James Alan Miller v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00227-CR
No. 07-24-00228-CR

JAMES ALAN MILLER, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 100th District Court
Childress County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 6845 & 7024, Honorable Dale A. Rabe, Jr., Presiding

March 13, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

James Miller appeals from the trial court’s judgments adjudicating him guilty of the

offenses of possession of a controlled substance, enhanced (Cause Number 6845) and

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver with a deadly weapon (Cause

Number 7024). The trial court sentenced appellant to serve 30 and 60 years, respectively,

in prison. The sentences were also ordered to run consecutively, with the 30-year term

to commence after completion of the 60-year sentence. His issues concern the

sufficiency of the evidence underlying the finding that he violated a condition of
community supervision, and the grossly disproportionate sentences purportedly levied.

We affirm.

Background

Appellant pleaded guilty to the offenses and was placed on deferred adjudication

community supervision. His community supervision was subject to certain terms and

conditions. In May 2024, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt in both causes.

Allegedly, he provided a fake urine sample when submitting to a drug test and ingested

methamphetamine.

Separate hearings were held in each cause. Though appellant pleaded “not true”

to the allegations within the motions to adjudicate, the State presented evidence

illustrating the allegations to be true in each. That evidence came in the form of appellant

admitting to his probation officer that he provided a fake urine sample when undergoing

a drug test and that he ingested methamphetamine while on community supervision.

Appellant admitted to the latter at trial in Cause Number 6845. That evidence resulted in

the trial court adjudicating appellant guilty of the aforementioned crimes and levying the

aforementioned sentences.

Issues One and Two—Sufficiency of the Evidence

By his first two issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when

it found the State satisfied its burden of proof that he violated the terms of his community

supervision by committing the offenses of possession of a drug falsification device and

consuming methamphetamine. Specifically, appellant argues the evidence was

insufficient because other forms of evidence such as an admission of use form was not

introduced into evidence and the probation officer failed to testify about the temperature

of the fake urine sample he provided. We overrule the issues.
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We review a trial court’s decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt and to

revoke deferred adjudication community supervision under the same standard as a

revocation of regular community supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

42A.108(b). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the person

on community supervision violated a term of his supervision. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d

860, 864-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006).

“Our review of an order adjudicating guilt and revoking community supervision is

limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the

defendant violated the terms of his community supervision.” Bell v. State, 554 S.W.3d

742, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). A single violation will support

the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d

20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

trial court’s order. Bell, 554 S.W.3d at 746. Finally, as the trier of fact at a revocation

proceeding, the trial court determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be

given to their testimony. Id.

To reiterate, appellant’s probation officer testified that appellant 1) submitted a fake

urine sample when asked to drug test, 2) eventually admitted to providing the fake

sample, and 3) admitted to using methamphetamine around April 17, 2024. When

testifying in Cause Number 6845, appellant also voiced his sorrow in using

methamphetamine while on probation. Such was more than sufficient evidence enabling

a factfinder to conclude appellant violated the conditions of probation the trial court found

he violated. And, while the officer was free to talk about the temperature of the fake urine

appellant provided if queried on the matter or proffer other forms of evidence
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memorializing appellant’s inculpatory admissions, the absence of same did not render the

court’s findings deficient. Appellant’s oral admissions sufficed.

Issue Two—Consecutive Sentences

Through his third issue, appellant contends the trial court erred when it ordered his

30-year sentence in Cause Number 6845 to run consecutively to his 60-year sentence in

Cause Number 7024. More specifically, appellant contends the sentences constituted

cruel and unusual punishment because the consecutive sentences were grossly

disproportionate to his crimes. We overrule the issue.

A trial court’s decision to cumulate, or “stack,” sentences is reviewed under an

abuse of discretion standard. Byrd v. State, 499 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

As is relevant here, an abuse of discretion will generally be found only if 1) the trial court

imposes consecutive sentences when the law requires concurrent sentences, 2) the trial

court imposes concurrent sentences when the law requires consecutive ones, or 3) the

trial court otherwise fails to observe the statutory requirements pertaining to sentencing.

Nicholas, 56 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d).

Next, the Eighth Amendment, applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth

Amendment, prohibits punishments that are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of

the crime” and those that do not serve any “penological purpose.” Bucklew v. Precythe,

57 U.S. 119, 167, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1144, 203 L. Ed. 2d 521 (2019). As a general matter,

so long as a sentence is legal and assessed within the legislatively determined range, it

will not be considered excessive, cruel, or unusual. State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318,

323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006) (orig. proceeding) (noting that “the sentencer’s discretion to impose any

punishment within the prescribed range is essentially ‘unfettered’”). Further, if the law
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authorizes the imposition of cumulative sentences, a trial judge has absolute discretion

to stack sentences. Nicholas, 56 S.W.3d at 765.

Here, appellant’s punishment and cumulative sentences are within statutory

parameters. Under article 42.08 of the code of criminal procedure, the judge has the

discretion to order sentences for convictions in two or more cases to run consecutively.

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.08(a); Byrd, 499 S.W.3d at 446. Appellant

nevertheless argues that the stacking order in this case violates his rights because the

total sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offenses.

A sentence that is within the applicable range of punishment may still be cruel or

unusual in the “exceedingly rare” or “extreme” case. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

73, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003); see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-

92, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). The analysis appellant invokes is based

on Solem, which held that “a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment

should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the

harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same

jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other

jurisdictions.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. The first Solem criteria constitutes a threshold

inquiry, in which we are to determine whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to

the offense, considering the severity of the former compared to the gravity of the

latter. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. We proceed to consider the second and third

criteria only if we conclude that the threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross

disproportionality. Id.

As noted, appellant’s sentences separately and cumulatively fell within the

statutory range of five to ninety-nine years or life, the applicable range of sentencing for
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first degree felonies. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32. And, contrary to appellant’s

assertion in his brief, to determine whether a sentence for a term of years is grossly

disproportionate for a particular defendant’s crime, “a court must judge the severity of the

sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the culpability of the

offender, and the offender’s prior adjudicated and unadjudicated offenses.” Id. Thus, the

court was free to take the nature of appellant’s crimes as well as appellant’s criminal

history and other cases before the court into consideration. Moreover, appellant admitted

to being in prison five times, having six felony convictions, attempting to dupe his

probation officer, and having ingested drugs during a period for rehabilitation, that is, while

on probation. This is not one of the highly rare situations evincing gross disproportionality.

So, we conclude the cumulated sentences are not grossly disproportionate to appellant’s

offenses.

Having overruled each of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.

1 One of appellant’s offenses was a first-degree felony and the other was a second-degree felony,

enhanced to a first for punishment purposes.

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