Isela Portales v. Todd Castillo

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 1, 2024.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-23-00787-CV

ISELA PORTALES, Appellant
V.
TODD CASTILLO, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Johnson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC0-D20230114

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Isela Portales appeals a protective order granted to her ex-
boyfriend, appellee Todd Castillo. Portales argues that (1) she received ineffective
assistance of counsel and (2) there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s order. Because (1) civil litigants generally are not
constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of counsel and (2) there is no
reporter’s record in this case, we overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the trial
court’s order.
Background

Castillo filed an application for a protective order, alleging that Portales
engaged in family violence against him. Portales retained counsel to represent her
in the proceeding below. The trial court conducted a hearing on Castillo’s
application, for which we have no reporter’s record. The trial court granted the
application and issued a protective order against Portales for a period of two years.

Portales timely filed this appeal.

Analysis

Portales presents three issues: (1) whether she received ineffective
assistance of counsel; (2) whether the trial court erred in making its judgment with
a “lack of factual evidence”; and (3) whether there is sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s ruling. We construe the last two issues as a challenge to the legal
and factual sufficiency of the evidence.

Before turning to the merits, we note that the Supreme Court of Texas
transferred this case to our court from the Tenth Court of Appeals. See Tex. Gov’t
Code § 73.001. We are unaware of any conflict between Tenth Court of Appeals
precedent and that of this court on any relevant issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.

A. Assistance of counsel in civil cases

In her first issue, Portales argues that her retained counsel provided
ineffective assistance by refusing to investigate Castillo’s relationships with
previous girlfriends and by failing to present evidence of Portales’s alleged
injuries.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right
to counsel in criminal prosecutions. See Cannon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 342, 348

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(Tex. Crim. App. 2008); U.S. Const., amend. VI. This guarantee entails the right
to effective assistance. Cannon, 252 S.W.3d at 348.

The doctrine of constitutionally guaranteed effective assistance does not
apply to civil cases when there is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel.
See Cherqui v. Westheimer St. Festival Corp., 116 S.W.3d 337, 343 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“[I]t is well established that the doctrine of
ineffective assistance of counsel does not extend to civil cases.”); see also Locke v.
Briarwood Vill., No. 14-17-00113-CV, 2018 WL 5621379, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Maki v. Anderson, No. 02-
12-00513-CV, 2013 WL 4121229, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 15, 2013,
pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (declining to reverse protective order based
on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Portales cites no authority and supplies no argument supporting the
proposition that a constitutional or statutory right to counsel exists in a protective-
order case. Accordingly, we overrule Portales’s first issue.

B. Evidentiary sufficiency

In her second and third issues, Portales challenges the evidence supporting
the protective order. Her argument is an extension of her ineffective-assistance
argument—namely that, had her counsel introduced evidence of Castillo’s
previous allegedly abusive relationships and of Portales’s bruises allegedly
inflicted by Castillo, then the trial court would not have ruled the way it did. To
the extent that these arguments raise an independent issue challenging sufficiency
of the evidence, we will address it separately.

When an appellant intends to raise any challenge involving the evidence or
argument presented to a factfinder, a reporter’s record is necessary. See Vernco

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Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tex. 2015). Because there is no
reporter’s record due to Portales’s failure to properly request that one be prepared,
we must presume that the trial court’s judgment is supported by sufficient
evidence. See id.; Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968)
(“The burden is upon a party appealing from a trial court judgment to show that the
judgment is erroneous in order to obtain a reversal. When the complaint is that the
evidence is factually or legally insufficient to support vital findings of fact, or that
the evidence conclusively refutes vital findings, this burden cannot be discharged
in the absence of a complete or an agreed statement of facts.”). For that reason, we
are compelled to overrule Portales’s second and third issues. See Johnson v. Freo
Tex. LLC, No. 01-15-00398-CV, 2016 WL 2745265, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] May 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting pro se litigant’s argument
that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed; appellant was unable to
demonstrate error because she failed to comply with procedural rules and laws
requiring her to request a reporter’s record); In re A.M.C., No. 10-10-00418-CV,
2011 WL 1166702, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“When no reporter’s record is filed, we must assume the missing evidence
supports the trial court’s ruling.”).

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order.

/s/ Kevin Jewell
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Zimmerer.

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