Carolyn Rodriguez v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00020-CR

CAROLYN RODRIGUEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 9
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1832044

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Tarrant County1 jury convicted Carolyn2 Rodriguez of interference with public duties3

and recommended a sentence of thirty days’ confinement and a fine of $750.00. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 38.15. Rodriguez appeals claiming (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the

jury’s verdict, (2) the trial court erred by denying Rodriguez’s motion for new trial, (3) the trial

court erred by resentencing Rodriguez and suspending execution of her sentence, and (4) the trial

court erred by using some of Rodriguez’s back-time credit toward the condition she serve ten

days’ in jail as a term of the community supervision. We overrule her points of error. Noting an

error in the trial court’s judgment, though, we will modify that instrument. We affirm the trial

court’s judgment, as modified.

I. Background

Rodriguez maintained a YouTube channel where she posted recordings of Fort Worth

police officers in the course of their duties or other events she considered of public relevance. 4

1
Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We follow the
precedent of the Second Court of Appeals in deciding the issues presented. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
We use the spelling of Rodriguez’s name from the documents in the record.
3
In the same trial, the jury acquitted Rodriguez of false alarm or report. She had been charged with resisting arrest,
but the State abandoned that charge before trial.
4
At punishment, the State showed a video recording of Rodgriguez walking through the unattended yet open Tarrant
County Facilities Management Construction Services office. Her narration claimed that many of the vehicles in the
parking lot, which she filmed and posted to her channel, were “undercover” police vehicles. Finding no one in the
building, she sat down at a computer terminal where she accessed the internet and opened her YouTube channel
website. She then left a note on the desk that said, “CAROLINA IN FT WORTH WAS HERE!” For that act, she
was convicted, in 2019, of breach of computer security. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02.
2
Tiffany Michel,5 a police officer with the Fort Worth Police Department (FWPD), testified that

officers are trained to “instruct an auditor[6] to go elsewhere,” and “they have to be given an

opportunity to go somewhere where they can still film.” Officers are “taught that merely yelling

at officers, even using profanity, but [not] doing anything to prevent [officers] from duties, [is]

not interfering.”

Rodriguez was in a busy area of downtown Fort Worth around 3:30 a.m. on June 23,

2024. Police were investigating a hit-and-run incident, where the driver had abandoned his or

her pickup truck in a parking lot and fled the scene.7 Rodriguez stayed on the other side of the

street from the parking lot where police were investigating the abandoned truck, and a tow truck

had arrived and was getting into position to remove it. The State introduced a video composite

exhibit that was created from the body-camera footage of Krueger,8 surveillance videos, and

Rodriguez’s YouTube video posting. The beginning of that composite video exhibit (which is

about seven-and a-half minutes long) is a segment from Rodriguez’s YouTube broadcast, where

her narration begins, “Nothing’s going’ on, so I need to see if I can stir up some trouble over

here” and then continues, “[Let’s] see if our magic camera will run ‘em off,” referring to the

police officers.

5
Michel had “five or six prior interactions with” Rodriguez.
6
Rodriguez and people who share this hobby are called “First Amendment auditors” by the police.
7
Michel was one of the officers on scene investigating the hit-and-run incident. The information alleged Rodriguez
interfered with Officer Matthew Krueger, who was in charge of this investigation.
8
Krueger was conducting the investigation named in the information.
3
After some time, Rodriguez crossed the street and walked through the parking lot by the

to-be-towed pickup truck and a few police officers, among whom were Michel, her partner,

Officer Kyla Botts of the FWPD, and Krueger in his police vehicle. Rodriguez, unaware of the

nature of the officers’ work, tried to engage Michel and Botts, who were walking together in the

parking lot.9 At that point, Rodriguez was about fifteen feet or so behind the officers.10

Rodriguez followed the officers, gradually getting closer to them. The officers, pursuant to their

training and previous experiences with Rodriguez in similar circumstances, ignored her when she

asked them how they determined whether a person had paid to park their vehicle in the lot.

Receiving no response, Rodriguez called out, in a kind of singsong voice, “Help! Rape! Fire!

Fire!” Gradually, Rodriguez closed the distance between her and the officers and called out,

“Hey ladies, hey ladies.” Still, the officers ignored her.

By that time, Rodriguez was a few feet away from the two officers and behind the pickup

truck that was to be towed. Krueger exited his police vehicle, which was parked a few feet away

from the officers and Rodriguez. He immediately engaged with Rodriguez in the following

conversation:

[Rodriguez:] Hey Krueger.

[Krueger:] Carolyn, we’re busy. Go to the other side of the street.

[Rodriguez:] No I’m not going to. What for? There’s no investigation, there’s
no nothing.

9
Rodriguez narrated her video for her audience. She believed officers were towing vehicles that appeared to be
legally parked. There was no indication any vehicle other than the one involved in the hit-and-run was being towed.
10
We use the lined parking space markers in the video evidence to gauge Rodriguez’s distance.
4
[Kreuger] You can go to the other side of the street or you’re gonna get
arrested. I’m not warning you again.

[Rodriguez:] What are you talking about?

[Krueger:] Go to the other side of the street right now.

[Rodriguez:] Why? Wait, tell me why first.

[Female Police Officer:] We’re doing an investigation.

[Krueger:] You’re under arrest. Turn around.

Although not played for the jury, the full recording from Krueger’s body camera shows Krueger

cuffing Rodriguez’s hands behind her and then taking her to the ground, face first. From that

video, it is clear Rodriguez momentarily lost consciousness and, upon coming to, was crying in

pain. Rodriguez suffered significant injuries when Krueger arrested her—a fractured orbital

bone, dislocated elbow, and lacerated top lip. Krueger was disciplined for his behavior in

arresting Rodriguez. About a week after the trial, Krueger was fired from the FWPD. After

trial, Rodriguez obtained documents from the City of Fort Worth describing Krueger’s

disciplinary reviews and ultimate termination from employment.

Rodriguez filed a motion for new trial, attaching the City of Fort Worth’s documents

regarding Krueger’s discipline and termination. At the hearing on her motion, Rodriguez also

argued about the importance of documents she had subpoenaed before trial. Two months before

trial, Rodriguez had subpoenaed documents from the Irving Police Department (IPD).

According to statements made at the motion for new trial hearing, Krueger had previously been

fired from the IPD for another incident involving the use of excessive force. The IPD materials

5
were submitted to the trial court, before trial, for in camera inspection.11 The trial court told the

parties, the day before trial, that it had reviewed the IPD documents and found nothing in their

“hundred to 120 pages” that was subject to discovery. Having never acquired the IPD

documents, Rodriguez did not attach them to her motion for new trial. The trial court denied that

motion, and this appeal followed.

II. The Evidence is Sufficient

Rodriguez complains the evidence is insufficient to prove she committed interference

with public duties. She argues that no officers at the scene explicitly told her an investigation

was being conducted, nor were there any circumstances or indicia of an investigation that would

alert her that an investigation was being conducted.12 We do not agree with her assessment of

the evidence.

A. Standard of Review

“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010)). “Our rigorous review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id.

(citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency

11
The Honorable Brent Carr heard and ruled on Rodriguez’s motion for new trial. He was sitting for the Honorable
Brian Bolton, who presided over the pretrial motions and both phases of the trial.
12
Rodriguez argues, “[T]here were no cones, crime scene tape, police vehicles with emergency lights flashing, or
officers standing guard that would clearly indicate [that] there was a crime scene.” She further argues that “no
officers bothered to inform [her] that she needed to move away until Krueger aggressively approached [her].”
6
under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury

‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007)).

“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

“In our review, we consider ‘events occurring before, during and after the commission of

the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common

design to do the prohibited act.’” Id. at 297 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “It is not

required that each fact ‘point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as

the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the

conviction.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Circumstantial evidence and direct

evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be

established by circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Further, ‘we must consider all of the

evidence admitted at trial, even if that evidence was improperly admitted.’” Id. at 297–98

(quoting Fowler v. State, 517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017) (citing Moff v.

7
State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)), rev’d in part, 544 S.W.3d 844 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018)).

The jury, as “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

their testimony[, could] ‘believe all of [the] witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.’”

Id. at 297 (second alternation in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014)). “We give ‘almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision

is based upon an evaluation of credibility.’” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

B. Analysis

Under a hypothetically correct jury charge, the State had to prove that, (1) with criminal

negligence, Rodriguez (2) interrupted, disrupted, impeded or interfered with (3) Krueger, a peace

officer, (4) who was conducting a criminal investigation (5) by refusing a directive to move away

from the scene of the investigation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15; Trevino v. State, 512

S.W.3d 587, 593–94 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).

Rodriguez clearly did not abide by Krueger’s commands to return to the other side of the

street. Krueger plainly gave Rodriguez “a directive to move away from the scene of the

investigation,” as alleged in the information. Rodriguez answered, “No, I’m not going to.”

Krueger directed her two more times, and both times Rodriguez questioned him and his

commands. It is true that neither Rodriguez nor Krueger raised their voices, and “arguing with

the officers does not constitute an actionable offense.” Carney v. State, 31 S.W.3d 392, 398

(Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). Neither is debating the officer, which may be a better

8
description for Rodriguez’s tone. But nothing in the police action was a limit on Rodriguez’s

right to free speech.13 However, she clearly refused Krueger’s directive to move away from the

scene of the investigation.

In Trevino, police responded to a report of a young lady threatening to kill or harm

herself with a kitchen knife. Trevino, 512 S.W.3d at 590. At the scene, officers detained the

young lady and attempted to escort her out of the house. Id. Trevino, the young lady’s sister,

blocked the front door, trying to prevent the officers from taking her sister. Id. Ultimately,

Trevino pushed one of the officers, causing him to lose his balance. Id. The State charged

Trevino with and convicted her of interference with public duties under Section 38.15. Id. at

592. The El Paso Court of Appeals found Trevino’s act of pushing the police officer “in an

attempt to impede his actions” to be “sufficient evidence that [Trevino] interfered with [the

officer]’s investigation.” Id. at 596.

Trevino took note of Carney. There, law enforcement attempted to execute an arrest

warrant for Carney’s wife at their home. Carney, 31 S.W.3d. at 393–94. Carney first told

officers that his wife was not in the home, and he argued extensively with them about the validity

of their warrant. Id. at 394. Finally, one of the officers testified that he “push[ed] [Carney]

away” and “entered the house.” Id. The information charged Carney with “blocking entry” of

the officers. Id. at 396. There were inconsistencies in testimony from the officers regarding

where they and Carney were standing throughout their encounter, but “[n]one of the armed

officers expressly testified that [Carney] blocked their entry into the house by physical action,”

13
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(d): “It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the interruption,
disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech only.”
9
and there was “nothing to show that the pushing or shoving of [Carney] was necessary to make

entry.” Id. at 398. As cited above, the Carney court held, “Under section 38.15, arguing with

the officers does not constitute an actionable offense.” Id.

By her conduct, Rodriguez clearly “refus[ed] a directive to move away from the scene of

the investigation” of a hit-and-run incident from earlier in the morning. She complains that there

was nothing in the area of the parking lot that would have informed her an investigation was

afoot and argued that officers did not tell her anything about an investigation. Obviously, this

disregards the conversation just before she was arrested. Krueger told her to move to the other

side of the street and warned her she risked arrest if she did not comply, and one other officer

informed her they were conducting an investigation. It is true, as Rodriguez states in her brief,

that the exchange happened within the span of about thirteen seconds. That is simply a

circumstantial matter we consider in evaluating the totality of the evidence. However,

Rodriguez’s degree of scienter did not require that she clearly appreciate the significance of the

activities around her. It was enough that her conduct showed that she “ought to [have been]

aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist[ed] or the result would

occur.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(d); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(a) (the mens rea

for interference with public duties is criminal negligence). “Just because [s]he did not intend the

result does not change h[er] awareness and perception of the risk.” Still v. State, 709 S.W.2d

10
658, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). By her conduct—not obeying Krueger’s instruction—

Rodriguez interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or interfered with the officers’ investigation.14

The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We overrule Rodriguez’s first

point of error.

III. Motion for New Trial Properly Denied

In her second point of error, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred to deny her

motion for new trial, in which she claimed that information she obtained after trial satisfied the

requirements for a new trial under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.15 The documents she

obtained after trial included the City of Fort Worth documents describing Krueger’s use of force

in arresting Rodrigez, discipline, and eventual firing from the FWPD. Part of her arguments

were also based on documents she subpoenaed before trial from Krueger’s previous employer,

the City of Irving. The trial court received and reviewed the IPD documents in camera before

voir dire and held that there was nothing discoverable in them. Rodriguez did not ask for the

documents reviewed in camera to be included in the appellate record, precluding our review.

After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling.

We will overrule this point of error.

14
If the purpose of the statute is to protect officers in the course of their duties and the integrity of their
investigations, that is a legitimate public policy. In Duvall v. State, 367 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012,
pet. ref’d), this Court observed that the intent of Section 38.04 of the Texas Penal Code, evading arrest or detention,
is “to deter flight from arrest or detention by the threat of an additional penalty, thus discouraging forceful conflicts
between the police and suspects,” and that the statute “supports an important public policy—encouraging suspects to
yield to a show of authority by law enforcement.” Id. at 513; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04 (Supp.). While
we are mindful of the language in Trevino and other cases such as Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835, 841–42
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d), requiring some physical act or conduct to rise above the defense
of speech, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(d), we still find that Rodriquez’s defiance of Krueger’s command
was conduct that refused his directive and hence satisfied the actus reus required.
15
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.001.
11
A. Standard of Review

“We review a trial judge’s denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion

standard.” Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “We do not substitute

our judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we decide whether the trial court’s decision was

unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). “A

trial judge abuses his discretion in denying a motion for new trial when no reasonable view of

the record could support his ruling.” Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

trial judge’s ruling and presume that all reasonable factual findings that could have been made

against the losing party were made against that losing party.” Id. “At a motion for new trial

hearing, the judge alone determines the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. “Even if the testimony

is not controverted or subject to cross-examination, the trial court has discretion to disbelieve

that testimony.” Id. “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial

for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if the trial court’s ruling was clearly erroneous and

arbitrary.” Adetomiwa v. State, 421 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.)

(citing Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

A defendant seeking a new trial must meet certain requirements.

Article 40.001 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, “A new trial shall be
granted an accused where material evidence favorable to the accused has been
discovered since trial.” To obtain relief under this provision, the defendant must
satisfy the following four-prong test:

(1) the newly discovered evidence was unknown or
unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial;

12
(2) the defendant’s failure to discover or obtain the new
evidence was not due to the defendant’s lack of due
diligence;

(3) the new evidence is admissible and not merely
cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and

(4) the new evidence is probably true and will probably
bring about a different result in a new trial.

State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (footnote omitted) (citation

omitted) (quoting Carsner v. State, 444 S.W.3d 1, 2–3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). “Motions for

new trial based upon newly discovered evidence are not favored by the courts and are viewed

with great caution.” Frank v. State, 183 S.W.3d 63, 71 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet.

ref’d).

Further, when as here, the trial court makes no findings of fact regarding the
denial of the motion for new trial, we ascribe to the court “implicit factual
findings that support that trial judge’s ultimate ruling on that motion when such
implicit factual findings are both reasonable and supported in the record.”

Holbert v. State, 665 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2023, pet. ref’d) (quoting Johnson

v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).

B. Analysis

On or about December 18, 2024, a few days after the jury found Rodriguez guilty,

Krueger was fired from the FWPD. Among the reasons for his termination was a finding that

Krueger used excessive force in his arrest of Rodriguez.

Rodriguez filed a motion for new trial, alleging that that was newly discovered evidence.

She introduced three exhibits at the motion for new trial hearing:

13
• Defense Exhibit 1, containing reports from two of Krueger’s FWPD supervisors
detailing their investigations into and findings about Rodriguez’s arrest (both
recommending “indefinite suspension” or termination); a press release about
Krueger’s termination; and a summary report from an internal affairs report
sustaining multiple allegations against Krueger;

• Defense Exhibit 2, containing an affidavit from a Lieutenant in the internal affairs
division stating many of the facts detailed in the above reports and that Krueger
was “indefinitely suspended” on December 18, 2024; and

• Defense Exhibit 3, containing an internal “use of force” (UOF) report that was
initiated June 23, 2024, the day of the incident, that lists personnel involved, that
was updated to reference the “UOF review board’s findings,” and that invites
review, findings, and recommendations from the recipient.

However, Rodriguez spent much of the hearing on her motion for new trial arguing about a

document not included in the record, Krueger’s personnel file from the IPD, where Krueger

worked before he was employed by the FWPD.

Rodriguez told the trial court at the hearing on her motion for new trial that Krueger’s

IPD file included information about an unrelated incident. However, the documents comprising

the IPD file are not in the appellate record.16

16
The record shows that Rodriguez subpoenaed the IPD information on October 30, 2024. The City of Irving moved
to quash the subpoena on November 18, 2024. Irving emailed the subpoenaed documents to the trial court on
December 9. On December 10, at a pre-trial hearing (voir dire and trial were held on December 11, 2024), the trial
court told the parties it had “reviewed between a hundred to 120 pages of documents that were sent by the City of
Irving.” The court continued, “The Court did not find anything that must be disclosed. So we’re not getting into
these matters that . . . were submitted by the City of Irving. They’re not subject to disclosure.”

Rodriguez made no objection to the trial court’s ruling and made no request for the documents to be sealed for
appellate review. It is Rodriguez’s burden to provide this Court with a sufficient record to determine the merits of
her appellate complaints. See London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Generally, the
appealing party carries the burden to ensure that the record on appeal is sufficient to resolve the issues presented.
The failure to provide a sufficient appellate record precludes appellate review of a claim.”). “If documents have
been submitted for in camera inspection, the complaining party must request that the exhibits be carried forward
under seal so that the appellate court can evaluate this information.” Lesher v. Coyel, 435 S.W.3d 423, 431–32
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied); see Hoyos v. State, 951 S.W.2d 503, 513 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1997), aff’d, 982 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“The record reveals that the trial court considered the
14
C. Impeachment is Not Grounds for A New Trial

New evidence will not warrant a new trial if, inter alia, it is “merely cumulative,

corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.” Carsner, 444 S.W.3d at 2 (quoting Wallace v. State,

106 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).17 Reviewing the record and Rodriguez’s

arguments, we remain unconvinced that the evidence presented in the motion for new trial and

hearing could have been used for anything beyond impeachment of Krueger, who did not testify

at trial.

Rodriguez’s new trial exhibits, summarized above, contained detailed reviews and

critiques of Krueger’s behavior in arresting Rodriguez and its aftermath. The documents found

fault in Krueger’s judgment and failure to de-escalate the incident. They include incident

reviews from two of Krueger’s superiors who both recommended indefinite suspension, which

apparently is the equivalent of termination. There was a copy of the FWPD press release

covering Krueger’s termination. Rodiguez has not, though, established what relevance the

information from the Fort Worth documents had towards her guilt or innocence. The

information in the Fort Worth documents concerns only Krueger’s behavior at and after the

arrest of Rodriguez. The only possible use of the three defensive documents produced at the

motion for new trial hearing was to impeach Krueger, who, again, did not testify.

evidence during an in camera inspection, but our record does not contain the evidence reviewed by the trial court
during this inspection. The burden is upon appellant to ‘see that a sufficient record is presented to show error
requiring reversal.’” (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 50(d), 49 TEX. B.J. 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986, repealed 2011))).
17
As far back as the late nineteenth century, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “a new trial will not be
granted for the purpose of procuring impeaching testimony.” Navarro v. State, 45 S.W. 724, 725 (Tex. Crim. App.
1898).
15
Rodriguez argued to the trial court that the combined information from the cities of Irving

and Fort Worth would show “a pattern of conduct,” demonstrating that Krueger was “a hothead”

who had used excessive force at least one other time before the arrest of Rodriguez in the Fort

Worth parking lot. Rodriguez further argued that, without that information, she “would have no

materials actually to review and be able to impeach should he -- he be dishonest.” But there is

the rub. Rodriguez has not presented any argument as to how the information, urged in the

motion for new trial, had any use beyond impeachment. Not only did Krueger not testify at trial,

but Rodriguez offers nothing but speculation that had he, Krueger would have presented some

kind of false impression testimony that would have subjected him to impeachment. She argued

to the trial court, “I wouldn’t want to put a witness on the stand where I don’t have all the

answers to know if he’s going to lie and -- perjure himself ‘cause I -- I would have no

impeachment material to present and impeach him on the stand.” She continued, “[Without the

information from Irving and Fort Worth], we would have no ability to impeach anything he said

on the stand if he was called to testify with regards to, Hey, didn’t this happen. He could sit

there and say no.” Yet, this has nothing to do with Rodriguez’s guilt of the charged offense.

Even without Krueger’s testimony, the State was able to present sufficient evidence that

Rodriguez refused a directive from Krueger to move away from the scene of the officers’

investigation.

It is mere speculation that any of the information Rodriguez obtained after trial could

have been used to bring about a different result at trial. Assuming without deciding that the IPD

documents were newly discovered evidence and said what Rodriguez told the trial court, they

16
were only relevant to impeach Krueger. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Rodriguez’s motion for a new trial. We overrule Rodriguez’s second point of error.

IV. No Abuse of Discretion in Resentencing

In her third point of error, Rodriguez complains of the trial court’s sua sponte decision to

suspend execution of her sentence and place her on community supervision for fifteen months.

We discern no error on the trial court’s part and overrule this argument.

The jury recommended a sentence of thirty days’ in the county jail, and the trial court

imposed that sentence. Rodriguez was taken into custody December 12, 2024. The trial court

brought her back to court on December 16 and, on its own motion and over Rodriguez’s

objection, suspended her sentence and placed her on community supervision for fifteen months.

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure clearly authorizes this. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 42A.201. At the resentencing hearing, the trial court cited Ivey v. Texas, 277 S.W.3d

43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).18 Ivey “deliberately forwent filing a sworn motion with the jury

[(which he had elected for punishment),] declaring that he had never before been convicted of a

felony offense in this or any other state,” and thus, the jury could not recommend that any

sentence be suspended in favor of community supervision. Id. at 44. Though the jury

recommended jail time and a fine, the trial court suspended Ivey’s sentence and placed him on

community supervision. Id. at 45. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that it was within

the trial court’s discretion to place Ivey on community supervision “so long as the appellant met

the criteria for community supervision” prescribed by the applicable statute. Id. at 52.

18
Ivey applied the prior version of the statue, former Article 42.12, Section 3(a), of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. See Ivey, 277 S.W.3d 43.
17
Rodriguez, before trial, filed a sworn application for community supervision and

requested that, if she were convicted, her punishment be assessed by a jury. However, she did

not request that the punishment charge include the option to recommend a probated sentence and

made a “strateg[ic] move forward” to “not ask the jury for probation.” Notwithstanding, the trial

court had the authority to suspend Rodriguez’s sentence and place her on community

supervision.

Rodriguez was charged with and convicted of the misdemeanor offense of interference

with public duties. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(b). Therefore, Article 42A.201

authorized the trial court to suspend Rodriguez’s sentence and place her on community

supervision.19

The judge of a court that imposed a sentence requiring confinement in a jail for
conviction of a misdemeanor may, on the judge’s own motion, . . . suspend
further execution of the sentence and place the defendant on community
supervision under the terms and conditions of this chapter if, in the opinion of the
judge, the defendant would not benefit from further confinement.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.201(b). Although the trial court did not explicitly find

that Rodriguez “would not benefit from further confinement,” it did find it was in the interest of

the community. Id. “Because the trial court did not make explicit findings of fact in this case,

we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the

trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the record.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d

488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Ex Parte Shires, 508 S.W.3d 856, 860 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2016, no pet.).

19
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.201.
18
The trial court, explaining its purpose in placing Rodriguez on community supervision,

said, “[T]he community is served best when the police are able to conduct investigations without

the distractions of an external force or an external stimulus.” The lower court also stated, “[T]he

community is best served and best protected when . . . police officers and first responders are

able to do their jobs without distractions from external stimuli.” Some of the trial court’s

conditions for supervision included requiring Rodriguez to stay twenty-five feet from law

enforcement officers if she were not seeking their assistance20 and not to commit any offenses

against the laws of the State of Texas or the United States.

Absent an explicit finding by the trial court that Rodriguez “would not benefit from

further confinement,” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.201(b), we will “infer[] the

necessary factual findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the record evidence (viewed in

the light most favorable to the ruling) supports these implied fact findings,” State v. Garcia-

Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

The trial court was within its discretion to place Rodriguez on community supervision.

We overrule her third point of error.

V. Complaint About Use of Back Time Not Preserved

Attendant to her third point of error, Rodriguez complains that the trial court erred when

it applied her “jail time credit to a condition of community supervision.” As noted above, on

December 12, 2024, the trial court sentenced Rodriguez to thirty days’ confinement in

accordance with the jury’s recommendation. Four days later, the trial court called the parties

20
At the resentencing hearing, Rodriguez agreed with the trial court that such a condition was “a fair compromise.”
19
back and suspended imposition of Rodriguez’s confinement for fifteen months and required that

she serve ten days in jail as a condition for the suspension of her sentence. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 42A.302. The trial court said it would credit Rodriguez with ten days in jail,

thus releasing her to community supervision that day. On appeal, she complains it was error to

apply her “back time credit,” i.e., her time served in jail prior to trial, to the ten days required as

a condition of supervision. However, she made no objection to this order in the trial court. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

After announcing the suspension of her sentence and the requirement of ten days’

confinement, the trial court listed several more conditions of Rodriguez’s supervision. That

elicited several complaints from Rodriguez, but she made no formal objections. Only after

several conditions were discussed and imposed did Rodriguez object, “Your Honor, we object to

any community supervision in this case and -- which would include all conditions.”21

“‘Shotgun’ objections,” generally citing “many grounds for [an] objection without

argument,” preserve nothing for appeal. Johnson v. State, 263 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d, untimely filed); citing Webb v. State, 899 S.W.2d 814, 818

(Tex. App.—Waco 1995, writ ref’d).22 To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party

21
Rodriguez’s counsel made this objection when asked by the trial court his feelings on imposing a curfew on
Rodriguez. In answer to the objection, the trial court said, “Okay. Well, you can object but -- specifically, about a
curfew.” This suggests the trial court sought specific objections to specific conditions. Thus, there was no objection
to the use of back time that was “apparent from the context.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
22
See also Wright v. State, No. 02-12-00057-CR, 2014 WL 261409, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 23, 2014, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing the same cases for the same proposition). Although without
precedential authority, we take note of Wright as indicative of how the Second Court of Appeals might address this
issue.
20
must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds

for the ruling desired. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

Rodriguez did not object in the trial court to whether time served for pre-trial

incarceration may be applied to sentences and conditions of supervision. Assuming without

deciding there was some error in the trial court’s ruling, the lower court was never presented

with this specific complaint from Rodriguez or given an opportunity to remedy it. See Resendez

v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Rodriguez failed to preserve this

complaint, and we decline to review it.

We overrule the fourth point of error.

VI. The Judgment Must Be Modified

In our review of the record, we have found an error in the trial court’s judgment. The

trial court entered one judgment when it accepted the jury’s verdict and sentenced Rodriguez

accordingly. When it suspended Rodriguez’s sentence and placed her on community

supervision, it entered another judgment with the supervision conditions. That judgment is titled

“Judgment of Conviction by Court – Waiver of Jury Trial.” Although the trial court suspended

imposition of the jury’s recommended sentence, Rodriguez was still convicted by a jury.

This Court has the “authority to reform the judgment . . . to make the record speak the

truth when the matter has been called to [our] attention by any source.” French v. State, 830

S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure also provide

direct authority for this Court to “modify the trial court’s judgment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b).

We modify the trial court’s judgment to state that it was a jury trial.

21
VII. Conclusion

We modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting the heading “Judgment of Conviction

by Court – Waiver of Jury Trial” and replacing it with “Judgment of Conviction by Jury.” As

modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: September 16, 2025
Date Decided: November 24, 2025

Do Not Publish

22