James Brickley v. Nicholas Walton

ACCEPTED
15-25-00118-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
10/8/2025 11:44 AM
No. 15-25-00118-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK

In the FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Fifteenth Court of Appeals of Texas 10/8/2025 11:44:52 AM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
at Austin Clerk

James Brickley,
Appellant,

v.

Nicholas Walton,
Appellee.

On Appeal from Order of Dismissal
440th Judicial District Court, Coryell County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-55842

APPELLEE’S BRIEF

KEN PAXTON BRIANA M. WEBB
Attorney General of Texas Assistant Attorney General
Acting Chief, Law Enforcement
BRENT WEBSTER
Defense Division
First Assistant Attorney General
ABIGAIL K. CARTER*
RALPH MOLINA
Assistant Attorney General
Deputy First Assistant Attorney
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
General
Austin, Texas 78701
AUSTIN KINGHORN (512) 475-3586
Deputy Attorney General for Abigail.Carter@oag.texas.gov
Civil Litigation
*Counsel of Record

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ................................................................................... 3
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...................................................... 5
Issues Presented........................................................................................ 6
Statement of Facts .................................................................................... 7
Summary of the Argument ....................................................................... 9
Standard of Review ................................................................................. 11
Arguments & Authorities........................................................................ 12

I. Appellant explicitly asserts in his complaint that his claim arises
under the Texas Penal Code, not any other statute. ..................... 12

II. The Texas Penal Code does not create private causes of action. .. 14

III. Appellant cannot cure a jurisdictional defect by pleading new or
different additional claims. ............................................................ 16

IV. If a jurisdictional defect cannot be cured through amendment, the
proper remedy is dismissal with prejudice. ................................... 18

V. Even if Appellant is allowed to amend his pleadings to assert facts
under the TTLA, the state has not waived sovereign immunity for
TTLA claims. .................................................................................. 19

VI. Appellee’s attorney, through his employment with the Texas Office
of Attorney General, had authority to defend Appellee. ............... 21
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 22
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................ 23
Certificate of Service ............................................................................... 24

Page 2 of 24
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alamo Heights I.S.D. v. Clark,
544 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018) .................................................................. 11
Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez,
487 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2016) .............................................................. 9, 17
Cty. of Cameron v. Brown,
80 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. 2002) .................................................................... 12
Harris Cnty. v. Deary,
695 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.).... 10, 18
Harris Cnty. v. Dillard,
833 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1994) .................................................................. 19
Harris Cnty. v. Sykes,
136 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. 2004) ............................................................ 11, 19
Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.,
369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) .................................................................. 11
Hosner v. DeYoung,
1 Tex. 764 (1847) .................................................................................. 19
Joyner v. DeFriend,
255 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App. 2008) ............................................... 9, 11, 14
Long v. Tanner,
170 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied) ......................... 14
Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha,
381 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. 2012) .................................................................. 20
Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Scott,
309 S.W.3d 927 (Tex. 2010) .................................................................. 11
Sai Monahans Brother Hosp., LLC v. Monahans Econ. Dev. Corp.,
657 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) ........................ 9, 17
Spurlock v. Johnson,
94 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) ...................... 14
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ................................................ 10, 12, 18, 19
Tex. DOT v. Ramirez,
74 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2002) .................................................................... 16
Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,
233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) ............................................................ 18, 19

Page 3 of 24
Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ...................................................... 11, 12, 16
Trevino v. Ortega,
969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1998) .............................................................. 9, 14

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .......................................................................... 12, 13, 14
Article IV, § 22 of the Texas Constitution .............................................. 21
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.003(a)(1-3)......................................... 12
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134.003(a) .............................................. 13
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134.005 ............................................ 12, 13
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134.005(a) ........................................ 12, 13
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.20 .............................................................. 2
Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 ....................................................................... 20
Tex. Gov’t Code § 497.096 ......................................................................... 2
Tex. Gov't Code § 402.021 ....................................................................... 21
Texas Penal Code § 39.04 ........................................................................ 13
Texas Penal Code § 31.03 .................................................................... 7, 13

Rules

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) ...................................... 23
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3) ........................................... 23
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5 ................................................... 24

Page 4 of 24
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

This case requires little more than a straightforward reading of

Appellant’s own petition and the district court’s decision to be decided.

Appellant does not advance any cogent legal argument that cannot be

overcome through proper application of foundational principles of law.

Therefore, oral argument will not materially assist the Court’s

deliberations.
ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Can Appellant assert different claims to cure a jurisdictional defect

in his complaint?

2. If a plaintiff cannot cure a jurisdictional defect in his complaint, is

dismissal with prejudice proper?

3. Does the Office of the Attorney General have authority to defend

Appellee in this matter?

Page 6 of 24
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Factually this case is simple. Appellant James Brickley is an

inmate in custody under the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

(“TDCJ”) at the Alfred D. Hughes (“Hughes”) Unit. CR at 12. Appellee

Nicholas Walton is a TDCJ correctional officer at the Hughes Unit. Id.

On June 14, 2023, Appellant alleges that Walton led a team of

correctional officers in a “shake down team” to conduct a “bi-annual

shake down for the G-pod in 7 building where [appellant] was housed.”

C.R. at 6-8. Appellant contends that when he returned to his cell after

this shake down was completed, he found that his legal materials were

missing. Id. Appellant further alleges that Walton said he would provide

a list of correctional officers who conducted the shake down to him, but

Walton never did so. Id.

Appellant filed a petition with the 440th District Court in Coryell

County alleging that Walton had committed theft under § 31.03 of the

Texas Penal Code and violated his civil rights under § 39.04 of the same.

C.Supp.R. at 12. Appellee filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction on April 29,

2025. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice for

lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 13; C.R. at 120. The district court also held that

Page 7 of 24
Appellant was not entitled to amend his pleading. Id. This appeal

followed.

Page 8 of 24
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Texas Penal Code does not create private causes of action.

Joyner v. DeFriend, 255 S.W.3d 281, 283 (Tex. App. 2008) (citing Trevino

v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. 1998)). As such, Texas civil district

courts do not have jurisdiction over claims pursuant to the Texas Penal

Code. Id. Here, Appellant brings two claims under the Texas Penal Code.

Because the Texas Penal Code does not provide Appellant with private

causes of action, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over his

claims.

Additionally, Appellant should not be given leave to amend because

there are no additional facts which he could allege to cure this

jurisdictional defect, and he cannot change his claims in order to create

jurisdiction. See Sai Monahans Brother Hosp., LLC v. Monahans Econ.

Dev. Corp., 657 S.W.3d 438, 450 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“[A]

plaintiff has no right to amend its petition to cure a jurisdictional defect

by ‘changing the claims [he is] bringing,’ and instead only has a right to

amend its petition by adding jurisdictional facts to support a previously

pled claim for relief.” (quoting Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487

S.W.3d 538, 559 (Tex. 2016))). If a plaintiff cannot cure the jurisdictional

Page 9 of 24
defect in his petition, then the proper remedy is dismissal with prejudice.

Harris Cnty. v. Deary, 695 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133

S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004)).

Further, the Appellee is entitled to sovereign immunity even under

Appellant’s alternative claims, and as such the Appellant cannot show

that jurisdiction is properly before the court. Finally, Appellant’s claim

that the Attorney General cannot defend the Appellee because the

Attorney General lacks authority to do so is baseless and meritless and

should be discarded.

Page 10 of 24
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Texas’ Courts of Appeal review a trial court’s order granting or

denying a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Presidio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Scott, 309 S.W.3d 927, 929 (Tex. 2010).

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a

case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136

S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). Subject-matter jurisdiction is “never

presumed and cannot be waived.” Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control

Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). In ruling on a plea to the

jurisdiction, the court begins its analysis by reviewing the live pleadings.

Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). A plea to

the jurisdiction “may challenge the pleadings, the existence of

jurisdictional facts, or both.” Alamo Heights I.S.D. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d

755, 770 (Tex. 2018).

It is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction. Joyner v. DeFriend, 255 S.W.3d at 282 (citing Texas Ass’n of

Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446). The court will construe

the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to his intent and

the facts he pleads that demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction.

Page 11 of 24
Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (citing Texas

Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446). “If the

pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea

to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff[] an

opportunity to amend.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 (citing Cty. of

Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002)).

ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES

I. Appellant explicitly asserts in his complaint that his claim
arises under the Texas Penal Code, not any other statute.

Appellant argues that his original claims raised in his petition

arose under the Texas Theft Liability Act (“TTLA”) for the alleged theft

of his legal mail and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his civil

rights. As evidence of this, Appellant points to his citations to Texas Civil

Practice & Remedies Code (“TCPRC”) § 134.005 (authorizing damages for

theft under the TTLA) and TCPRC § 41.003 (authorizing exemplary

damages with proof by clear and convincing evidence of malice, fraud, or

gross negligence). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134.005(a); TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003(a)(1-3). While Appellant cites to these

statutes, they do not form the basis of the claims that he brings against

Appellee.

Page 12 of 24
Appellant states directly under his first count that “The following

provisions hold Defendant liable under Texas Penal Code §31.03.” C.R. at

8 (emphasis added). Likewise, Appellant states under his second count

that “In the alternative, [Appellant] sues [Appellee] for violation of his

civil rights pursuant to Texas Penal Code §39.04.” Id. at 9 (emphasis

added). The district court rightly believed that Appellant brought his

claims under the Texas Penal Code because that is exactly what

Appellant told the district court in his petition. Although Appellant does

claim that his damages are authorized under the above TCPRC statutes,

he directly and explicitly states that the statutes his claims arise under

are in the Texas Penal Code, and not in the TCPRC.

Even if this Court were to find that Appellant’s claims might

plausibly suggest that he may have attempted to allege a claim under the

TTLA or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as Appellant asserts he did, the statute’s text

foils this attempt. In order to pursue damages under TCPRC § 134.005,

a person must bring “a suit under this chapter.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 134.005(a). This means that Appellant must have asserted a

claim under TCPRC § 134.003(a), not the Texas Penal Code. TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134.003(a). Likewise, in order to assert a claim

Page 13 of 24
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Appellant would have had to specifically allege

that his civil rights claim arose under that statute, not the Texas Penal

Code.

Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Appellant’s claims

arose under the Texas Penal Code, exactly as Appellant claimed in his

petition.

II. The Texas Penal Code does not create private causes of
action.

Central to the district court’s findings of facts and conclusions of

law was that Appellant fails to state a cause of action because the Texas

Penal Code does not create a private cause of action. In support of this

proposition, the district court cites to Joyner v. DeFriend, 255 S.W.3d at

283. C.Supp.R. at 12-13. The 10th Court of Appeals in Joyner cite to

numerous cases in support of the same from other courts of appeal and

the Supreme Court of Texas. See Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 953

(Tex. 1998) (refusing to recognize criminal evidence spoliation as an

independent civil cause of action, as with perjury and embracery);

Spurlock v. Johnson, 94 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002,

no pet.) (“the Texas Penal Code does not create private causes of action;

therefore these allegations fail to state a viable claim for relief.”); Long v.

Page 14 of 24
Tanner, 170 S.W.3d 752, 755 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied) (Texas

does not recognize a civil cause of action for perjury or aggravated

perjury, both of which are crimes under the Texas Penal Code).

Appellant recognizes that the district court correctly held, in

accordance with precedent from appellate courts, that the Texas Penal

Code does not create a private cause of action. Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Bizarrely, Appellant attempts to argue that the Texas Penal Code

simultaneously does not preclude a private cause of action – apparently

because other statutes may give rise to subject matter jurisdiction. This

assertion is unsupported by any Texas law and by common sense. If a

private cause of action is not created by a statutory scheme, then a court

does not magically receive subject matter jurisdiction over a non-claim

because a different statutory scheme might give rise to a claim. To hold

otherwise would be farcical and would destroy any meaning behind the

requirements of subject matter jurisdiction.

Thus, the District Court did not err in finding that Appellant did

not state a valid claim because the Texas Penal Code does not create a

private cause of action for Appellant to recover under.

Page 15 of 24
III. Appellant cannot cure a jurisdictional defect by pleading
new or different additional claims.

Appellant claims that the district court erred by not allowing him

to amend his petition to cure the jurisdictional defect that led to his

petition being dismissed. Appellant argues when a court dismisses a

plaintiff’s petition for lack of jurisdiction the plaintiff will be allowed to

amend the petition to properly assert the court’s jurisdiction. Appellant

is half-correct: “a plaintiff has a right to amend her pleadings to attempt

to cure pleading defects if she has not alleged enough jurisdictional facts.”

Tex. DOT v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002) (citing Texas Ass'n

of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). The

latter clause of this sentence is important: if she has not alleged enough

jurisdictional facts. A plaintiff does not have the right to amend if he

cannot allege additional facts that would give the court jurisdiction. The

Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed this:

A plaintiff's general right to amend its pleadings to allege
additional facts to cure a jurisdictional defect is not a
mechanism for parties, over whose claims the trial court does
not have jurisdiction, to plead new claims over which the trial
court does have jurisdiction. In other words, a plaintiff has no
right to amend its petition to cure a jurisdictional defect by
‘changing the claims they are bringing,’ and instead only has
a right to amend its petition by adding jurisdictional facts to
support a previously pled claim for relief.

Page 16 of 24
Sai Monahans Brother Hosp., LLC v. Monahans Econ. Dev. Corp., 657

S.W.3d at 450 (citing Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at

559) (internal citations omitted).

Here, Appellant asserts his claims under the Texas Penal Code,

which as discussed above does not create a private cause of action. Since

appellant does not assert a viable cause of action, no amount of factual

development will cure this jurisdictional defect. Even if Appellant could

assert a perfect factual recounting of that day in exacting detail, the fact

that he brought his claims under the Texas Penal Code prevents him

from amending his pleading because he cannot cure this jurisdictional

defect by citing additional facts to a non-existent cause of action.

Additionally, Appellant cannot cure jurisdictional defects by

attempting to argue that his claims actually are different than what he

pled in his petition. The right to amend for jurisdictional facts does not

extend to new or different claims. See Sai Monahans Brother Hosp., LLC

v. Monahans Econ. Dev. Corp., 657 S.W.3d at 450. Even if the Court were

to find that Appellant’s assertion that he is not alleging new claims

because he cited to the damages provisions under the TTLA, Appellant

would still be attempting to amend to include different claims, not

Page 17 of 24
jurisdictional facts for his claims under the Texas Penal Code.

Accordingly, Appellant does not have the right to amend his pleadings to

properly assert the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the district court did not

err in not allowing Appellant to amend his pleadings.

IV. If a jurisdictional defect cannot be cured through
amendment, the proper remedy is dismissal with prejudice.

When pleadings cannot cure a jurisdictional defect by amending to

add additional jurisdictional facts, allowing for a remedy of dismissal

without prejudice would serve no legitimate purpose. See Texas A & M

Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). Simply put, if a

plaintiff cannot allege facts that would overcome a court’s lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, then allowing him to refile the same claims — even

with the new jurisdictional facts — would be a moot point because the

claims would be dismissed again for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

“When, as here, no amendment can cure the jurisdictional defect, a

plaintiff is not entitled to amend her pleadings, and we must dismiss the

defective claims with prejudice.” Harris Cnty. v. Deary, 695 S.W.3d at 573

(citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227); see

also Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 837, 846 (holding

plaintiff was not entitled to amend pleading that could not be cured of its

Page 18 of 24
jurisdictional defect and dismissing plaintiff's claims with prejudice);

Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Tex. 2004) (holding that

order granting plea to jurisdiction based on immunity is dismissal with

prejudice). “Such a dismissal is with prejudice because a plaintiff should

not be permitted to relitigate jurisdiction once that issue has been finally

determined.” Harris County. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d at 639. Thus, the

district court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s claims with prejudice.

V. Even if Appellant is allowed to amend his pleadings to assert
facts under the TTLA, the state has not waived sovereign
immunity for TTLA claims.

The State of Texas and its agencies are entitled to sovereign

immunity, which immunizes the State and its agencies both from suit

and from liability. Texas A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 843–

44; Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224. A

plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain a suit against a state agency unless

the State has expressly waived sovereign immunity through a legislative

act. Harris Cnty. v. Dillard, 833 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. 1994). Texas

courts interpret waivers of sovereign immunity narrowly, and the intent

of the legislature to waive immunity must be clear and unambiguous. See

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034; see also Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769

Page 19 of 24
(1847) (“[N]o state can be sued in her own courts without her consent,

and then only in the manner indicated by that consent.”); Prairie View

A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 513 (Tex. 2012) (“We have

repeatedly affirmed that any purported waiver of sovereign immunity

should be strictly construed in favor of retention of immunity.”).

Critically, the TTLA does not contain a waiver of sovereign

immunity like the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) does. As such, even if

Appellant was allowed to replead his claims under the TTLA, his claims

would be dismissed as lacking any basis in law under Chapter 14 of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because the state’s sovereign

immunity would deprive any court of subject matter jurisdiction. Because

Appellant’s claims would be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction even if he replead his claims under the TTLA, allowing

Appellant to amend would still not provide him with a cognizable remedy.

As such, the district court did not err in not allowing him to amend his

pleadings to include claims under the TTLA.

Page 20 of 24
VI. Appellee’s attorney, through his employment with the Texas
Office of Attorney General, had authority to defend
Appellee.

Under Article IV, § 22 of the Texas Constitution, the Attorney

General “shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme

court of the State in which the State may be a party… and perform such

other duties as may be required by law.” This constitutional power is

extended by Texas Government Code § 402.021: “The attorney general

shall prosecute and defend all actions in which the state is interested

before the supreme court and courts of appeals.” Here, the state is clearly

interested in defending one of its employees from suit and ensuring that

the state’s sovereign immunity is not infringed upon. Thus, the Attorney

General’s Office is acting pursuant to its constitutional and statutory

authority by defending Appellee in this matter.

As for Appellant’s claims that Appellee is not entitled to qualified

immunity, that Appellee never claimed qualified immunity as a defense,

and that Appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights are

being violated, Appellant never addressed these arguments to a trial

court. As this court is not a court of first view but a court of review, these

arguments should not be addressed.

Page 21 of 24
CONCLUSION

Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, this Court should find

that the district court did not err in granting Appellee’s plea to the

jurisdiction and dismissing the Appellant’s petition with prejudice and

affirm.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/Abigail K. Carter
ABIGAIL K. CARTER
Assistant Attorney General
Texas State Bar No. 24126376

Law Enforcement Defense Division
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
abigail.carter@oag.texas.gov
(512) 463-2080 (Phone No.)
(512) 370-9814 (Fax No.)

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

Page 22 of 24
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I, ABIGAIL K. CARTER, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, do

hereby certify pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3)

that this brief complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure

9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 2,913 words, inclusive of all portions of

this brief.

/s/Abigail K. Carter
ABIGAIL K. CARTER
Assistant Attorney General

Page 23 of 24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, ABIGAIL K. CARTER, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, do

hereby certify that pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5

and the Court’s Local Rules a true and correct copy of the foregoing was

served on October 8, 2025, via U.S. certified mail, return receipt

requested, as follows:

James Brickley, TDCJ No. 02289486 CMRRR 7009 2250 0003 9939 8488
TDCJ – Hughes Unit
3201 FM 929
Gatesville, TX 76597

/s/Abigail K. Carter
ABIGAIL K. CARTER
Assistant Attorney General

Page 24 of 24
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Gloriana Ojeda on behalf of Abigail Carter
Bar No. 24126376
gloriana.ojeda@oag.texas.gov
Envelope ID: 106593607
Filing Code Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: Appellee Brief FINAL
Status as of 10/8/2025 11:47 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Abigail Carter 24126376 abigail.carter@oag.texas.gov 10/8/2025 11:44:52 AM SENT

Nicholas Larkin nicholas.larkin@oag.texas.gov 10/8/2025 11:44:52 AM SENT

Carson Young Carson.Young@oag.texas.gov 10/8/2025 11:44:52 AM SENT