statement, through the
following exchange:

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	17 	2026 UT App 132
Prosecutor: 	Do you recall making a statement to a
West Valley police officer that the
person 	making 	[a 	claim 	of 	sexual
abuse] 	was 	a 	stepdaughter 	of 	Mr.
Hassan who is now deceased? Do you
recall making that statement?
Anisa: 	Deceased?
Prosecutor: 	Yes.
Anisa: 	What?
Prosecutor: 	Yes. Did you make a statement to a
police officer in 2021 that the person
making 	the 	[claim] 	was 	a
stepdaughter who was then deceased
at the time of your conversation with
the 	police 	in 	2021. 	Do 	you 	recall
saying that?
Anisa: 	I don’t recall what you’re saying.
Prosecutor: 	Okay. Would it surprise you to know
that a West Valley City police officer
recorded in his report that he was
confused by the statement?
Anisa: 	I’m confused myself. Who is deceased?
You 	said 	stepdaughter 	who 	is 	now
deceased.
Prosecutor: 	Yes. You didn’t tell the police that?
Anisa: 	No.
Prosecutor: 	Never?

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	18 	2026 UT App 132
Anisa: 	No.
The Jury Is Instructed Not to Convict Hassan Based on Other Acts
¶30 	After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the
jury. 	One 	jury 	instruction—Instruction 	42—included 	this
directive:
[K]eep in mind that the defendant is on trial for the
crimes charged in this case, and for those crimes
only. You may not convict the defendant simply
because you believe he may have committed some
other acts at another time.
The Jury Convicts Hassan on Three Charges and Acquits Him on the
Aggravated Kidnapping Charge
¶31 	During 	closing 	argument, 	the 	State 	indicated 	which
incidents were tied to which charges. Specifically, the prosecutor
informed the jury that count one—aggravated sexual abuse of a
child—was based on Hassan touching Anisa’s vagina during the
chest-hair-picking incident on his bed in the Magna house; that
count two—rape of a child—was based on Hassan penetrating
Anisa’s vagina with his penis in the laundry room of the first West
Valley City house; that count three—object rape—was based on
Hassan digitally penetrating Anisa after checking her out of high
school while the pair were in the car parked next to a restaurant;
and that count four—aggravated kidnapping—was based on
Hassan tying Anisa up with a rope after picking her up from her
boyfriend’s house. The jury convicted Hassan on the first three
charges and acquitted him of aggravated kidnapping.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶32 	Hassan now appeals, asserting four claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	19 	2026 UT App 132
court ruling to review and we must decide whether the defendant
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of
law.” State v. Reid, 2018 UT App 146, ¶ 17, 427 P.3d 1261 (cleaned
up).
¶33 	Hassan also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the bodycam footage of police interviewing Anisa at
her high school. “We review the trial court’s determinations
regarding 	the 	admissibility 	of 	evidence 	under 	an 	abuse 	of
discretion standard.” Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, ¶ 25,
176 P.3d 464.
ANALYSIS
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶34 	Hassan 	contends 	that 	Counsel 	rendered 	ineffective
assistance in four ways: (1) by failing to make a directed verdict
motion 	asserting 	that 	Anisa’s 	testimony 	was 	inherently
improbable; (2) by failing to move for a directed verdict on the
rape of a child charge by asserting that the evidence did not
establish that Anisa was under the age of fourteen at the time of
the alleged crime; (3) by not asking the court to instruct the jury
that it could not use evidence that Hassan sexually abused Sister
as propensity evidence in support of the object rape charge; and
(4) by not demanding a jury instruction clarifying that the jury
could not convict Hassan based on evidence that he sexually
abused Sister. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that “counsel’s performance was deficient”
and that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Defendants
“must establish both deficient performance and prejudice, and if
either is lacking, the claim fails and this court need not address
the other.” State v. Bush, 2025 UT App 87, ¶ 20, 572 P.3d 449
(cleaned up), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 44 (Utah 2026).

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	20 	2026 UT App 132
¶35 	To show deficient performance, a defendant “has the
burden to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
State v. Hunter, 2021 UT 44, ¶ 68, 496 P.3d 119 (cleaned up).
“Deficient performance is not determined in a vacuum; rather, it
involves asking whether the strategy counsel employed was that
of a reasonable, competent lawyer . . . .” State v. Wilkes, 2020 UT
App 175, ¶ 24, 479 P.3d 1142 (cleaned up). “The ultimate question
is always whether, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s
acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable.” State v. Scott,
2020 UT 13, ¶ 36, 462 P.3d 350 (cleaned up).
¶36 	To 	demonstrate 	prejudice, 	“[t]he 	burden 	is 	on 	the
defendant 	to 	demonstrate 	a 	reasonable 	probability 	that 	the
outcome of his or her case would have been different absent
counsel’s 	error.” 	Id. 	¶ 	43. 	“A 	reasonable 	probability 	is 	a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of
the proceeding.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶37 	We 	address 	each 	of 	Hassan’s 	claims 	of 	ineffective
assistance in turn.
A. 	Counsel’s Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict Based on
the Argument that Anisa’s Testimony Was Inherently
Improbable
¶38 	We first consider Hassan’s assertion that Counsel should
have moved for a directed verdict based on the argument that
Anisa’s testimony was inherently improbable.
¶39 	“Though [a trial] court must ordinarily accept the jury’s
determination 	of 	witness 	credibility, 	when 	the 	witness’s
testimony is inherently improbable, the court may choose to
disregard it” when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. State
v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 16, 210 P.3d 288. “[W]itness testimony is
inherently improbable and may . . . be disregarded if it is
(1) physically impossible or (2) apparently false”—or in other
words, “incredibly dubious.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. “There are three

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	21 	2026 UT App 132
hallmarks of inherently improbable testimony that courts have
often considered in their analysis: material inconsistencies, patent
falsehoods, and lack of corroborating evidence.” State v. Barnes,
2023 UT App 148, ¶ 24, 542 P.3d 108 (cleaned up). While “our
supreme court has warned against inflexible reliance on these
three factors” and “courts must . . . keep in mind that the proper
test is, and always has been, whether reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime,” 	“courts 	are 	still 	allowed—and 	perhaps 	even
encouraged—to examine these three factors.” Id. (cleaned up). We
examine each factor here.
1. 	Material Inconsistencies
¶40 	Hassan asserts that Anisa testified inconsistently “about
when [Counselor] or [Elder] first became involved after she
disclosed the alleged abuse.” We disagree. It is true that in the
above-recited 	exchange 	between 	Anisa 	and 	the 	prosecutor
discussing the timing of the disclosures to Counselor and Elder, it
appears that Anisa went back and forth on which disclosure
occurred first. See supra ¶¶ 19–20. However, from the context of
the 	surrounding 	discussion, 	this 	was 	clearly 	due 	to 	a
misunderstanding. Anisa said, “[Mother] had called the . . .
preacher or something, or counselor, like more of a counselor for
them, but he was a . . . preacher. . . . [S]he called the counselor, the
. . . preacher, and then she told what happened to us.” The
prosecutor then asked Anisa about “the preacher, counselor,” but
his subsequent reference to the “counselor” was apparently to
Counselor because he referenced a “meeting with the counselor”
and there was no evidence of a meeting with Elder. The court
appears to have realized that two people were being referred to
as “counselor” when it asked for clarification. But then the
prosecutor asked twice whether the meeting with Counselor
occurred 	before 	Elder 	became 	involved, 	and 	Anisa 	gave
conflicting answers. After the prosecutor again clarified, Anisa
consistently said that the meeting with Counselor came after
Elder became involved. The prosecutor then asked Anisa how

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	22 	2026 UT App 132
much time elapsed between the events, and she clearly did not
understand the question until it was repeated a third time,
eventually answering that it was “like a year.” This exchange
demonstrates that Anisa had difficulty understanding what the
prosecutor was asking given (1) the use of “counselor” to refer to
both Counselor and Elder, (2) the complex nature of the role Elder
played—including 	acting 	like 	a 	counselor, 	and 	(3) 	English
apparently being Anisa’s second language (as evidenced by
Mother and Hassan relying on interpreters to testify, the fact that
Anisa was going on six years old when the family moved from
Kenya to the United States, and Anisa’s obvious confusion over
some words, including “elapsed”). In short, this was not a true
inconsistency, let alone a material one.
¶41 	Hassan also claims that Anisa’s testimony was inconsistent
as to “whether [he] touched her chest during the alleged incident
where she claimed she was picking his chest hair.” Anisa testified
that the sexual abuse began when Hassan “start[ed] touching
[her] private parts[,] as in [her] vagina and [her] chest areas.” The
prosecutor asked Anisa, “When was the first time you remember
something like that happening?” And she replied, “I don’t
remember exactly the first time, but I remember a period of time
of what he had done and that was more in Magna . . . .” The
prosecutor asked what Hassan did in Magna, and Anisa began
describing Hassan inserting his fingers into her vagina while she
“pick[ed] his chest hair,” using language that made it sound as if
such 	incidents 	happened 	more 	than 	once. 	The 	prosecutor
followed this up with questions about the Magna house, the
growing family, the chest-hair picking, where those events took
place, and what clothes Anisa would wear during these incidents.
The prosecutor then asked, “And so when Hassan would ask you
to pick at his chest hairs, what would happen next?” Anisa
responded, “He would either touch my chest or just start touching
on me, either outside the clothes or my butt. He would just feel on
me.” Anisa then described the specific incident recited above, see
supra ¶ 3, saying, “I remember the bedtime incident one time.”
The 	prosecutor 	asked 	several 	questions 	about 	“that 	time,”

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	23 	2026 UT App 132
including, “Do you remember his hand touching you anywhere
else?” And Anisa responded negatively. Then the prosecutor
asked, “On any other occasion do you remember his hand
touching you anywhere else?” This time, Anisa replied, “Yes.”
The prosecutor asked where, and Anisa said, “On my butt and on
my vagina.” The prosecutor asked, “The time he touched you on
your butt, where was that?” Anisa replied, “In the laundry room,”
and she then went on to describe the laundry room incident
recounted above. See supra ¶ 4.
¶42 	Anisa did not explicitly deny that Hassan touched her
“chest” 	after 	initially 	saying 	he 	did 	so. 	And 	we 	see 	no
inconsistency between her saying he sometimes touched her chest
and her saying he did not do so during the particular “bedtime
incident” 	she 	described. 	However, 	even 	if 	there 	was 	an
inconsistency here, this is the sort of detail that is routinely left
to the judgment of the jury to consider while determining
credibility and finding facts. “Inconsistent testimony, conflicting
stories, and varying degrees of credibility are the hallmarks of a
trial. The inherent improbability standard is not satisfied where
the appellant raises garden-variety credibility questions, such as .
. . which version of a witness’s conflicting account to believe.”
State v. Corona, 2025 UT App 93, ¶ 28, 574 P.3d 988 (cleaned up),
cert. denied, 574 P.3d 525 (Utah 2025). “It is the jury’s prerogative
to weigh the evidence, infer the material facts from it, and apply
the law stated in the jury instructions to the facts.” Id. (cleaned
up).
¶43 	Hassan also asserts inherent improbability stemming from
the statement in the 2021 police report indicating that Anisa told
police “the stepdaughter of Mr. Hassan who was abused is now
deceased.” Detective testified that the note was not his, that he
“was confused by that statement,” that he had spoken to Anisa
himself during the investigation, and that she had not said
anything to him about anyone being deceased. Anisa made no
such statement under oath, and she expressed confusion when
asked about it at trial, testifying that she did not understand the

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	24 	2026 UT App 132
statement and had never made such a statement. The officer who
noted this in the report did not testify at trial and was therefore
unable to explain it. Accordingly, this was just one more piece of
information 	for 	the 	jury 	to 	weigh 	when 	assessing 	Anisa’s
credibility. See id. ¶¶ 21–22 (“While [the chief witness’s] testimony
may have contained some inconsistencies, we have pointed out
that . . . it would be a rare case in which defense counsel could
identify no inconsistencies in the account given by the State’s
main witness. . . . The inconsistencies in the evidence must, at the
very 	least, 	be 	substantial 	for 	a 	witness’s 	testimony 	to 	be
considered inherently improbable.” (cleaned up)).
¶44 	Hassan further contends that Anisa’s testimony “was
inconsistent because the prosecutor moved to dismiss [five]
charges of sexual offenses based on [Anisa’s] trial testimony.” The
State is permitted to move to dismiss charges to align with the
evidence presented at trial, see Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d) (“The court
may permit an information to be amended after the trial has
commenced but before verdict if no additional or different offense
is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not
prejudiced.”), and Hassan has not argued that he was prejudiced
by the dismissal of the five charges. More importantly considering
that 	Hassan 	raises 	this 	point 	in 	the 	context 	of 	inherent
improbability, Hassan does not direct us to any earlier sworn
statements Anisa made that provided the grounds upon which
the five additional charges were based and that contradicted her
trial testimony. Therefore, Hassan has not carried his burden of
persuasion on this point. See, e.g., Pinder v. Duchesne County Sheriff,
2020 UT 68, ¶ 36, 478 P.3d 610 (“An appellant must provide
sufficient argument for ruling in its favor. To do that, the
appellant’s brief must assert contentions of error that occurred in
the proceedings below and develop a reasoned argument for why
the purported errors should be reversed. An appellant who fails
to adequately brief an issue will almost certainly fail to carry its
burden of persuasion on appeal.” (cleaned up)).

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	25 	2026 UT App 132
2. 	Patent Falsehoods
¶45 	Hassan suggests that Anisa’s testimony that she ran down
the stairs during the conflict over her boyfriend was patently false
because, he asserts, it was physically impossible for her to run
down the stairs in light of her testimony that she was tied up with
a rope. Hassan is mistaken. Anisa testified that a single rope was
used to tie her hands and feet together while she sat in a “squat
position.” She explained that she “managed to get the rope out of
[her] hands [be]cause it wasn’t tied very tightly” and that the rope
“was . . . kind of still on” her while she ran downstairs. It is
plausible that a person could be ambulant in such a situation, the
rope being loose enough to untie at the hands and loosened at the
feet by the freeing of the hands. Therefore, this detail was not
physically impossible and, thus, not patently false.
3. 	Lack of Corroborating Evidence
¶46 	Hassan argues that Anisa’s “claims of sexual abuse are
uncorroborated.” He takes issue with the lack of DNA evidence
and the fact that no exam was performed by a sexual assault nurse
examiner (SANE). But Anisa testified that she was not ready to
report the abuse to police until years after the abuse ended, and
Hassan does not explain how DNA evidence of the abuse could
have been obtained then or how a SANE exam would have been
useful so long after the abuse. This type of evidence is not
required for a jury to convict on these charges, nor does its
absence inherently detract from Anisa’s credibility.
¶47 	Hassan also emphasizes that Mother did not testify to
seeing the abuse during the chest-hair-picking incident despite
Anisa testifying that Mother was in the same room at the time. But
this is easily explainable. Anisa testified that Mother was sitting
on a mattress on the floor, while the bed Hassan and Anisa were
on “was very high” and that she was not sure Mother could have
seen the touching.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	26 	2026 UT App 132
¶48 	Hassan further contends that “no witness corroborated the
alleged [sexual] abuse.” While it is true that no witness testified to
seeing the alleged abuse, “corroborating evidence sufficient to
defeat 	an 	inherent 	improbability 	claim 	does 	not 	have 	to
corroborate the witness’s account across the board, in every
particular. It just has to provide a second source of evidence for at
least some of the details of the witness’s story.” State v. Corona,
2025 UT App 93, ¶ 25, 574 P.3d 988 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 574
P.3d 525 (Utah 2025). Here, multiple witnesses provided evidence
supporting various details of Anisa’s testimony.
¶49 	Sister testified that Anisa disclosed to her that Hassan was
“touching [her] body” and “forcing [her] to do something that
[she did not] want to do.” Mother testified that she spoke to Elder
about Hassan’s sexual abuse, which conversation occurred after
Sister and Anisa together told Mother that Hassan had sexually
abused them. It was undisputed that Anisa disclosed sexual abuse
to Counselor and that Counselor, as a mandatory reporter,
reported to police that there was a concern about safety in Anisa’s
home. See generally Utah Code § 80-2-602(1) (requiring that if a
qualifying individual “has reason to believe that a child is, or has
been, the subject of abuse or neglect, . . . the person shall
immediately report the suspected abuse or neglect to [DCFS] or to
the nearest peace officer or law enforcement agency”). And
Detective 	corroborated 	Anisa’s 	disclosure 	of 	the 	abuse 	to
Pittsburgh police. The various witnesses’ testimony regarding
Anisa and Sister’s disclosure to Mother, Anisa’s disclosures to
Counselor and law enforcement, Mother’s disclosure to Elder,
and Elder’s response all supported aspects of Anisa’s overall
account, even if they did not directly corroborate the abuse itself.
See Corona, 2025 UT App 93, ¶ 25; see also State v. Crespo, 2017 UT
App 	219, 	¶ 	31, 409 P.3d 	99 	(“Because 	other circumstantial
evidence existed to corroborate [a witness’s] account of the events,
the Robbins improbability test does not apply.”); cf. State v. Saddler,
2004 UT 105, ¶ 24, 104 P.3d 1265 (“In addition, [a detective] was
able to verify other, more innocent details provided by the

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	27 	2026 UT App 132
confidential informant . . . . This corroboration of innocent details
further boosts the confidential informant’s credibility.”).
¶50 	Furthermore, Mother testified that she once saw Hassan
coming out of Sister’s bedroom in the middle of the night, that he
was “holding onto his clothes,” and that he apologized and said
it would not happen again. And Sister testified that Hassan
sexually abused her at night in her room multiple times, including
on the night Mother saw Hassan exiting her room. While Hassan
is correct that “this evidence alone cannot sustain convictions for
conduct that allegedly occurred against [Anisa],” it is properly
considered 	corroborating 	propensity 	evidence 	further
discrediting Hassan’s inherent improbability claim as to the
aggravated sexual abuse of a child and rape of a child charges
(though not as to the object rape charge, see infra ¶ 63).
¶51 	Hassan also specifically asserts that Anisa’s testimony
underlying 	the 	aggravated 	kidnapping 	charge 	was
uncorroborated by other witnesses or by photos of the black eye.
As an initial matter, we note that Hassan has pointed to no case
law supporting an interpretation of our inherent improbability
standard to require corroboration of each charged offense. In fact,
the opposite is true: “our inherent-improbability case law does
not require evidence corroborating the specific-offense conduct or
elements of the offense.” State v. Jok, 2019 UT App 138, ¶ 25, 449
P.3d 	610, 	aff’d, 	2021 	UT 	35, 	493 	P.3d 	665. 	Therefore, 	the
corroborating 	evidence 	listed 	above 	is 	sufficient 	to 	defeat
Hassan’s inherent improbability claim. And we further note that
on this charge the jury acquitted Hassan, performing its job of
weighing each charge separately and concluding that it could not
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hassan tied Anisa up with a
rope, which is consistent with Mother’s testimony that it was
Sister who tied up Anisa because Sister was concerned about
Mother’s pregnancy.
¶52 	But at any rate, there was evidence corroborating that both
the boyfriend incident and the black eye injury occurred. Mother

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	28 	2026 UT App 132
and Sister each recalled there being a conflict concerning a
boyfriend, and Mother admitted that Anisa had been tied up with
a rope. Additionally, Mother and Sister agreed that Anisa had a
black eye, though they linked the injury to a scuffle with Sister. In
other words, Mother’s and Sister’s testimony corroborated basic
facts regarding the incident underlying the kidnapping charge:
that there was a family conflict regarding Anisa’s boyfriend, that
Anisa was tied up during this conflict, and that at some point
Anisa got a black eye. Detective also testified that there was a
DCFS report that “mentioned abuse and a black eye,” further
corroborating these events. And while Detective did not recall
seeing photographs of the black eye, that does not mean no photos
were taken some nine years earlier by someone whom Anisa
believed 	was a 	“school 	cop.” 	Thus, 	Detective’s information
provided “a second source of evidence for at least some of the
details of the witness’s story.” Corona, 2025 UT App 93, ¶ 25
(cleaned up).
¶53 	Again, disagreements between the witnesses as to the
details of any particular incident—including, as regards the
boyfriend incident and as emphasized by Hassan, whether a knife
was 	involved, 	whether 	Anisa 	was 	stripped 	down 	to 	her
underwear, whether Hassan and the siblings beat her, and who
tied her up—are the types of disagreements that are at the core of
a jury’s factfinding role. See id. ¶ 28 (“The inherent improbability
standard is not satisfied where the appellant raises garden-variety
credibility questions, such as which witness to believe . . . .”
(cleaned up)); see also State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 39, 392 P.3d 398
(“The question of which version of [multiple witnesses’] stories
was more credible is the type of question we routinely require
juries to answer.”). Rather, “for [Hassan] to succeed on this
element of inherent improbability, he must show that there was a
complete 	lack 	of 	any 	additional 	circumstantial 	evidence
supporting the verdict. He has failed to do so.” See Jok, 2019 UT
App 138, ¶ 25.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	29 	2026 UT App 132
¶54 	Finally, Hassan asserts that—beyond the three hallmarks
associated with inherent improbability—“reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that [Hassan] committed the
crimes of which he was convicted,” see id. ¶ 19 (cleaned up),
because 	Anisa 	testified 	that 	she 	“frame[d]” 	Hassan. 	But
reasonable minds could have concluded that Anisa used this
word 	mistakenly. 	As 	noted 	above, 	Anisa 	apparently 	spoke
English as a second language and sometimes had difficulty
understanding 	and 	answering 	questions 	posed 	to 	her. 	For
example, at one point, Anisa asked the prosecutor what he meant
by “precipitate,” and she seemed to struggle to understand other
words, including “elapsed.”
¶55 	Moreover, the context surrounding this statement supports
that the word was used in misunderstanding. Anisa’s comment
about “fram[ing]” Hassan came in response to the prosecutor’s
question, “[A]t what point did you feel that you were able to come
forward and talk about what happened? Do you remember when
that was?” Anisa replied that she disclosed the abuse to Mother
and Counselor in order to alert them to the situation, and then she
said, “But like to actually frame him and get my justice was after
my third birthday party for my daughter.” After this, Anisa
reiterated that her inability to see Mother and her siblings for her
daughter’s birthday made her angry. But this does not mean she
fabricated the abuse to get back at Hassan for something else.
Indeed, she said she wanted to “get [her] justice,” which is
reasonably interpreted as referring to justice for enduring years of
abuse and for Hassan continuing to exert indirect control over her
by refusing to allow Mother and the siblings to visit her. The
prosecutor then asked Anisa multiple times if she had “ever lie[d]
to anyone about what Mr. Hassan had done to [her],” and she
said, “Never. No.” Based on the language barriers and context,
reasonable jurors could interpret Anisa’s use of “frame” as
meaning “expose” and understand that Anisa did not mean that
her testimony was fabricated.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	30 	2026 UT App 132
¶56 	Ultimately, we do not agree that reasonable jurors must
have entertained reasonable doubts about Hassan’s guilt, and in
our view reasonable counsel would have understood as much.
Counsel did not perform deficiently in forgoing a directed verdict
motion based on inherent improbability, because Counsel could
have reasonably expected the court to deny the motion. See State
v. Corona, 2025 UT App 93, ¶ 29, 574 P.3d 988 (“There was no
inherent improbability here, and thus, counsel did not perform
deficiently because reasonable counsel could have concluded that
a Robbins motion and a directed verdict motion would have been
futile.” (cleaned up)), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 525 (Utah 2025).
Therefore, 	Hassan’s 	first 	claim 	of 	ineffective 	assistance 	is
unavailing.
B. 	Counsel’s Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict on the
Rape of a Child Charge
¶57 	Second, Hassan argues that Counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to move for a directed verdict on the rape of
a child charge. Again, we disagree.
¶58 	“A defendant may move for a directed verdict at the close
of the [State’s] case-in-chief by pointing to the [State’s] failure to
adduce evidence in support of an essential element of one of the
[State’s] claims.” Salo v. Tyler, 2018 UT 7, ¶ 30, 417 P.3d 581. “To
succeed on a directed verdict motion, [Hassan would have been]
required to show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the State, no evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime.” See
State v. Spencer, 2025 UT App 171, ¶ 23, 582 P.3d 847 (cleaned up),
cert. denied, 585 P.3d 46 (Utah 2026).
¶59 	Here, Hassan contends that a motion for a directed verdict
on the rape of a child charge would have been successful because
conviction for rape of a child requires that the victim be “younger
than 14 years old,” Utah Code § 76-5-402.1(1)(a)(i), (2), and that
the evidence could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	31 	2026 UT App 132
Anisa was under the age of fourteen at the time of the laundry
room incident.6 As recited above, Anisa testified that the laundry
room incident happened when she was in “about seventh grade”
and that she did not recall how old she was at the time.
Admittedly, these statements are ambiguous as to her age at the
time of this incident. However, that is not all she said. On cross-
examination, Counsel questioned Anisa about “the point in time
that’s about the seventh grade,” an apparent reference to the time
when the laundry room incident occurred. He said, “I’ll represent
to you that seventh graders are twelve and turn thirteen typically,
traditionally during their seventh grade year. So that would have
been about 2011. Is that correct?” Anisa initially replied, “I don’t
know what year it would have been.” However, Counsel asked
the follow-up question, “But you don’t believe that’s inaccurate,
the 2011/2012 school year?” to which Anisa answered, “I believe
that’s accurate.” This testimony confirming that it was accurate to
say that the point in time when the laundry room incident
occurred was during the 2011/2012 school year was sufficient to
support a finding that the laundry room incident happened
between August 2011 and May 2012. Anisa also testified that she
was born in December 1998 and that she began kindergarten in
the fall of 2004. And Hassan himself testified, “Whenever I have
to go to the school where she was seventh grade, sixth grade, she
would be eleven years old, twelve years old.” Based on all of this
evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Anisa began
seventh grade in 2011 and that she turned thirteen in December
of that year—or, in other words, that Anisa was under fourteen
6. Hassan asserts that “the rape of a child charge could have been
based on two alleged incidents—a laundry room incident and a
master bedroom incident.” Because Anisa testified that both of
these incidents occurred when she was in “about seventh grade”
and the prosecutor informed the jury that the rape of a child
charge was based on the laundry room incident, we limit our
analysis to that incident.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	32 	2026 UT App 132
years of age throughout the entire time between August 2011 and
May 2012.
¶60 	The circumstances here are not unlike those in State v.
Spencer, 2025 UT App 171, 582 P.3d 847, cert. denied, 585 P.3d 46
(Utah 2026). There, the defendant was also charged with rape of a
child and the victim did not directly testify regarding her age at
the time of the rape. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. But there, the State did not present
evidence of the victim’s birthday. Id. ¶ 24. Nevertheless, the victim
testified (1) of her age at trial; (2) that she did not know the season
when the rape occurred but it was “cold”; (3) that she went to the
doctor in May, which was “a couple of months” after the rape;
and (4) that the rape occurred before her birthday in the year in
question, which was around the time of the doctor appointment.
Id. ¶ 9. We stated that “viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, the evidence did allow a reasonable jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the victim] was 13 when the sex occurred
and thus that [the defendant] was guilty of rape of a child.” Id.
¶ 24. This conclusion applies here, too. The jury received evidence
upon which it could infer—without speculating—that Anisa was
under fourteen at the time of the laundry room incident, even if
Anisa did not testify directly to her age at the time. This included
testimony of Anisa’s birthdate and date of kindergarten entry, her
agreement that the incident occurred during the 2011/2012 school
year, and Hassan’s acknowledgment that she was eleven and
twelve in sixth and seventh grade. See Salt Lake City v. Carrera,
2015 UT 73, ¶ 12, 358 P.3d 1067 (“In short, the difference between
an inference and speculation depends on whether the underlying
facts support the conclusion. A jury draws a reasonable inference
if there is an evidentiary foundation to draw and support the
conclusion. In the case of speculation, however, there is no
underlying evidence to support the conclusion.”).
¶61 	Because there was evidence upon which the jury could find
Hassan guilty of rape of a child, the court was not likely to grant
a motion for a directed verdict. Therefore, Counsel did not

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	33 	2026 UT App 132
perform deficiently for failing to move for a directed verdict on
this charge.
C. 	Counsel’s Failure to Request an Instruction Against Using
Evidence of Sister’s Abuse on the Object Rape Charge
¶62 	Third, Hassan contends that Counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to request a jury instruction explaining that
the jury could not use evidence that Hassan sexually abused Sister
as propensity evidence in support of the object rape charge.
¶63 	Hassan is correct that the jury should have been instructed
that 	evidence 	of 	Sister’s abuse 	could 	not 	be 	considered 	as
propensity evidence on this charge. Rule 404(c) of the Utah Rules
of 	Evidence 	permits 	the 	admission 	of 	“other 	acts 	of 	child
molestation” 	“prov[ing] 	a 	propensity 	to 	commit 	the 	crime
charged” when “a defendant is accused of child molestation.”
Utah R. Evid. 404(c)(2)(A). “Child molestation” is defined as a
sexual offense “committed in relation to a child under the age of
14.” Id. R. 404(c)(1). Hassan was charged with object rape for
digitally penetrating Anisa’s vagina while the pair were in the car
and parked next to a restaurant after Hassan checked Anisa out
of high school. Because Anisa was in her late teens at the time, this
charge was not for object rape of a child and was not a charge of
child molestation. Compare Utah Code § 76-5-402.2 (object rape),
with id. § 76-5-402.3 (object rape of a child). Accordingly, the jury
should have been instructed that evidence of Sister’s abuse could
not be used—for propensity purposes—in reaching a verdict on
this charge, even if it could be so used on two of the other charges.
¶64 	But 	even 	assuming 	(without 	deciding) 	that 	Counsel
performed deficiently by not requesting such an instruction,
Hassan 	was 	not 	prejudiced 	by 	this 	deficiency. 	Again, 	to
demonstrate 	prejudice, 	“the 	burden 	is on 	the 	defendant 	to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of his or
her case would have been different absent counsel’s error.” State
v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 43, 462 P.3d 350 (cleaned up). Here, we are

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	34 	2026 UT App 132
not convinced that there was a reasonable likelihood of acquittal
on this charge if the jury had been properly instructed. For
starters, we disagree with Hassan’s characterization that Anisa’s
“credibility was incredibly dubious at trial.” As discussed above,
multiple 	witnesses 	corroborated 	various 	aspects 	of 	Anisa’s
testimony. See supra ¶¶ 49–50, 52. And the verdict on the child
rape and aggravated sexual abuse of a child charges confirms that
the jury did not view Anisa’s testimony as wholly incredible.
¶65 	As to the object rape charge specifically, Anisa provided
her first-hand account of the relevant incident at trial, even
identifying the restaurant Hassan parked next to. Additionally,
Sister testified that Anisa disclosed to her that Hassan was
“touching [her] body” and “forcing [her] to do something that
[she did not] want to do.” Thus, even if the jury did not factor
Sister’s 	abuse 	into 	its 	deliberations 	on 	this 	charge, 	Sister’s
testimony would have corroborated Anisa’s, and any credibility
Sister had would have reinforced Anisa’s credibility.
¶66 	Anisa’s disclosure to Counselor further corroborated the
specific object rape charge. Counselor testified that during a
meeting about Anisa’s performance in high school, Anisa became
“really upset,” was crying, and “disclosed some information . . .
[about] something that happened at home,” which prompted
Counselor to report to the police. Anisa testified that what she
disclosed to Counselor was, “[H]e sexually abuses me . . . .”
Notably, this testimony refers to abuse happening in the present
tense, and the only abuse Anisa testified occurred during high
school was the inappropriate touching in the car on days when
Hassan would check her out of school. Additionally, the questions
and remarks of the officers interviewing Anisa after her disclosure
to Counselor—which the jury heard by way of the bodycam
footage—chiefly focused on whether the children in Anisa’s
family were currently safe at home, suggesting that the officers
had likewise been informed of abuse that was ongoing at the time
of the alleged object rape. For these reasons, Anisa’s disclosure to

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	35 	2026 UT App 132
Counselor most strongly corroborated the abuse that formed the
basis of the object rape charge.
¶67 	Moreover, 	to 	evaluate 	prejudice 	under 	the 	applicable
standard 	for 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel, 	“we 	assess
counterfactual scenarios—that is, what would have happened but
for the [deficient performance].” State v. Bell, 2025 UT App 169,
¶ 23, 581 P.3d 1030 (cleaned up). “The counterfactual analysis
requires us to consider a hypothetical—an alternative universe in
which the trial went off without the error.” Id. (cleaned up). The
applicable hypothetical scenario here is one where the jury was
instructed that when considering the charges of aggravated
sexual abuse of a child and rape of a child, it could use for
propensity purposes the evidence that Hassan sexually abused
Sister but that it could not use that evidence when considering the
charge of object rape (and, for that matter, the kidnapping
charge). Given the non-propensity evidence bearing directly on
the object rape charge and the jury’s willingness to credit Anisa’s
credibility on the other sexual abuse charges, we believe there is
no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Hassan
on the object rape charge in this hypothetical scenario.
¶68 	Given the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the jury, if
instructed not to consider evidence of Sister’s abuse on the object
rape charge, would have been reasonably likely to acquit Hassan
on this charge. Because Hassan was not prejudiced by any
deficient performance on this point, his claim of ineffective
assistance fails.
D. 	Counsel’s Failure to Request an Instruction Forbidding
Conviction Based Solely on Evidence of Sister’s Abuse
¶69 	Hassan’s final ineffective assistance of counsel claim faults
Counsel for not requesting a jury instruction specifically stating
that the jury could not convict Hassan based on evidence that he
sexually abused Sister. Hassan argues that Instruction 42, recited
in relevant part above, see supra ¶ 30, “inadequately ‘instructed

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	36 	2026 UT App 132
the jury about the applicable law’ because it did not directly
address 	the 	evidence 	that 	Hassan 	allegedly 	abused 	Sister.”
(Quoting State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186, ¶ 12, 355 P.3d 1078.)
¶70 	“A party is not entitled to have the jury instructed with any
particular wording. So long as they correctly state the law, the
precise wording and specificity of jury instructions is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 60,
582 P.3d 772 (cleaned up).
¶71 	Instruction 42 informed the jury that Hassan was on trial
only for the charged crimes and that the jury could “not convict
[Hassan] simply because [it] believe[d] he may have committed
some other acts at another time.” This correctly stated the law. The
allegations regarding Hassan’s abuse of Sister clearly fell within
the term “some other acts at another time,” so the jury was
properly instructed that it could not convict based on what he was
alleged to have done to Sister.7 Because Counsel could reasonably
7. Hassan specifically asserts that Counsel should have sought an
instruction 	similar 	to 	the 	Model 	Utah 	Jury 	Instruction 	for
evidence 	admitted 	under 	rule 	404(b) 	of 	the 	Utah 	Rules 	of
Evidence. See Model Utah Jury Instructions 2d CR411 (2019),
https://legacy.utcourts.gov/muji/?cat=2 	[https://perma.cc/EPK9-
Z97D]. But the evidence of Hassan’s abuse of Sister was admitted
under rule 404(c) for the aggravated sexual abuse of a child and
rape of a child charges. We have already acknowledged that
Hassan was entitled to an instruction indicating that this evidence
could not be used for propensity purposes in connection with the
object 	rape 	charge, 	though 	we 	concluded 	Hassan 	was 	not
prejudiced by this error. This error was based on a missing
instruction and did not turn on the text of the included Instruction
42. Hassan’s desired language from the model instruction (which
limits evidence to use for non-propensity purposes) would not
have been appropriate to add to Instruction 42 because the
evidence 	in 	question 	was 	properly 	available 	as 	propensity
evidence on two of the charges.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	37 	2026 UT App 132
believe that the court would deny a request to modify the accurate
instruction, Counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to make
such an effort. Additionally, Counsel could have reasonably
decided not to highlight Sister’s testimony by insisting on a jury
instruction that called attention to it specifically, rather than an
instruction that referred more generally to “some other acts at
another time.”
¶72 	Accordingly, Hassan has not proved that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.
II. Admission of the Bodycam Footage
¶73 	Hassan has also argued that the trial court abused its
discretion 	by 	admitting 	the 	bodycam 	footage 	of 	police
interviewing Anisa at her high school. We disagree.
¶74 	“The trial court is afforded broad discretion to admit or
exclude evidence, and we will disturb its ruling only for abuse of
discretion.” Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare, 2014 UT App 40,
¶ 16, 320 P.3d 1037 (cleaned up). “Likewise, trial courts have wide
discretion 	in 	determining 	relevance, 	probative 	value, 	and
prejudice. Therefore, we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling on
evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the trial court so
abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice
resulted.” State v. Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, ¶ 16, 122 P.3d 581 (cleaned
up).
¶75 	Hassan contends that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the video because it was irrelevant and, if it had any
probative value, its probative value was substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Not so.
¶76 	“Relevance 	is 	a 	very 	low 	bar 	for 	the 	admission 	of
evidence.” State v. Swearingen, 2023 UT App 155, ¶ 11, 542 P.3d
123 (cleaned up). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	38 	2026 UT App 132
action.” Utah R. Evid. 401. Here, the bodycam footage was
relevant to whether Hassan committed the abuse Anisa alleged
because it showed Anisa’s demeanor soon after she disclosed to
Counselor that Hassan was abusing her. It also provided context
for why she did not tell the officers about the abuse. Additionally,
it was relevant because Hassan argued that Anisa had fabricated
the abuse.
¶77 	Under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, “[t]he court
may 	exclude 	relevant 	evidence 	if 	its 	probative 	value 	is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”
“The type of prejudicial evidence that calls for exclusion is
evidence that creates an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional
one.” Anderson-Wallace v. Rusk, 2021 UT App 10, ¶ 23, 482 P.3d 822
(cleaned up). Hassan asserts that this video satisfied this standard.
But like the trial court, we deem the video to be less emotional
than much of the other evidence presented in this case. The jury
heard evidence that Hassan sexually abused Anisa many times
over the course of many years, including by raping her and
repeatedly digitally penetrating her. This behavior was likely to
evoke emotion in jurors—emotion that was a natural reaction to
an adult sexually abusing a child. The video does not depict Anisa
sobbing, vocalizing emotionally, or otherwise being distraught.
Rather, she merely fails to audibly respond to officers, turns away
from them, and hides her face, while her leg bounces under her
chair. While her use of the tissue suggests that she is crying, that
much is not visible. We are simply unconvinced that this video
had any chance of pushing the jury toward a conviction based on
an improper emotional response, particularly in light of the
inherently emotional nature of such a case. Therefore, the court
properly 	determined 	that 	rule 	403’s 	prejudice 	bar 	was 	not
triggered, and it did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
video.

State v. Hassan
20240292-CA 	39 	2026 UT App 132
CONCLUSION
¶78 	Hassan has not demonstrated that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel or that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the bodycam footage. We affirm.