Latoya Jo Skorich v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00001-CR

LATOYA SKORICH, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

No. 07-25-00002-CR

JOHN WOODY, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 222nd District Court
Deaf Smith County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR-2021B-020, CR-2021B-021 Honorable Roland D. Saul, Presiding

March 30, 2026
OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

On the evening of September 10, 2020, a seven-year-old boy arrived at a Hereford,

Texas, emergency room unresponsive, severely dehydrated, and covered in bruises. His
sodium levels were the highest the treating physicians had ever seen. Medical

professionals did not expect him to survive. His mother, Appellant Latoya Jo Skorich,

and her boyfriend, Appellant John Woody, had been traveling with him for days in an 18-

wheeler immediately before his admission. Both were later charged with injury to a child

causing serious bodily injury and injury to a child causing bodily injury.1

Woody and Skorich were separately indicted but agreed to be tried together. A

jury found both guilty and assessed punishment. Woody received concurrent sentences

of 30 years and 10 years imprisonment with a $10,000 fine. Skorich received concurrent

sentences of 20 years and 10 years imprisonment with a $10,000 fine. We consolidate

these appeals because the facts and legal issues substantially overlap.

Both Appellants challenge the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and venue.

Woody separately contends he owed no legal duty to the child. Skorich separately

challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions. We hold the

trial court had jurisdiction and venue was proper. We further hold sufficient evidence

supported a finding that Woody assumed a duty of care, custody, and control, and that

Skorich knowingly or recklessly caused the child’s injuries through her omissions. We

affirm the judgments and sentences for both Appellants.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04.

2
BACKGROUND

A. The Family Unit

Woody and Skorich lived together in Arkansas. Skorich considered Woody her

husband and the stepfather to her seven-year-old son, “A.T.”2 Woody made his living as

a long-haul truck driver. Skorich often stayed home with A.T. and helped schedule hauls.

A.T. and Skorich lived either in Woody’s house or with him in the truck. Woody and

Skorich combined Woody’s income with A.T.’s disability checks to pay for the family’s

needs.

During the COVID pandemic, A.T. was enrolled in an online school; this permitted

him and Skorich to spend more time on the road with Woody. For the haul that led to

these charges, Skorich booked a route from Arkansas to California and back. A

substantial part of that road trip passed through Texas.

B. The Road Trip

Although he was age seven, A.T. had developmental delays and was being potty

trained. He used a portable urinal during the day, so the family did not have to stop

driving. During the road trip, Appellants restricted A.T.’s fluid intake to no more than eight

ounces every one to one-and-a-half hours until 2:00 p.m., after which he was not allowed

any fluids at all.

There was no seat or seatbelt for A.T. in the cab of the 18-wheeler. The only place

for him to sit or sleep was a bunk bed that sat six feet from the floor. At times, A.T. sat or

2 We use initials to mask the identity of the minor victim.

3
slept on the floor between the driver and passenger seats. Appellants told law

enforcement that during the trip, A.T. fell off his bunk bed at least once, though their

accounts of when this occurred conflict.3

Also conflicting are the Appellants’ reports of an “outburst” A.T. had while the family

was returning from California.4 According to Appellants, the boy began hitting and kicking

Woody while Woody was driving. Unable to calm A.T., Woody pulled over. Skorich went

into the cab to get something to eat. Woody then allegedly punished A.T. with a belt.

On September 9, 2020, Appellants and the boy reached the Midland-Odessa area

from New Mexico by way of El Paso. A.T. had become lethargic. According to Woody,

A.T. had begun showing signs of lethargy as early as September 7 or 8. Woody told

officer Stewart he instructed Skorich on when to seek medical care, stating that if A.T. did

not get better in a couple of days, they would take him to the hospital. Woody

acknowledged that A.T.’s condition “progressively keeps getting worse.”

On September 10, the family was en route from Midland-Odessa to Hereford.

When they stopped at a truck stop for the night, A.T. was discovered to be unresponsive.

Appellants then took A.T. to the emergency room at Hereford’s local hospital.

3 According to Woody’s interview with officer Tim Stewart, A.T. fell off the bunk bed more than once.

4 Appellants maintained the outburst and punishment occurred near the Arizona-New Mexico

border. Admitted cell phone data shows the family traveling from Arizona to New Mexico mid-afternoon on
September 9, entering Texas that evening, and remaining there through A.T.’s hospital admission the
following evening. But early on September 11, Skorich twice told Officer Stewart the incident occurred
“yesterday,” permitting a factfinder to conclude the outburst and punishment took place after the family
entered Texas.

4
C. A.T.’s Medical Condition

Upon arrival at the Hereford emergency room, A.T. was in a borderline comatose

state, exhibiting almost no response to verbal commands or physical stimuli aside from

slight withdrawal from pain. Dr. Caom Hansen observed that the child’s eyes were rolled

back in his head and that he was in severe circulatory distress, characterized by a rapid

heart rate and a pulse that was weak and thready. Clinical signs of profound dehydration

were immediately apparent. A.T.’s mouth was so dry that his saliva had turned into a

paste and crust, and his skin exhibited tenting: it remained peaked when pinched rather

than rebounding. Because the boy’s blood volume was so low, staff could not find a vein

for a standard IV and were forced to drill a metal intraosseous device into a bone to pump

fluids directly into the marrow. The lack of moisture in A.T.’s mucous membranes also

made emergency intubation difficult, as the breathing tube would not slide easily through

his dry larynx.

Laboratory results confirmed a sodium level of nearly 200. Dr. Raphael Mattamal,

a pediatric hospitalist at Northwest Texas Hospital in Amarillo, testified at trial that A.T.’s

lab values were “wildly out of the bounds of what you should have in your body” and that

such a level “would kill most of the people in this room.” The jury heard medical evidence

that due to A.T.’s chronic water deprivation, his body was forced to prioritize available

blood for his brain at the sacrifice of other organs like kidneys. This, in effect, resulted in

A.T. to suffer from uremic encephalopathy caused by toxins building up in his blood. Dr.

Hansen testified that the level of dehydration A.T. had achieved is not possible for

someone to achieve on their own, meaning the human body responds to prevent this from

happening. Dr. Mattamal categorized the dehydration as chronic, not likely caused by a

5
virus: water was likely withheld from A.T. over an extended period until sodium levels

became “astronomically abnormal.”

In Hereford, physicians knew A.T. needed more extensive care than their hospital

could provide. They stabilized him for transport to a children’s hospital in Amarillo. When

A.T. arrived, his sodium levels remained at record highs, even for the children’s hospital.

A.T. was admitted to the intensive care unit.

D. A.T.’s Physical Injuries

Beyond the internal medical crisis, A.T. was covered in injuries from head to toe.

Dr. Hansen observed substantial, layered bruising on A.T.’s buttocks and thighs. He

defined layering as the presence of bruises in multiple stages of healing in a single area,

ranging from older yellow-brown bruises to fresh, bright red petechiae. He further

observed weeping wounds, indicating trauma that had just occurred. Both Dr. Hansen

and the examining nurse concluded that these patterned injuries were inflicted trauma

rather than the result of accidental falls.

Forensic Nurse Felicia Manning conducted a detailed head-to-toe examination of

A.T. at the Amarillo hospital, documenting over 30 distinct sites of injury using body

diagrams. These injuries were widespread across the child’s body, including multiple

bruises on his forehead, under his chin, on the left side of his abdomen, and on both sides

of his chest. Manning also identified significant trauma to A.T.’s extremities and back,

noting bruises on his upper and lower arms, knees, and lower legs, as well as

circumferential gray-blue bruising surrounding his rectum. She noted the injuries were

6
consistent with the use of an object like a belt or buckle.5 Officer Erik Medel’s initial

photographs at the Hereford emergency room provide further evidence of the trauma,

capturing numerous pink, purple, and red bruises that witnesses testified appeared fresh.

Medical professionals were most concerned about dark bruising on A.T.’s buttocks that

resembled the shape of a large hand.

E. Appellants’ Explanations

When confronted with these injuries, Appellants offered varying explanations.

Woody appeared to agree with the investigating officer that the boy had extensive

bruising; Skorich denied seeing any. Each also theorized possible causes: natural

susceptibility, A.T.’s clumsiness, running when he should have walked, falls from the bunk

bed, Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, anemia, pharmaceuticals, tantrums, or self-inflicted injury

to punish them.

The jury also heard evidence of another cause: punishment. When A.T. wasted

food or medicine or destroyed things, he was punished. Woody handled most discipline

when A.T. failed to respond to a “time-out,” using a belt, often on A.T.’s bare buttocks.

Skorich reported that A.T. “can’t feel” ordinary spankings, requiring spankings of sufficient

quantity or severity to “get his attention.” She then explained that spankings continued

only until A.T. said he felt a sting. Woody acknowledged his belt sometimes left bruising

in its shape. He admitted hitting A.T. harder than he should have on a few past occasions

5
Multiple witnesses also documented head trauma. Officer Medel described a giant welt on the
back of A.T.’s head. Dr. Hansen confirmed swelling there, and the investigating officer photographed a
scabbed injury in the same location the next day. Woody called the injury an accident; Skorich attributed it
to A.T. falling from the top bunk in the semi-truck. Medical experts found both explanations inconsistent
with the severity and nature of the injuries.

7
but denied doing so within the last two or three days. He said he had assumed the role

of primary disciplinarian because A.T.’s paternal grandmother and aunt had been too

deferential, leaving A.T. “not afraid of them.”

The State removed A.T. from Appellants’ care, and he was placed with the Texas

Department of Family and Protective Services. Thereafter, Appellants left Texas and

continued working as long-haul truckers together. After a grand jury indicted them and

an arrest warrant was issued, Appellants were arrested in Nebraska and extradited by

the Deaf Smith County Sheriff’s Department to Hereford. Skorich later permanently

surrendered her parental rights to A.T.

ANALYSIS

By numerous issues, Skorich and Woody both contend the trial court erred in

denying their motions for instructed verdict. They argue the court lacked jurisdiction and

that venue was improper. Woody also argues his motion should have been granted

because he owed no duty to A.T. Skorich argues the evidence was legally insufficient to

support her convictions. We address each issue, beginning with Appellants’ challenges

to the court’s jurisdictional authority.

A. Territorial Jurisdiction

Both Appellants challenge the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction. Under Texas

Penal Code § 1.04, a Texas court has jurisdiction over an offense when “either the

conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs inside this state.” TEX. PENAL

8
CODE § 1.04(a)(1).6 The statute reaches conduct that begins in Texas and produces

results elsewhere,7 as well as conduct that begins elsewhere but produces results in

Texas.8 See Lee v. State, 537 S.W.3d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“Texas has

jurisdiction over an offense if either a conduct element or a result element occurs inside

the state.”).

Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense. Cyr v. State, 665 S.W.3d 551, 556

(Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Section 22.04(a) defines the offense as occurring when a person,

by act or omission, causes a child bodily injury. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(a). The

consequence of a defendant’s conduct (i.e., the injury) is therefore an element of the

offense. Id.

We need not determine precisely when Appellants’ conduct or omissions satisfied

the elements of § 22.04. The evidence permits a rational factfinder to find that A.T.’s

condition deteriorated while in Texas. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.04(a)(1) (reaching “either

the conduct or a result” occurring in Texas). After Appellants entered the state, A.T.

became lethargic somewhere during the drive from El Paso to Midland-Odessa. As they

6
Additionally, § 1.04(c) provides that when an offense is based on an actor’s omission to perform
a duty imposed by statute, such act (c) “is committed inside this state regardless of the location of the actor
at the time of the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.04(c).
7
See Rodriguez v. State, 146 S.W.3d 674, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (kidnapping in Texas
followed by murder in Mexico); Brown v. State, No. 02-22-00037-CR, No. 02-22-00038-CR, 2023 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7088, at *23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 7, 2023, no pet.) (vehicle driven on Texas service road
became airborne and landed on Oklahoma side of Red River).
8 Delaney v. State, No. 09-25-00039-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 9631, at *20–21 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Dec. 17, 2025, pet. filed) (Missouri resident transmitted child pornography to investigator in
Texas); see also Roberts v. State, 619 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 134 for the proposition that when an offense encompasses consequences affecting persons or
property within a jurisdiction, the crime is generally regarded as having been committed where the
consequences occur, regardless of where the act took place); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)
(holding that acts performed outside a jurisdiction, but with intended results within it, justify that jurisdiction
in punishing the cause of the harm as if defendant had been present).

9
drove toward Hereford, he lost consciousness. When they stopped in Hereford, he was

unresponsive.

Dr. Mattamal testified that before A.T. became unresponsive, he would have

exhibited observable symptoms, such as less activity, glazed eyes, and not talking.

Appellants noticed some change in A.T.’s condition. Skorich told the investigating officer

that in the past three days, A.T. had been acting differently. Woody likewise described

things going on for the past three or four days, and that the couple had discussed when

A.T. should receive medical care; he told Officer Stewart that the boy was getting

progressively worse. This deterioration, from lethargy to unconsciousness to

unresponsiveness, permits the reasonable inference of a child whose condition was

worsening mile by mile.

Evidence shows that A.T. was taken to the emergency room in Hereford and later

transferred to Amarillo, where he continued to suffer the consequences of dehydration.

El Paso, Midland, Odessa, Hereford, Amarillo, and the routes between them are all in

Texas. The evidence permits the conclusion that Appellants’ failure to provide adequate

fluids and medical care allowed A.T.’s serious bodily injury to occur or worsen while he

was in this state. Under § 1.04(a)(1), that is enough. Because Texas possessed territorial

jurisdiction, the trial court properly exercised its authority to hear the case.

The second charged offenses alleged that, in Deaf Smith County, Woody

knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury to A.T. by striking him, and that Skorich

knowingly or recklessly failed to protect A.T. from assault despite a legal duty to do so.

10
Much of the testimony pertained to an alleged outburst that led to Woody spanking

A.T. with a belt. Skorich testified that Woody last spanked A.T. near the Arizona-New

Mexico border. The jury was free to disregard this geographic estimation. See Torres v.

State, 141 S.W.3d 645, 654 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.). It could have found her

account self-serving and designed to defeat Texas jurisdiction. Moreover, upon A.T.’s

admission into the Hereford hospital on September 10, Skorich told officers (early the

morning of the 11th) that A.T.’s outburst and resulting spanking occurred “yesterday.”

The record reveals that Appellants and A.T. were in Texas some of the ninth and all of

the tenth.

The Hereford emergency room physician also testified that A.T. had multiple

injuries in different stages of healing. One injury was believed to be recent because there

were petechiae and the wound was still weeping. The State introduced photographic

exhibits depicting A.T.’s injuries at the time he arrived at the hospital.

The jury was entitled to believe the evidence the State presented regarding how

and when A.T. suffered those bruises. Chakravarthy v. State, 516 S.W.3d 116, 127 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi 2017, pet. denied). Based on the admitted evidence, the jury was

free to conclude Woody’s act of striking A.T. occurred in Texas. Because Skorich’s failure

to protect A.T. is tied to the location of Woody’s conduct, we hold the evidence is also

sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction over both offenses for both Appellants.

We overrule Appellants’ issues complaining of an absence of territorial jurisdiction.

11
B. Venue

Next, both Appellants argue that venue was improper in Deaf Smith County. We

disagree.

Venue is not an element of the offense and may be proven by a preponderance of

the evidence. Estrada v. State, 148 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.);

see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 13A.002(b). Texas venue statutes reflect a

“substantial contacts” approach, meaning the defendant, the conduct, the victim, or the

fruits of the crime must have some relationship to the prosecuting county. Soliz v. State,

97 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Appellants’ venue challenge rests on the claim that no evidence places A.T.’s

injuries in Deaf Smith County. They point to Skorich’s own testimony that the discipline

occurred near the Arizona-New Mexico border. But conflicting evidence, discussed

above, supports a finding that A.T.’s outburst and punishment occurred while the family

was in Texas. Skorich’s testimony and cell phone records also show Appellants were in

Texas for almost 24 hours before taking A.T. to the hospital. And although Skorich

testified she noticed no bruising on A.T., the medical testimony and Woody’s own

acknowledgment of extensive bruising undermine that claim.

Moreover, as explained above, injury to a child is a result-oriented offense.

Sufficient evidence supports a finding that A.T.’s serious bodily injury occurred or

worsened in Deaf Smith County. When Appellants stopped at a truck stop in Hereford,9

they found A.T. unresponsive. They took him to the Hereford emergency room, where

9 Hereford is the county seat of Deaf Smith County.

12
his sodium levels were so high the treating physicians did not expect him to survive. The

result of Appellants’ conduct manifested there.

Even setting aside this evidence, venue was alternatively proper under the

extradition provision. See TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. art. 13.1910 (providing that the location

of an offense committed within the state cannot readily be determined, venue lies in the

county to which the defendant is extradited). The jury’s charge includes this provision.

Appellants were arrested in Nebraska and extradited to Hereford. Therefore, under either

theory, sufficient evidence established Deaf Smith County as the proper venue.

We overrule Appellants’ issues complaining of improper venue.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When conducting a review of the evidence for sufficiency, we consider all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the

evidence and reasonable inferences, any rational juror could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Reese v. State, No. 07-19-00253-CR,

2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3771, at *15 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 4, 2020, pet. ref’d);

Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).11 We defer to the jury’s

responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Reese, No. 07-19-00253-CR,

2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3771, at *15. A conviction can be supported on circumstantial

10
This article was repealed in 2023, but the substance is now found in TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. art.
13A.003.
11
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict under the same standard as a
review of legal sufficiency. Reese, No. 07-19-00253-CR, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3771, at *14–15.

13
evidence; we do not require that any single item of evidence prove guilt on its own. See

id.

1. Woody’s Challenge: No Evidence of Duty Owed to A.T.

Woody argues that he could not be convicted of serious bodily injury to A.T. by

omission because he did not have a duty of care to A.T. We disagree.

Texas Penal Code § 22.04(a) provides that a person commits an offense if the

person intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or by

omission, causes serious bodily injury or bodily injury to a child. TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 22.04(a). Subsection (b) clarifies the scope of the relationship to a child, elderly person,

or disabled individual: that the defendant has “a legal or statutory duty to act” on their

behalf, or “has assumed [their] care, custody, or control.” § 22.04(b). A defendant has

assumed care, custody, or control when they have, “by act, words, or course of conduct

acted so as to cause a reasonable person to conclude that he has accepted responsibility

for protection, food, shelter, and medical care for a child . . . .” § 22.04(d).

The statute was not always so expansive. Under an earlier version, Texas courts

held there was no common law duty imposed on individuals to protect strangers from

harm that could be engrafted on the Penal Code’s provisions. In Billingslea v. State, 780

S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc), for example, a son who lived with his wife

and 94-year-old mother was charged with injury to an elderly individual after his mother

was found in deplorable condition, suffering from severe bedsores, burns, and

malnutrition. The Court of Criminal Appeals held the indictment was fundamentally

defective because it failed to allege the son possessed a statutory duty to act. Id. at 276.

14
The court applied similar logic in Florio v. State, 784 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim. App.

1990). There, a mother’s live-in boyfriend was convicted of injury to a child by omission

after the child died from neglect. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that

the record did not establish a statutory duty of care on the part of the defendant toward

the child. Id. at 417. Although the court of appeals had described the defendant as

“babysitter, disciplinarian and caretaker” – terms that might describe a moral duty – they

fell short of establishing the parent-child relationship and corresponding statutory duties.

Id. The defendant’s status as a live-in boyfriend did not provide a basis for prosecution

under the statute as it then existed. Id.

Importantly, the Florio court recognized that change lay ahead. In a footnote, the

court observed that § 22.04, as amended effective September 1, 1989, would “provide[]

statutory authority for potential prosecution of actors who have assumed responsibilities

of care toward the specified classes of protected individuals.” Id. at 417 n.2; see Act of

May 29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 357 (S.B. 1154), § 1. The amended statute added

what is now subsection (b), establishing the alternative bases for criminal liability

discussed in the present case. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(b).

Rey v. State, 280 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), shows how the amended

statute operates. Rey was married to a woman who had a three-year-old son from a prior

relationship. Id. at 266. During the marriage, the defendant and his wife had a daughter.

Id. After the couple separated, the defendant arrived one night at his estranged wife’s

apartment and found both children alone. Id. He removed both children but then left his

stepson outside on a cold night and took only his biological daughter with him. Id. at 267.

Rey was convicted of child abandonment under § 22.041(b).

15
This Court, sitting en banc, reversed. Applying logic similar to Florio and

Billingslea, the Court reasoned that the status of stepparent alone does not obligate the

stepparent to care for a stepchild except in limited circumstances. Rey v. State, 238

S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, rev’d, 280 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009)). The Court found the record bereft of evidence that Rey had accepted

responsibility to protect, shelter, feed, and care for the three-year-old, and it rendered a

judgment of acquittal.

The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. It held that the revised Penal Code

provision did not contain an “in loco parentis” requirement, and that this Court erred in

reading one in. Rey, 280 S.W.3d at 268. The test under the plain language of § 22.04 is

whether a person had at least temporary care, custody, or control, not whether the person

assumed all the duties of a parent. Id. The proper analysis asks, consistent with

§ 22.04(d), whether the defendant, by act, words, or course of conduct, acted so as to

cause a reasonable person to conclude that he accepted responsibility for protection,

food, shelter, and medical care for the child. Id.

In determining whether a defendant assumed care, custody, or control, courts

examine the defendant’s acts, words, and course of conduct. Relevant considerations

include whether the defendant lived with the child, provided financial support, participated

in decisions regarding the child’s care or discipline, held himself out as a parental figure,

and provided food, shelter, or transportation for the child. Circumstantial evidence alone

may establish this element. See Proo v. State, 587 S.W.3d 789, 809–13 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2019, pet. ref’d); Bleimeyer v. State, 616 S.W.3d 234, 242 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.).

16
Woody’s sufficiency argument relies in large part on the Florio line of cases. That

reliance is misplaced. Given the amendment to § 22.04, we examine whether evidence

would support the conclusion that Woody assumed care, custody, or control of A.T.

There is sufficient evidence of acts, words, and course of conduct demonstrating

Woody’s assumption of care, custody, and control over A.T. The record shows that

Appellants and A.T. lived together as a family unit. Skorich and Woody considered

themselves husband and wife, and A.T. was referred to as their “Son.” A.T. called Woody

“Daddy Johnny”; Woody referred to himself in the third person as A.T.’s “Daddy.” Woody

told the investigating officer that the boy looked up to him more than Skorich because he

was the father figure. Woody said that he took care of A.T. during times when Skorich

needed to go into a store so that the boy would not cause a scene.

Appellants shared the family’s income and bills. Woody provided food and shelter

for A.T., who lived either in Woody’s house or with him in his truck. Photographs showed

the truck was equipped with a port-a-potty, a refrigerator, a microwave, and cases of

water, items Woody managed as the driver.

In addition, Woody undertook parental duties for A.T. He took the child to the

bathroom and to shower. He participated in A.T.’s education, including reading and color

instruction. He assumed the role of primary disciplinarian for A.T. Evidence sufficiently

shows that Woody spanked A.T. with a belt. Evidence is replete regarding an occasion

wherein Woody pulled the semi-truck over on the side of the road specifically to spank

A.T. with a belt. Woody admitted hitting A.T. harder than he should have on past

occasions; at minimum, this evidences that his disciplinary role was ongoing, not isolated.

17
Trial testimony indicates Woody and Skorich both provided information about

A.T.’s medical history to providers. Video evidence shows that when Woody was

interviewed at the hospital, he told the police officer that he and Skorich knew of A.T.’s

declining medical condition, and he made the decision they would wait and see if it

improved over the next few days. One could not make such a decision absent care,

custody, or control.

Based on the cumulative force of the direct and circumstantial evidence, the

reasonable inferences from the evidence, and deferring to the jury on matters of credibility

and weight, we hold there is sufficient evidence to support the element of care, custody,

or control.

We overrule Woody’s sufficiency issue.

2. Skorich’s challenge: no evidence

Skorich alleges the evidence was insufficient to show she failed to provide

nourishment or medical care and insufficient to show she failed to provide protection from

assault. As with Woody’s sufficiency contention, we disagree.

A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a result of her conduct

when she “is aware that [her] conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” TEX.

PENAL CODE § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly with respect to the result of her conduct

when she is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that

the result will occur. § 6.03(c). The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its

disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person

18
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint. Id.

The jury charge instructed the jury on these definitions.

When a defendant is accused of injury to a child by omission, the state must prove

either the defendant intended the harm through their inaction or knew their inaction was

reasonably certain to cause injury. Proo, 587 S.W.3d at 809–10 (citations omitted).

Mental state almost always depends on circumstantial evidence rather than direct proof.

Id. at 810 (citing Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Smith v. State,

56 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)). The defendant’s

mental state may be inferred from any facts, including the defendant’s acts, words, and

conduct, the method of committing the crime, and the nature of wounds inflicted. Proo,

587 S.W.3d at 810 (citing Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

The evidence established A.T. had obvious dehydration and physical injuries the

jury could reasonably infer Skorich would have noticed. Skorich testified she knew that

lack of water and food would cause death. Skorich stated A.T.’s lips were dry, his gums

bled, he was lethargic, and he pleaded for water. She observed his deterioration from

lethargy, to unconsciousness, to unresponsiveness.12 Woody’s statements to the police

confirmed that the couple was so concerned about A.T.’s health that they discussed when

he should be taken to the hospital.

12 Skorich testified that she called A.T.’s primary care physician because she was concerned about

him. According to Skorich, the doctor’s office advised her to “keep doing what she was doing” and to take
A.T. to the hospital if he worsened. She argues this evidence negates the jury’s finding. But no evidence
corroborates the substance of the call beyond Skorich’s own testimony, and the jury was free to disbelieve
her. See Torres, 141 S.W.3d at 654.

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Dr. Mattamal testified that before A.T. became unresponsive, he would have

exhibited observable symptoms, such as less activity, glazed eyes, and not talking.

Woody acknowledged that A.T. had been feverish and weak for three days leading up to

the hospitalization. A.T. was asleep for most of the day, and Skorich would have to

physically try to wake him up and ask if he was hungry or thirsty. She said A.T. would

nod his head yes, but his eyes would remain closed. She would try to force the food or

the water by giving him sips or rubbing it on his gums.

When A.T. was admitted to the emergency room, he was severely dehydrated,

with record-breaking high levels of sodium. Because A.T. was so dehydrated, staff could

not reliably find a vein for an IV and had to use an intraosseous device to pump fluids

directly into the boy’s bone marrow. His kidney failure caused toxic levels of urea in his

blood. The treating physicians stated A.T.’s dehydration had occurred over time and was

inconsistent with having a virus. It showed A.T.’s level of dehydration was not something

a person could achieve on their own.

The jury could have disregarded Skorich’s statements that she was giving A.T.

food and fluids. Her portrayal of unremarkable symptoms is difficult to square with

Woody’s admission to the officer that they had discussed taking A.T. to the hospital due

to his progressively worsening condition.

The evidence also supports a finding that Skorich failed to protect A.T. from

assault. A.T. had multiple physical injuries in various stages of healing all over his body

that were visually obvious and immediately apparent to the emergency room staff when

he was brought in. They were also obvious to Woody, yet Skorich denied knowledge of

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any. According to the health care providers, different phases of healing showed the

injuries occurred over an extended period of time and during multiple incidents. The jury

had the opportunity to hear Appellants’ varying and conflicting explanations for how A.T.

could have received such injuries and to compare them to the medical evidence offered

at trial.

The evidence showing the extent of A.T.’s injuries was not limited to testimony; the

jury was allowed to see photographs of the boy at the time of his hospital admission.

Such visual images may refute a defendant’s claim of lack of knowledge or recklessness

by clarifying and supporting the observations and conclusions about a victim’s condition.

Proo, 587 S.W.3d at 809–13. They often give the factfinder a point of comparison against

which to test the credibility of a witness and the validity of her conclusions. See Sifuentes

v. State, No. 04-12-00607-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8105, at *16 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio July 3, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).

In sum, the jury was free to disregard Skorich’s denials of knowledge about A.T.’s

physical injuries. Based on the medical testimony, the parties’ contemporaneous

statements to law enforcement, and the visual evidence, the jury could have reasonably

inferred Skorich knowingly or recklessly caused A.T.’s serious bodily injury and bodily

injury by failing to provide him with protection from assault, adequate nutrition, and

medical care.

We overrule Skorich’s sufficiency issue.

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CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of Appellants’ issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Lawrence M. Doss
Justice

Publish.

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