The State of Texas v. YELP, Inc.

Reversed and Remanded and Opinion filed October 16, 2025.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-24-00040-CV

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.
YELP, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the 335th District Court
Bastrop County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2519-335

OPINION
Yelp, Inc. filed a special appearance in response to the State’s petition seeking
civil penalties, damages, and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. The trial court granted Yelp’s special appearance and dismissed
the State’s case. On appeal, the State argues that this dismissal was erroneous
because the State established both general and specific jurisdiction over Yelp in
Texas. We hold that the State did not plead facts establishing general jurisdiction
over Yelp, but the State has established specific jurisdiction. Consequently, we
reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand the case for adjudication on
the merits.

BACKGROUND

Yelp is an internet-based Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in San Francisco, California. Yelp essentially operates as an online “yellow
pages,”1 providing consumers in search of a service or product with lists of
businesses that match the user’s specifications, as well as custom location-targeted
ads, paid for by businesses. The consumer is then able to either book a reservation
or purchase a product in some cases. Consumers can post reviews about their
experience with those businesses, subject to moderation by Yelp. Other consumers
using Yelp are then able to read the reviews. If a consumer books an appointment or
reservation, or purchases a product, Yelp generally derives revenue from these
services. In 2009, Yelp registered to conduct business in Texas as a foreign, for-
profit corporation. Yelp listed its express purpose for transacting business in Texas
as “Internet Advertising.”

Following the leak of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), Yelp CEO Jeremy
Stoppelman urged business leaders to use their “platform and influence” to help
protect reproductive rights. Three months later, in August 2022, Yelp posted a
consumer notice on the Yelp business pages of Crisis Pregnancy Centers across the
nation. The notice stated, “This is a Crisis Pregnancy Center. Crisis Pregnancy

1
Back when phones were still tethered to walls and not yet unleashed to dominate society,
Americans typically owned hard-copy “telephone books.” In those telephone books, the “yellow
pages” were the section—readily identifiable by the yellow hue of the paper—listing “business
and professional firms alphabetically by category and that include[ed] classified advertising.”
Yellow Pages, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/yellow%20pages (last visited 4 Oct. 2025).

2
Centers typically provide limited medical services and may not have licensed
medical professionals onsite.”

By letter dated February 7, 2023, twenty-four state attorneys general,
including Texas Attorney General Paxton, demanded that Yelp remove the notice
and “stop discriminating” against Crisis Pregnancy Centers. The next day, Yelp
responded by providing sources in support of its notice, but Yelp also revised the
notice to address the concerns raised in the letter. The revised notice stated, “This is
a Crisis Pregnancy Center. Crisis Pregnancy Centers do not offer abortions or
referrals to abortion providers.”

On September 28, 2023, the State sued Yelp in Bastrop County, asserting that
Yelp violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act by misleading Texas consumers
about the availability of medical services at Crisis Pregnancy Centers. In response,
Yelp filed a special appearance, arguing that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction because (1) Yelp, as a nonresident, lacks sufficient minimum contacts
with Texas to demonstrate purposeful availment of the Texas forum; (2) the State’s
Deceptive Trade Practices claim does not arise from Yelp’s contacts with Texas; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction over Yelp would offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.

The State filed a response to the special appearance asserting that Yelp had
extensive contacts with Texas, which gave rise to both general and specific
jurisdiction. The State also asserted that Yelp had consented to general jurisdiction
by registering to do business in Texas. The trial court granted Yelp’s special
appearance and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In two issues, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting Yelp’s
special appearance because (1) Yelp consented to general jurisdiction in Texas as a
3
condition of registering to do business in the state; and (2) Yelp is subject to specific
jurisdiction in Texas because it purposefully availed itself of the Texas forum, and
the State’s claims are related to those purposeful contacts with Texas.

I. Standard of Review

A nonresident defendant is subject to the personal jurisdiction of Texas courts
if (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the court to exercise jurisdiction, and (2)
exercising jurisdiction does not violate state and federal constitutional due process
guarantees. LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023) (citing
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 17.041–.045); Kelly v. Gen. Interior Const., Inc.,
301 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2010). The requirements of the long-arm statute “are
satisfied if an assertion of jurisdiction accords with federal due-process limitations.”
Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007). Personal
jurisdiction “is consistent with due process ‘when the nonresident defendant has
established minimum contacts with the forum state, and the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Kelly, 301
S.W.3d at 657 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575).

The nonresident defendant’s forum-state contacts can give rise to two types
of personal jurisdiction—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Moki Mac,
221 S.W.3d at 575. General jurisdiction arises when a defendant’s contacts with the
forum state are so “continuous and systematic” that the defendant is “essentially at
home.” State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 412 (Tex. 2023)
(quoting Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021)).
General jurisdiction permits courts to “render a binding judgment against a
defendant even if the plaintiff’s claims neither arise from activities conducted in the
forum state nor ‘relate to the forum [s]tate or the defendant’s activity there.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592

4
U.S. 351, 358 (2021)). If general jurisdiction is established, the cause of action “may
concern events and conduct anywhere in the world,” subject to certain limits. Id.

Courts can exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, when
(1) the defendant engages in some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the state and (2) the plaintiff’s claims arise
out of or relate to those forum contacts. LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 347.
Purposeful availment and relatedness are “two co-equal components.” Id. (quoting
Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579). There must be an appropriate “nexus between the
nonresident defendant, the litigation, and the forum.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579.
The plaintiff “must demonstrate a ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant’s
contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.” LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 347
(quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585).

Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a party is a question of law that
we review de novo. Id. at 346. When the trial court does not issue findings of fact
and conclusions of law, as is the case here, “we presume all factual disputes were
resolved in favor of the trial court’s decision unless they are challenged on appeal.”
Mehta v. State ex rel. Ahmed, 716 S.W.3d 186, 191 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, no
pet.) (quoting Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 8).

II. The State Did Not Plead Allegations Sufficient to Establish General
Jurisdiction.

In the State’s first issue, the State asserts that Yelp consented to general
jurisdiction in Texas as a condition of registering to do business in the state, citing
Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023) and Section 9.203 of the Texas
Business Organizations Code. In Mallory, the United States Supreme Court
addressed a Pennsylvania statute requiring all corporations that registered to do
business in Pennsylvania to consent to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania in

5
exchange for status as a foreign corporation. Mallory, 600 U.S. at 126–27. The
Supreme Court determined that this statute—which conferred general personal
jurisdiction on Pennsylvania courts over registered foreign corporations—did not
violate the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 146.

The State argues that Section 9.203 of the Texas Business Organizations Code
functions just like the Pennsylvania statute in Mallory, making every foreign
corporation consent to personal jurisdiction in Texas as a condition of registering as
a foreign corporation. That provision states, in relevant part:

in any matter that affects the transaction of intrastate business in this
state, a foreign entity and each member, owner, or managerial official
of the entity is subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and
liabilities imposed on a domestic entity to which it most closely
corresponds or on a member, owner, or managerial official of that
domestic entity.

Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 9.203.

Yelp disputes that the Texas Business Organizations Code vests Texas courts
with general jurisdiction over all foreign corporations registered in Texas.
Regardless, Yelp argues that we cannot consider this statute as a basis for conferring
general jurisdiction because the State did not mention either Section 9.203 or
Mallory in its live pleadings. Rather, the State waited until its response to Yelp’s
plea to the jurisdiction to assert, for the first time, that Yelp consented to general
jurisdiction in Texas by registering to do business in Texas. On appeal, Yelp argues
that although a response to a special appearance may contain evidence supporting
the petition’s allegations, the allegations on which the plaintiff bases the exercise of
jurisdiction must be in the petition. The State argues that it was sufficient to raise
these sources of jurisdiction in its response to Yelp’s plea to the jurisdiction, and that
the State need not have pleaded either Mallory or Texas Business Organizations

6
Code Section 9.203 as the basis for an exercise of general jurisdiction.

We agree with Yelp. The Rules of Civil Procedure require courts to determine
a special appearance on the “basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made by and
between the parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties,
the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(3)
(emphasis added). The Texas Supreme Court has “consistently held that the plaintiff
bears the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring the nonresident
defendant within the reach of Texas’s long-arm statute.” Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658;
LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 346 (noting that for a special appearance, “[t]he
plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring the
nonresident defendant within the reach of the long-arm statute.”). “The nonresident
‘defendant then bears the burden to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction alleged
by the plaintiff,’” an exercise that typically requires evidence. Mehta, 716 S.W.3d at
191 (quoting LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 346). But when the Plaintiff’s pleadings
fail to contain facts bringing the defendant within the reach of the long-arm statute,
then the “defendant need only prove that it does not live in Texas to negate
jurisdiction.” Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659.

Under this burden shifting framework, the plaintiff’s pleadings set the
boundaries for what types of evidence and arguments may be offered either for or
against jurisdiction. Although the pleadings themselves may not be dispositive of
jurisdiction when the defendant contests those pleadings with evidence, the
“additional evidence merely supports or undermines the allegations in the
pleadings.” Id. at 658 n.4. In other words, “[b]ecause the plaintiff defines the scope
and nature of the lawsuit, the defendant’s corresponding burden to negate
jurisdiction is tied to the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleading.” Id. at 658. If the
plaintiff’s evidence is not within the scope of the pleadings’ factual allegations, then

7
“the plaintiff should amend the pleading to include the necessary factual
allegations.” Id. at 659.

We hold that Kelly controls here and compels the conclusion that the State
must meet its initial burden on a special appearance by pleading in its petition
sufficient allegations to invoke jurisdiction. See id. at 658 (requiring the factual bases
supporting the exercise of jurisdiction to be in the petition). We are aware of contrary
authority in which other courts of appeals have concluded that Rule 120a
contemplates considering jurisdictional allegations made in the plaintiff’s response,
but these decisions are not consistent with Kelly’s reasoning. 2

We are not alone in interpreting Kelly to require the allegations supporting
jurisdiction to be included in the petition. The en banc Fifth Court of Appeals has
reached the same conclusion, holding that “[t]he plaintiff’s response to the special
appearance may contain evidence supporting the petition’s jurisdictional allegations,
but that evidence must be consistent with the allegations in the petition.” Steward
Health Care System LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 129 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021,
no pet.) (en banc). Interpreting Kelly, the Steward court held that “the allegations on
which the plaintiff bases the exercise of jurisdiction must be in the petition,” as
“nothing in the supreme court’s precedent suggests the defendant must negate
jurisdictional allegations appearing only in the response to the special appearance.”

2
See e.g., Patel v. Pate, No. 02-16-00313-CV, 2017 WL 2871684, at *5 n.4 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth July 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Sembcorp Marine Ltd. v. Carnes, Nos. 09-15-00430-
CV, 09-15-00484-CV, 2016 WL 3019552, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 26, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Mi Gwang Contact Lens Co., No. 13-13-00306-CV, 2015 WL 3637846, at *3 n.2
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Accelerated Wealth,
LLC v. Lead Generation & Mktg., LLC, No. 04-12-00647-CV, 2013 WL 1148923, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Mar. 20, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Hale v. Richey, No. 10-11-00187-CV,
2012 WL 89920, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 11, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); Max Protetch, Inc.
v. Herrin, 340 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Touradji v.
Beach Cap. P’ship, L.P., 316 S.W.3d 15, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); Ennis
v. Loiseau, 164 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.).

8
Id. The Court resolved that “[t]o be consistent with Kelly, we conclude that the
plaintiff must meet its burden on a special appearance by pleading, in its petition,
sufficient allegations to invoke jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute.” Id.
(overruling the court’s prior opinions to the extent that they conflicted with this
conclusion). Because the jurisdiction-conferring allegations appeared only in the
plaintiffs’ response to the plea to the jurisdiction and not their live pleadings, the
Steward Court held that the plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient allegations to bring
the defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. Id. at 131.

Since Steward issued, many of our sister intermediate courts have followed
Kelly in requiring defendants to negate only those factual bases for personal
jurisdiction that are stated in the plaintiff’s pleadings—not those asserted elsewhere,
such as in a response to a plea to the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Texas Bank & Tr. v.
California Coast Credit Union, No. 12-24-00149-CV, 2025 WL 657280, at *10
(Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 28, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (refusing to credit an
indemnification agreement as a basis for personal jurisdiction where the plaintiff
never amended its pleadings to invoke that agreement as a basis for jurisdiction);
Witty Yeti, LLC v. Plummer, No. 04-22-00075-CV, 2022 WL 3046942, at *5 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Aug. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( “If the plaintiff fails to plead
facts to bring the defendant within the reach of the court’s jurisdiction, the defendant
need only prove that it does not live in Texas to negate personal jurisdiction. Once
the plaintiff has met its burden to plead sufficient jurisdictional allegations, the
burden shifts to the defendant to negate all potential bases for personal jurisdiction
that exist in the plaintiff’s pleadings.”) (citing Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658–59)). The
Texas Business Court, too, has followed Kelly on this point. Riverside Strategic Cap.
Fund I, L.P. v. CLG Investments, LLC, No. 25-BC01B-0006, 2025 WL 2419620, at
*7 ¶ 45 (Tex. Bus. Ct. Aug. 19, 2025) (“Riverside’s arguments and evidence

9
opposing the special appearance do not save it. The court considers only allegations
in plaintiffs’ petition—not allegations made in its response—and considers
additional evidence only to the extent it supports or undermines those allegations.”
(citing Kelly, 301 S.W3d at 658–59, and Steward, 633 S.W.3d at 129). We join these
courts in refusing to consider factual grounds for jurisdiction that are not asserted in
the plaintiff’s pleadings.

In this case, the State did not raise its argument that the Texas Business
Organizations Code created jurisdiction by consent until the State filed its response
to Yelp’s plea to the jurisdiction. This ground for jurisdiction does not appear in the
pleadings, so we do not consider it. 3

We instead review the factual assertions in the pleadings to determine whether
the State met its burden of pleading sufficient allegations to establish that Yelp’s
continuous and systematic contacts render it essentially “at home” in Texas. See
Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 412. The State’s original petition alleged that Yelp is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. The State
provided that Yelp could be served with process by serving its registered agent

3
Following submission of this appeal, Yelp filed several notices of supplemental authority
citing other courts that have held that nonresident defendants do not impliedly consent to general
jurisdiction in Texas by registering to do business in Texas. See Morris v. Kan. City Ry., No. 2:24-
CV-00018-JRG, 2024 WL 3347379, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 8, 2024) (“Mallory’s conclusion of
implied consent to jurisdiction does not extend to the Texas long-arm statute.”); Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Henry Vogt Mach. Co., Inc., 712 S.W.3d 909, 924 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (concluding that by registering to do business in Texas
a nonresident company does not impliedly consent to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
them by Texas courts); Repairify, Inc. v. Opus IVS, Inc., No. 05-23-00921-CV, 2024 WL 2205663,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 16, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[U]nlike Pennsylvania law in
Mallory, none of Texas’s business registration statutes—and nothing in Texas’s long-arm
scheme—includes any language specifically directing that complying with them would subject a
business to personal jurisdiction in Texas.”). Because this ground for jurisdiction does not appear
in the State’s pleadings, we need not address Yelp’s supplemental authority addressing the State’s
arguments that by registering to do business in Texas Yelp consented to general jurisdiction.

10
located in Dallas, Texas. The State did not plead that Yelp consented to general
jurisdiction by registering to do business in Texas. Nor did the State plead anything
about Mallory or Texas Business Organizations Code Section 9.203. The State relied
on the affidavits, discovery materials, and other evidence attached to its response.
Attached to the State’s response was a copy of Yelp’s application to register as a
foreign non-profit in Texas. This evidence, however, was not in support of any
pleading that Yelp had consented to general jurisdiction. See Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s, London v. Henry Vogt Mach. Co., Inc., 712 S.W.3d 909, 919 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (“These allegations appear to address
service of process, not consent to personal jurisdiction.”).

Because the State did not plead sufficient allegations to support its theory of
Yelp’s consent to general jurisdiction, we conclude the State failed to establish
general jurisdiction.4 We overrule the State’s first issue.

III. The State Met Its Burden to Plead and Establish Specific Jurisdiction.

In its second issue, the State contends the trial court erred in granting Yelp’s
special appearance because the State has pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate
specific personal jurisdiction over Yelp in Texas. According to the State, Yelp
purposefully availed itself of the Texas forum and the State’s claims are related to
those purposeful contacts.

Specific jurisdiction, as opposed to general jurisdiction, covers defendants
who are less intimately connected with the forum state, but with respect to limited

4
We note that the Texas Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff fails to establish
jurisdiction through its pleadings, the plaintiff “should amend the pleading to include the necessary
factual allegations, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 63, thereby allowing jurisdiction to be decided based on
evidence rather than allegations, as it should be.” Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659. Although the State
could amend its pleadings to assert the facts underlying its general jurisdiction theory, the State
need not do so because the State has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate specific personal
jurisdiction over Yelp on the claims at issue.

11
kinds of claims. Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 412. Texas courts may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident if the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise
of personal jurisdiction and the exercise is consistent with federal and state
constitutional due-process guarantees. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 574; see also Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042 (Texas long-arm statute). The Texas Supreme
Court has consolidated these inquiries, holding that the Texas long-arm statute’s
broad language allows Texas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction as far as the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution permits. Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at
412; BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002).
The requirements of the Texas long-arm statute thus are fulfilled if an assertion of
personal jurisdiction is consistent with federal due-process limitations. Moki Mac,
221 S.W.3d at 575.

Federal due-process requirements are satisfied when the nonresident
defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state and the exercise
of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Volkswagen, 669
S.W.3d at 412. Minimum contacts exist when the nonresident defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Michiana Easy Livin’
Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005).

There are three components to the “purposeful availment” inquiry. Searcy v.
Parex Res., Inc., 496 S.W.3d 58, 67 (Tex. 2016). First, only the defendant’s contacts
with the forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third
person. Id. Second, the contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random,
fortuitous, isolated, or attenuated. Id. Third, the defendant must seek some benefit,
advantage, or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction. Id. Specific jurisdiction is

12
established if the claims in question arise from or relate to the defendant’s purposeful
contacts with Texas. See Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 412–13.

In conducting a specific-jurisdiction analysis, we focus on the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658. For a
nonresident defendant’s contacts with Texas to support an exercise of specific
jurisdiction, there must be a substantial connection between the defendant’s contacts
with the forum state and the operative facts of the litigation. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d
at 585. The operative facts are those facts that would be the focus of a trial on the
merits. Law Firm of Donald Wochna, LLC v. Am. Frontier Mgmt., No. 03-17-00489-
CV, 2018 WL 1614782, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin April 4, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op.).

A. The State Met its Burden to Sufficiently Plead Specific Jurisdiction.

The Texas long-arm statute broadly permits a court to exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation who does “business in this state.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 17.042. The State’s original petition alleged that Yelp is “a company” that
maintains a “platform in which users can connect with businesses by publishing
online public reviews.” Crisis Pregnancy Centers, which “are located throughout the
State of Texas, including Bastrop County,” are one such business. The State alleged
that Yelp “violated Texas law” by posting a false, misleading, and disparaging
disclaimer on the Yelp business pages of every pregnancy center across the nation.
This allegation included Crisis Pregnancy Centers in Texas because the State alleged
that (1) the “transactions forming the basis of this suit occurred in Bastrop County,
Texas” and (2) Yelp “has done business in Bastrop County, Texas.”

These doing-business pleadings were sufficient to allege that Yelp is subject
to specific jurisdiction under Texas’s long-arm statute. See Steward, 633 S.W.3d at
126 (plaintiff’s pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident
13
defendant is doing business in Texas).

B. The Asserted Contacts are Sufficient to Show that Yelp Purposely
Availed Itself of the Privilege of Conducting Activities in Texas.

Once the State satisfied its initial burden to plead allegations sufficient to
bring Yelp within the reach of Texas’s long-arm statute, the burden flipped to Yelp
to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction in the State’s pleading. Kelly, 301 S.W.3d
at 658. Here, the State pleaded that Yelp is an internet-based company that “features
a platform in which users can connect with businesses by publishing online public
reviews of those businesses on a publicly accessible page that Yelp maintains.”
According to Yelp, its platform contains “trusted local business information, photos
and review content.” Yelp placed a disclaimer on its platform on the pages of Crisis
Pregnancy Centers across the nation, including in Bastrop County.

In Yelp’s special appearance, Yelp argued that there was no basis for
exercising personal jurisdiction because Yelp is a California-based website operator
with no offices in Texas. Yelp argued the State failed to establish general or specific
jurisdiction because the State failed to allege the disclaimer was purposely directed
at Texas, only that Yelp targeted Crisis Pregnancy Centers nationwide. Yelp asserted
it “owns and operates a local search website (available at Yelp.com), a mobile
website, and related mobile applications that allow users across the country to share
information about their communities” and maintained no technology infrastructure
in Texas. Yelp further asserted all decisions concerning the disclaimer for Crisis
Pregnancy Centers were made in California.

The State responded with evidence including (1) images of Yelp’s webpages;
(2) copies of news articles regarding Yelp; (3) Yelp’s Texas Secretary of State
filings; (4) publications of Yelp’s terms of service, social media posts, letter to
shareholders, and investor presentations; and (5) Yelp’s discovery responses.

14
Due to its internet-based business model, Yelp has no need for a physical
presence in Texas—or in most other states for that matter. However, it hires and
retains remote employees in Texas. Nevertheless, the record reflects that Yelp
derives benefits in the form of revenue from the sales of customizable location
specific advertising, and from any reservations or other purchases made through
Yelp. The State established through evidence in support of its response that Yelp
does substantial business in Texas, accesses and generates profits from Texans who
book reservations or purchase items through Yelp pages, and purposefully directs
tailored advertisements to Texas users. The State asserted that when a consumer
searches Yelp’s website Yelp uses the consumer’s location to show business pages
for local Texas providers within the consumer’s geographic area. Yelp also tracks
consumers’ keyword searches and uses that information to facilitate paid
advertisements.

The State cites Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.
1982) in support of its argument that Yelp purposely availed itself of jurisdiction in
Texas. In Siskind, the Texas Supreme Court held that exercise of personal
jurisdiction was proper over Villa—a school for troubled children located in Arizona
that solicited business in Texas. Id. at 435, 437. Siskind, a Texas resident, sued Villa
on the theory that he had paid tuition for his son to attend Villa with the
understanding from the modified enrollment contract that Siskind would be
reimbursed if his son left during the school year. Id. at 435–36. Villa expelled
Siskind’s son and refused to refund the tuition. Id. at 435. Siskind sued the school in
Texas for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and violation of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act. Id. at 435–36.

In holding that Villa had personally availed itself of the Texas forum, the
Siskind Court noted that a significant number of Villa’s students were Texas

15
residents, and that the school advertised in the El Paso, Houston, and Lubbock
telephone directories as well as solicited business in a number of national
publications that were circulated in Texas. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court held that
Villa’s advertisements, “in conjunction with its practice of mailing informational
packets, applications for admission, invitations to re-enroll, and enrollment contracts
to Texas residents,” indicated that the school had affirmatively sought business in
Texas. Id. at 436.

Here, Yelp does not need to send brochures through the mail or advertise in
conventional telephone directories, but seeks consumers by sending targeted
advertising based on where those consumers live. Yelp also engaged in additional
conduct, such as creating independent pages for different cities in Texas. The State
introduced evidence of Yelp pages advertising medical practices in Austin in
addition to images of Yelp pages targeted to Dallas, Austin, Houston, and San
Antonio. While the method of delivery is not the same as in Siskind, like the
defendant in Siskind, Yelp actively solicited business in Texas.

Yelp makes two other arguments for why it did not purposefully avail itself
of the privilege of doing business in Texas. First, Yelp argues that it purposefully
avoided the privilege by including a forum selection clause and choice-of-law
provision in its online user agreement. A defendant may “purposefully avoid a
particular forum by structuring its transactions in such a way as to neither profit from
the forum’s laws” nor subject itself to the forum’s jurisdiction. Moki Mac, 221
S.W.3d at 575 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
In support of this argument, Yelp attached to its special appearance a fifteen-page
user agreement that required any claim, cause of action, request for relief, or dispute
that might arise between the consumer and Yelp to be resolved by arbitration. Any
claims that could not be arbitrated were required to be brought in courts located in

16
San Francisco County, and California law would govern the terms of the agreement.

In Michiana, the defendant cited a similar forum-selection clause as a basis
for granting its special appearance. 168 S.W.3d at 792. The Texas Supreme Court
rejected the argument, holding that a forum-selection clause does not foreclose the
possibility that the defendant had minimum contacts elsewhere. Id. As the Supreme
Court explained, the clause generally “operates as consent to jurisdiction in one
forum, not proof that the Constitution would allow no other.” Id. Regardless of the
clause’s enforceability in this case (an issue not before us), it does not prevent the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in Texas.

Second, Yelp argues that it has not purposefully availed itself of the forum
because it did not make any money from the representations contained in its
Consumer Notice. It is undisputed that Yelp does not allow any business categorized
as a Crisis Pregnancy Center to purchase any services offered by Yelp, whether the
business is located in Texas or elsewhere in the United States. Further, Yelp does
not conduct any trade or commerce with any business that is categorized as a Crisis
Pregnancy Center, whether in Texas or anywhere else in the United States, and
makes no money off Crisis Pregnancy Centers, directly or indirectly. Yelp argues
that rather than seek any advantages from Texas, Yelp posted the Consumer Notice
to better inform consumers across the country about businesses that they may choose
to visit.

The fact that Yelp did not profit from the Consumer Notice itself does not
preclude a finding of personal jurisdiction based on Yelp’s availment of the Texas
forum. Neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has
conditioned a personal availment finding on whether the defendant profited from the
communication directed toward the forum. The State is suing Yelp on a Deceptive
Trade Practices claim, a claim for which no financial loss need be shown in order to

17
recover. Mother & Unborn Baby Care of N. Tex., Inc. v. State, 749 S.W.2d 533, 538
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (“It is immaterial whether appellants
provided a service in exchange for money; the statute as a whole supports the
conclusion that transfer of valuable consideration is not necessary.”). Moreover, the
State has raised a fact issue on whether Yelp might make money from data
harvesting on user searches for Crisis Pregnancy Centers.

We conclude the State’s allegations coupled with the evidence attached to its
response are sufficient to establish that Yelp purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting business in Texas, and that Yelp did not negate the State’s
allegations. Yelp’s business contacts with Texas are thus not the kinds of “random,
isolated, or fortuitous” ones that will save a company from personal jurisdiction in a
State notwithstanding its contacts with it. Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Rather, Yelp
“deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home” by appending the Consumer Notice to
Crisis Pregnancy Centers in Texas. We therefore turn to the question of whether the
State established a substantial connection between Yelp’s contacts and the operative
facts of the litigation.

C. Yelp’s Contacts with Texas are Related to the Operative Facts of
the Litigation.

The State’s Deceptive Trade Practices claim is premised on allegations that
Yelp directly appended misleading statements about Texas Crisis Pregnancy Centers
to the business pages of over 200 Texas Crisis Pregnancy Centers, including in the
district where this suit was brought—Bastrop County. Yelp responds that the
relevant decisions at issue were made by Yelp employees in California. Those
decisions included whether to create the Crisis Pregnancy Center business category
and whether to place disclaimers on Crisis Pregnancy Centers. The United States

18
Supreme Court has recognized that the relatedness inquiry, however, does not
require a causal connection. See Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 361–62, 366 (holding
that car manufacturer was subject to specific jurisdiction in Montana and Minnesota
on claims for car-wreck injuries suffered there because manufacturer had advertised,
sold, and serviced the relevant car models “in both States for many years,” even
though the manufacturer did not sell the specific cars involved in the litigation in
those states). Instead, the relatedness inquiry requires only that the suit arise out of
or relate to the defendant’s contact with the forum. Id. at 362; see Volkswagen, 669
S.W.3d at 431 (determining that “[r]elationships may ‘support jurisdiction without
a causal showing’ even when the litigation merely relates to the defendant’s forum
contacts.”) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 362); Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17
(refusing to condition specific jurisdiction on a “strict causal connection,” and
instead finding it sufficient that SprayFoam “intended to serve a Texas market for
the insulation that the Lucianos allege injured them in this lawsuit.”).

That inquiry is satisfied here. Here, the State alleged that Yelp, using location
data, appended a misleading disclaimer to the business pages of over 200 Crisis
Pregnancy Centers in Texas and “divert[ed] consumers from seeking [Crisis
Pregnancy Centers’] services in favor of other facilities that lacked the misleading
disclosure.” Accordingly, the State’s claim “arises from an injury which occurred in
the forum state”—which is a “relevant part of the relatedness prong of the analysis.”
Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17. 5

5
In another post-submission supplemental brief, Yelp cited a Thirteenth Court of Appeals
case in which our sister intermediate court held that Google was not subject to specific jurisdiction
in Texas because the State did not specifically plead that the operative facts of its Deceptive Trade
Practices claim arose out of or were related to Google’s contacts with Texas. Google LLC v. State,
No. 13-23-00114-CV, 2025 WL 52611, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 9, 2025,
pet. abated) (mem. op.). This case is factually distinguishable in that, here, the State specifically
pleaded that the operative facts arose out of or were related to Yelp’s contacts with Texas.

19
Yelp makes two responses for why the relatedness prong nevertheless is
unsatisfied here. First, Yelp responds that the required relatedness nexus is not
satisfied because the disclaimer at the heart of the State’s claim was published
nationwide and not sent specifically to any Texas consumer. According to Yelp,
because Yelp targeted Crisis Pregnancy Centers everywhere, it cannot be said to
have targeted Texas specifically. We disagree. The fact that Yelp targeted Crisis
Pregnancy Centers outside Texas as well as in Texas does not preclude us from
finding the relatedness inquiry to be satisfied. The Texas Supreme Court recently
rejected an analogous argument, holding that a “defendant need not single Texas out
in some unique way to satisfy constitutional dictates.” Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at
420. Rather, the “critical inquiry is whether a nonresident defendant has established
sufficient contacts with Texas—not whether those contacts are materially different
from its contacts with other states.” Id. at 421. A contrary rule would create perverse
incentives, encouraging actors to commit harms everywhere to avoid being haled
into court anywhere. See id. Here, as in Volkswagen, “there was no happenstance to
[Yelp’s] contacts with Texas.” Id. at 420. Yelp’s conduct reflects intent to avail itself
of several markets nationwide, including Texas. Yelp’s contacts in Texas are related
to the operative facts of the litigation; the fact that Yelp did not single out Texas
does not defeat specific jurisdiction. Id.

Second, Yelp argues that the State’s primary authorities do not involve
internet transactions, and that this distinction compels a different result. See Ford,
592 U.S. at 366 n.4 (excluding internet transactions from the product-liability case
analysis because internet transaction cases “may raise doctrinal questions of their
own.”). According to Yelp, although Ford rejected a “strict causal theory” of
relatedness, “it did not say that ‘anything goes.’” Johnson v.
TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 21 F.4th 314, 324 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ford Motor

20
Co., 592 U.S. at 362). Yelp invokes the Fifth Circuit’s directive in Johnson that “a
plaintiff must link the defendant’s suit-related conduct to the forum. Mere market
exploitation will not suffice.” Id. In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit held that merely
making a website “that’s visible in Texas, of course, does not suffice” to confer
specific jurisdiction. Id. at 320; see Admar Int’l, Inc. v. Eastrock, L.L.C., 18 F.4th
783, 785 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Merely running a website that is accessible in all 50 states,
but that does not specifically target the forum state, is not enough to create the
‘minimum contacts’ necessary.”); Wakefield v. British Med. Journal Publ’g Group,
Ltd., 449 S.W.3d 172, 188 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) (“[T]he plaintiff must
establish that the nonresident defendant’s internet activity was intended to target and
focus on the forum.”).

We agree with Yelp that “not anything goes” with respect to establishing
specific jurisdiction over a company for its internet activities. But nor is the internet
an invisibility cloak that prevents an actor from being haled into court in a given
state simply because the actor used the internet in the course of targeting its activity
at Texas. Here, Yelp took specific actions to target its communication at persons
who were seeking help from Texas Crisis Pregnancy Centers. Yelp appended the
Consumer Notice—which contains the statements that the State contends are
misleading—about Texas Crisis Pregnancy Centers to the business pages of over
200 Texas Crisis Pregnancy Centers, including in the district where this suit was
brought—Bastrop County. It is undisputed that the Consumer Notice at issue here
was viewable only on “relevant Yelp pages”—in other words, the business listings
for Crisis Pregnancy Centers, including the Texas locations.

These facts distinguish this case from Johnson. In Johnson, the plaintiff sued
about a story that was posted on HuffPost’s general news website. The site was
“interactive,” but its story about Johnson had “no ties to Texas”; did “not mention

21
Texas”; recounted “a meeting that took place outside Texas,” and “it used no Texan
sources.” Johnson, 21 F.4th at 319. The Court further recognized that the mere fact
that the website was accessible in Texas was the only possible basis for haling
HuffPost into Texas courts, as HuffPost had not otherwise purposefully availed itself
of Texas. Id. at 320. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction
over HuffPost with respect to Johnson’s libel claim. Id. at 325. This case is unlike
Johnson in all key respects: jurisdiction does not turn on mere website accessibility,
but rather “internet activity was intended to target and focus on the forum.”
Wakefield, 449 S.W.3d at 188. Here, Yelp expressly acknowledges that, while some
people come to Yelp to find businesses that offer the pregnancy resources that Crisis
Pregnancy Centers provide, there are others who turn to Yelp to find reliable
information about abortion providers, and that Yelp issued the Consumer Notice to
help consumers make informed decisions. Here, the Consumer Notice was appended
to Texas Crisis Pregnancy Centers, the customers of which are likely to be Texans.
This is enough to establish the relatedness prong. 6

D. Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction over Yelp Comports with
Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice.

Once minimum contacts have been established, we must consider whether,
for other reasons, exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant would
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.

6
In addition to its supplemental briefing on general jurisdiction, Yelp filed an additional
supplemental brief citing two Texas Supreme Court cases in which the Court adhered to its long-
established precedent that, in product-liability cases, Texas follows the “stream-of-commerce-
plus” doctrine of personal jurisdiction and that “[t]argeting Texas remains the touchstone” when
determining whether a nonresident defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas. See
BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98, 108 (Tex. 2025); Hyundam Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Swacina, 716 S.W.3d 167, 174 (Tex. 2025). This is not a product liability case, but our
determination that Yelp targeted Texas in appending the Consumer Notice to Texas Crisis
Pregnancy Center business pages is consistent with the Texas Supreme Court’s analysis in Shaik
and Swacina.

22
at 316. Rarely will properly exercised jurisdiction be found to impair fair play and
substantial justice. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 18. We consider Yelp’s contacts with
Texas in light of (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum in
adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of several states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Id. at 18–19.

There is no undue burden placed upon Yelp by exercising jurisdiction. Yelp
enjoys benefits and privileges when conducting business in Texas, which are
accompanied by the corresponding obligation to answer suits that may arise from
that business. Id. at 19 (“[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws
of that state.”) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).

Yelp asserts that it will be burdensome for it to litigate this case in Texas
because all of its witnesses and documents are located in California. The burden to
litigate in Texas, however, is lessened by modern travel and technology. See id.;
Moncrief Oil Intern. Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 155 (Tex. 2013)
(“Distance alone cannot ordinarily defeat jurisdiction.”). Yelp also contends that the
State’s interest in the litigation is lessened because it has not named a specific
consumer who has been harmed by Yelp’s actions. The State, however has a strong
interest in exercising jurisdiction to protect its citizens from activities that may
violate the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 19 (“[B]y
virtue of the Legislature’s enactment of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, . . . Texas
has demonstrated a special interest in protecting its citizens from the sort of activity
alleged here.”). Furthermore, as evidenced by the number of attorneys general who
signed the letter sent to Yelp, several states share Texas’s interest in ensuring that

23
Crisis Pregnancy Centers are not the targets of actionable misleading statements,
assuming arguendo that the State’s allegations are meritorious. We conclude
exercising jurisdiction over Yelp does not offend notions of fair play and substantial
justice. We sustain the State’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Yelp is subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas, we
reverse the trial court’s order granting Yelp’s special appearance and remand this
case to the trial court.

/s/ April Farris
April Farris
Justice

Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

24