Tiffany Rhae Whittley v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-24-00415-CR
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TIFFANY RHAE WHITTLEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 258th District Court
Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 25352
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Appellant Tiffany Rhae Whittley

pleaded guilty to the offense of intentional injury to a child, a third-degree

felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(f). The trial court found Whittley guilty

of the offense of intentional injury to a child. The trial court sentenced her to nine

years of confinement, assessed a $2,000 fine, assessed 200 hours of community

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supervision, required her to pay $50.00 to the Polk County Crimestoppers, Inc.,

required her pay $50.00 to Childrenz Haven within ninety days, and ordered her to

attend and complete anger management classes within ninety days. On November 7,

2017, the trial court suspended the sentence and placed Whittley on community

supervision for a period of five years. In November 2019, based on certain violations

of the conditions of her community supervision, the trial court extended Whittley’s

supervision an additional year from November 7, 2022, to November 6, 2023. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.753.

Subsequently, the State filed multiple motions to revoke community

supervision. The State alleged that Whittley violated the terms and conditions of her

community supervision. Whittley pleaded “not true” to the alleged violations but

stipulated to violating condition “a” by being convicted of another criminal offense.

After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found multiple allegations

“true,” and that Whittley violated terms a, b1, d, and p of her community supervision.

The trial court revoked Whittley’s community supervision and assessed punishment

at three years of confinement.

Whittley’s appellate counsel filed an Anders brief presenting counsel’s

professional evaluation of the record and concludes that the appeal is frivolous.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.

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Crim. App. 1978). On June 24, 2025, after Whittley’s counsel filed the Anders brief,

we granted an extension for Whittley to file a pro se brief, but Whittley filed no

response.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, a court must conduct a full examination of

the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). We have reviewed the entire

record and counsel’s brief, and subject to the modification discussed below, we agree

with counsel’s evaluation that no arguable issues support the appeal. See Bledsoe v.

State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature

of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in

the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of

appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”).

Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief

the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Modifying the Judgment

We have the power to reform or modify a judgment in Anders cases to address

non-reversible error and to affirm the judgment as modified. See Tex. R. App. P.

43.2(b) (allowing appellate court to modify trial court’s judgment and affirm as

modified); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (noting a court

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of appeals may modify the lower court’s judgment by correcting or reforming

it); Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)

(exercising authority to reform judgment in Anders case and affirming trial court’s

judgment).

Here, we note that the trial court’s Judgment Revoking Community

Supervision incorrectly states that Whittley violated conditions “a, b1, d, k, l, m, p,

and q.” Subsequently, the State filed a Motion Nunc Pro Tunc, asking that the

Judgment Revoking Community Supervision be amended to reflect the correct

violations of “a, b1, d, and p.” The trial court signed an Order granting the Motion

Nunc Pro Tunc, but an amended judgment or judgment nunc pro tunc does not

appear in the clerk’s record or supplemental record. We can modify the judgment

“to make the record speak the truth.” French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1992); see Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b). Therefore, consistent with the record

in this case and the trial court’s Order granting the Motion Nunc Pro Tunc, we

modify the trial court’s Judgment Revoking Community Supervision to delete the

following conditions violated: “k,” “l,” “m,” and “q.” The judgment should now

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reflect that Whittley violated conditions “a, b1, d, and p.” We affirm the trial court’s

judgment as modified. 1

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice

Submitted on April 14, 2026
Opinion Delivered April 22, 2026
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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Whittley may challenge our decision by filing a petition for discretionary
review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.
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