Katrina P. Petrini v. Scott Simon and Simon Group Consulting, Inc.

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00012-CV

KATRINA P. PETRINI, APPELLANT

V.

SCOTT SIMON AND SIMON GROUP CONSULTING, INC., APPELLEES

On Appeal from the 207th District Court
Comal County, Texas 1
Trial Court No. C2024-0968B, Honorable Tracie Wright-Reneau, Presiding

June 2, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Katrina P. Petrini, appeals from the trial court’s orders granting

Appellees Scott Simon and Simon Group Consulting, Inc.’s (SGC) special appearance

and motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, as well as the order

1 This matter was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to a docket

equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. We apply the Third Court’s precedent to the extent it
conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
compelling post-judgment discovery and awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm the order

sustaining the special appearance. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction the portion of the

appeal challenging the order compelling discovery.

BACKGROUND

SGC, a California-based corporation, obtained a default judgment against

Appellant in California superior court on a counterclaim arising from her prior

employment. 2 Appellant had originally worked for SGC in California but relocated to

Texas and worked remotely.

SGC domesticated its California judgment in Comal County, Texas, district court

in May 2024. Appellant responded with a counterpetition asserting claims for violation of

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, malicious prosecution, and extrinsic fraud. SGC filed

a special appearance challenging personal jurisdiction together with an alternative Rule

91a motion to dismiss. After amendment and briefing, the trial court sustained the special

appearance, granted the Rule 91a motion, compelled post-judgment discovery, and

awarded attorney’s fees. Appellant presents fourteen issues on appeal wherein she

challenges three categories of rulings: (1) the special appearance; (2) the Rule 91a order

dismissing her claims; and (3) the order compelling discovery.

2 SGC alleged Appellant was liable to it under CAL PENAL CODE ANN. § 502, which provides a civil

remedy for accessing, altering, destroying, and downloading digital data without authorization. SGC also
pursued other causes of action, including breach of the duty of loyalty, conversion, intentional interference
with prospective economic relations, intentional interference with contractual relations, unjust enrichment,
and unfair competition.

2
ANALYSIS

A. Special Appearance

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a allows a nonresident defendant to challenge

personal jurisdiction by special appearance. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(1). Texas courts

may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when the long-arm statute

authorizes it and the exercise is consistent with due process. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 17.042; State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 412 (Tex.

2023). The Texas long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

if the party:

(1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is
to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; (2) commits a tort in
whole or in part in this state; or (3) recruits Texas residents, directly or
through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or
outside this state.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042. Due process requires sufficient minimum contacts

with Texas so that suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. Id. 3

The main thrust of Appellant’s complaint is that Texas jurisdiction exists over

Appellees because they domesticated the California judgment in Texas. In response to

the special appearance she alleged that Appellees committed a tort in Texas, owned real

3 Whether a court possesses personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a question of

law we review de novo. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007). When,
as here, the trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, we infer all facts necessary to
support the judgment and supported by the evidence. Id.

3
property in Texas through a subsidiary, and employed her remotely while she resided in

Texas.

A nonresident defendant's forum-state contacts may give rise to two types of

personal jurisdiction: general and special. Moki Mac River Exped., 221 S.W.3d at 575.

General jurisdiction requires contacts so continuous and systematic that the defendant is

essentially at home in the forum. Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 412. None of Appellant’s

allegations satisfy that standard. Remote employment of a Texas resident and prior

ownership of Texas real property do not render California residents and entities at home

in Texas. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Tex.

2002).

Specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities in Texas and that the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or

relate to those contacts. Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 412–13. The operative facts of

Appellant’s claims concern conduct that occurred in California before domestication: the

filing of suit and entry of default judgment on the counterclaim for misappropriation of

confidential information.

Domestication of a foreign judgment and post-judgment discovery constitute

purposeful availment for claims arising from the enforcement process itself, but they do

not confer specific jurisdiction over claims that predate and are unrelated to that process.

See Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d 387, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (holding that employment of a Texas resident alone is not

4
necessarily sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant).

Moreover, allegedly directing a tort at a Texas resident is insufficient to confer personal

jurisdiction. See Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 565 (Tex. 2018)

(“[W]e have explicitly rejected an approach to specific jurisdiction that turns upon where

a defendant ‘directed a tort’ rather than on the defendant’s contacts.” (citing Michiana

Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 790–92 (Tex. 2005)); TV Azteca,

S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 43 (Tex. 2016); Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 796–97

(no specific jurisdiction where alleged misrepresentations occurred outside Texas).

Finally, we note that ownership of Texas real property likewise supplies no basis for

specific jurisdiction when the claims do not relate to that property. Booth v. Kontomitras,

485 S.W.3d 461, 480 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.).

Appellant also complains that procedural defects in Appellees’ special appearance

prevented the court from granting it. For example, she points out that Appellees’ initial

special appearance lacked verification as required by rule 120a. However, Appellees

amended their special appearance to correct any deficiencies before they made any

general appearance. See Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. 1998)

(permitting amendment of special appearance to add verification any time before general

appearance is made). Further, domestication of the judgment before Appellant asserted

any claims against Appellees did not constitute a general appearance. See TEX. R. CIV.

P. 120a; Exito Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Tex. 2004) (Rule 11

agreement to extend filing deadlines did not constitute “a plea, pleading, or motion” and

thus was not a general appearance); Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d at 422 ([V]oluntarily filing suit in a

5
particular jurisdiction is purposeful availment of the jurisdiction’s facilities and can subject

the party to personal jurisdiction in another lawsuit only when the lawsuits arise from the

same general transaction.”). The amended special appearance was filed in advance of

the hearing and afforded Appellant notice and an opportunity to respond.

The trial court therefore correctly sustained the special appearance for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

B. Rule 91a Dismissal

Because we affirm the order sustaining the special appearance, it is unnecessary

to review Appellant’s complaints regarding the alternative Rule 91a dismissal. 4

C. Order Compelling Discovery

Finally, we briefly consider Appellant’s complaints regarding the trial court’s order

compelling her to produce post-judgment discovery. 5 Post-judgment orders compelling

discovery are not final, appealable orders. Bahar v. Lyon Fin. Services, Inc., 330 S.W.3d

379, 388 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review

the order compelling Appellant to respond to post-judgment discovery requests.

4 We take no position on the trial court’s authority to award Rule 91a attorney’s fees to Appellees

in light of its grant of the special appearance. Appellant makes no such challenge on appeal.

5 Appellant does not challenge the reasonableness or necessity of the attorney’s fees.

6
CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s orders sustaining Appellees’ special appearance. We

dismiss for want of jurisdiction the portion of the appeal challenging the order compelling

post-judgment discovery.

Lawrence M. Doss
Justice

7