Kendrick Kinard Kelly v. the State of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00423-CR

Kendrick Kinard Kelly, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 483RD DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY
NO. CR-23-1316-B, THE HONORABLE TANNER NEIDHARDT, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted appellant Kendrick Kinard Kelly of assault-family violence by

impeding breath or circulation. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B). The district court

sentenced Kelly to ten years’ imprisonment but suspended imposition of the sentence and placed

him on community supervision for ten years. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.053(a)(1). On

appeal, Kelly contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that his trial

counsel was ineffective, and that the district court erred by admitting extraneous-offense

evidence of Kelly’s prior assault against complainant. We will affirm the district court’s

judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

Gary Colton Brigham, a friend of Kelly’s who had lived with him for a year or

two, called the Hays County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) reporting that Kelly had assaulted him.
HCSO Deputy Stefan Halterman received the call from dispatch and met with Brigham, who had

some “fairly recent” injuries from “a day or two” before. Brigham’s visible injuries included

bruising of his left eye, abrasions around his neck, bruising on his upper left arm, an abrasion on

his lower lip with swelling, and scabbed abrasions up and down his back. 1 Deputy Halterman

testified that the bruising on both sides of Brigham’s neck was consistent with “an event of

strangulation.”

On a Tuesday night, two days before his report to police, Brigham, his friend

Jasmine Reyes, and Kelly walked to a bar near Brigham’s house. Brigham and Reyes each had a

drink; Kelly had a bottle of wine and some “Jägerbomb” shots. Brigham and Reyes left the bar

around 11:00 p.m. and spent some time sitting around a fire pit in Brigham’s front yard. Kelly

returned from the bar and joined them after midnight.

A few hours later, around 2:00 a.m. on Wednesday, Brigham went into his

bathroom and got ready for bed. After brushing his teeth and washing his face, he turned off the

bathroom light. Seconds later he heard two big thuds, and then “Kendrick was just right in my

face, like charging at me.” Kelly held Brigham up against the bathroom mirror and faucet,

breaking the faucet handle. Brigham testified that the attack continued outside the bathroom:

And then he picked me up after that and slammed me outside of my bathroom.
And then he was yelling, “Why did you lock the door? I told you not to lock the
door.” And then he was choking me. And I was trying to get up under my
armoire to just get—you know, like, try to get away. And I was just trying to say,
[“]I didn’t lock the door. I’m sorry.[”] Like, [“I]t’s okay. Calm down.[”] But I
couldn’t really speak much. And everything happened really fast. And then—
then he got up and he was still yelling at me. And before he got up, he punched
me in my nose and kind of banged my head on the ground a few times. And then

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Sheriff’s office deputies took photos of Brigham’s injuries, and those photos were
admitted into evidence at trial.
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he got up and he said, “I told you not to lock the door. You need to listen. That’s
disrespectful.” And then he walked out of my room.

Brigham testified that being thrown around caused him pain. He did not

understand what was going on and was frightened. His nose and mouth were bleeding, and his

head was pounding. He was unable to speak, and he could not breathe because of the pressure

on his neck from Kelly’s hands. He tried to get away or just underneath a dresser where Kelly

could not hit his face or choke him. Although the lights were off, Brigham realized it was Kelly

when he heard his voice.

Brigham barricaded the door to his room and stayed there after Kelly left. On

Thursday, Brigham reported the assault to police. He explained that he had never been the kind

of person to call the police on someone and that Kelly “was like [his] brother.” On Friday,

Brigham began running a fever, was unable to “think right” or eat, and feared his “head was

bleeding on the inside,” so he went to the hospital. Medical records admitted into evidence

showed that Brigham told hospital staff he was assaulted by his roommate, who had grabbed

Brigham, smashed his head against a mirror, kneed him in the abdomen, struck him in the face

multiple times, and choked him by placing his hands around Brigham’s neck. Brigham was

diagnosed with a fractured nose, abdominal trauma, and a concussion. At trial, Brigham was

asked whether anything like this assaultive episode had ever happened between him and Kelly

before, which Brigham confirmed:

Prosecutor: Had anything like this, any kind of assaultive episode, ever happened
between you and Mr. Kelly in the past?

Brigham: Yes.

Prosecutor: How many times?

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Brigham: Twice.

After this incident, Brigham’s only contact with Kelly was when he was trying to serve Kelly

with notice of eviction.

Reyes testified that she also went inside the house before Kelly. While Brigham

was in the bathroom, she heard a loud noise coming from the front of the house. Moments later,

she saw Kelly enter Brigham’s bedroom, and “he just went straight for Colton [Brigham],” who

had just turned off the bathroom light. Kelly grabbed Brigham, pushed him back into the

bathroom and into a mirror, shattering it. They ended up back in the bedroom, where Kelly

slammed Brigham onto the concrete floor, “swinging at him.” At some point Brigham was

trying to pull himself under a dresser to protect himself. Then Kelly started choking Brigham.

Reyes could hear Brigham “gasping for air” while “on the ground” with Kelly “over him.” Kelly

said something about “locking the front door” and about Brigham being “f’ing disrespectful.”

Reyes froze. She saw blood and yelled for Kelly to stop. Eventually Kelly left. Reyes saw that

Brigham’s nose kept dripping blood, his lip was busted, and he had marks on his face and around

his neck. Reyes used her phone to make video recordings of the broken mirror and the condition

of the room after the incident. The videos and a still photo from the video were admitted into

evidence, showing blood on the floor and strands of Brigham’s hair embedded in the cracked

mirror. Later, when Brigham began running a fever, had headaches, and was “feeling nauseous,”

Reyes took him to the hospital. Reyes realized after the incident that the loud noise she heard

initially was from Kelly hitting or getting into the locked front door. She noticed the damage to

that door, its dead bolt “completely pushed through[,] . . . the wood basically broke from the door

being opened.”

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Kelly’s former foster parent, Sherry Marroquin, testified that Kelly is known as a

“gentle giant,” a peacemaker, and a truthful person. She opined that he did not commit

the offense.

The jury found Kelly guilty of assault-family violence by impeding breath or

circulation as charged in the indictment. The district court suspended imposition of Kelly’s

sentence in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Kelly filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Kelly contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because

“the prosecution’s case was marred by unreliable testimonies, a lack of physical evidence, and an

inability to provide conclusive proof linking [him] to the alleged crime.”2

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by considering whether,

after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational juror could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). This

standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate

facts, Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, and it applies whether the case was proven by direct or

circumstantial evidence, Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

2
Kelly challenges both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. But the Court
of Criminal Appeals has decided that the “legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a
reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each
element of a criminal offense.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(plurality op.); see Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“We do not
review the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s finding on the elements of a
criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Canada
v. State, 547 S.W.3d 4, 12 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (same).
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“The jury acts as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and may choose

to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented.” Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762

(Tex. Crim. App. 2023). Jurors may use common sense and apply common knowledge,

observation, and experience gained in ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from the

evidence. Id. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury

resolved the conflicts in the prosecution’s favor and defer to the jury’s factual determinations.

Id. Our role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a factfinder

does not act rationally. Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

Sufficiency of evidence supporting assault conviction

The offense of assault-family violence by impeding breath or circulation is

defined in Penal Code subsection 22.01(b)(2)(B), which states in relevant part:

(a) A person commits an offense if the person:

(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another,
including the person’s spouse;

....

(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the
offense is a felony of the third degree if the offense is committed against:

....

(2) a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is
described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005, Family Code, if:

....

(B) the offense is committed by intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the
blood of the person by applying pressure to the person’s throat or
neck or by blocking the person’s nose or mouth[.]

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Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(B).

The required type of relationship referenced in subsection (2) of the assault-

family-violence statute includes a person who is a member of the same “household” as the

defendant. See id. § 22.02(b)(2); Tex. Fam. Code §§ 71.0021(b), .003, .005. “Household” is

defined in the Family Code as “a unit composed of persons living together in the same dwelling,

without regard to whether they are related to each other.” Tex. Fam. Code § 71.005. Kelly’s

indictment tracked the assault-family-violence statute, alleging that he

did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to
Gary Brigham, a member of the Defendant’s household, by intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the
blood of Gary Brigham, by applying pressure to the throat or neck or by blocking
the nose or mouth of Gary Brigham.

Evidence presented during trial supports this charged offense. The jury heard

testimony that Brigham and Kelly were roommates for a year or two. Brigham and Reyes

identified Kelly as the person who assaulted Brigham, choked him, and prevented him from

breathing. Brigham testified that he could not breathe because of the pressure on his neck from

Kelly’s hands. Brigham, who had known Kelly for more than a decade, recognized his voice.

Reyes, who had known Kelly for about four years, testified that she saw him choking Brigham

and heard Brigham gasping for air on the ground. Brigham and Reyes heard thuds or loud noises

just before the assault, and both recalled Kelly saying something about a locked door and being

disrespectful toward him. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

(“Motive is a significant circumstance indicating guilt.”).

Kelly argues that a locked door is a nonsensical basis for the assault and that

Brigham and Reyes provided unreliable testimony. But the jury is entrusted with determining

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the credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicting inferences drawn from the evidence.

See Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762. And the evidence at trial would have allowed a rational jury to

reasonably infer that Kelly—who stayed at the bar about an hour after Brigham and Reyes left—

was affected by the bottle of wine and “Jägerbomb” shots he consumed and that he broke the

front-door lock and assaulted Brigham out of frustration. Kelly argues that the prosecution

should have presented physical evidence and “conclusive proof” linking him to the charged

offense. That is not the standard. A perpetrator’s identity may be proven by direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or by reasonable inferences from the evidence. Ingerson v. State,

559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (“When there is no direct evidence of the perpetrator’s identity

elicited from trial witnesses, no formalized procedure is required for the State to prove the

identity of the accused.”). Here, Reyes was an eyewitness to the assault, Brigham recognized his

roommate’s voice during the assault, and both identified Kelly as the perpetrator of that assault.

We conclude that the entirety of the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict, is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Kelly committed the offense of

assault-family violence against Brigham by impeding his breath or circulation. We overrule

Kelly’s first issue.

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Next, Kelly contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during trial

based on counsel’s failure to cross-examine Brigham thoroughly, deliver a persuasive closing

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argument, and object to the admission of prior alleged assaults between Kelly and Brigham as

unfairly prejudicial under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. 3

We evaluate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel complaints under the Sixth

Amendment using a two-pronged test: (1) whether counsel was deficient and (2) whether the

defendant suffered prejudice resulting from counsel’s error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); Hart v. State, 667 S.W.3d 774, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). 4 To establish that

counsel’s actions were deficient, the defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687-88; Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 781. There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; thus, the defendant must overcome

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound

trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 781-82. Courts should consider

the reasonableness of counsel’s actions at the time, rather than viewing those actions through the

benefit of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 782. Courts should make

this determination in light of all the circumstances to determine whether counsel’s actions fall

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Hart,

667 S.W.3d at 782.

Claims of ineffective assistance must be firmly rooted in the record. Hart,

667 S.W.3d at 782. In most circumstances, the record on direct appeal is insufficient to show

that counsel’s representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic

3
Kelly notes that during trial his counsel objected only that this evidence “was irrelevant
to the elements of the charged offense.”
4
We do not reach the prejudice prong because we resolve this issue on the
deficiency prong.
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decision-making as to overcome the strong presumption that his conduct was reasonable and

professional. Id. Thus, trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his

conduct before being denounced as ineffective. Id. A record explaining counsel’s thought

processes and trial strategy is usually developed in a hearing on a motion for new trial or on a

writ of habeas corpus. Redmond v. State, 30 S.W.3d 692, 698-99 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000,

pet. ref’d).

In the absence of that opportunity, when faced with an undeveloped record on

direct appeal, courts commonly presume a strategic motive if any can be imagined and conclude

that counsel’s performance is deficient only if the conduct was so outrageous that no competent

attorney would have engaged in it. Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 782. Counsel’s actions are considered

deficient only if the court finds, as a matter of law, that “no reasonable trial strategy could justify

trial counsel’s acts or omissions, regardless of his or her subjective reasoning.” Id. (quoting

Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).

Kelly did not file a motion for new trial, and the record is silent as to trial

counsel’s reasons for the actions and omissions that Kelly complains about on appeal. Thus, this

case falls into the category of ineffective-assistance claims raised on direct appeal for which the

record is undeveloped because it does not adequately reflect counsel’s reasoning. See id. at 783.

Under these circumstances, because counsel has had no opportunity to explain his actions, we

will assume a strategic motive, if one can be ascertained, and find counsel deficient only if his

conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it or, stated

differently, if no reasonable trial strategy could justify counsel’s actions. Id.

Kelly contends that his trial counsel was ineffective based on counsel’s failure to

cross-examine Brigham thoroughly, deliver a persuasive closing argument, and object to the

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admission of prior alleged assaults between Kelly and Brigham as unfairly prejudicial under

Texas Rule of Evidence 403. Regarding cross-examination, Kelly contends that trial counsel

should have challenged the nonsensical, locked-door basis for the assault; Brigham’s

identification of Kelly as the perpetrator in the dark, based only on his voice; and Brigham’s

delay in making a police report. A suggestion that cross-examination should have been

conducted differently does not rebut the presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance. Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003); see Blott v. State, 588 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (concluding that just

because another attorney might have pursued different strategy does not support finding of

ineffectiveness of counsel). Trial counsel may have thought that extensive cross-examination on

the topics suggested here would have been futile or risky given the evidence indicating that

Kelly’s judgment that morning may have been impaired by alcohol consumption and that

Brigham would likely be familiar with Kelly’s voice after knowing him for a decade and living

with him for one or two years. Trial counsel may have also thought that Brigham appeared

credible to the jury when he testified that he delayed his report to police because he had never

been the kind of person to call the police on someone and because Kelly “was like [his] brother.”

Kelly complains that trial counsel’s closing argument was unpersuasive and that

counsel failed to mention “inconsistencies and absurdities” in Brigham’s testimony, the lack of

physical evidence, and the implausibility of the prosecution’s theory. But trial counsel’s closing

argument addressed the lack of physical evidence for the strangulation; that Brigham’s injuries

were “not recent” and could have been caused by something else; that “there’s no solid

evidence”; and that the marks on Brigham’s neck depicted in the photos “don’t fit this man’s

hands.” The type of closing argument to make is “clearly trial strategy.” Ortiz v. State,

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866 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). Trial strategy will be

reviewed only if the record reflects that the argument was without any plausible basis. Id. On

this undeveloped record, we cannot conclude that the closing argument trial counsel presented to

the jury lacked “any plausible basis.” See id.

Kelly also faults trial counsel for not objecting to the admission of prior alleged

assaults between Kelly and Brigham as unfairly prejudicial under Texas Rule of Evidence 403.

See Tex. R. Evid. 403 (allowing court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice). The extraneous-offense evidence

consisted of Brigham’s answers to these two questions, without elaboration: “Q.: Had anything

like this, any kind of assaultive episode, ever happened between you and Mr. Kelly in the past?”

“A.: Yes.” “Q.: How many times?” “A.: Twice.” The general wording of these questions did

not identify the instigator of the assaults, the severity of any resulting injury, or the timeframe

when they occurred. Trial counsel may have decided to withhold his objections to avoid drawing

unwanted attention to this issue, to suggest that the incidents were merely minor skirmishes

between longtime friends, or to prevent the impression that Kelly had something to hide from the

jury. See Huerta v. State, 359 S.W.3d 887, 894 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)

(concluding that counsel may have decided to allow prosecutor to discuss details of defendant’s

prior theft case to make defendant seem more honest and forthright, to minimize seriousness of

earlier offense, or to avoid drawing unwanted attention to that issue); see also Thomas v. State,

886 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (concluding that trial

counsel’s lack of objection to hearsay testimony was plausible trial strategy designed to persuade

jury with his appearance of candor and confidence that evidence presented was not harmful).

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Because counsel was given no opportunity to explain his motives, and because his

decisions on conducting cross-examination, delivering closing argument, and objecting to

extraneous-offense evidence could have been part of a conceivable trial strategy that he may

have reasonably believed would be beneficial to Kelly, we cannot conclude from this record that

counsel was deficient. See Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 784. We overrule Kelly’s second issue.

Admission of extraneous-offense evidence

Lastly, Kelly contends that the district court erred by admitting

extraneous-offense evidence of Kelly’s prior assaults against Brigham, a member of Kelly’s

household. The State offered evidence of the prior assaults to show the nature of Kelly and

Brigham’s relationship—specifically, that it was not always a good one—and why Brigham

might have decided to make a police report after an initial delay. Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure article 38.371(b) allows evidence of “all relevant facts and circumstances” that may

assist a trier of fact in a prosecution involving an offense against a member of the defendant’s

household, including evidence “regarding the nature of the relationship between the actor and the

alleged victim.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.371(b). However, the relationship evidence must

be otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. See id. (making evidence offered under

38.371(b) subject to rules of evidence or other applicable law).

Kelly contends for the first time on appeal that evidence of the prior assaults

offered under article 38.371(b) was more prejudicial than probative under Texas Rule of

Evidence 403 and offered only as proof that he acted in conformity with his bad character, a

purpose prohibited by Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). See Tex. R. Evid. 403, 404(b). But Kelly

did not preserve those evidentiary complaints for appeal with an objection during trial. See Tex.

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R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) (requiring party to preserve error for appeal by making timely objection

stating grounds for ruling that party sought from trial court with sufficient specificity to make

trial court aware of that complaint). 5

To preserve a complaint under Rule 403 or Rule 404(b) when a trial court admits

extraneous-offense evidence to show the nature of a relationship between a defendant and

complainant under Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.371, the defendant must specifically

object at trial. See Luna v. State, 687 S.W.3d 79, 102 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d)

(concluding that Rule 404(b) character-conformity complaint as to wife’s testimony about

defendant-husband’s past abuse of her and his aggressive behavior toward her was not preserved

by objection at trial); Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 228 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d)

(concluding that Rule 403 complaint about unfairly prejudicial nature of child’s testimony about

prior incident of defendant-father’s sexual abuse of her was not preserved by objection at trial).

The record shows that during trial Kelly raised only a relevance objection: “[T]his has nothing

to do with the elements of the offense. This so-called nature of the relationship stuff has nothing

to do with the elements of the offense and, therefore, shouldn’t be admissible.”

Preservation is a systemic requirement. Williams v. State, 707 S.W.3d 233, 247

(Tex. Crim. App. 2024). A first-tier appellate court may not reverse a judgment of conviction

without first addressing any issue of error preservation. Id. Most complaints are forfeited by a

failure to object; that is, they must be preserved. Id. When a complaint must be preserved, the

party raising the complaint on appeal must have complained to the trial court in a timely fashion

and stated the grounds for the ruling sought. Id. Further, the complaint at trial must match the

5
In his ineffective-assistance complaint, Kelly acknowledges that his trial counsel did
not raise a Rule 403 objection contending that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial.
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claim raised on appeal. Id. “The purpose of requiring a specific objection in the trial court is

twofold: (1) to inform the trial judge of the basis of the objection and give him the opportunity

to rule on it; [and] (2) to give opposing counsel the opportunity to respond to the complaint.”

Douds v. State, 472 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

When an issue has not been properly preserved for appeal, we should not address

the merits of that issue. Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Because

Kelly did not make a Rule 403 or 404(b) objection when evidence of his prior assaults against

Brigham was offered under article 38.371(b) at trial, and because Kelly’s arguments on appeal

relying on those rules of evidence do not comport with the only objection he raised below, we

conclude that he failed to preserve his complaints about admission of that evidence. See Tex. R.

App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Williams, 707 S.W.3d at 247; Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 530; Luna,

687 S.W.3d at 102; Keller, 604 S.W.3d at 228. We overrule Kelly’s third issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment of conviction.

__________________________________________
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: August 21, 2025

Do Not Publish

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