Jeffrey Longino, Geralynn Longino & All Other Occupants v. Itay Sharoni

Dismissed and Opinion Filed December 4, 2024

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00653-CV

JEFFREY LONGINO, GERALYNN LONGINO,
AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, Appellants
V.
ITAY SHARONI, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 003-01063-2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Breedlove, and Kennedy
Opinion by Justice Breedlove
This is an appeal of a forcible detainer case. The trial court granted final

judgment in favor of lessor Itay Sharoni against lessees Jeffrey Longino and

Geralynn Longino. In two issues, the Longinos challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction

and contend that the final judgment is void. Sharoni, in turn, has challenged this

Court’s jurisdiction and has moved to dismiss this appeal. We conclude the trial

court had subject matter jurisdiction, but we lack subject matter jurisdiction to

decide the parties’ merits-based issues because those issues are moot. Accordingly,
we grant Sharoni’s motion to dismiss, dismiss the appeal as moot, and vacate the

underlying judgment.

BACKGROUND1
Sharoni owns real property located at 3801 Anatole Ct., Plano, Texas 75075

(the Property). On January 26, 2021, the parties entered into two agreements. Under

the first, a residential lease, the Longinos agreed to lease the Property for six months.

Under the second, an option to purchase the Property, Sharoni granted the Longinos

the right to purchase the Property at any time during the same six-month period. The

contracts commenced on February 1, 2021, and terminated on August 1, 2021. The

option to purchase was explicitly contingent on the Longinos remaining current on

their monthly rent.

The Longinos had paid only one month’s rent when, in March 2021, they were

forced to vacate the Property due to damage caused by Winter Storm Uri. They

returned to the Property approximately two-and-a-half months later, in late April or

early May 2021, but did not pay any further rent. They remained there until they

were evicted by a peace officer on August 22, 2022, over a year after the lease

expired.

1
The facts of this case are well-known to the parties; therefore, we include only those facts which are
relevant to the issues on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

–2–
Sharoni filed suit to evict the Longinos in Justice of the Peace Court Precinct

3 in Collin County. After a trial on April 22, 2022, Sharoni was awarded possession

of the Property. The same day, the Longinos appealed for a trial de novo in County

Court at Law 3 in Collin County. After a trial on June 20, 2022, the trial court

affirmed the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court and made the following

findings:

1. The defendants entered into a lease with an option to purchase
effective February 1, 2021, for the property located at 3081 [sic]
Anatole Ct., Plano, Texas 75075.

2. The option to purchase was conditioned upon the defendants
being in compliance with the terms of the lease agreement.

3. The defendants made one payment for the month of February,
2021, and did not make another payment.

4. The defendants were excused from making payments for the
months of March and April of 2021, due to being displaced from
the home because of the ice storm.

5. The defendants are guilty of forcible detainer.

6. The defendants are liable to the plaintiff for unpaid rent in the
amount of $2,450.00 per month from March 1, 2021 to today.

7. The defendants are entitled to an offset for the months of March
and April of 2021 ($4900).

8. The defendants are entitled to a credit for monies paid for the
option of $6,500.

9. Plaintiff is holding a security deposit of $4,500 from the
defendants.

–3–
10. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the amount of $27,800 after
all just and lawful offsets and credits. (May 2021 rent through
June 2022, less $6,500).

11. The Plaintiff is entitled to possession of the premises.

The County Court at Law also awarded Sharoni $27,800 in damages, the right to

immediate possession of the Property, and costs of court. The Longinos then filed

this appeal on June 27, 2022.

On October 17, 2023,2 Sharoni filed a Partial Release of Judgment in the

County Court at Law, releasing the monetary award and costs of court rendered by

the court in its final judgment. On November 1, 2023, Sharoni filed a Motion to

Dismiss Appeal in this Court, asserting that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because the appeal is moot. On November 11, 2023, the Longinos filed

their Objection to Sharoni’s motion to dismiss. The Longinos argued there was a

live controversy between the parties regarding the Longinos’ right to current, actual

possession of the Property because the trial court’s judgment was void and the trial

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.3

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Between the parties’ briefs and Sharoni’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, there are

a number of issues the parties request this Court to resolve. For clarity, we include a

2
In the interim, this appeal was abated during the Longinos’ bankruptcy proceedings.
3
By letter of April 2, 2024, we informed the parties that Sharoni’s motion to dismiss was deferred to
the submissions panel for resolution with the appeal.

–4–
summary of the issues asserted by each party here. The Longinos bring two issues

on appeal:

(1) Did the right to immediate possession necessarily require the
resolution of a title dispute, such that the county court at law was
deprived of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a forcible
detainer case?

(2) Was the final judgment defective and void because the judgment
awarded Sharoni possession to the premises located at 3081 Anatole
Ct. when the actual address of the subject property at issue is 3801
Anatole Ct.?4

Sharoni brings five issues on appeal5:

(1) Is the Longinos’ request for this Court to “determine that the
Appellant has a potentially meritorious claim of right to current,
actual possession of the premises and/or monetary damages . . .” a
non-justiciable declaratory judgment request due to a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction?

(2) Is the issue of damages nonjusticiable due to mootness because of
the Partial Release of Judgment?

(3) Is the issue of possession nonjusticiable due to mootness?

(4) Did the lower court properly enter the judgment with regard to the
issue of the alleged title dispute?

4
Sharoni does not address the typographical error in the Final Judgment on appeal or otherwise respond
to the Longinos’ contention that the Final Judgment is void because it includes the incorrect house number.
5
Although Sharoni does not bring a cross-appeal, we are authorized to consider Sharoni’s issues on
appeal. See Dean v. Lafayette Place (Section One) Council of Co–Owners, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“If an appellee is satisfied with the relief granted by the trial
court, but merely wants to present additional, independent grounds for affirming the trial court’s judgment,
no notice of appeal is required. The independent grounds for affirmance can be raised in a cross-point as
long as the appellee is not requesting greater relief than that awarded by the trial court.”). Further, while
there are slight differences between Sharoni’s issues as framed in his Motion to Dismiss Appeal and his
brief on appeal, the substance of the issues is the same; therefore, we do not distinguish between them.

–5–
(5) Did the lower court properly enter the judgment with regard to the
residual issues of (not awarding) attorney’s fees and the security
deposit?

Because both Sharoni and the Longinos raise issues that implicate this Court’s

jurisdiction, we address those first. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,

133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) (courts must address questions of subject matter

jurisdiction at the “earliest opportunity” to do so).

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the court’s power to decide a case.

Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015). The

existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.

Id.

Chapter 24 of the Texas Property Code grants justice courts “jurisdiction in

eviction suits,” including suits for forcible entry and detainer and forcible detainer.

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a). Eviction suits are designed to provide “a

summary, speedy, and inexpensive remedy for the determination of who is entitled

to possession of the premises.” Westwood Motorcars, LLC v. Virtuolotry, LLC, 689

S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. 2024) (quoting McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 232

(Tex. 1984)); see also Miller v. Miller, No. 05-21-00422-CV, 2022 WL 1260183, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (pursuant to chapter 24 of

the property code, “justice courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear eviction

–6–
cases.”). Eviction suits are limited in scope and effect, with the “sole focus” being

“the right to immediate possession of real property.” Id. (quoting Shields Ltd. P’ship

v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 478 (Tex. 2017)); see also Marshall v. Hous. Auth.

of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006) (“The only issue in a forcible

detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises.”).

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 510.3, which governs eviction cases, identifies

“the right to actual possession” as the “[o]nly [i]ssue” in an eviction case and

specifies that claims “not asserted because of this rule can be brought in a separate

suit in a court of proper jurisdiction.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e). Section 24.008 of the

Property Code states that “[a]n eviction suit does not bar a suit for trespass, damages,

waste, rent, or mesne profits.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.008. The supreme court

has concluded, then, that an eviction suit in justice court is “not exclusive, but

cumulative, of any other remedy that a party may have,” and matters beyond “the

justice court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction” may be brought in another “court

of competent jurisdiction.” Virtuolotry, LLC, 689 S.W.3d at 883 (quoting

McGlothlin, 672 S.W.2d at 233).

–7–
DISCUSSION

A. This Court’s Jurisdiction to Consider the Longinos’ First Issue6
Before considering the Longinos’ first issue, we must address Sharoni’s

challenge to this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks &

Wildlife, 133 S.W.3d at 226. Sharoni argues that, in substance, the Longinos are

seeking a declaration that they have a potentially meritorious claim of right to

current, actual possession of the Property. According to Sharoni, this issue was not

litigated in the trial court, and, indeed, could not have been litigated because the

justice of the peace court only had jurisdiction to consider forcible detainer actions,

not declaratory judgment actions.

The Texas Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have long held that an

appellate court’s jurisdiction cannot exceed that of the lower court from which the

appeal is taken. See, e.g., Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tex. 1933) (citing

TEX. CONST. § 6 art. 5). As applicable here, when a forcible detainer case is brought

in a justice of the peace court and appealed to a county court for a trial de novo, the

county court exercises appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction; therefore, the

county court’s jurisdiction in such a case only extends as far as the justice court from

which the case originated. See Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415,

6
This section corresponds to Sharoni’s first issue.

–8–
433 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Ward v. Malone, 115

S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, pet. denied)).

In a forcible detainer action such as the one underlying this case, the only issue

is the right to actual and immediate possession of the premises. See Marshall, 198

S.W.3d at 785.7 We look at the substance of a claimant’s pleadings, not its form, to

determine under what cause of action a claim sounds. See Brumley v. McDuff, 616

S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. 2021) (holding that although a party sought declaratory

judgment, their dispute actually sounded in trespass-to-try-title and must be treated

as such) (citing Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex. 2004)).

Sharoni’s argument is premised on the Longinos’ use of the word “determine”

in their briefing. The Longinos request that this Court “determine that the Appellant

has a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the

premises.” (Emphasis added). The substance of their brief makes clear, however,

that by making this request, the Longinos are seeking reversal of the lower court’s

holding that Sharoni, not the Longinos, has a right to actual, current possession of

the Property. Despite their use of the word “determine,” the Longinos do not make

a specific request for declaratory relief or any citation to authorities concluding that

7
In a trial de novo on appeal to the county court, the parties are also permitted to plead, prove, and
recover damages suffered by withholding or defending possession of the premises during the pendency of
the appeal. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.007; see also Hong Kong Dev., Inc., 229 S.W.3d at 434–35 (detailing
types of damages allowed to be recovered in forcible detainer cases, relying rule of civil procedure 752, the
predecessor of property code § 24.007).

–9–
declaratory relief would be appropriate; therefore, it does not appear that the

Longinos intended to seek declaratory judgment. We conclude that this Court has

jurisdiction to consider the Longinos’ first issue because it was within the

jurisdictions of the lower courts to do so. See id.; see also Morrow, 62 S.W.2d at

646. We overrule Sharoni’s first issue.8

B. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Consider the Underlying Dispute9

We next turn to the question of the trial court’s jurisdiction. In their first issue,

the Longinos argue that the trial court never had subject matter jurisdiction in the

underlying case because the right to immediate possession of the Property

necessarily required the resolution of a title dispute, which is outside the scope of

the Justice of the Peace court’s—and therefore the County Court at Law’s—

jurisdiction. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785.

For the reasons we discuss below, we conclude that the trial court had

jurisdiction because (1) it was not required to resolve title issues in order to

determine the right to immediate possession of the premises; (2) the Longinos failed

to preserve their arguments that they own an equitable interest in the property and

that they are entitled to a lien under property code §§ 91.004 and 5.084; and (3) there

8
Further, we note that even if we ultimately conclude that the lower court did not have jurisdiction over
this case as the Longinos assert in their first issue, we would still have jurisdiction to consider their first
issue because an appellate court “always has jurisdiction to determine its own, and the lower courts’,
jurisdiction.” Abbott v. Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 699 (Tex. 2022).
9
This section corresponds to the Longinos’ first issue and Sharoni’s fourth issue.

–10–
is no evidence to support the Longinos’ contention that they exercised their option

to purchase the Property.

A justice court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear eviction cases where the issue

of immediate possession of the property is not intertwined with title issues. Barch

Ints. LP v. TitleMax of Tex., Inc., No. 05-24-00143-CV, 2024 WL 4432323, at *3

(Tex. App.—Dallas October 7, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing Miller, 2022 WL

1260183, at *2. However, a justice court or county court at law is not deprived of

jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute, but rather is deprived of

jurisdiction only if “the right to immediate possession necessarily requires the

resolution of a title dispute.” Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2001, no pet.) (citing Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Thus, we must determine whether the

right to immediate possession in this case depended upon a resolution of a title

dispute.

The Longinos argue that the trial court was required to determine questions of

title in order to render its judgment. In its judgment, the trial court characterized

$6,500 as “monies paid for the [O]ption” and $4,500 as a “security deposit.” The

Longinos contend that to make these characterizations, the trial court first had to find

that the $11,000 paid by the Longinos to Sharoni did not constitute an equitable

interest in the Property. They argue that this finding required the trial court to

–11–
interpret conflicts between the Lease Agreement and the Option and

Acknowledgment Agreements, including whether the $11,000 the Longinos paid to

Sharoni constituted an assignment fee or an equitable interest in the Property. The

Longinos further argue that the Property was clouded by a lien owned by a prior

tenant as a result of a judgment the tenant received after Sharoni wrongfully withheld

her security deposit, and that the Longinos should also have been afforded a lien on

the Property to secure payment of damages pursuant to property code §§ 91.00410

and 5.08411.

Sharoni responds that in this case, there is no title dispute to resolve at all,

much less a need to determine how intertwined a title dispute is with the forcible

detainer action. In support of this argument, Sharoni cites page 14 of the Longinos’s

brief, asserting that the “option [to purchase] was never assigned” as the Longinos’

admission that they merely had a conditional option to purchase, which they did not

exercise, and that any attempt to exercise such option would have been fruitless

10
Section 91.004 reads as follows:
(a) If the landlord of a tenant who is not in default under a lease fails to comply in any
respect with the lease agreement, the landlord is liable to the tenant for damages
resulting from the failure.
(b) To secure payment of the damages, the tenant has a lien on the landlord's
nonexempt property in the tenant's possession and on the rent due to the landlord
under the lease.
11
Section 5.084 states: “If a seller is liable to a purchaser under this subchapter, the purchaser, without
taking judicial action, may deduct the amount owed to the purchaser by the seller from any amounts owed
to the seller by the purchaser under the terms of an executory contract.”

–12–
because they defaulted on their lease agreement and the option contract was

contingent on the Longinos remaining current on their lease. In support of this

argument, Sharoni points to Mrs. Longino’s testimony during trial that neither her

nor her husband paid rent for the months of April through July 2021 as required

under the lease, paired with the language in the Option that “[a]ll of the terms of the

Lease Agreement must be complied with in order for th[e] Option to be valid.”

The Longinos did not argue before the lower court that they owned an

equitable interest in the Property by virtue of the $11,000 they paid to Sharoni or

that they were entitled to a lien on the Property under either property code §§ 91.004

or 5.084. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely, specific

objection or motion in the trial court that states the grounds for the desired ruling

with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1(a) (stating prerequisites to presenting complaint for appellate

review); Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993) (“As a rule, a claim,

including a constitutional claim, must have been asserted in the trial court in order

to be raised on appeal.”) (citations omitted). During trial, the trial court explicitly

asked the parties whether the $11,000 the Longinos paid to Sharoni should be

credited to the Longinos. Sharoni’s counsel responded that only $6,500 should be

credited to the Longinos because the $4,500 was a security deposit Sharoni was

entitled to retain. The Longinos’ counsel did not respond at all much less object to

–13–
Sharoni’s characterization of the $11,000. Therefore, the Longinos failed to preserve

these arguments for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).12

Without an equitable interest in the Property established through a lien as

discussed above, the Longinos’ only pathway to establish a valid title dispute based

on the record before us is to present some evidence that they had successfully

exercised their option to purchase the Property and therefore the landlord-tenant

relationship was dissolved. See Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“A forcible detainer action is dependent on proof of a

landlord-tenant relationship.”) (citing Haith, 596 S.W.2d at 196). The Longinos

make no such argument. The Longinos also do not contend, and the record before us

does not establish, that the sale of the Property was ever initiated. The record reflects

only that the Longinos expressed interest in exercising the Option without meeting

the Option’s requirements for doing so. Specifically, the Longinos admit that they

did not pay rent for the months of April 2021 through July 2021 as required by the

lease.13 Therefore, the evidence supports only the existence of a landlord-tenant

12
However, we conclude that even if the Longinos had preserved this issue for appeal, it would not
change the outcome of this issue. Section 91.004 applies only to tenants who are not in default and § 5.084
applies only to purchasers; the record before us demonstrates that the Longinos were neither. See TEX.
PROP. CODE §§ 91.004, 5.084.
13
The Longinos argue that their failure to fulfil the terms of the lease should be excused because Sharoni
breached the lease first by allowing a lien on the Property, and, in the alternative, they seem to imply that
the lease and/or option agreement were void to begin with because “a potential seller may not even execute
an executory contract with a potential purchaser if the seller does not own the property in fee simple free
from any liens or other encumbrances,” citing § 5.085 of the property code. To the extent the Longinos
intended to argue that the contract were void, we conclude they waived this argument both because they

–14–
relationship, not a buyer-seller relationship. Cf. id. at 201 (holding that the district

court, not the justice of the peace court, had jurisdiction when there was some

evidence that the parties’ original landlord-tenant relationship had ended and a new

buyer-seller relationship began).

The Longinos have not asserted a valid title dispute, so they cannot maintain

a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower court based upon the

necessity of resolving a title dispute that they have not established exists. Because

the right to immediate possession of the Property in this case did not depend upon

the disposition of title issues, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this

case. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. We overrule the Longino’s first issue.

C. Mootness14
Sharoni argues that even if this Court would otherwise have appellate

jurisdiction over the case, this Court has lost its jurisdiction to decide the issue of

possession because it is moot. In their Objection to Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss

Appeal, the Longinos argue that the appeal should not be dismissed because it raises

did not raise it before the trial court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a), and because they failed to adequately brief
the issue, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). However, even if the issue were properly preserved and briefed, it
would not change the outcome of our decision because the plain language of the Option requires that all of
the terms of the Lease Agreement be complied with and does not condition that performance on the
performance on the other party. See Pathfinder Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Great Western Drilling, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d
882, 889 (Tex. 2019) (“[a] contract’s plain language controls, not what one side or the other alleges they
intended to say but did not.”) (citations omitted).
This section corresponds to Sharoni’s third issue. We do not address Sharoni’s second issue on
14

whether the issue of damages is non-justiciable due to mootness because the Longinos did not assert a claim
for monetary damages in the trial court and, despite a single line in the Conclusion of their brief referring
to “monetary damages,” do not argue that they are entitled to such. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

–15–
issues of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and argues that the Final

Judgment is void.

An appellate court is prohibited from deciding a moot controversy. See Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). This prohibition is

rooted in the separation of powers doctrine in the Texas and United States

Constitutions that prohibits courts from rendering advisory opinions. See Nat’l

Collegiate, 1 S.W.3d at 86. For a plaintiff to have standing, a controversy must exist

between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. See

Trulock v. City of Duncanville, 277 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no

pet.) (citing Pantera Energy Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 150 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2004, no pet.)). If a case becomes moot, the parties lose their standing

to maintain their claims. Id.

Generally, an appeal is moot when the court’s action on the merits cannot

affect the rights of the parties. VE Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex.

1993). A case on appeal is moot if: (1) there are no live controversies between the

parties; and (2) any decision rendered by the appellate court would be an advisory

opinion. See Seals v. City of Dallas, 249 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,

no pet.) (citing Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.

1988)); cf. id. (issue on appeal is moot if either: (1) a party seeks judgment on

controversy that does not really exist; or (2) a party seeks judgment which, when

–16–
rendered for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect on a then-existing

controversy).

It is well-settled that the only issue in a forcible detainer suit is the right to

actual possession of the premises. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785. As such, when

a tenant vacates the property, the issue of possession becomes moot unless the tenant

asserts a potentially meritorious claim for right to current, actual possession of the

property. See id. at 787 (citing Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001))

(case becomes moot if controversy ceases to exist between parties). When the tenant

vacates the property while the suit is on appeal and the judgment awards no damages,

the entire case, and not just the issue of possession or appeal, becomes moot and the

judgment must be vacated. See id. at 785.

Here, the County Court at Law awarded damages to Sharoni in the amount of

$27,800; however, Sharoni filed a release of his claim for monetary damages. “The

unconditional release of a judgment operates as a total relinquishment of all the

creditor’s rights in the judgment and a complete discharge of the debt created by the

judgment.” Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Reavis, 627 S.W.3d 713, 740 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2021, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (citing Rapp v. Mandell

& Wright, P.C., 123 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.

denied)). Any controversy regarding any portion of damages subject to an

unconditional release becomes moot. Id. Therefore, the Longinos are precluded from

–17–
appealing any issues related to the monetary judgment in this case, and to the extent

they have intended to do so, those issues are moot. See id.

It is undisputed that the Longinos have vacated the Property; therefore, the

appeal is moot as to the issue of possession unless they assert a potentially

meritorious claim for right to current, actual possession of the Property. See

Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. The record before us establishes that although the

Longinos expressed a desire to exercise their option to purchase, they were not

current on their rental payments. Because the option contract was expressly

conditional on the Longinos being current on their rental payments, the Longinos

could not, and did not, successfully exercise their option to purchase the Property.15

The record also establishes that the lease term expired on August 1, 2021. Further,

the record does not establish that the Longinos attempted to exercise their option.

Therefore, the Longinos cannot establish that they have a potentially meritorious

claim for right to current, actual possession of the Property, making the appeal moot.

See id.

15
In the County Court at Law, the Longinos argue that they had every intention of becoming current
with their rent obligations through the use of funds provided by a rental assistance program operated by
Catholic Charities but were prevented from doing so by Sharoni’s unwillingness to participate in the
program. Although not expressly addressed on appeal, we note that this argument is similarly unavailing
because the Longinos’s obligation to pay rent was not optional, but Sharoni’s participation in the rental
assistance program was. See Fifty-Third Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19 State of Disaster, 660
S.W.3d 101, 102 (Tex. 2022), effective June, 20, 2022 through September 1, 2022 (requiring courts in
eviction cases to inquire “whether [landlord or tenant] are interested in participating in an available rental
assistance program” (emphasis added)).

–18–
Because no live controversy remains between the parties, we have no

jurisdiction over the case. See Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex.

2022) (holding that a case becomes moot when live controversy ceases to exist, and

courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over moot controversies). Because we have

no subject matter jurisdiction in this case, we do not address the Longinos’s second

issue or Sharoni’s fifth issue and must dismiss the appeal as moot. See id. We also

vacate the underlying judgment. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 788–89 (vacating

underlying judgment in a forcible detainer appeal when the case became moot during

the pendency of the appeal to prevent prejudice to the rights of the parties when

appellate review of a judgment on its merits is precluded) (citing Danciger Oil &

Ref. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 122 Tex. 243, 56 S.W.2d 1075, 1076 (1933); see also U.S.

Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 22–25 (1994) (noting

that vacatur must be granted where mootness results from the unilateral action of the

party who prevailed in the lower court).

–19–
CONCLUSION
Because we conclude this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the

parties’ merits-based issues on appeal, we grant Sharoni’s Motion to Dismiss

Appeal, dismiss this appeal as moot, and vacate the underlying judgment.

220653f.p05 /Maricela Breedlove/
MARICELA BREEDLOVE
JUSTICE

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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

JEFFREY LONGINO, GERALYNN On Appeal from the County Court at
LONGINO & ALL OTHER Law No. 3, Collin County, Texas
OCCUPANTS, Appellants Trial Court Cause No. 003-01063-
2022.
No. 05-22-00653-CV V. Opinion delivered by Justice
Breedlove. Justices Molberg and
ITAY SHARONI, Appellee Kennedy participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is
DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. It is ORDERED that the underlying
judgment is vacated.

It is further ORDERED that appellee ITAY SHARONI recover his costs of
this appeal from appellants JEFFREY LONGINO, GERALYNN LONGINO &
ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS.

Judgment entered this 4th day of December, 2024.

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