Abner Josue Castillo-Villamin v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00442-CR
No. 02-24-00443-CR
___________________________

ABNER JOSUE CASTILLO-VILLAMIN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 235th District Court
Cooke County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. CR23-00233, CR24-00135

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Abner Josue Castillo-Villamin (“Castillo”) appeals his convictions for

aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 20.04,

29.03. In two points, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s

findings (A) that he did not release his victim in a safe place and (B) that he used or

exhibited a deadly weapon during the robbery. See id. §§ 20.04, 29.03. Because sufficient

evidence supports the jury’s verdict, we will affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Abduction

On June 20, 2023, Castillo went to Josepth Alberto Sanchez-Coello’s

(“Sanchez”) home and told him they had to steal a car. Castillo and Sanchez waited in

a parking lot in Dallas where they confronted Corrini Appelgryn, the victim, as she was

leaving work. Appelgryn felt Castillo, who was behind her, press a knife into her back

and felt it scratch her. Appelgryn felt the knife but did not see it; Sanchez saw the knife.

Castillo took Appelgryn’s keys from her and threw them to Sanchez. Sanchez got into

the driver’s seat of Appelgryn’s car, and Castillo forced Appelgryn into the back seat,

then climbed in with her.

Sanchez drove while Castillo sat in the back with Appelgryn. Castillo made

Appelgryn lay her head on his lap, petted her, and said, “[S]hut up, baby, it’s okay,

baby.” The men otherwise spoke only Spanish, which Appelgryn could not understand.

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Castillo put a blanket over Appelgryn’s head and compelled her to enter a passcode to

unlock her phone so he could use it to play music in the car.

After driving for about one-and-one-half hours, the men stopped the car on a

gravel access road near a bridge that crossed the Red River.1 Castillo indicated that

Appelgryn should write her phone’s passcode on a sheet of paper; she complied. The

men got out, led her out and away from the vehicle, and then pushed her down onto

her knees. Both Appelgryn and Sanchez feared that Castillo would execute Appelgryn.

The men stood behind her for about a minute and then walked back to the car, got in,

and drove away.

They left Appelgryn in the dark, without her phone, on a gravel roadway near a

highway at the Texas–Oklahoma border. Appelgryn climbed over the barrier beside

the highway and waved her arms for fifteen to twenty minutes before a passing car

stopped. Appelgryn got into the car. The driver called 911 and then drove her to a

nearby rest stop where she could use the toilet and wait for deputies from the Cooke

County Sheriff’s Office. Appelgryn also called her father using the driver’s phone.

B. Castillo’s Apprehension

Because Castillo and Sanchez still had her phone, Appelgryn’s father—still on

the phone call with Appelgryn—was able to track them in her car using the phone’s

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The gravel road was described as either an access road or a pathway leading to
an electrical box under the bridge.

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GPS. Appelgryn relayed the location information from her father to the deputies. Her

father sent the deputies a map showing the car’s path of travel from Dallas to the

Oklahoma–Texas border where they had left Appelgryn and then west to Nocona,

Texas.

Cooke County Sheriff’s staff contacted the police in Nocona. Nocona police

officers stopped Castillo and Sanchez—driving Appelgryn’s car—and arrested them.

Cooke County Sheriff’s deputies retrieved the car and took custody of Castillo and

Sanchez. A subsequent search of their persons and the vehicle produced no knife.2

They then released the car to Appelgryn.

A grand jury indicted Castillo for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping.

See id. §§ 20.04, 29.03. In the indictment for aggravated robbery, the State alleged that

Castillo, in the course of committing theft of property, intentionally and knowingly

threatened or placed Appelgryn in fear of imminent bodily injury or death while using

or exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely a knife. See id. §§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2). The

indictment for aggravated kidnapping alleged that Castillo intentionally and knowingly

abducted Appelgryn with the intent to facilitate the commission of felony unauthorized

use of a vehicle or to facilitate the flight after the attempt or commission of the offense.

See id. § 20.04(a)(3).

A Cooke County investigator and Nocona police officers searched the vehicle
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and found, among other items, Appelgryn’s purse, a mug with her name printed on it,
her phone, and the paper on which she had written the phone’s passcode.

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C. Later-Found Knife

About a year after the abduction and about a week before the jury trial began,

Appelgryn’s sister found a roll of cloth under the front passenger seat of the car and

turned it over to the police.3 That night, Appelgryn and her sister further searched in

the car, and her sister saw a knife partially under the floorboard carpet, wedged between

the console and the front passenger seat. They did not remove the knife; they contacted

Cooke County officials, who retrieved it from the vehicle.

D. Trial

At the jury trial, Appelgryn, her father, her sister, four Nocona police officers,

the lieutenant who retrieved the knife from Appelgryn and her sister, a Cooke County

investigator, and Sanchez testified. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to both

offenses.

Neither Castillo nor the State introduced additional evidence during the

punishment phase of the trial, which was also tried to a jury. The jury found that

Castillo did not voluntarily release Appelgryn in a safe place. The jury assessed Castillo’s

punishment at thirty years’ incarceration for the aggravated kidnapping and fifteen

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The day before, Appelgryn and her sister had found an article of Castillo’s
clothing, a neck gaiter, in the vehicle. A Cooke County Sheriff’s Lieutenant took
possession of the gaiter. The lieutenant who took possession of the clothing did not
further search the car at that time. During his testimony at Castillo’s trial, Sanchez
identified the clothing as having been worn by Castillo while the men abducted
Appelgryn.

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years’ incarceration for the aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him

accordingly.

Castillo timely filed this appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

Castillo argues two points: (A) that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s

finding that he did not release Appelgryn in a safe place and (B) that insufficient

evidence supports the jury’s finding that he used a deadly weapon while committing

robbery.

A. Release in a Safe Place

At the punishment stage of the trial, Castillo raised the mitigating affirmative

defense to aggravated kidnapping that he had released Appelgryn in a safe place. See id.

§ 20.04(d). Castillo argues that the jury’s rejection of this defense was not supported by

legally and factually sufficient evidence.

1. Standard of Review
The defendant has the burden of proving an affirmative defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 2.04(d). We may review a factfinder’s rejection

of a defendant’s affirmative defense for legal and factual sufficiency. Petetan v. State,

622 S.W.3d 321, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Butcher v. State, 454 S.W.3d 13, 20 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015).

In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a factfinder’s

rejection of an affirmative defense, we first examine the record for more than a scintilla

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of evidence supporting the jury’s implicit rejection of that defense, disregarding all

evidence to the contrary unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Petetan, 622 S.W.3d

at 337; Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). If there is no

evidence to support the implicit finding, we must examine the entire record to see if the

appellant proved the affirmative defense as a matter of law. Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at

669–70. If the record reveals evidence supporting the appellant’s affirmative defense

but that supporting evidence was “subject to a credibility assessment and was evidence

that a reasonable jury was entitled to disbelieve, we will not consider that evidence in

our matter-of-law assessment.” Id. at 670. In other words, we may reverse a factfinder’s

rejection of an appellant’s affirmative defense on legal-sufficiency grounds, and

therefore reverse the sentence, only if the evidence conclusively proves the appellant’s

affirmative defense and no reasonable factfinder was free to think otherwise. Petetan,

622 S.W.3d at 337.

In assessing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a factfinder’s

rejection of an affirmative defense, we must consider all the evidence relevant to that

defense in a neutral light and determine whether the verdict is so against the great weight

and preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or

clearly biased. Petetan, 622 S.W.3d at 357; Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670–71. In our review,

we may not usurp the factfinder’s function by substituting our judgment in the place of

its verdict. Petetan, 622 S.W.3d at 357; see Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671. We may sustain

this point, and remand the case for a new trial, only if after detailing the relevant

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evidence and stating how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence

supporting the verdict, we also clearly state why the verdict is so against the great weight

of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust, why it shocks the conscience, or why it

clearly demonstrates bias. Petetan, 622 S.W.3d at 357; Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20.

2. Applicable Law
To examine the record to determine whether Castillo proved the affirmative

defense that he voluntarily released Appelgryn in a safe place as defined in Section

20.04(d), we must first consider the meaning of the phrase “a safe place.” See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 20.04(d); Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 16; see also Floyd v. State 620 S.W.3d 154,

158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (explaining that sometimes a sufficiency issue turns on a

statutory definition’s meaning). When construing a statute, we must first look to its

literal language to ascertain its meaning. See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991). If the language of the statute is plain, then we interpret the statute

according to that plain language. Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 15–16. However, if the

language of the statute is ambiguous or the plain meaning would lead to absurd results,

then we examine extratextual sources to discern the meaning of the statute. See Brown

v. State, 98 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We employ these rules of statutory

construction to fulfill this court’s constitutional duty to construe the meaning of a

particular statute in the way intended by the legislators who enacted the law. See id.;

Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785–86.

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The term “safe place” as used in the statute is ambiguous because it is not defined

and the term is susceptible to different meanings based on the facts of each case. See

Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 16–17. To determine whether a victim in a given case was

released in a “safe place,” we may consider seven nonexclusive factors, including (1) the

remoteness of the location, (2) the proximity of help, (3) the time of day, (4) the climate,

(5) the condition of the complainant, (6) the character of the location and surrounding

neighborhood, and (7) the complainant’s familiarity with the location or neighborhood.

See id. at 19–20.

3. Application
Castillo released Appelgryn (1) on a gravel path off a well-traveled highway, a

somewhat remote location but (2) not far from possible help in the form of drivers on

the highway; (3) at night; (4) in a climate that presented no special threat to Appelgryn;

(5) who was very distressed but physically unharmed; (6) in an unpopulated area with

no nearby businesses; (7) and she was familiar with the area only in passing. Considering

these seven factors, disregarding all evidence to the contrary unless a reasonable

factfinder could not, we hold that more than a scintilla of evidence supports the jury’s

finding that Castillo did not release Appelgryn in a safe place. See West v. State,

406 S.W.3d 748, 766–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (holding

that victim released in emotional distress on deserted beach near roadway at night was

not released in a “safe place”); Yates v. State, No. 06-12-00004-CR, 2012 WL 2928536,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July 18, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

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publication) (holding same when victim was released near residential roadway in great

distress); Nolan v. State, 102 S.W.3d 231, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,

pet. ref’d) (holding same when victim was released at unfamiliar middle school after

school hours). Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s

rejection of Castillo’s affirmative defense.

As to factual sufficiency, Castillo argues that because Appelgryn was not a child

and not all seven factors weigh strongly against the affirmative defense, the finding was

so against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust,

conscience-shocking, and clearly biased. We disagree. A victim—whether an adult or

a child—in great emotional distress and in an unfamiliar, remote, and unpopulated area,

is not necessarily safe. See Woods v. State, 301 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding that jury’s finding that adult victim who was released

in distress in an unfamiliar, unpopulated area was not released in a “safe place” was not

manifestly unjust); Harrell v. State, 65 S.W.3d 768, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2001, pet. ref’d) (holding same). Considering the entire record in a neutral light,

including the factors above and the age of the victim, we hold that the evidence against

the verdict was not so much against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence

as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased. See Matlock,

392 S.W.3d at 670. We overrule Castillo’s first point.

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B. Use or Exhibition of a Deadly Weapon

In his second point, Castillo challenges the evidentiary sufficiency supporting the

jury’s finding that he used a deadly weapon while robbing Appelgryn, an element of the

offense of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2).

1. Standard of Review
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review of the elements of an offense, we view all

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational

factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State,

520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the

factfinder’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2021).

The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our

judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine

whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative

force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State,

569 S.W.3d 392, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.

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Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a

‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the

evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences

in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d

at 608.

To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime’s elements as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Hammack v. State,

622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The essential elements of an offense are determined by state

law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict the

State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the

defendant was tried. Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914. The law as authorized by the

indictment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging

instrument’s allegations. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)

(“When the State pleads a specific element of a penal offense that has statutory

alternatives for that element, the sufficiency of the evidence will be measured by the

element that was actually pleaded, and not any alternative statutory elements.”).

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2. Applicable Law
A person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if the person commits the

offense of robbery4 and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 29.03(a)(2). “Deadly weapon” is defined in the Texas Penal Code as “(A) a firearm

or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death

or serious bodily injury; or (B) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is

capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 1.07(a)(17).

An object that has an obvious purpose apart from causing death or serious bodily

injury is typically not a deadly weapon under Subsection 1.07(a)(17)(A) because it is not

manifestly designed, made, or adapted for that purpose. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497,

502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Texas courts have held that kitchen knives, utility knives,

straight razors, and eating utensils are manifestly designed for other purposes and,

consequently, do not qualify as deadly weapons under subsection (A). Id. A knife, the

weapon alleged in the indictment, falls into the same category due to its obvious

purpose apart from inflicting death or serious bodily injury. See id. at 502–03.

However, a deadly weapon can also be “anything that in the manner of its use or

intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). This provision does not require that the actor caused death or

4
A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the course of committing theft,
he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another or threatens or
places another in fear of bodily injury or death. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02.

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serious bodily injury, nor even that he actually intended to do so. McCain, 22 S.W.3d

at 503. Indeed, while a victim’s injuries are factors in determining whether an object

qualifies as a deadly weapon, Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004),

the State is not required to show that an object actually caused serious bodily injury to

prove that it was used as a deadly weapon. Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017).

3. Application
The indictment alleged that in the course of committing theft of property,

Castillo intentionally and knowingly threatened or placed Appelgryn in fear of imminent

bodily injury or death by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely a knife. See id.

§§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2).5

5
Castillo does not challenge whether the jury could consider the presence of a
knife, only whether his use of the knife fell under the Texas Penal Code’s definition of
a deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17).

Although Castillo also does not allege error in the jury charge, a hypothetically
correct jury charge may have included an accomplice-witness instruction because the
record suggests that Sanchez was also indicted for and convicted of an offense—the
specific offense is not specified in the record—arising out of the events of this case, so
he may have been an accomplice witness. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14
(“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated
by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed[,] and
the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.”);
Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (defining an accomplice
witness). Although Castillo did not preserve the issue for appeal by requesting an
accomplice-witness instruction or objecting to the trial court’s failure to include one,
unpreserved charge error may warrant reversal if it results in egregious harm. See Nava
v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial court’s failure to charge
the jury on the need for corroboration of a codefendant-accomplice’s testimony can

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Sanchez testified that Castillo had used a knife, and at trial, he identified the knife

that Appelgryn and her sister found in the car as the one Castillo had used.6 Appelgryn

testified that after Castillo took her keys, she tried to back away from the car, but

Castillo had “stuck something very sharp in [her] back” that she believed to have been

a knife. His pressing the knife into her back had left scratch marks. Castillo then

pushed her into the back seat of the car.

In deciding whether the knife used in this kidnapping was capable—the standard

required under Section 1.07(a)(17)(B)—of causing death or serious bodily injury, the

Court of Criminal Appeals has said:

[W]e consider words and other threatening actions by the defendant,
including the defendant’s proximity to the victim; the weapon’s ability to
inflict serious bodily injury or death, including the size, shape, and
sharpness of the weapon; and the manner in which the defendant used

result in egregious harm when there is little corroboration in the record. See Saunders v.
State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). But the trial court’s omission
of an accomplice-witness instruction is generally harmless unless the corroborating
evidence is “so unconvincing in fact as to render the State’s overall case for conviction
clearly and significantly less persuasive.” Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 632 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002) (quoting Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692). In this case, even were we to presume
the trial court’s omission of the instruction was error, it was harmless because the
corroborating evidence—e.g., Appelgryn’s testimony—would have been sufficient to
support the conviction. See Jackson v. State, 487 S.W.3d 648, 659 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2016, pet. ref’d) (holding that failure to include accomplice-witness instruction was
harmless when supported by victim testimony).
6
The State showed Sanchez the knife during his testimony, and he confirmed
that it was the same knife Castillo had used. The State did not offer the knife into
evidence at that time. When the State offered the knife into evidence later, Castillo
objected, and the trial court excluded it on the basis of the length of time and lapse in
custody before the knife was recovered.

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the weapon. . . . These, however, are just factors to guide a court’s
sufficiency analysis; they are not inexorable commands.
Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim App. 2017).

Moreover, in determining whether a knife is a deadly weapon under the facts of

a given case, the Court of Criminal Appeals has said that “a factfinder should consider

its intended use from the attitude indicated by the perpetrator.” Glover v. State, 710 S.W.3d

816, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting Tisdale v. State, 686 S.W.2d 110, 117 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1985) (Clinton, J., concurring on reh’g)). As the court explained:

When a suspect acts in a way that shows his purpose is to convey to his
victim that he will thwart resistance to a taking by using the knife to harm
the person of the victim, he intends for the victim to believe that the knife
is capable of producing serious bodily injury or death to obtain the
[objective], and the factfinder is warranted in concluding that the knife is
capable of causing death or bodily injury.
Id..

In this case, Castillo used the knife to facilitate the theft of Appelgryn’s car and

pressed it into her back hard enough to leave scratch marks. The jury could have

rationally concluded that Castillo’s standing close behind Appelgryn, the knife’s being

sharp enough to scratch her, and Castillo’s using the knife to get Appelgryn into the car

after she gave him her keys communicated his intent to persuade her that, if she resisted

the theft of her car or tried to escape, he would use the knife to cause serious bodily

injury, if not death. See id. at 820–21 (holding that a pocket knife used to cut a nylon

strap during a robbery was a deadly weapon under the statutory definition because of

the implied threat of harm inherent in its display, even though the knife was not used

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to cause or overtly threaten bodily harm); McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503 (holding that

brandishing a butcher knife can meet the definition of a deadly weapon when used in a

dangerous situation because of the inherent threat). This is true even though Appelgryn

did not see the knife and it was not admitted into evidence; the threat was

communicated to her by physical contact. See Gomez v. State, 685 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1985) (holding that complainant’s description alone was legally sufficient to

prove use of firearm without recovery of weapon); Hernandez v. State, 501 S.W.3d 264,

268 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d) (holding that circumstantial evidence may

support a deadly weapon finding when victim did not see knife that was used). Under

the circumstances of this case, the presence of the knife during the robbery, after

Castillo demonstrated to Appelgryn that it was present, was sufficient for a factfinder

to conclude that the knife’s intended use was that it be capable of causing death or

serious bodily injury. See McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503.

Accordingly, we overrule Castillo’s second point.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Castillo’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 19, 2026

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