Emilee Shae Groh v. the State of Texas

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS

EMILEE SHAE GROH, § No. 08-24-00083- CR

Appellant, § Appeal from the

v. § 109th District Court

THE STATE OF TEXAS, § of Crane County, Texas

Appellee. § (TC# 23-052-DCCR-00019)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Emilee Shae Groh pled guilty to and was convicted of possession of between

one and four grams of methamphetamine. She appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to

suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Groh was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance after

methamphetamine was found during a warrantless search of her vehicle. She moved to suppress

the evidence. At a hearing on the motion, the following evidence was presented:

On the morning of February 18, 2023, Crane Police Officer Sonny Williams was on regular

patrol when he noticed Groh parked in front of a residence, seemingly asleep in her vehicle but

sitting upright and in an awkward position. He decided to do a welfare check and as he approached
her car, he heard that it was running. After knocking three times on Groh’s window, Williams was

able to wake her. Groh told Williams that the house she was parked in front of belonged to her

friend’s boss. As he spoke to her, Williams could see a “bonglike smoking device” in the passenger

side door. He searched the vehicle and found a “crystal-like substance” in the glove box and on

the floorboard. Field testing showed that the substance was methamphetamine. The entire

interaction and search was captured on Officer Williams’s bodycam and the video was entered

into evidence at the suppression hearing.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress without written findings. Groh later pled

guilty to the charges and was sentenced by the trial court to four years. This appeal followed.

Groh’s sole issue on appeal challenges the ability of the officer to enter onto the curtilage of a

home to approach her vehicle. The State counters that the car was not parked on the curtilage of

the house and, alternatively, if it was on the curtilage, the officer entered the property under the

community caretaking exception.1

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review rulings on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard. Cole v. State, 490

S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). When, like here, the trial court has not entered findings

of fact, the facts that support the ruling are implied. Id. We give almost total deference to a trial

court’s findings of fact. Id. However, we review de novo the application of the law to the facts. Id.

“We will sustain the judge's ruling if the record reasonably supports that ruling and is correct on

any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id.

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In its brief, the State also argues that once Officer Williams approached the vehicle, the plain view and automobile
exceptions allowed him to search the vehicle without a warrant. Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009) (holding that the automobile exception allowed the warrantless search of a vehicle when items in plain
view gave the officer probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband). Groh, however, does not challenge
the officer’s actions after he approached the vehicle.

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III. ANALYSIS
A. Fourth Amendment protection from entry onto curtilage

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This right against “unreasonable governmental intrusion” would

be greatly reduced if police could enter the property around a home to observe activities “from just

outside the front window.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (citing Silverman v. United

States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). The Fourth Amendment therefore protects not just the home,

but the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home, known as the curtilage. Id.

(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).

Property is not included in the curtilage simply because it is private property. Rather, the

curtilage is the area that is “intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically”

and “to which the activity of the home life extends.” Id. at 7 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476

U.S. 207, 213, (1986) and Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n. 12). In determining whether property is a

curtilage, the primary question is whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the area as she would in a home. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (“[T]he extent

of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may

expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself.”); see also Sayers v. State,

433 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Courts consider four factors

when deciding if an area is curtilage:

[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the
area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the
uses to which the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the
area from observation by people passing by.”

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Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.

The area where Groh was parked is pictured below, in a frame taken from the Officer

Williams’s bodycam video.

The house has a covered carport area; however, Groh was parked on a dirt strip

immediately adjacent to the street. This was separated from the house by a yard. As the officer

testified, the area is closer to the street than to the house. The area is not fenced and does not appear

to be part of the yard. Because there is no vegetation in that area, it appears that it is commonly

used for parking as the street itself has no shoulder on which to park. Finally, there are no

indications that the owner of the home took steps to shield that area from the public view. Anyone

driving or walking down the street, as Officer Williams had been, could observe the activities that

occurred in that area.

Based on all these factors, we hold that the dirt area next to the street where Groh parked

was not part of the house’s curtilage in which Groh had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Compare Buchanan v. State, 129 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. ref’d)

(appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in well-defined dirt driveway that went

through an open gate and into a backyard where a mechanic business operated), with State v. Betts,

397 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (fenced backyard was curtilage); State v. Serna, 644

S.W.3d 712, 724 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, pet. ref’d) (driveway under carport was curtilage);

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Sayers v. State, 433 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (flowerbed

directly beneath the window was curtilage).

Because Groh’s car was not on the curtilage, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when

Williams approached entered that part of the property without a warrant.

B. Community caretaking doctrine

Alternatively, this court holds that Officer Williams’s entry onto the curtilage, if it were so

found to be, was permissible under the community caretaking exception. Officers can make

warrantless entries into a home when “they reasonably believe that a person is in need of immediate

aid.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 855 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2003) (en banc) (“as part of the police officer’s community caretaking functions to

protect and preserve life and prevent substantial injury, an officer may enter and search a private

residence without a warrant for the limited purpose of serving those functions when it is objectively

reasonable.”)

Groh insists that Texas courts have not “decided the application of the ‘community

caretaking’ exception and whether that justifies an intrusion on the curtilage.” The curtilage of a

home is “considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.

It therefore is protected to the same extent as a home but is also subject to the same exceptions to

the warrant requirement. If an officer is permitted under the community caretaking exception to

enter a home, he is also permitted to enter the curtilage.

To determine if the community caretaking exception applies to an officer’s conduct, we

first ask “whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community caretaking purpose,” and,

if so, we then ask “whether the officer's belief that the individual needs help was reasonable.”

Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

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(1) Officer’s motivation

At the suppression hearing, Officer Williams explained why he was concerned for Groh’s

welfare: because of “the odd laying position that [Groh] was in. It wasn’t normal. When

somebody’s sleeping in a vehicle, they lean the seat back, sleep in a vehicle. [Groh] was laying in

an awkward upright position, leaning in a certain way. It just looked really odd to me.” He said

that he thought maybe Groh was having a medical issue. The bodycam video shows that once

Williams was able to wake Groh, the first thing he told her after he identified himself was that he

was doing a welfare to check to make sure that she was ok. Groh argues that the officer’s stated

reason for approaching Groh’s vehicle—his belief that she may need medical help—was a pretext.

She argues that, because of Crane’s small population, Williams knew that she had a criminal

history and that the vehicle was hers, and those facts “should lead to the inference that Williams

actually approached the vehicle not out of genuine concern for Groh, but out of a desire that his

unlawful search might [bear] fruit.” Our role is not to decide which inference is correct. The trial

court’s implied findings are supported by the evidence, and we do not “second-guess the trial

court’s determination of an issue that is supported by the record and depends so much on credibility

and demeanor.” Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 855.

Groh characterizes Williams’s actions as gathering evidence or investigating a crime,

which are not justified under the community caretaking exception. It is true that when Williams

saw the drug paraphernalia in plain view while speaking to Groh, his objective changed to

assessing if any criminal laws were violated. However, when determining whether the entry onto

the curtilage was justified, our focus is the officer’s objective in making that entry, not in the later

search. Martin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 749, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“This change in roles [from

safety to investigation], however, does not negate the safety-related justification for the initial

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entry.”). The evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that Williams had a community

caretaking purpose when he entered the curtilage even though he discovered probable cause to

investigate a crime after the entry.

(2) Williams’s actions were reasonable

The factors considered in deciding if an officer’s belief that an individual needs

assistance are:

(1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual;

(2) the location of the individual;

(3) whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance
independent of that offered by the officer; and

(4) to what extent the individual—if not assisted—presented a danger to himself or
others.

Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc); Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d

at 855.

Groh contends that there was no evidence she was in distress. Given that Groh had not

reclined her seat, Williams was concerned that she was not just sleeping, but that there was a

medical issue. We have previously noted that there are “a multitude of cases in which courts have

concluded that an officer who either observed an unresponsive individual in a parked car, or

received a report of such, had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the individual was

in distress and needed assistance.” Ramirez v. State, No. 08-19-00097-CR, 2021 WL 3260630, at

*5 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 30, 2021, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (citing Yocom

v. State, No. 02-03-00181-CR, 2004 WL 742888, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 8, 2004,

pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); King v. State, No. 05-13-00178-CR, 2014 WL

2807993, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 18, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

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publication); Rochester v. State, No. 02-03-00519-CR, 2004 WL 1798090, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Aug. 12, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)); see also Windham v.

State, No. 04-13-00284-CR, 2014 WL 769333, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 26, 2014, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“There is no question that responding to a report

of an unresponsive person in a parked car, regardless of its location, falls within a police officer’s

community caretaking function.”); Velazquez v. State, No. 02-22-00041-CR, 2023 WL 1860002,

at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(“An officer who either observes a person asleep or unconscious in a parked vehicle or receives a

report of such a situation has an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the person is in

distress and needs help.”). Because Groh was asleep in a vehicle on the side of a street, the first

two factors weigh in favor of finding that Williams’s belief that Groh was in distress was

reasonable.

Furthermore, Groh was alone in the car, with no one nearby. Although she was parked near

a home, no one was outside and, at the time he approached the vehicle, Williams had no way to

know if the occupants of the residence were home, knew Groh, knew she was parked outside, or

would help her if she needed it. The third factor weighs in favor of the State. Finally, although

Groh was not presenting a danger to herself or others when the Williams saw her, he did not know

what her condition was and if she would wake up and attempt to drive. Ramirez, 2021 WL

3260630, at *7 (“a person who was previously unresponsive could suddenly wake up and put his

foot on the gas pedal, thereby possibly causing an accident and endangering himself or others on

the roadway.”); King, 2014 WL 2807993, at *5 (“If King was incapacitated and accidentally set

the vehicle in motion again, either he or others could have been injured.”). If Groh had passed out

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because of a medical emergency or because she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, she

could present a danger to herself and others if she woke up and decided to operate the vehicle.

Analyzing the facts of this case using Wright factors, we hold that Williams had a

reasonable belief that Groh needed assistance.

We overrule Groh’s sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION
Because Groh was not parked on the curtilage of the home, the Fourth Amendment’s

protections against governmental intrusion did not prevent Williams from approaching her vehicle.

Even if Groh had parked on the curtilage, Williams would have been permitted to enter the

property under the community caretaking doctrine. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice

May 23, 2025

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

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