In the Matter of A.H. v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00347-CV
___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF A.H.

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. JV-2017-00736

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant A.H.1 attempts to appeal the trial court’s order denying his

“Amended Application for Sealing Records.” Because an order of this nature by a

juvenile court is not appealable, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

I. Background

In February 2018, A.H. judicially confessed to the offense of indecency with a

child by contact. The trial court found that A.H. had engaged in delinquent conduct

and placed him on probation for two years. He was successfully discharged from

probation in February 2020.

In May 2021, A.H. filed an application to seal his juvenile records. He

nonsuited that application, and in April 2025, A.H. filed a second application for

sealing records. He then filed an amended application, which the trial court heard and

denied on July 10, 2025. A.H. timely appealed the trial court’s denial.

II. Appellate Jurisdiction

Section 56.01(c) of the Texas Family Code sets out a juvenile’s right to appeal

certain juvenile court orders and specifically lists those appealable orders. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(a), (c); In re J.H., 176 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2005, no pet.). Specifically, a juvenile may appeal an order under:

(A) Section 54.02 respecting transfer of the child for prosecution as an
adult;

While A.H. is no longer a minor, because this appeal involves juvenile court
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proceedings, we refer to him by his initials. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(c).

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(B) Section 54.03 with regard to delinquent conduct or conduct
indicating a need for supervision;

(C) Section 54.04 disposing of the case;

(D) Section 54.05 respecting modification of a previous juvenile
court disposition; or

(E) Chapter 55 by a juvenile court committing a child to a facility
for person with mental illness or intellectual disabilities[.]

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(c)(1). Additionally, an appeal may be taken “by a person

from an order entered under Section 54.11(i)(2) transferring the person to the custody

of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.” Id. § 56.01(c)(2).

When a legislative enactment permits a juvenile to appeal statutorily delineated

orders, such as Section 56.01(c), there is no right to appeal orders not included in the

statute. In re D.M., Nos. 01-17-00950-CV, 01-17-00951-CV, 01-17-00952-CV, 01-17-

00953-CV, 2018 WL 3059738, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 21, 2018,

no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); In re R.J.M., 211 S.W.3d 393, 394 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2006, pet. denied); J.H., 176 S.W.3d at 679. An order denying an application

to seal juvenile records is not an order included in Section 56.01(c). See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 56.01(c)(1), (2). Thus, the trial court’s order denying A.H.’s amended

application for juvenile record sealing is not an appealable order. See id.

On July 18, 2025, we notified A.H. by letter that we had received his notice of

appeal and that we were concerned that we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because

the order from which he appeals does not appear to be a final judgment or an

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appealable interlocutory order. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.

2001); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (listing appealable

interlocutory orders). We requested a response from A.H. showing grounds for

continuing this appeal and warned that it could be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

A.H. filed a response asserting that the trial court’s order “must be

characterized as final” because the trial court intended for its decision to be final. He

argued that the issue of sealing a juvenile record is a “serious collateral consequence”

and that “[t]o be left with no appellate recourse is absurd.” After considering A.H.’s

response, we decided to continue his appeal at that time.

A.H. further addressed the issue of this court’s jurisdiction in his appellant’s

brief. In his brief, A.H. argued that, in addition to the reasons presented in his

response to our jurisdiction letter, we have jurisdiction over his appeal because

juvenile cases are classified as civil cases, and according to A.H., he “passes the $250

amount in controversy jurisdictional threshold required of civil appeals.” In support,

he cites In re Hall, 286 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding), and Harris v.

State, 402 S.W.3d 758, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

Instead of filing an appellee’s brief, the State filed a motion to dismiss A.H.’s

appeal pursuant to Section 56.01(c) of the Texas Family Code. The State argued that

we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal because Section 56.01(c) does not include

orders under Section 58.256 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 58.256 (providing procedure for and requirements of application for sealing juvenile

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court records). A.H. did not respond to the State’s motion.

The cases upon which A.H. relies are inapposite. Hall is inapplicable because it

was an original proceeding, not an appeal, and A.H. does not seek mandamus relief.

See generally Hall, 286 S.W.3d at 925–30. In Harris, the appellate court determined that

it had jurisdiction under the general grant of appellate jurisdiction over civil appeals.

Harris, 402 S.W.3d at 762. But here, unlike in Harris, A.H.’s right of appeal “is

specifically controlled by Section 56.01 of the Texas Family Code.” C.L.B. v. State, 567

S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. 1978).

Because Section 56.01 does not permit a juvenile to appeal from an order on an

application for sealing juvenile court records, we do not have jurisdiction over A.H.’s

appeal. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(c); see also D.M., 2018 WL 3059738, at *2;

In re W.E.H., No. 02-10-00234-CV, 2011 WL 1901986, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

May 19, 2011, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); R.J.M., 211 S.W.3d at 394–95; J.H.,

176 S.W.3d at 679.

III. Conclusion

Having concluded that we do not have jurisdiction over A.H.’s appeal, we

dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 2

Per Curiam

Delivered: January 8, 2026

Based on our disposition, we grant the State’s motion to dismiss, and all other
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pending motions are dismissed as moot.

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