Jesse James Segundo v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-23-00332-CR
__________________

JESSE JAMES SEGUNDO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23-03-03459-CR
__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Jesse James Segundo (“Appellant,” “Defendant” or “Segundo”)

appeals his conviction for violating a protective order two or more times within

twelve months—a third degree felony offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.072.

A grand jury indicted Segundo for intentionally and knowingly violating the terms

of a protective order two or more times from on or about February 14, 2023, through

February 25, 2023. The indictment also alleged that Segundo was previously

convicted of a felony offense. Segundo pleaded “not guilty.” A jury found him guilty

1
as charged in the indictment. Segundo pleaded “true” to the enhancement allegation,

and the jury found the enhancement allegation “true” and assessed punishment at

twenty years of confinement and a $10,000 fine. Segundo timely appealed raising

four issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

Evidence on Guilt or Innocence

Testimony of Jackie Muratorri

Jackie Muratorri testified that she works as a detention officer at the

Montgomery County Jail. She explained that she works on the probable cause

docket, which sometimes includes preparing paperwork in connection with an

emergency protective order and may include giving the paperwork to a judge in court

and taking paperwork back to central jail records after the probable cause court

proceedings have concluded. According to Muratorri, the accused person receives a

copy of a protective order after the court has granted it. Muratorri identified State’s

Exhibit 2 as a recording of probable cause proceedings in this case, and the exhibit

was published to the jury. Muratorri testified that the recording shows the judge hand

Muratorri a packet of papers, including a probable cause sheet and protective order,

and it also shows the Defendant signing the paperwork.

Muratorri identified State’s Exhibit 1 as an emergency protective order

against the accused, Jesse James Segundo, signed by a judge on February 6, 2023,

2
and it is also signed by Segundo. She agreed that the video in Exhibit 2 shows

Segundo signing the order in front of a probation officer.

Testimony of Suzanne Hollifield

Suzanne Hollifield testified that she is an investigator with the Montgomery

County District Attorney’s Office in the domestic violence division. She explained

that one of her duties is to access and listen to jail calls that inmates make, and those

calls are monitored and recorded. Hollifield testified that each inmate has a unique

account number, and the system used to record and save the calls includes the date

the calls were made, the numbers called, and the duration of the calls. She explained

that she listens to jail calls because sometimes they include admissions, confessions,

coercion, or apologies. She also testified that sometimes inmates will use another

inmate’s account number or PIN, but if the inmate calls a “target number[]” that the

inmate has previously called, the system will link that call to the inmate’s account.

Hollifield testified that she was familiar with Segundo, and she identified him

as the Defendant at trial. She agreed she had pulled his jail calls and had listened to

the calls he made between February 12th and 25th of 2023. She also agreed that she

recognized the voices in the calls. She recognized the victim’s voice because the

victim had a conversation with Hollifield when Hollifield served a subpoena on the

victim. Hollifield testified that she pulled Segundo’s calls that occurred between

February 12th and 25th, ten of those calls were between Segundo and the victim

3
“Kimberly[,]”1 and the victim did not answer one of those calls. Hollifield recalled

that, when she served the victim with a subpoena, they talked about the subpoena,

and Hollifield asked if Kimberly wanted a ride to the courthouse. Hollifield also

testified that she recognized Segundo’s voice because she watched the officer’s body

camera video from the date of Segundo’s arrest and heard him speaking.

Hollifield explained that Segundo was arrested on February 5, 2023, and a

copy of the indictment for that offense was admitted as State’s Exhibit 6. The

February 5th indictment reflects that Segundo was indicted for assault-family

violence for intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to “Kimberly” by

“grabbing, squeezing, and striking” her. Hollifield read from the protective order in

this case, stating in relevant part, “This order is effective upon issuance and should

remain in full force and effect for 91 days until midnight at the 8th day of May,

2023[]” and she agreed that the “start date” for the protective order was February 6,

2023.

Hollifield identified State’s Exhibit 5 as a screenshot from the Securus System

that provided Hollifield with access to listen to Segundo’s jail calls. Hollifield agreed

that State’s Exhibit 3 is a fair and accurate representation of the recorded calls she

reviewed from February of 2023. The prosecutor asked Hollifield how she was able

We refer to the victim by a pseudonym. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1)
1

(granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).
4
to authenticate the two people in these calls were Segundo and Kimberly, and the

following exchange occurred:

[Hollifield]: I can authenticate the defendant’s voice from watching
body cam video. I can authenticate the victim’s voice from a
conversation I had with her on Friday, October the 13th, in her home.

[State]: About how long was that conversation?

[Hollifield]: Five minutes.

[State]: Does she have a distinct or unique voice?

[Hollifield]: I think she does.

[State]: How would you describe it?

[Hollifield]: Sometimes, she speaks quickly, and other times, it’s raspy.
Sometimes, it’s really low, but oftentimes, it’s really fast.

[State]: And is there anything within the contents of those calls that
would also lead you to believe this conversation is between the
defendant and the victim listed in the emergency protective order?

[Hollifield]: Yes. In three of the four calls that have been tendered to
the Court, the defendant calls her by name, “[Kimberly].”

Hollifield agreed that the first call Segundo made to Kimberly was on February 14,

2023. When asked what happened in that call, Hollifield replied,

You are going to hear the defendant ask the victim to do an affidavit
and get it notarized by the Court. You are also going to hear them talk
about the name “[Reese] Segundo,” and you are going to hear him talk
about having letters sent to her from [Reese] Segundo.

5
Hollifield explained that “Reese” is Kimberly’s middle name. Hollifield also agreed

that Segundo called Kimberly on February 18, 2023, and she described that call as

follows:

The defendant is going to ask the victim if she checked the mail today
because of the mail coming under the name [Reese] Segundo. He, then,
is going to go back to talking to her about the affidavit, [and] getting it
notarized at Woodforest Bank.

Hollifield testified about a third call Segundo made to Kimberly on February 21,

2023. According to Hollifield, that call related to a commissary account where

persons outside of the jail can put money on an inmate’s commissary account to

purchase food or other items. The last call the Prosecutor asked about was made on

February 25, 2023, and Hollifield testified:

You are going to hear him ask her when she gets money, and she’s
going to tell him when she gets money. It’s going to talk about if he
gets [out] on bond without a monitor, that he can go home.

Hollifield agreed that going home was a violation of the protective order. Hollifield

testified that Segundo continued to try to call Kimberly from jail after he was

charged with violating the protective order, including making a phone call to a

person Hollifield believed was Segundo’s son in which Segundo asked for

Kimberly’s new phone number, and then another call when Segundo called

Kimberly’s new phone number on April 7, 2023. Hollifield testified that, when she

ran a report for the new number, the report showed that Segundo dialed that number

“[h]undreds[]” of times, and she recalled listening to calls where she heard Segundo
6
and Kimberly speaking. The recorded jail calls in State’s Exhibit 3 were published

to the jury.

Hollifield identified State’s Exhibit 7 as a report from the Securus System for

Kimberly’s new phone number, and the report showed forty-seven calls by Segundo

from jail to that number between February 5, 2023 and May 8, 2023. According to

Hollifield, in one call she listened to, Segundo asked Kimberly to fill out a non-

prosecution affidavit and have it notarized at a bank.

Testimony of Amy Doss

Amy Doss testified that she is a Victim Assistance Coordinator for the

Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, she is bilingual, and Spanish is her

first language. She agreed that she listens to jail calls as part of her job duties. Doss

testified that she was assigned to this case, she had watched video showing Segundo

and listened to Segundo’s voice, and she identified the Defendant as Segundo.

Doss testified that she listened to a jail call from February 12, 2023, that

Suzanne Hollifield had pulled, in which Segundo identified himself. Doss explained

that she had previously watched a body camera video (with audio) of Segundo that

enabled her to identify Segundo’s voice. According to Doss, in the February 12th

jail call, Segundo spoke with his mother, and she agreed that State’s Exhibit 4 was

a fair and accurate recording of that call. Doss described the call as follows:

. . . Mr. Segundo tells his mother that he has papers that the victim needs
to sign, that he cannot talk to the victim or they will file more charges
7
on him, “they,” referring to the district attorney’s office. He tells his
mom to tell the victim to write to him under a different name, not to put
her name. He specifically designates a name of [Reese] Segundo when
she writes to him.

State’s Exhibit 4 was published to the jury.

After the State rested, the defense rested. The Defendant called no witnesses

and did not offer any evidence. The jury found Segundo guilty as charged in the

indictment.

Punishment Phase Evidence

In an enhancement paragraph in the indictment, the State alleged that Segundo

was convicted of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft in 1999 and

that conviction became final before he committed the offense for which he was

charged in this case. Segundo pleaded “true” to the enhancement allegation.

Testimony of Sergeant David Stovall

Sergeant David Stovall testified that he is an investigator with the

Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office and a fingerprint comparison expert.

He testified that he has been in law enforcement for over thirty years and has

fingerprinted “thousands of people.” Stovall explained that the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice creates a penitentiary packet or “pen packet” for each person who

is convicted of an offense, and the pen packet includes multiple identifiers, including

the person’s name, date of birth, driver’s license number, social security number,

previous convictions and their trial cause numbers, and a state or county ID number.
8
Stovall testified that when he is trying to prove up a judgment for a prior conviction,

he starts with fingerprints obtained when the person was arrested for the current

offense, and he compares the other information in the pen packet to the defendant’s

information. Stovall agreed that he used this methodology when reviewing the

documents in State’s Exhibits P1 through P23.

Stovall testified that he began his review by taking fingerprints from Segundo

the day before Stovall testified so that his starting point would be the fingerprints he

knew were from Segundo. State’s Exhibit P1 is a 1994 judgment for misdemeanor

theft that Stovall testified “only has identifiers[]” and not fingerprints. However,

Stovall testified that he was able to tie Exhibit P1 to Segundo through use of a DPS

fingerprint card that included Segundo’s name, his criminal history, the cause

number, arrest date, the date of the offense, and the judgment date. Based on the

totality of the evidence, Stovall was able to conclude that P1 “belongs to Mr.

Segundo.”

Stovall identified State’s Exhibit P1-A as a “certified DPS ten card[,]” and

Stovall testified that the card includes a tracking number found on Segundo’s

criminal history and date of offense that closely matches the 1994 judgment. Stovall

testified that he also used the right thumbprint from the card to link the judgment in

Exhibit P1 to Segundo.

9
Stovall identified State’s Exhibits P3 through P5 representing a judgment for

Segundo, a revocation, and a pen packet for a 1999 conviction for felony burglary

of a habitation with intent to commit theft. The prosecutor asked the trial court to

take judicial notice that Segundo pleaded “true” to this judgment, as alleged in the

indictment. Stovall also connected the following exhibits to prior convictions for

Segundo:

• a 1997 judgment for misdemeanor possession of marijuana (State’s
Exhibit P2);
• a 1997 judgment for misdemeanor evading arrest (State’s Exhibit
P6);
• a 2004 judgment for misdemeanor criminal trespass (State’s Exhibit
P8);
• a 2005 judgment for misdemeanor theft (State’s Exhibits P9 and 9-
A);
• a 2005 judgment for misdemeanor possession of marijuana (State’s
Exhibits P10 and P10-A);
• a 2006 judgment adjudicating guilt for possession of cocaine (state
jail felony) (State’s Exhibit P11);
• a 2007 judgment for felony theft (state jail felony) (State’s Exhibits
P12 and P12-A);
• a 2008 judgment for misdemeanor possession or use of abusable
volatile (State’s Exhibits P13 and P13-A);
• a 2008 judgment for misdemeanor assault on a family member
(State’s Exhibits P14 and P14-A);
• a 2008 judgment for misdemeanor failure to identify oneself to a
peace officer (State’s Exhibits P15 and P15-A);
• a 2010 judgment for attempted assault on a family member, second
offender (State’s Exhibit P16);
• a 2012 judgment for trespass to property/building, no depart (State’s
Exhibit P17);
• a 2012 judgment for interference with duties of a public servant
(State’s Exhibit P18);

10
• a 2014 judgment for attempted felon in possession of a weapon
(State’s Exhibits P19 and P20);
• a 2016 judgment for felony theft-third offender (state jail felony)
(State’s Exhibits P21 and P21-A);
• a 2018 judgment for misdemeanor assault of a family member by
impeding breath or circulation of the complainant’s neck or throat
(State’s Exhibits P22 and P22-A); and
• a 2018 judgment for attempted assault on a public servant (state jail
felony) (State’s Exhibit P23).

Stovall testified that three judgments for Segundo included copies of charging

instruments indicating that Kimberly was the victim or complainant in: the 2008

judgment for assault on a family member, the 2010 judgment for attempted assault

on a family member, and the 2018 judgment for assault of a family member. Stovall

testified that some of the felony charges were reduced to state jail offenses, and some

of the felonies were reduced to misdemeanors. Stovall also agreed that after all these

prior judgments, Segundo had served only two years in the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice.

Testimony of Ross Hutto

Ross Hutto testified that he was a Senior Police Officer with the Houston

Police Department in the Northeast Patrol Division, and he was assigned to a case

in 2016 where Segundo was the defendant and Kimberly was the victim. He

identified State’s Exhibits P24 through P29 and P31 through P33 as copies of photos

he took during that investigation, and the exhibits were published to the jury. Hutto

explained that Exhibit P24 includes the case number and the date December 14,

11
2016. Hutto agreed that the offense report number matched the case number in

Exhibit P22, which is a judgment for assault of a family member and shows “Date

of Offense: 12/14/16” and he took the photos referenced above on that offense. Hutto

identified Kimberly in the photos. Hutto testified that Exhibit P25 shows Kimberly

with “[d]ry blood around the lips and swelling of the nose[,]” P26 shows abrasions

on the front of her neck, P27 shows bruising and abrasions, P28 shows bruising and

abrasions on the back of her neck, P31 shows bruising and abrasions on the left side

of her neck, and P32 shows her left earlobe that was severed and that “[i]t appears

possible an earring was ripped out[.]”

Additional Testimony of Suzanne Hollifield

Suzanne Hollifield gave additional testimony about the recorded jail calls

about which she had previously testified. She testified that at one point, Segundo

admitted he was guilty of assaulting the victim in this case, he said, “All I did was

scratch your little, f**king neck[,]” and in one of the calls he also tried to entice

Kimberly to commit a crime—namely, selling Xanax—so she could put more money

into his jail account. Hollifield also agreed that in one of the jail calls to Kimberly,

Segundo told Kimberly that she needed to be on the same page with him and that

she needed to be a “boss” and not a “flunky.”

12
After the State rested, the defense rested without calling any witnesses. The

jury found the enhancement allegation “true” and assessed punishment at twenty

years of confinement and a fine of $10,000. Segundo timely filed a Notice of Appeal.

Issues

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

finding that the State had adequately authenticated the jail calls in State’s Exhibit 3.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

finding that the State had established that State’s Exhibits P1 and P1-A adequately

linked Appellant to the prior felony conviction alleged as an enhancement in the

indictment. In his third issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to

support his conviction. And in his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the judgment

should be reformed to eliminate court costs because he was found indigent and there

was no material change in his circumstances.

Authentication of Jail Calls
(Issue One)

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

overruling his objection to State’s Exhibit 3 (recorded jail calls) because the voices

on the recordings were not adequately authenticated. According to Appellant, there

was “no testimony to indicate that [Investigator Hollifield] had listened to the jail

calls only after meeting with [Kimberly] and reviewing the [body camera] footage

so as to substantiate her identification of the voices.” Appellant contends that
13
because Hollifield had not talked with Kimberly and Segundo on multiple occasions,

her testimony was insufficient to identify their voices and authenticate the exhibit.

In addition, Appellant argues that Kimberly disregarded her subpoena and did not

appear at trial, so the jury was not able to make its own determination whether the

woman’s voice in the jail calls was Kimberly’s.

We review a trial court’s ruling on authentication for an abuse of discretion.

Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under this deferential

standard, if the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, an

appellate court must uphold the court’s admissibility decision. Id.; Tienda v. State,

358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Rule 901 outlines the authentication

requirement for the admissibility of evidence, and it requires the proponent of an

item of evidence to “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is

what the proponent claims it is.” Tex. R. Evid. 901(a). “As with evidence in general,

authenticating evidence may be direct or circumstantial.” Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d

595, 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

Rule 901(b) provides a nonexclusive list of methods for authenticating

evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 901(b). Evidence may be authenticated in several ways,

including by direct testimony from a witness with personal knowledge, by

comparison with other authenticated evidence, or by circumstantial evidence.

Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638; see Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 602 (noting that authenticating

14
evidence may be direct or circumstantial). Further, authenticity may be established

with evidence of “‘distinctive characteristics and the like,’ including ‘[t]he

appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics

of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.’ Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(4).”

Acosta v. State, No. AP-77,092, 2024 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 225, at *100

(Tex. Crim. App. June 5, 2024) (per curiam).

One way in which a voice can be identified is with “[a] [person’s] opinion

identifying a voice—whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic

transmission or recording—based on hearing the voice at any time under

circumstances that connect it with the alleged speaker.” See Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(5);

see also Hasley v. State, 786 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1989, pet.

ref’d). So, a witness is qualified to identify voices in a recording for the purposes of

authentication under Rule 901 if the witness has had conversations with the speaker

or if the witness has heard the voice under circumstances that connect it with the

alleged speaker. Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(5); Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 67-68

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (the officer was qualified to make an identification

of the speakers because he had carried on a conversation with them). Similarly,

recorded jail cell calls can be sufficiently authenticated by a witness who is “familiar

with the voices” on the calls, or who testifies about other factors that exist to identify

the speakers. Long v. State, No. 09-15-00295-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4221, at

15
**4-5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 10, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (finding the recorded jail calls were sufficiently authenticated based on

testimony by witnesses who were “familiar” with defendant’s voice and the calls

were made by an inmate at the jail, on the jail recording system, using the inmate’s

identification number); see also Martinez v. State, No. 08-19-00046-CR, 2021 Tex.

App. LEXIS 1023, at **16-17 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (concluding recorded jail calls were sufficiently

authenticated where administrator for the jail phone system testified the recordings

were made through the jail’s phone call recording system while defendant was in jail

by someone using the defendant’s unique identification number); Raper v. State, No.

05-12-01047-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 12332, at **3-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept.

30, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that

recorded jail calls were sufficiently authenticated based on circumstances

connecting the recordings with defendant where police investigator testified that the

calls were linked to defendant’s unique identification number when he was booked

into jail and the caller referred to the complaining witness in the calls).

The authentication requirement is a liberal standard of admissibility. Fowler,

544 S.W.3d at 848-49 (quoting Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600). The proponent must

produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find

genuineness. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. Conclusive proof of authenticity is not

16
required. Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848. The trial court need only make a preliminary

determination that the proponent of the evidence has supplied facts sufficient to

support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic. Id.

at 849. It is up to the jury to make the final determination of whether the evidence is

what the proponent claims it to be. Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600. Error in the admission

of evidence is nonconstitutional error that we disregard unless the error affected the

appellant’s substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Johnson v. State, 967

S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

Here, Suzanne Hollifield testified that the recordings were made at the

Montgomery County Jail through the jail’s phone call recording system, while

Segundo was in jail, by an inmate utilizing Segundo’s unique personal identification

number and to phone numbers that Segundo had previously called using his unique

personal identification number. Hollifield testified that she recognized Kimberly’s

voice in the recorded jail calls based on her own conversation with Kimberly when

serving Kimberly with a subpoena, and she testified that Kimberly’s voice was

distinctive in that “[s]ometimes, she speaks quickly, and other times, it’s raspy.

Sometimes, it’s really low, but oftentimes, it’s really fast.” Hollifield further testified

that she recognized Segundo’s voice because she had viewed the officer’s body

camera video from when Segundo was arrested. In addition, Hollifield testified that

in three of the calls, Segundo called Kimberly by her name.

17
The illustrations for authentication in Rule 901(b) are not exhaustive, and they

do not limit the general provisions in Rule 901(a). See Morris v. State, 460 S.W.3d

190, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Other means of

authenticating the identity of the speakers’ voices in a telephone call include

evidence such as the context of the telephone call, the contents of the statements

made during the telephone call, and disclosure of knowledge and facts known

particularly to the speakers. Id. (citing Mosley v. State, 355 S.W.3d 59, 69 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)). Hollifield testified that, in the jail calls,

Segundo is heard telling Kimberly to watch her mail for letters from “[Reese]

Segundo[,]” and Reese is Kimberly’s middle name. In addition, Hollifield testified

that she retrieved the recorded calls from the jail system, that each inmate has a

unique account number to use in making phone calls, and that she had pulled the

calls associated with Segundo’s unique account number.

Therefore, we conclude the trial court could have reasonably found that

Hollifield’s identification of Kimberly’s voice was based on her personal

knowledge, and Hollifield’s identification of Segundo’s voice was based on her

hearing Segundo speak in the body camera video when he was arrested, as well as

other identifiers from the context and content of the telephone calls. See Tex. R.

Evid. 901(b)(5); Angleton, 971 S.W.2d at 67-68; Hasley, 786 S.W.2d at 734. On this

record, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in making a preliminary

18
determination that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a reasonable

jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic. See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d

at 849; Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 639-40. Finding no error in the court’s ruling that the

jail calls were sufficiently authenticated, we need not examine whether Appellant

was harmed. See Burleson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

(Baird, J., concurring) (“[W]ithout error there can be no harm[.]”). We overrule

Appellant’s first issue.

Admission of Punishment Exhibits
(Issue Two)

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting

State’s Exhibits P1 and P1-A relating to a 1994 felony conviction. According to

Appellant, Exhibit P1 is “barely legible” and contains no descriptors except for the

first and last name of the person convicted and a conviction date of December 1,

1994. Appellant further contends that Exhibits P1 and P1-A reflect different dates of

the offense. Exhibits P1 and P1-A are for a 1994 offense, which is not the 1999

conviction the State alleged in the enhancement paragraph. The State offered

Exhibits P3 through P5 in support of the 1999 conviction for burglary of a habitation

with intent to commit theft. Appellant does not challenge those exhibits, and he

pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph.

“[T]o establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the
19
defendant is linked to that conviction.” Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016) (citing Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007)). No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two

elements. Id. Evidence of a certified copy of a final judgment and sentence may be

a preferred and convenient means, but the State may use other types of evidence to

prove an enhancement. Id. Examples of acceptable evidence include the admission

or stipulation of the defendant, testimony by people present at the time of the

defendant’s conviction and who can identify the defendant as the person convicted,

and documentary proof which contains sufficient information to establish that a prior

conviction exists and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted. Id. (citing

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921-22).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has indicated the process used by the State of

proving up prior convictions closely resembles putting together a “‘jigsaw puzzle.’”

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923 (quoting Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 835-36 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1988) (op. on reh’g)). Ultimately, it is for the factfinder to consider the

totality of the evidence admitted and determine (1) whether there was a previous

conviction, and (2) whether the defendant was the person convicted. Id. If these two

elements can be found beyond a reasonable doubt, then the pieces used to complete

the “jigsaw puzzle” are necessarily legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction. Id.

In addition, any alleged missing data in the evidence or inconsistencies with other

20
evidence would go to the weight, and not the authenticity, of the challenged exhibits.

See Robinson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc);

Hasley, 786 S.W.2d at 735.

Additionally, if a defendant pleads “true” to an enhancement paragraph, that

relieves the State of its evidentiary burden to prove the enhancement allegations and

the defendant cannot complain on appeal that the evidence is insufficient, unless the

record affirmatively reflects that the enhancements were improper. See Hopkins v.

State, 487 S.W.3d 583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Roberson v. State, 420

S.W.3d 832, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)); Magic v. State, 217 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

The record here reflects that Segundo pleaded true to the enhancement

paragraph. The jury charge included the following instruction: “To the allegation in

Enhancement Paragraph 1 of the indictment, the defendant has pleaded ‘True.’

Therefore, you are instructed to find Enhancement Paragraph [1] to be ‘True.’”

Appellant does not argue that State’s Exhibits P1 and P1-A affirmatively reflect that

the enhancement was improper or that the prior conviction as charged in the

indictment was not final. See Hopkins, 487 S.W.3d at 586; Roberson, 420 S.W.3d at

838. Any inconsistencies between the exhibits would go to their weight, and not their

authenticity. Robinson, 739 S.W.2d at 802; Hasley, 786 S.W.2d at 735. We overrule

Appellant’s second issue.

21
Sufficiency of the Evidence
(Issue Three)

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to

support the jury’s finding of guilt because the evidence was not credible. Appellant

argues:

There was no proof offered in the case that [Kimberly] was ever harmed
by Appellant in 2023: no bruises, 911 call, hospital records, etc.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that [Kimberly] was intimidated by
or frightened of Appellant. In fact, all the evidence proved that
[Kimberly] wanted Appellant to contact her.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational factfinder could

have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007). We give deference to the factfinder’s responsibility to fairly resolve

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. If the record contains

conflicting inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved such facts in

favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d

893, 899 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326); Clayton v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury as factfinder is the

sole judge of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses, and a jury

may believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. See Febus
22
v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Margraves v. State,

34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Laster

v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)); Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d

500, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence

nor determine the credibility of the evidence, nor does it substitute its own judgment

for that of the factfinder. Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572; Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d

742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

“Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: ‘Circumstantial

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.’” Clayton, 235

S.W.3d at 778 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). Each fact need not point directly

and independently to the guilt of the defendant, as long as the cumulative force of

all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Temple v.

State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13;

Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

Section 25.072(a) of the Penal Code provides that “[a] person commits an

offense if, during a period that is 12 months or less in duration, the person two or

more times engages in conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 25.07[,]”

and the offense is a third degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.072(a), (e).

Section 25.07 states, in relevant part, that a person commits an offense if, in violation

23
of Article 17.292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the person knowingly or

intentionally communicates

in any manner with the protected individual or a member of the family
or household except through the person’s attorney or a person
appointed by the court, if the violation is of an order described by this
subsection and the order prohibits any communication with a protected
individual or a member of the family or household[.]

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.07(a)(2)(C).

Here, the State alleged that Segundo communicated with Kimberly in

violation of a protective order. Appellant has not challenged that he was subject to a

protective order. The State was not required to prove that Appellant’s conduct

caused any particular result, including fear or family violence. See Wesley v. State,

605 S.W.3d 909, 918 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). To the extent

Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient because there is no evidence that

Kimberly was harmed, intimidated, or frightened by Appellant’s calls and

communications, Appellant cites no legal authority for his argument that the State

must show the communications caused Kimberly harm, intimidation, or fear, and

those items are not elements of the offense for which he was charged. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. §§ 25.07(a)(2)(C), 25.072(a); Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).

The record includes a copy of the protective order signed by the trial court and

by Segundo on February 6, 2023. Above Segundo’s signature, the order states, “I

am the above-named Defendant in this case, and I have received a copy of the

24
Magistrate’s Order for Emergency Protection in open court, on this the 6[th] day of

February, 2023.” The protective order was issued against Jesse James Segundo, and

it was issued at the request of the victim, Kimberly. The order further provides that

it restricts Segundo from going within 200 yards of a specific address and prohibits

the following acts, in relevant part, “communicating in any manner with a member

of the family or household of a person protected under the order or with the person(s)

protected under the order, except through the party’s attorney or a person appointed

by the court (good cause).”

The evidence also reflects that Segundo knew about the protective order. His

signature is on the order. Jackie Muratorri, a detention officer for Montgomery

County, identified State’s Exhibit 2 as a recording of probable cause proceedings in

this case, the exhibit was published to the jury, and Muratorri testified that the

recording shows the Defendant signing the paperwork. Amy Doss, a Victim

Assistance Coordinator for the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office,

testified that in one of the phone calls Segundo made from jail, he told his mother

that he had papers that Kimberly needed to sign, and he said if he talked to the victim,

the District Attorney’s Office would file more charges against him. He also told his

mother to tell Kimberly to use her middle name.

Finally, Suzanne Hollifield, an investigator with the Montgomery County

District Attorney’s Office, testified that Segundo made twenty-one calls from jail,

25
and records retrieved from the Securus System—which records inmate calls from

jail—reflect that ten of the calls were between Segundo and Kimberly. She also

testified that the ten calls from Segundo to Kimberly occurred between February 12

and 25, 2023, which is after the date the emergency protective order became

effective (February 6, 2023) and before it expired (May 8, 2023). Hollifield further

testified that in three of the phone calls from jail, Segundo called Kimberly by her

name.

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence sufficiently established there was an

emergency protective order against Segundo for the protection of Kimberly,

Segundo knew about the order, and he violated it two or more times during a period

that was twelve months or less. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.072(a). Based on the

record before us, the jury could have reasonably concluded beyond a reasonable

doubt from the evidence presented that Segundo committed the offense of violation

of a protective order two or more times in a period that was twelve months or less as

alleged in the indictment. See id.; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Hooper, 214

S.W.3d at 13. We further conclude that “[t]his was not a determination so outrageous

that no rational trier of fact could agree.” Wirth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012). We overrule Appellant’s third issue.

26
Assessment of Court Costs
(Issue Four)

In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the judgment should be reformed to

eliminate the court costs assessed against him because there were “continuous

findings of Appellant’s indigency.” Appellant argues that he was found to be

indigent, counsel was appointed to represent him at the outset of the case, and the

record includes no evidence that Appellant had a material change in financial

circumstances that would show he was no longer indigent.

We note that the Appellant fails to cite to any part of the record where

Appellant made any objection in the trial court about the assessment of court costs

against him, nor does he argue on appeal that he was not required to preserve error

on this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. That said, assuming without deciding that

error was preserved, we find no error. Article 42.16 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure provides that a trial court “shall [] adjudge the costs against the

defendant[] and order the collection thereof as in other cases.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 42.16. Fees and costs serve a remedial function by compensating the State

for various costs associated with the criminal justice system. Gipson v. State, 428

S.W.3d 107, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “[C]ourt costs are not part of the guilt or

sentence of a criminal defendant, nor must they be proven at trial; rather, they are ‘a

nonpunitive recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in connection

27
with the trial of the case.’” Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).

This Court has previously held that a trial court can assess court costs against

an indigent defendant. See Valdez v. State, No. 09-22-00148-CR, 2022 Tex. App.

LEXIS 8915, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (citing Armstrong, 340 S.W.3d at 766-67; Allen v. State,

426 S.W.3d 253, 258-59 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.); Owen v. State, 352

S.W.3d 542, 546-47 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); Williams v. State, 332

S.W.3d 694, 700 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. denied)). Accordingly, we

overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.

Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment of conviction.

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on August 9, 2024
Opinion Delivered September 25 2024
Do Not Publish

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

28