Ugalahi Offoboche v. Collin County, Texas, Collin County Sheriff's Deputies Mounger, Watson, and McMillan and Former Collin County Chief Deputy Constable Rumfield

ACCEPTED
15-25-00044-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/15/2025 11:57 PM
No. 15-25-00044-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS

at Austin, Texas AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/15/2025 11:57:53 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
UGALAHI OFFOBOCHE,
Appellant,
V.
COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS, COLLIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPUTIES
MOUNGER, WATSON, AND MCMILLAN AND FORMER COLLIN
COUNTY DEPUTY CONSTABLE RUMSFIELD
Appellees.

On appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas
Cause No. 429-08578-2024, The Honorable Jill Willis, Presiding

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

U. A. C. OFFOBOCHE LAW FIRM

/s/ Ugalahi Agbo Claire Offoboche
Ugalahi Agbo Claire Offoboche
State Bar No. 24068619
675 Town Square Blvd., Bldg. 1A, Ste. 200,
Garland, TX 75040
Ph: 469-315-0358
Fax: 214-853-5708
ugy@uacoffobochelaw.com
PRO SE APPELLANT
UGALAHI OFFOBOCHE

ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
Title Page
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………...2
Index of Authorities………………………………………………………………...4
Summary of Argument……………………………………………………………..5
Preliminary objection to matters not in the appellate record and motion to strike
Appellees Appendix............................……………………………………………..6
Law and Argument..………...…………………….………………………………..9
I. Issues related to quashed subpoena are not moot because Appellant continues to
suffer collateral consequences and Issuance of the Subpoena is capable of
repetition yet evading review…………...…..….…………………………........10
II. Appellees have failed to substantiate the 429th Court’s assertion of jurisdiction to
adjudicate 193rd Trial Subpoenas……………....…………................................15
A. Appellees have failed to show that Rule 176.6(e) applies to Trial Subpoenas
and the Canons of Statutory Construction support Appellant’s
Interpretation’………………………………………………………………15

B. Appellees’ case law regarding dominant jurisdiction all apply to discovery
subpoenas and do not address trial subpoenas……………………………..21

C. Being unable to deny that they made false assertions of improper service of
subpoena, Appellees claim that the issue is irrelevant and moot, when it did
not appear to be moot at the hearing where the lies were told, is
disingenuous………………………………………………………………..26

D. The 429th lacked exclusive or dominant jurisdiction to issue the protective
order hence any claim to the overbroad unsubstantiated order being limited
is irrelevant……………………………………………………....................27
E. The Four Texas Attorney General opinion rulings require disclosure of the
basic information per 552.108(c), Appellees misinterpretation of the case
law notwithstanding….………………………………………………….....29

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 2 of 37
F. Appellees having failed to negate the issues raised in Appellant’s brief,
appellant relies on appellant’s corrected brief for any remaining issues…..35
Prayer……………………………………………………………………………...35

Certificates

Certificate of Compliance………………………………………………….37

Certificate of Service………………………………………………………37

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 3 of 37
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abott v. Mexican Am. Legis, Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Tex. 2022)..........................................10
Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 568 (Tex. 2004) .................................................................19
Carlton v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 32 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) ......8
City of Carrollton v. Paxton, 490 S.W.3d 187, 197-198 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2016, pet. denied)........ 29
City of Carrollton v. Paxton, 490 S.W.3d 187, 197-200 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2016, pet. denied)........ 30
City of Carrollton, 490 S.W.3d at 190-202....................................................................................31
City of Carrollton, 490 S.W.3d at 201 .................................................................................... 31, 32
City of Carrollton, 490 S.W.3d at 202 ............................................................................................34
City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain, 206 S.W.3d 97, 105 (Tex. 2006). ...........................................18
City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003) .............................................21
Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008). ..................... 19
Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex.2008) ....................... 18
Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974) .........................................................................24
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 186–87 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975) .....................................................................................................................34
In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2024) ...................................................................10
In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250 (2011) .............................................................................................35
In re J.M., 699 S.W.3d 685, 687-89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.)......................... 17
In re J.M., No. 14-24-00478-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, opinion delivered October 15,
2024) ................................................................................................................................ 11, 15
In re KVIA-Channel 7, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 5967 *7 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 19, 2024, no pet.
h.)(mem. op.), writ denied) ......................................................................................................11
In re Seitel, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9690, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], Nov. 2, 2004) ......... 26
In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d 297, 303 (Tex. App.—San Antono 2002, orig. proceeding) ..............................24
In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 302 ................................................................................................. 24, 33
In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 303 ............................................................................................24, 25, 27
Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 515 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc). ....................................29
Latham v. Thornton, 806 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, orig. proceeding) ............. 22
Leordeanu v. Am. Protection Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d 239, 248 n.35 (Tex. 2010) ................................18
Medlin v. King, 705 S.W.3d 267, 285 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2024) ....................................................17
Melendez v. Exxon Corp., 998 S.W.2d 266, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) ......8
Paxton v. Escamilla, 590 S.W.3d 617, 621-622 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied) ....................... 32
Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979) ..........................8
Sewell v. Adams, 854 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) ...................8
Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23-0192, Txcourts.gov
at *25-26 (Tex. May 30, 2025) .......................................................................................12, 14, 27
Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23-0192, Txcourts.gov
at *30 (Tex. May 30, 2025) ................................................................................................. 10, 12

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 4 of 37
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. 2010) .............................................. 12, 13
Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). .................................................................. 12, 14
Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988) .....................................................24
Statutes
§30.006(c)(1) and (2), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code.......................................................................28
Tex. Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 19A, Art. 19A.051 and 19A.252(a) and (b) ..................... 12
Tex. Gov’t Code §22.220(c) ...........................................................................................................8
Tex. Government Code §552.001(b); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §30.006(c)(2)............................35
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §30.006(c) .......................................................................28
Texas Gov’t Code §552.108(c) ....................................................................................................29
Rules
Rule 192.6(b) ..................................................................................................................19, 20, 21
Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(d)-(e) ..................................................................................................... 11, 15
Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(e) and 176.6(f) .............................................................................................16
Tex. R. of Civ. P. R. 176.6(f) and 176.7 .................................................................................. 11, 15

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 5 of 37
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Appellant objects and moves to strike Appellees’ Appendix Exhibits 1-4 as

containing matters outside the appellate record.

Mootness does not apply to the quashed subpoenas because Appellant still

suffers collateral consequences in the form of sanctions and because Subpoena must

issue again for the 193rd continued trial, the issue is capable of repetition yet evading

review.

Appellees have failed to show that the judgment of the 429th was supported

by sufficient evidence to support the 429th’s claim to exclusive jurisdiction when the

case law and Rule 176.6(f) show that the 193rd retains dominant jurisdiction.

Appellees have failed to show sufficient evidence on the record to support the

429th’s granting of the motion for protective order on grounds of privilege or undue

burden, harassment, unnecessary expense or annoyance and the judgment should be

reversed.

Appellees have failed to show that there is sufficient evidence of bad faith

abuse of the judicial process by appellant that significantly interfered with the 429th

Court’s traditional core functions and invoking the inherent power of that court to

sanction appellant was an abuse of discretion.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 6 of 37
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO MATTERS NOT IN THE APPELLATE
RECORD AND MOTION TO STRIKE APPELLEES APPENDIX
Before reaching the merits of the appellate issues, Appellant humbly requests

that the court first address Appellant’s preliminary objection to Appellees’

introduction of matters not in the Appellate Record and strike all such matters and

all arguments and conclusions based on such matters. Appellees filed a Response

Brief containing matters outside the Appellate Record that have not been tested for

veracity or admissibility under the rules of evidence at the 429th, including an

Appendix with four exhibits on which it relies. APPELLEES BRIEF, Pg, x n.4; pg. ix

n. 2; and pp. 2-4. None of the Appendix Exhibits are matters of record and were

never presented to the 429th. APPELLEES BRIEF APPENDIX EXHIBITS 1-4. Further,

Appellees include weblinks to the Collin County Judge’s profile 1 and a link to the

the Collin County Sheriff’s website2, none of which are contained in the appellate

record. APPELLEES BRIEF, pg. x n.4; pg. 1 n. 6.

Appellees do not offer the appendix and weblinks to support any challenge to

this court’s jurisdiction. APPELLEES BRIEF, Pg, x n.4; pg. ix n. 2; and pp. 2-4. With

the exception of determining an appellate court’s own jurisdiction 3, it is settled law

in Texas that this Court’s review is confined to the evidence in the trial court’s

1
With a boast about the judge’s long serving service in a not so veiled attempt to influence this
court’s opinion of the case by invoking some unfair comradery to the 429th Judge. APPELLEES
BRIEF, pg. x n.4.
2
Designed to misdirect the court from the issues at hand. APPELLEES BRIEF, pg. 1 n.6.
3
Tex. Gov’t Code §22.220(c).
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 7 of 37
(appellate) record. See Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d

840, 841 (Tex. 1979); Sewell v. Adams, 854 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); and see Melendez v. Exxon Corp., 998 S.W.2d 266, 280

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that parties are to confine

their arguments and factual recitations to matters contained in the record).

It is improper for parties to rely on matters outside the record in making

arguments to the court and the remedy is to strike and not consider the improper

items submitted and confine the review to the appellate record. Carlton v. Trinity

Universal Ins. Co., 32 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000).

Appellant therefore requests that this court strike all arguments and materials

beginning at the second full paragraph on page 2 of Appellees brief and ending on

the paragraph that runs into page 4 of Appellees brief as relying on matters outside

the appellate record.

Appellant further requests this court to strike note 2 on page ix, note 4 on page

x and note 6 on page 1 of Appellees brief, as relying on or directing the court’s

attention to matters outside the appellate record. Appellant further requests that this

court strike from Appellees brief, and disregard all facts, references or arguments

relying on or based upon matters outside the appellate record.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 8 of 37
LAW AND ARGUMENT

I. ISSUES RELATED TO QUASHED SUBPOENA ARE NOT MOOT
BECAUSE APPELLANT CONTINUES TO SUFFER
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBPOENA IS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET EVADING
REVIEW
Appellant’s clients retain a personal stake in the outcome of the live case at the

193rd and must issue subpoena to get the testimony of Appellees, hence there are no

intervening events that make it impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief

whatever to any prevailing party. CR.42. Appellees are unable to meet their difficult

burden of establishing mootness especially when six prior subpoenas had issued

without challenge 4 indicating that more must issue until the trial is held, and

appellees got the December 3, 2024 trial subpoenas quashed on January 30, 2025

[CR.97], 58 days after the trial setting had been continued. “Mootness is difficult to

establish. The party asserting it must prove that intervening events make it

impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”

In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Abott v. Mexican

Am. Legis, Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Tex. 2022).

Appellees have failed to meet their burden of showing that the case is moot.

“[T]here is no presumption in favor of mootness.” Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective

Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23-0192, Txcourts.gov at *30 (Tex.

4
CR.37
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 9 of 37
May 30, 2025). Admitting that the 193rd trial case is live and was only continued5

appellees argue that merely because the Subpoenas for the December 3, 2024 trial

setting were quashed 58 days after they had expired, the issue is moot.6 Yet

Appellees are aware that Appellant continues to suffer from the collateral

consequence of the wrongful imposition of sanctions and are aware that fresh

subpoenas must issue from the 193rd again. CR.97(1)-(2), 98.

Thus, the following are live justiciable controversies: (1) Whether the 429th’s

error in asserting jurisdiction to quash the 193rd trial subpoenas under Tex. R. Civ.

P. 176.6(d)-(e)7 has caused appellant, who, as an officer of the 193rd Court, issued

the quashed trial subpoenas or 193rd Orders 8, continues to suffer the collateral

consequences of sanctions [CR.95-97], and (2) whether the 429th court of equal

jurisdiction with the 193rd Court is capable of repeating the act of quashing the trial

subpoenas that are certain to issue from the 193rd in the immediate future, the case

only being continued and not abated, and if not addressed now, will evade review.

CR.97(1)-(2).

5
Appellees brief at 7, CR.31
6
Appellees brief at 7, CR.97
7
An error alleged in Appellant’s brief at 36 and 46 being court orders as under Tex. R. of Civ. P.
R. 176.6(f) and 176.7
8
See In re J.M., No. 14-24-00478-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, opinion delivered
October 15, 2024) (identifying subpoenas as court orders per Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.
2024).
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 10 of 37
In making their arguments in support of the issue of trial subpoenas allegedly

being moot, Appellees rely on only one case wherein appellees stated but ignored

the importance of the intervening fact that the (issuing) Grand Jury had expired, in

comparing this case to In re KVIA-Channel 7 9 which found that “Because the

subpoena has expired, there is no longer a justiciable controversy between the

parties.” APPELLEES BRIEF at 7. Appellees position is untenable because, unlike a

trial court which does not expire, grand juries are empaneled by a district court judge

for a specified term, hence, logically, such a grand jury’s subpoena expiring would

render any issues relating quashing such a grand jury subpoena moot. See Tex. Code

of Criminal Procedure Chapter 19A, Art. 19A.051 and 19A.252(a) and (b).

Appellees approach to mootness is oversimplistic.

Assessing mootness generally proceeds in two steps. Tex. Dep't of Family &

Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23-0192, Txcourts.gov at

*30 (Tex. May 30, 2025). “First, [the court asks] if the case is moot on its face—that

is, has the live controversy come to an end. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315

S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. 2010).

9
2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 5967 *7 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 19, 2024, no pet. h.)(mem. op.), writ
denied).

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 11 of 37
If the answer is yes, the court then asks, “if any “exception” to mootness applies.”

Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). This second step means that some

cases that are moot on their face actually remain live such as when collateral

consequences flow from the resolution of a seemingly moot dispute or when

circumstances causing the injury, despite being ended, are likely to recur as between

the same parties yet evade review because the injury is of short duration. Tex. Dep't

of Family & Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23-0192,

Txcourts.gov at *25-26 (Tex. May 30, 2025).

Appellees argue that because the December 3, 2024 trial date was continued,

issues relating to the 193rd trial subpoena which the 429th quashed on January 30,

2025, were rendered non-justiciable, rendering moot any errors attributed to the

portion of the challenged judgment. APPELLEES BRIEF, Pg. 7. This argument is

disingenuous because if mootness applies to this appeal then mootness applied to the

429th Court’s jurisdiction to quash the subpoenas when Appellees argued and got the

challenged judgment issued 58 days after the December 3, 2024 trial had been

continued, yet Appellees did not argue that the subpoenas had expired or that their

motion to quash was moot instead they proceeded to get the subpoenas quashed

anyway with the obvious goal of intimidating Appellant. 2RR.9 lines 9-12, 2RR.10

lines 2-6, 2RR.12 lines 13-20.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 12 of 37
To the first inquiry—whether the live controversy has come to an end, if the only

subpoenas at issue are the December 3, 2024 trial subpoenas, then, Appellees would

be right that that controversy has ended, however the judgment does not limit itself

to those subpoenas 10 and the issue is still justiciably live. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at

865. However, if this court were to separate the issue of quashed

subpoena[CR.97(1)] from the order not to request or serve any subpoena[CR.97(2)],

and address them as separate issues, then the appropriate response would be a very

hesitant, yes to the question that the December 3, 2024 trial subpoenas have expired

and would lead to the next inquiry. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 865.

Upon a yes, the next issue this court would consider is “if any “exception” to

mootness applies.” Lara, 52 S.W.3d at 184. Like the Texas Supreme Court requires,

this court’s analysis of the facts, would then turn to whether this case, though it

appears to be moot on its fact actually remains live because collateral consequences

flow from the 429th’s resolution of the seemingly moot dispute or when

circumstances causing the injury [sanctions for Appellant and new subpoenas for

Appellees], despite being ended, are likely to recur as between the same parties yet

evade review because the injury is of short duration. Tex. Dep't of Family &

10
CR.97(2)
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 13 of 37
Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23-0192, Txcourts.gov at

*25-26 (Tex. May 30, 2025).

This exception territory is where this case falls because Appellant is yet suffering

collateral consequences in the form of sanctions from the 429th’s resolution of the

seemingly moot dispute about the issuance and quashing of the trial subpoenas for

the December 3, 2024 setting and because, Appellant still represents the Plaintiffs at

the 193rd and though each subpoena duration is short, Appellant must issue trial

subpoena for the testimony of the majority of Appellees until the case is resolved.

Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23-

0192, Txcourts.gov at *25-26 (Tex. May 30, 2025).

The issue is not moot because there are live justiciable controversies about

whether the 429th had, and has jurisdiction to quash 193rd trial subpoenas under Tex.

R. Civ. P. 176.6(d)-(e) 11 and to impose the collateral consequence of sanctioning

appellant as the issuing 193rd officer which appellant continues to suffer12; and

whether the 429th court, as a court of equal jurisdiction with the 193rd Court, has the

authority to continue to insert itself into the 193rd trial court case by insisting on

ruling on Appellants future trial subpoenas, making these issues capable of repetition

11
An error alleged in Appellant’s brief at 36 and 46 being court orders as under Tex. R. of Civ. P.
R. 176.6(f) and 176.7; and see In re J.M., No. 14-24-00478-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2024, opinion delivered October 15, 2024) (identifying subpoenas as court orders per Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
12
There are added sanctions for each stage of each appeal. CR.98.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 14 of 37
and certain to repeat, and which, without a resolution, will evade review and

continue to interfere with the 193rd jury trial. CR.97(1)-(2).

In conclusion, the case at the 193rd has only been continued [CR.31] and not

abated or dismissed and therefore the issue of quashing subpoenas is not moot

because Appellant must be able to issue necessary trial subpoenas on behalf of

Appellant’s clients in order to zealously represent her clients at the 193rd without

Appellees using the 429th Court to intimidate Appellant by controlling 193rd trial

subpoenas as this clearly favors defendants at the 193rd.

APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE 429TH COURT’S
ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE 193RD TRIAL
SUBPOENAS
A. APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT RULE 176.6(e) APPLIES TO
TRIAL SUBPOENAS AND THE CANONS OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT APPELLANT’S INTERPRETATION

Appellees challenge the 193rd’s Rule 176.6(f) exclusive jurisdiction over its trial

subpoenas, but appear to be uncertain about whether the 429th had exclusive or dual

jurisdiction because, while asserting that a “robust consensus” of authorities support

its new claim that “a plain reading” of Rules 176.6(e) and 176.8 provide “dual

District Court Jurisdiction,” 13 at the trial court level, appellees argued that the 429th

has exclusive jurisdiction but does not view the plain words in context. See 2RR.7

lines 11-14; Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(e) and 176.6(f).

13
Appellees brief at 8
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 15 of 37
Appellees insistence that Rule 176.6(e) is dispositive of the issue of jurisdiction

over the trial subpoenas lacks merit14 especially with Appellees arguing without a

legal basis that appellant “puts too great emphasis on the term “trial subpoena”” and

that “basic rules of statutory construction compel rejection of Appellant’s facially

flawed interpretation of Rule 176.6(f).” Appellees’ brief at 10. For clarity,

Appellant’s position remains that trial subpoenas are treated differently from

discovery subpoenas under Rule 176, with Rule 176.6(e) providing for discovery

subpoenas whilst Rule 176.6(f) applies to trial subpoenas only and give exclusive

jurisdiction to the court of the time and place of trial. Appellant’s brief at 39-43 15.

To support this position, and as a starting point, finding no definition for “subpoena”

in the rules, Appellant views the dictionary definition of Subpoena through the

limited lens of a court 16 wherein that court relied on Black’s Law Dictionary’s

definition of “Subpoena” as “a writ or order commanding a person to appear before

14
Appellees brief at 8
15
Appellant asks that this court take judicial notice of its records wherein, Appellees’ counsel and
this court were notified via motion for leave, that Appellant had suffered acute symptoms of
Idiopathic Intracranial Hypertension which include temporary blindness during the drafting of her
brief and had notified the court and appellees that the condition caused appellant to make numerous
errors and omissions. Appellant was able to correct the errors she could find but was unable to
correct the omissions in the Amended brief. Appellee identified the omissions and took advantage
of it to allege that Appellant’s brief is “deceptively AI generated.” However, the omissions are
obvious because the full text of the portions of Medlin v. King was laid out on page 39 of the
Amended brief and the full text of In re J.M. on which Appellant relies is also laid out on page 41
showing that the definition of subpoena was adopted by In re J.M. from Black’s Law Dictionary.
Correcting this in this brief is confusing hence, Appellant filed a corrected brief and has sought
leave to file it.
16
In re J.M., 699 S.W.3d 685, 687-89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.).
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 16 of 37
that court subject to a penalty for failing to comply.” Appellant’s brief at 41, citing

In re J.M., 699 S.W.3d 685, 687-89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.).

Appellant juxtaposed the definition of subpoenas as orders, with the effect of

Rule 176.3(b) cited for the limited purpose of showing that it is only discovery

subpoenas that are limited to an extent, manner or time by the discovery rules, and

therefore, not trial subpoenas. Appellant’s brief at 40-41 citing Medlin v. King, 705

S.W.3d 267, 285 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2024) (the full text of the quote is set out on

page 40 of Appellant’s brief and applied to show how appellant arrived at position

taken). Thereafter, taking Rule 176 as a whole17 and applying the dictionary

definition of Subpoena, which is different 18 from summons, to mean a “writ or

Order” appellant put together a summation in the analysis which Appellees

misinterpret as a purported holding of In re J.M. because Appellant omitted

references to Medlin v. King before and after In re J.M. on page 41. Appellees brief

at 12; but see corrected brief at 39. Appellant stands by the arguments in the brief.

Appellees ask this court to ignore the words “Trial Subpoenas” in Rule 176.6(f) by

alleging that Appellant puts too great an emphasis on the words “trial subpoenas”19

17
See Appellant’s corrected briefs at 39-43 reviewing Rules 176.3(b), 176.6(c), 176.4(b),176.6(f),
176.6(e)-which requires motions for protective orders to be brought under discovery Rule 192.6(b)
only.
18
Appellees wrongly state that juvenile subpoena is equivalent to a summons for service of
petition when the case states the opposite [citing In re J.M., 699 S.W.3d 685, 687-89 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.)].
19
Appellees brief at 9
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 17 of 37
claiming 20 that “[b]asic rules of statutory construction compel rejection of

Appellant’s…interpretation of Rule 176.6(f). 21 It is a canon of construction that the

entire statute is intended to be effective, and therefore the court should not read any

language to be pointless or a nullity. Leordeanu v. Am. Protection Ins. Co., 330

S.W.3d 239, 248 n.35 (Tex. 2010) citing Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v.

Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex.2008)(“We construe statutes to give effect to

every provision and ensure that no provision is rendered meaningless or

superfluous.”); accord City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain, 206 S.W.3d 97, 105

(Tex. 2006). Appellees are wrong to ignore the words “Trial Subpoenas” because

even by the basic canons of statutory construction, the specific use of the words

“Trial Subpoenas” as the title for Rule 176.6(f) only will be rendered meaningless

and superfluous, if the court applies appellees interpretation of Rule 176.6(f).

Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008).

This is more so, when the term “trial subpoenas” is excluded from 176.6(e) and only

included in Rule 176.6(f) because another canon of statutory interpretation is that

when a term has been carefully included in one section of a statute and excluded in

another, it should not be implied where excluded. Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d

560, 568 (Tex. 2004) (holding that “when the Legislature includes a right or remedy

20
Without citation to any authorities regarding the basic rules of statutory construction on which
they rely
21
Appellees brief at 10

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 18 of 37
in one part of a code and omits it in another, that may be precisely what the

Legislature intended”). Thus, applying the canons of interpretation to Rule 176.6(e)

and 176.6(f), trial subpoenas being excluded from the language of 176.6(e) but

included in the language of 176.6(f) only, any matters relating to trial subpoenas

were legislatively promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court to require the

application of Rule 176.6(f) only, and only the 193rd court has jurisdiction thereunder

to adjudicate 193rd trial subpoenas, as “the court at the time and place specified for

compliance”. Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(f).

While Rule 176.6(f) is titled “Trial Subpoena” by the Texas Supreme Court and

expressly provides for protective orders for the recipient of a trial subpoena to

comply or object before the court at the time and place specified for compliance,

Rule 176.6(e) on the other hand, relies on discovery Rule 192.6(b) for a party to seek

a protective order. Tex. R. of Civ. P. The Texas Supreme Court obviously intended

Trial Subpoenas to be treated differently because of the way Rule 176 is set up,

making Rule 176.6(e) motions subject to discovery Rule 192.6(b),22 expressly

stating that subpoena for discovery but not for trial, may not be used to an extent, in

a manner, or at a time other than as provided by the rules governing discovery 23,

22
“may move for protective order under Rule 192.6(b)”
23
Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.3(b)
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 19 of 37
while Trial subpoena motions are not subject to any discovery rules under Rule

176.6(f). Appellees brief at 8.

Focusing only on the dual court designation reserved for discovery subpoenas,

Appellees fail to explain why, under Rule 176.6(e), a motion for protective order

may only be brought under discovery Rule 192.6(b) thereby limiting the extent and

manner in which the protective order may be brought and thus how discovery

subpoena may be used per Rule 176.3; whereas Rule 176.6(f) carries no limitation

requiring moving for protection under any discovery rule. Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(f),

176.6(e), 192.6(b) and 176.3. Appellant posits that under Rule 176.6(e), the Texas

Supreme Court anticipated discovery subpoena duces tecum for custodians of

business records and other non-parties summoned to a “deposition, hearing or trial”

not for their testimony but for the production of records in including the word “trial”

under the list of places to which a person commanded to “produce and permit

inspection and copying of designated documents and things may be ordered to

appear. This position comports with the canon of statutory construction that in a

statute dealing with words grouped together, all those words should be given a

related meaning. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex.

2003). Because issues related to discovery typically have more time for resolution

before trial, it makes sense to permit a non-party to move for a protective order under

Rule 192.6(b) before either the court where the matter is pending or a district court

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 20 of 37
in the county where the discovery subpoena was served but it makes no sense to

allow the same for trial subpoenas as these usually have a shorter duration and

involve a lot more participants like jurors and other witnesses who will be adversely

affected by the delay arising from the issuing officer needing to leave the ongoing

trial to appear before another court. It is no surprise therefore that Appellees “robust

consensus of well-reasoned authority” 24 regarding dominant jurisdiction, all address

discovery subpoenas but none address trial subpoenas. Appellees brief at 13-15.

B. APPELLEES’ CASE LAW REGARDING DOMINANT JURISDICTION ALL
APPLY TO DISCOVERY SUBPOENAS AND DO NOT ADDRESS TRIAL
SUBPOENAS

The case law which Appellees cite in support of their claim that clearly

established law regarding dominant jurisdiction of a court when resolving non-party

motions for protective orders, favor Appellant’s interpretation of Rule 176.6(e) as

limited to discovery subpoenas, and do not address Rule 176.6(f) at all.

First, Appellees rely on Latham v. Thornton25 for the proposition that “the first-

filed motion for protective order [and resulting court’s order] controls over the

second-filed motion to compel presented in a different district court in another

county where the underlying litigation was already pending.” Appellees brief at 13,

citing Latham, 806 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, orig.

24
Appellees brief at 8
25
806 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, orig. proceeding).
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 21 of 37
proceeding). However, that case deals only with jurisdiction over depositions and

was an original petition for writ of mandamus brought to overturn a discovery court

order to compel the deposition and production of documents of a nonparty and did

not involve a trial subpoena. Latham, 806 S.W.2d at 347-48. That court relied on

discovery Rule 215.1(a) 26 which identifies the appropriate court for depositions and

other discovery matters and held that, per Rule 215.1(a) because an application for

an order to a “deponent” who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district

where the deposition is being taken, that court has jurisdiction over the “deposition”

however, “[a]s to all other discovery matters, an application for an order will be

made to the court in which the action is pending.” Latham, 806 S.W.2d at 349.

Notwithstanding Appellees self-serving summary 27 of the case, Latham28 favors

appellant because the trial subpoenas 29 at issue in the present case did not seek to

depose any of the officers but instead commanded their appearance at a jury trial so

that even if one were to view the trial subpoenas as requesting the production of

documents 30 as appellees contend,31 not being a deposition request, the 193rd as the

court in which the action is pending would have jurisdiction and not the 429th. Tex.

26
Formerly Rule 215(1)(a)
27
Appellees brief at 13
28
806 S.W.2d at 349.
29
CR.47, 53, 59, 64
30
The subpoenas only requested that the witnesses bring a government issued identification to
court but requested no other documents. CR.47, 53, 59, 64.
31
CR.11
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 22 of 37
R. Civ. P. 215.1(a). And reading the “Appropriate Court” provisions of Rule

215.1(a) in conjunction with Rules 176.6(e) and 176.6(f), it is more consistent that

the court in which the action is pending has jurisdiction over its own trial subpoenas

than that some other court would. See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.1(a), 176.6(e)

and 176.6(f).

Second, Appellees cite to In re reed, 32 a case allegedly involving a discovery

subpoena duces tecum for production of expunged records issued in a civil case out

of Cleburne Texas and because the case appears to involve discovery requests which

fall under Rule 176.6(e), the court of appeals is alleged to have afforded jurisdiction

to the court in Ellis County. Appellees brief at 14. Without reading the case,

appellant cannot confirm whether that court cited to Latham and if it did, whether

the quotation is accurate, however, that case does not involve trial subpoenas and

only addresses a discovery subpoena duces tecum, making it inapplicable to the issue

in the present case.

Third, Appellees intentional misinterpretation of the holdings of these cases is

laid bare in In re Sims,33 wherein it quotes a portion of the case out of context.

32
Appellant cannot verify the facts and holdings herein because Appellant has searched but been
unable to locate In re reed with the citation provided, which may be an unpublished opinion, in
which case Tex. R. App. P. 47.7 requires that a copy be attached otherwise it is improper for any
party to cite unpublished judgments as orders from various courts as authority when such items do
not appear in the appellate record. Carlton, 32 S.W.3d at 458, citing Tex. R. App. P. 47.7 and
Carlisle v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied).
33
88 S.W.3d 297, 303 (Tex. App.—San Antono 2002, orig. proceeding).
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 23 of 37
Appellees brief at 14-15. In In re Sims, the San Antonio Court of Appeals, set out

dominant jurisdiction stating: “As a general rule, when suit would be proper in more

than one county, the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction

to the exclusion of other courts.” In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 302; citing Wyatt v. Shaw

Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988); Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263,

267 (Tex. 1974). Thus, it held that:

“Where two actions involving the same subject matter brought in
different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first
acquires jurisdiction should retain such jurisdiction, undisturbed by the
interference of another court, and dispose of the controversy…It is not
required that the exact issues and all the parties be included in the first
action before the second action is filed, provided that the claim in the
first suit may be amended to bring in all necessary and proper parties
and issues…The test is whether there is an inherent interrelation of
the subject matter in the two suits…As long as the forum of the first
action is proper, the plaintiffs choice of forum must be respected,
and a defendant is “simply not at liberty to decline to do battle in
the forum chosen by the plaintiff.”” In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 303
(citations omitted).
Appellant accedes to the holding in In re Sims and Appellee having relied on it as

well, appears to agree with its holding which would mean that the 193rd as the first

court in which the case by the Browns—Plaintiffs, was filed retains dominant

jurisdiction to the exclusion of the 429th and since the subject matter is admittedly,34

the Brown’s aircraft in both courts, the 429th should not have interfered with the

193rd’s jurisdiction. Id. Importantly, In re Sims, holds that dominant jurisdiction is a

34
CR.7; Appellees brief at 2.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 24 of 37
waivable error which makes Appellant’s reticence35 at appearing before the 429th to

avoid waiving her clients’ rights, a rational fear and does not constitute interference

with the 429th’s jurisdiction because the 193rd has dominant jurisdiction to the

exclusion of the 429th. 88 S.W.3d at 303-304. Ultimately, In re Sims, mandamus

writ issued against the court in which the case was first filed for abating the suit in

favor of the second court because that first court had dominant jurisdiction and the

first trial court had no jurisdiction to abate in favor or the lawsuit in the other county.

88 S.W.3d at 303. Like the others, this case favors appellant’s position.

Last, Appellees rely on In re Seitel, 36 another original proceeding challenging a

discovery order to produce privileged documents for want of proper service of a

subpoena, notice of hearing or an opportunity to present evidence of its claimed

privilege as they relate to the discovery order under Tex. R. of Civ. P. 176.6(e),

however, the court dismissed the case as moot because the parties reached an

agreement. In re Seitel, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9690, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.], Nov. 2, 2004). This reliance is also ineffective as no trial subpoena was

at issue and Appellee has been unable to locate a single case that supports its

assertion that trial subpoenas are governed by Rule 176.6(e) or that negates

35
Appellant’s brief at 71.
36
Appellees brief at 15.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 25 of 37
Appellants position that trial subpoenas are governed by Rule 176.6(f) while

discovery subpoenas are governed by Rule 176.6(e).

C. BEING UNABLE TO DENY THAT THEY MADE FALSE ASSERTIONS OF
IMPROPER SERVICE OF SUBPOENA, APPELLEES CLAIM THAT THE
ISSUE IS IRRELEVANT AND MOOT, WHEN IT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE
MOOT AT THE HEARING 37 WHERE THE LIES WERE TOLD IS
DISINGENUOUS

Because Appellees are unable to substantiate the lies told at the 429th hearing

58 days after the trial subpoenas had expired, to get the 429th to assume “exclusive

jurisdiction” Appellees now claim that their false assertion of improper service and

unsubstantiated claim that Appellant was trying to issue new subpoenas and

attempting to have the officers served on Thanksgiving day 38 is now irrelevant39.

Appellees brief at 15. However, Appellees did not argue the issue as moot when they

brought it up to convince the 429th that she had exclusive jurisdiction 58 days after

the trial subpoenas had expired. 2RR.7 lines 11-14. These lies with no evidence on

the record were offered to paint Appellant as a villain, when there was clear evidence

of proper service on the record and no evidence to support the allegation of improper

service of the four trial subpoenas by which appellees had misled the 429th Court.

2RR.7 lines 15-21. However, because this issue is capable of repetition and will

37
2RR.7 lines 7-8, 9-10, 15-21 containing Davis’s lies about actions allegedly taken by
Appellant unsubstantiated by any evidence on the record.
38
2RR.7 lines 7-8, 9-10, 15-21
39
Because Appellees have been caught in a lie.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 26 of 37
evade review if not resolved, the issue of the officers requesting subpoena in person

or by email, signing waivers and then denying service is not moot. Tex. Dep't of

Family & Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., No. 23-0192,

Txcourts.gov at *25-26 (Tex. May 30, 2025).

D. THE 429TH LACKED EXCLUSIVE OR DOMINANT JURISDICTION TO
ISSUE THE PROTECTIVE ORDER HENCE ANY CLAIM TO THE
OVERBROAD UNSUBSTANTIATED ORDER BEING LIMITED IS
IRRELEVANT

This court should not credit, as relevant to any issue, Appellees claim that the

429th protective order is limited because that allegation is irrelevant if the 429th

lacked jurisdiction to issue the protective order to govern trial subpoenas at the 193rd.

Rule 176.6(f) places jurisdiction over trial subpoena squarely with the issuing court

as the court of the place specified for compliance. Tex. R. Civ. P. As the court with

dominant and exclusive jurisdiction, only the 193rd jurisdiction over its trial

subpoenas and the 429th abused its discretion by interfering with the 193rd Court’s

case once the case was filed first at the 193rd. In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 303.

The overbroad protective order protects against “any testimony related to and/or

records governed by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §30.006(c) in the

possession of Collin County…or the attendance of any Collin County employees be

requested and/or subpoenaed…without” the 429th’s order when the 429th does not

have jurisdiction over the 193rd case. CR.97. This is especially so when, §30.006(c),

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 27 of 37
in relevant part40, requires the restriction of an order for discovery if the requested

information deals with an investigation by the nonparty law enforcement agency that

does not result in conviction or deferred adjudication “and 41 the release of the

information…would interfere with the detection, investigation, or prosecution

of criminal acts.” §30.006(c)(1) and (2), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code. Since these

parameters must be met before a court in a civil action is restricted from issuing a

discovery for information from a nonparty law enforcement agency under

§30.006(c), and because even Appellees’ arguments 42 show that those parameters

were never met, no court in a civil action would be restricted from issuing an order

for discovery thereunder and applying the plain meaning of the text, compliance with

§30.006(c) would simply not apply. A plain meaning must include reading words

and phrases in context and construing them in accordance with the rules of grammar.

Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 515 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).

Disregarding the word “if” which establishes a precondition and the word “and”

which requires both subsections (1) and (2) to apply for the court in a civil action to

be constrained by §30.006, Appellees do not even attempt to address the added

requirement of subsection (c) as raised in Appellant’s brief, 43 totally ignoring

40
Appellees brief at 21 bolding the text to show that it relies on §30.006(c)(1)(B).
41
A conjunctive requiring both subsections (1) and (2) for this section to apply.
42
Appellees brief at 21 disregarding the requirements under 30.006(c)(2) whilst offering
misdirection that §552.108(a)(2) tracks nearly verbatim §30.006(c)(1)(B).
43
Appellant’s brief at 57-60.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 28 of 37
§30.006(c)(2) as Appellees did at the 429th, whilst relying solely on §30.006(c)(1),

when both are needed to trigger the applicability of §30.006(c). Appellees brief at

21-22. This matter should be resolved against Appellees.

E. THE FOUR TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION RULINGS REQUIRE
DISCLOSURE OF THE BASIC INFORMATION PER 552.108(c),
APPELLEES MISINTERPRETATION OF THE CASE LAW
NOTWITHSTANDING

Appellees arguments are confusing regarding their obligations because they

do not appear to understand that Texas Gov’t Code §552.108(c) creates an exception

for basic information even when other information is privileged. City of Carrollton

v. Paxton, 490 S.W.3d 187, 197-198 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2016, pet.

denied)(holding: “Basic information about an arrested person, an arrest, or a

crime”—[o]ur disposition [means]… that the City may withhold the information at

issue … under Section 552.108's law-enforcement exception unless and to the extent

the information is “basic information about an arrested person, an arrest, or a

crime” that must be disclosed under Subsection (c) of that provision”)(emphasis

added).

The cases on which Appellees rely 44 show that the party seeking to block the

disclosure of the basic information authorized by the AG files suit to prevent its

disclosure under the Government Code. City of Carrollton 45 and Paxton v.

44
Appellees brief at 19-20.
45
490 S.W.3d 187, 197-200 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2016, pet. denied)
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 29 of 37
Escamilla.46 appear to be confused about the exception at issue. Appellees’

summary of the AG’s opinion rulings is disingenuous because the summaries omit

the AG’s command that the basic information must be released pursuant to

552.108(c)47. Appellees brief at 17-18; but see CR.21-26. Appellees provide this

court with case law that shows what government agencies do when the attorney

general commands the release of the basic information in an opinion ruling.

Appellees brief at 19 citing City of Carrollton v. Paxton, 490 S.W.3d 187, 197-200

(Tex. App.—Austin, 2016, pet. denied). Like this case, four opinion rulings were

issued by the AG and commanded the release of the basic information, but unlike

this case wherein Collin County ignored the AG’s command to release the basic

information, the City of Carrollton sued to withhold the “basic information” which

the attorney general defined broadly rather than as narrowly as set out in the statute,

because without the lawsuit the City was duty bound to release the basic

information. City of Carrollton, 490 S.W.3d at 190-202. Importantly, once again,

Appellees select a portion of the case law that is misleading when the full text

supports the release of the basic information. Appellees brief at 19-20 (relying on

the City of Carrollton’s argument to the Court of Appeals and skipping to the

analysis regarding the attorney general). The language below shows that if law

46
590 S.W.3d 617, 621-622 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied).
47
Texas Government Code
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 30 of 37
enforcement makes a determination that a crime has actually occurred, then basic

information about the arrest, arrested person and the crime should be disclosed:

“[t]he Legislature has explicitly limited the potential scope of “basic
information” subject to disclosure under Subsection (c) solely to
that which is “about” (i.e., on the subject of or concerning) either
“an arrested person,” “an arrest,” or “a crime.” A further
implication of Subsection (c)'s wording is that there can be no “basic
information” subject to disclosure under that provision unless there has
been “an arrest” or “a crime.” These limitations would require, in the
very least, some sort of determination by law enforcement that a
crime has actually occurred, if not also an arrest made…” City of
Carrollton, 490 S.W.3d at 201.

The requirement that law enforcement make some sort of determination that

a crime has actually occurred, if not an arrest made48, has been met in this case

because without law enforcement determining that someone had taken actions

determined to be crimes, the case of theft would not have been referred to a Grand

Jury. See CR.8 n.1. Appellees misplaced conclusions regarding what basic

information is, has led to its intentionally ignoring relevant holdings in the case law

on which it relies, because, the issue is not whether some information is privileged

rather the issue is that basic information about the arrest, the arrested person and the

crime as determined by law enforcement leading to a Grand Jury referral, like the

offense report, is not privileged and must be released. See Appellees brief at 19-20;

CR.8 n.1 and City of Carrollton, 490 S.W.3d at 201. Appellees reliance on City of

48
City of Carrollton, 490 S.W.3d at 201.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 31 of 37
Carrollton is flawed because in that case, the City did not oppose the disclosure of

two offense reports as basic information. 490 S.W.3d at 202 (finding “We do not

understand the City to be contesting disclosure of the two offense reports related to

the incident, and these documents may largely satisfy the City's obligation to

produce “basic information” here”).

Appellee implying that it was only required to disclose the basic information

in two of the AG’s opinion rulings is false because the other two opinions stated that

“with the exception of the basic information”49 Appellees may withhold the class of

information which it considered privileged. Appellees brief at 20 and see, CR. 24,

25, CR.21-22. Appellees rely on Escamilla, 50 a case in which the attorneys for the

City tendered affidavits to the court with the records for in camera review 51, the

proposition that, under §552.108(a)(2) of the Public Information Act, it is not

required to disclose information relating to the officers criminal investigations if the

criminal investigation did not result in a conviction or deferred adjudication.

Appellees brief at 20.

Escamilla52 is distinguishable from this case because (1) the Travis County

Attorney did not sue the requestor, rather he correctly sued the AG for ordering the

49
Meaning in plain English that they may withhold information but must disclose the basic
information.
50
Paxton v. Escamilla, 590 S.W.3d 617, 621-622 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied).
51
Escamilla, 590 S.W.3d at 623 n.4.
52
590 S.W.3d 617, 621-622
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 32 of 37
release of the information; (2) the records expressly requested were deferred

prosecution agreements (DPA) which were tendered to the court for review. In

contrast, Appellees have not disclosed what records are allegedly requested, or stated

how the release of the information would interfere with the detection, investigation,

or prosecution of criminal acts,53 yet the 429th granted an overbroad protective order

encompassing any testimony related to and/or records governed by §30.006(c) shall

not be sought by any party (no specific suit identified) nor the attendance of any

Collin County employees (not just the officers) be requested without the 429th’s

order, 54 even though, the 429th lacks jurisdiction over 193rd trial subpoenas and

cannot control another court’s proceedings, when as here, that other court has

dominant or exclusive jurisdiction. In re Sims, 88 S.W.3d at 302.

Appellees’ conclusion that because the case did not result in a conviction or

deferred adjudication, it did not have to release the basic information is simply

wrong because it relied on the AG to issue an opinion, and that opinion required the

release of the basic information. Appellees brief at 20. Without filing suit to preclude

the release of the basic information, Appellees were bound to release such

information as §552.108(c) permits especially because the law enforcement officers

53
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code §30.006(c)(1) and (2).
5454
CR.97

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 33 of 37
had determined that a crime had been committed which warranted a referral to the

Grand Jury. CR.8 n.1.

The basic information would include things like the offense report,55 notes

about what crime was reported or alleged, who, if any person was arrested, when the

person was arrested and why but does not require testimony about the full

investigation. City of Carrollton, 490 S.W.3d at 202 (“I.e., notes revealing “the

offense committed, location of the crime, identification and description of the

complainant, the premises involved, the time of the occurrence, property involved,

vehicles involved, description of the weather, a detailed description of the offense in

question, and the names of the investigating officers.” citing Houston Chronicle

Publishing Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 186–87 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1975), writ refused n.r.e., 536 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1976) (per curiam)).

The Public Information Act’s invocation to liberally construe the statute in

favor of granting a request for disclosure supports the release of the kinds of basic

information here itemized, especially when there is nothing on the record to show

that the release of the information would interfere with the detection, investigation

or prosecution of criminal acts. Tex. Government Code §552.001(b); Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code §30.006(c)(2).

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 34 of 37
F. APPELLEES HAVING FAILED TO NEGATE THE ISSUES RAISED
THEREIN APPELLANT RELIES ON APPELLANT’S CORRECTED BRIEF
FOR ANY REMAINING ISSUES

Attorneys, as advocates, are required to zealously represent their clients and

should be able to have strenuous adversarial arguments and disagreements outside

the court room without one attorney making the extrajudicial discussions a basis for

a sanction by a court. CR.96; CR.33-40 (being Appellees self-serving extrajudicial

accusations tendered without any corroborating evidence). Appellees reliance on In

re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250 (2011) is flawed because that case involved an attorney

who filed a frivolous motion to recuse the judge for which specific rules permit the

award of sanctions. That is not the case here. As to Appellees conclusory arguments

and unsubstantiated claims 56 Appellant relies on Appellant’s Corrected Brief57

asserting that there is insufficient evidence in support of the 429th judgment, the 429th

abused her discretion, and Appellees brief fails to negate any issues raised therein.

PRAYER

Appellant prays that this Court reverse the entire judgment of the 429th Court.

56
Referring to Appellees brief at 23-35 launching an unsubstantiated campaign of calumny against
Appellant by making accusations that are simply not supported by the record. Nothing shows bad
faith toward any court.
57
Appellant holds to faith that the pending Motion for leave will be granted.
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 35 of 37
Respectfully submitted,

U. A. C. OFFOBOCHE LAW FIRM

/s/ Ugalahi Agbo Claire Offoboche
Ugalahi Agbo Claire Offoboche
State Bar No. 24068619
675 Town Square Blvd., Bldg. 1A, Ste. 200,
Garland, TX 75040
Ph: 469-315-0358
Fax: 214-853-5708
ugy@uacoffobochelaw.com
PRO SE ATTORNEY APPELLANT

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 36 of 37
CERTIFICATES

a. Certificate of Compliance

I, the undersigned attorney, do hereby certify that the brief herein does not
exceed the 7,500 word limit of Rule 9.4, T.R.A.P., relying on the word count of
Microsoft 365, this brief contains 7,500 computer generated words, not including
the caption, table of contents, index of authorities, signature, proof of service,
certificate of compliance, and certificate of service. The text in the body of the brief
is a 14-point font, and the footnotes are in 12-point font.

/s/ Ugalahi Agbo Claire Offoboche
Ugalahi Agbo Claire Offoboche

b. Certificate of Service

I certify that on September 15, 2025, I served a true and correct copy of

above and foregoing on all counsel of record for appellees via simultaneous

efiletexas.org eservice upon filing including on:

Robert J. Davis
bdavis@mssattorneys.com
and
Kyle T. Barry
kbarry@mssattorneys.com
Counsel for Appellees

/s/ Ugalahi Agbo Claire Offoboche
Ugalahi Agbo Claire Offoboche

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF Page 37 of 37
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Ugalahi Offoboche
Bar No. 24068619
ugy@uacoffobochelaw.com
Envelope ID: 105617239
Filing Code Description: Other Brief
Filing Description: Appellant's reply brief
Status as of 9/16/2025 7:08 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Ugalahi UgyOffoboche ugy@uacoffobochelaw.com 9/15/2025 11:57:53 PM SENT

Robert J.Davis bdavis@mssattorneys.com 9/15/2025 11:57:53 PM SENT

Robert J.Davis bdavis@mssattorneys.com 9/15/2025 11:57:53 PM SENT

Robert J.Davis bdavis@mssattorneys.com 9/15/2025 11:57:53 PM SENT

Kyle T.Barry kbarry@mssattorneys.com 9/15/2025 11:57:53 PM SENT

Kyle T.Barry kbarry@mssattorneys.com 9/15/2025 11:57:53 PM SENT