Amanda Adams v. Allen Butler Construction, Inc.

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00191-CV

AMANDA ADAMS, APPELLANT

V.

ALLEN BUTLER CONSTRUCTION, INC., APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 237th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-2023-CV-1035, Honorable Les Hatch, Presiding

May 5, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Amanda Adams, appearing pro se, appeals from the trial court’s Order Awarding

Attorneys’ Fees & Dismissing Case. Adams challenges the trial court’s order through

several appellate issues. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The underlying proceedings involved an employment dispute in which Adams

accused Allen Butler Construction, Inc. (ABCI) of disability discrimination, retaliation,
breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Several discovery disputes occurred over the

life of the case, leading the court to enter an order, after a hearing, granting ABCI’s Motion

to Compel and for Sanctions. Thereafter, Adams filed a motion to dismiss. Although she

purportedly withdrew her motion to dismiss via email, the trial court entered its Order

Awarding Attorneys’ Fees & Dismissing Case on June 18, 2025. The order was filed on

June 23, 2025. By that order, the court awarded ABCI $14,271.25 in attorney’s fees as

discovery sanctions and dismissed Adams’s claims without prejudice per her request.

ANALYSIS

Applicable Law

A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must

comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Clemens v. Allen, 47 S.W.3d 26, 28

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.). At both trial and on appeal, the pro se appellant

must properly present her case. Id. The rules of appellate procedure require an

appellant’s brief to contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with

appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

An appellate issue unsupported by argument or citation to the record or by

appropriate legal authority presents nothing for our review. Blankinship v. Brown, 399

S.W.3d 303, 307 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied). “An appellate court has no

duty—or even right—to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law

to determine whether there was error.” Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). “Were we to do so, even on behalf of a pro se appellant,

we would be abandoning our role as neutral adjudicators and become an advocate for

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that party.” Id. See also Roberts v. City of Tex. City, No. 01-21-00064-CV, 2021 Tex.

App. LEXIS 9623, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (discussing requisites of appellate briefs); Plummer v. Reeves, 93 S.W.3d 930, 931

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (discussing same).

Waiver Due to Inadequate Briefing

At the outset, ABCI argues Adams has waived error through inadequate briefing.

It points to, among other deficiencies in her brief, several citations by Adams that appear

to be non-existent. It points also to fictitious quotations Adams attributed to real cases

that do not contain such language, Adams’s inaccurate descriptions of case holdings and

mischaracterizations of the clerk’s and reporter’s records, and Adams’s failure to comply

with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, including failing to provide the required

Appendix and Certificate of Compliance.

Our review of Adams’s brief reveals ABCI’s contentions to be true. We note also

the trial court previously admonished Adams as follows:

Ms. Adams is reminded that, as a pro se litigant, she is held to the same
standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and
rules of procedure. Any further blatant misrepresentations of case law will
not be permitted and may result in the issuance of sanctions. The use of
artificial intelligence in preparation of a submission to the Court will not
excuse misrepresentations of case law.

We find Adams has failed to comply with Rule 38.1 concerning appellate briefing

rules. Among other deficiencies, she has not provided this Court citation to appropriate,

relevant case law to support her contentions. See Suday v. Suday, No. 04-23-00836-CV,

2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 261, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem.

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op.) (use of an artificial intelligence tool in preparing a brief “could be grounds for striking”

the brief). Many of the cases she cites and the quotations she attributes to cases do not

exist, do not contain the said quotations, or do not stand for the propositions for which

she cites the authority. Those authorities cannot, therefore, serve as support for her

claims. As noted, failure to support arguments by citations to appropriate and relevant

legal authority presents nothing for our review. Blankinship, 399 S.W.3d at 307.

Consequently, Adams has waived her issues for our review.

Effect of Motion to Dismiss

Further, even if we did not find waiver, we would resolve Adams’s issues against

her. Over the course of the proceedings below, the trial court had to repeatedly intervene

in discovery disputes. It issued numerous orders instructing Adams to comply with her

discovery obligations and to produce responsive discovery to ABCI’s discovery requests.

She failed to do so and in fact, revoked all authorizations for the third-party records the

trial court had ordered her to sign and produce, claiming she was attempting to protect

them from tampering. Ultimately, the disputes and refusal to cooperate by Adams led to

ABCI filing its Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. The trial court held a hearing after

which it issued an order, dated May 14, 2025, requiring Adams to discontinue her

disregard of several enumerated orders.

Adams filed a motion to dismiss the case on May 28, 2025, asking the court to

dismiss her case without prejudice. ABCI filed an application for an award of attorney’s

fees on May 29, 2025. In response, Adams stated in a written pleading, “[i]f the Court

determines that dismissal must come at a financial cost, Plaintiff reserves the right to

withdraw her Motion to Dismiss and proceed with litigation. Plaintiff will not be forced to
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subsidize the defense’s fees in exchange for access to the courthouse doors closing

behind her.” On June 18, 2025, the court issued its Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees &

Dismissing Case. The order was filed on June 23, 2025. Adams claims on appeal that

the Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees & Dismissing Case is void because she withdrew the

underlying motion via a June 18, 2025 email before the order was signed.1 Even

assuming such a withdrawal by email would be valid and effective, we cannot agree with

Adams’s contention.

Rule 162 provides “[a]t any time before the plaintiff has introduced all of [her]

evidence other than rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff may dismiss a case, or take a non-

suit.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. Also, a dismissal under the rule has “no effect on any motion

for sanctions, attorney’s fees or other costs, pending at the time of dismissal, as

determined by the court.” Id. Under Texas law, a motion for nonsuit is effective the

moment it is filed, and the filing party has no unilateral right to withdraw it. Our Court

noted in Trigg v. Moore, 335 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. denied)

that “[i]t does not take much imagination to see how a litigant could use an unfettered

ability to dismiss and reinstate to utterly disrupt discovery, a trial, or the orderly proceeding

of the cause in general.” Indeed, the unqualified right of a party to withdraw its nonsuit

“could render legal proceedings farcical.” Id. The trial court here granted the dismissal

in accordance with Adams’s motion, doing so without prejudice as she requested.2

1 She also makes allegations that the trial court “backdated” the order to show it was signed prior

to receipt of her email purportedly withdrawing the motion to dismiss.
2 We note that ABCI asked the trial court to dismiss the cause with prejudice.

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A nonsuited claim may be revived by filing a motion for new trial, by filing a motion

to reinstate or a motion to withdraw the nonsuit, or by agreement of the parties. Lawson

v. Scott Morrison & Oaks, Hartline & Daly, LLP, No. 03-19-00301-CV, 2021 Tex. App.

LEXIS 3799, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin May 14, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Whether to

grant or deny such a motion rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Adams

did not file any of the above motions, nor was there an agreement by the parties. She

instead filed a motion to vacate the order on June 23, 2025. It was overruled by operation

of law. While Adams contends the trial court refused to rule on the motion during its

period of plenary power, thereby depriving her of a fair opportunity to be heard, such a

motion may be ruled upon either by a written and signed order or by operation of law,

whichever occurs first. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b. Nor was an in-person hearing required

before ruling on the motion. See Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 843–44 (Tex. 2004)

(“[a] ‘hearing’ does not necessarily contemplate a personal appearance before the court

or an oral presentation to the court”). Therefore, the trial court did not deprive Adams of

any right or opportunity, and it retained the discretion to overrule the motion by operation

of law. Therefore, the order dismissing Adams’s suit remained in place.

Other Claims

Lastly, Adams argues the following: (1) the attorneys’ fees that were paid by

insurance cannot be recovered as sanctions, (2) the law required individualized rulings

on discovery requests and the court did not make such rulings, (3) the trial court

improperly refused to apply the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege, (4) there

were improper alleged ex parte communications made, and (5) judicial bias existed.

These points all lack legal merit.

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First, Adams provided no relevant or applicable legal authority to support her

proposition that a party cannot recover fees as sanctions when fees were paid by

insurance. The only authority she did cite was authority that did not exist. Second, Adams

does not cite to any relevant, applicable authority supporting her claim that the trial court

was required to review and rule on each discovery request and objection individually. The

authority she cited did not support her assertion. And the record shows the court did

make several individual rulings. Third, Adams failed to include in the record pleadings

necessary to review the merits of her claim concerning the application of the crime-fraud

exception to attorney-client privilege. It appears from the record that the exception was

properly not applied in this case, and Adams did not provide authority to show otherwise.

Fourth, Adams complains of ex parte communications. The record reveals no such

communications. Lastly, Adams contends there was bias by the trial court. However,

Adams never filed a motion to recuse, and, other than reserving her right to file a motion

to recuse under rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in her motion to vacate,

she never brought this issue to the attention of the trial court.

CONCLUSION

We resolve Adams’s issues against her and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Alex Yarbrough
Justice

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