Jarvis Lamar Booker v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00445-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JARVIS LAMAR BOOKER, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 25TH DISTRICT COURT
OF LAVACA COUNTY, TEXAS

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

I agree with the majority and write separately to further address the issues raised

by appellant.

Appellant first argues that Section 547.613(a)(1) does not proscribe objects that

hang from the rearview mirror. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(a)(1). Appellant asserts

that the air freshener was not directly attached to the windshield because it was hung

from the rearview mirror. Relevant here, the statute proscribes any “object or material that
is placed on or attached to the windshield.” Id. Neither the parties nor this court have

found any cases interpreting whether “placed on or attached” requires direct placement

or attachment or includes indirect placement or attachment. Courts construe the

Transportation Code as follows: “Words and phrases shall be read in context and

construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage . . . . [unless they] have

acquired a technical or particular meaning . . . .” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011; TEX. TRANSP.

CODE § 1.002 (providing the Transportation Code is construed in accordance with the

provisions of Chapter 311 of the Government Code); see also Douglass v. State, No. 03-

20-00134-CR, 2022 WL 548275, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). “Attached” is defined as “joined, connected, or

bound.” Attached, Collins English Dictionary,

https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/attached (last visited May 21,

2026). Notably, there is no language in the statute limiting its application to objects or

materials that are directly “joined, connected, or bound” to the windshield. Accordingly,

the Legislature appears to have proscribed all objects or material that are joined,

connected, or bound to the windshield—both directly and indirectly. And while the statute

expressly provides an exemption permitting “a rearview mirror,” the “a” indicates an

exemption for a singular object. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(b)(4) (emphasis

added). The statute does not exempt “a rearview mirror [and things hanging

therefrom].” See id. Additionally, interpreting the statute to allow objects to “obstruct[] or

reduce[] the operator’s clear view” as long as they are not directly attached to the

windshield would be illogical and contrary to the purpose of the prohibition.

Regardless of the proper interpretation of Section 547.613(a)(1), the inquiry

determining the outcome in this case is not how we should construe the statute. Rather,

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the inquiry is whether Officer Simpkins’s understanding of Section 547.613(a)(1) was an

objectively reasonable understanding of the statute. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574

U.S. 54, 66, 68 (2014); Daniel v. State, 683 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

Reasonable suspicion is supported even where an officer operates under an objectively

reasonable mistake of law. Heien, 574 U.S. at 61. The United States Supreme Court held

that where a North Carolina statute required only one rear stop light, a nearby provision

created confusion by “requir[ing] that ‘all originally equipped rear lamps’ be functional,”

and because no North Carolina Court previously construed the provision, an officer had

reasonable suspicion to believe that one faulty break light was a violation of state law. Id.

at 59, 68. Accordingly, evidence of cocaine emanating from the stop was not suppressed.

Id. at 60, 68.

Similarly, in Daniel v. State, Daniel sought to suppress evidence of intoxication

after a traffic stop. 683 S.W.3d at 778. An officer stopped Daniel for violating Section

545.060(a) of the Transportation Code which provides: “An operator on a roadway divided

into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic: (1) shall drive as nearly as practical

entirely within a single lane; and (2) may not move from the lane unless that movement

can be made safely.” Id. at 779 (quoting TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.060). At the time of the

stop, Texas Courts of Appeal issued conflicting decisions as to whether the statute

involved a single offense or the two subsections defined separate offenses, and an

opinion joined by four judges of Court of Criminal Appeals provided the statute defined

two separately actionable offenses. Daniel, 683 S.W.3d at 779–80; see Leming v. State,

493 S.W.3d 552, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The officer stopped Daniel in 2017 only for

violation of subsection one. Daniel, 683 S.W.3d at 778. It was not until 2022 that the Court

of Criminal Appeals settled the matter by holding the statute defined only a single offense.

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Id. at 780–81; see State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

Accordingly, the officer in Daniel had reasonable suspicion to stop Daniel because his

mistake of law was “entirely reasonable in view of the nuanced statutory language and

conflicting caselaw from [the Court of Criminal Appeals] and the intermediate courts of

appeal.” 683 S.W.3d at 783.

Given the foregoing law, Officer Simpkins’s understanding that the statute

proscribed items attached to the windshield indirectly was objectively reasonable in light

of the statutory text and lack of cases interpreting the statute.

Second, appellant appears to suggest that an air freshener could not have

“obstructed the driver’s clear view.” Such an argument is premised on a

mischaracterization of the statute at issue. The statute proscribes any “object or material

that is placed on or attached to the windshield . . . and that obstructs or reduces the

operator’s clear view.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute

does not specify a degree of visibility reduction required for a violation to occur. This is a

proactive statute that is intended to prevent hazardous driving conditions or habits on

public roads. While obstruction of view caused by an air freshener may appear de

minimis, obstructed views create a hazard relative to the degree view is reduced. Much

like posted speed limits, the danger presented increases commensurate with the degree

of violation. Nevertheless, a traffic stop based on excessive speed constitutes reasonable

suspicion, regardless of whether the violation is for one mile or thirty miles per hour over

the posted speed limit. See id. § 545.352(a) (providing that “[a] speed in excess of the

limits established . . . is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent

and that the speed is unlawful”).

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Third, appellant relied on Ford v. State to assert that Officer Simpkins merely

provided conclusory statements that appellant violated Section 547.613(a)(1). See 158

S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). However, in Ford, an officer’s statements were

conclusory where he stated that he pulled Ford over for “following too close.” See id.; TEX.

TRANSP. CODE § 545.062(a) (statute governing following distance). Ford should have

provided facts (such the distance between vehicles, speed, and highway conditions)

supporting how he arrived at the conclusion that a “following too close” violation occurred.

See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.062(a). Otherwise, an officer would only have to say he

thought a legal violation occurred, and there would be no means by which a court could

determine whether such thought was based on reasonable suspicion or not. See Ford,

158 S.W.3d at 493. Ford has no application to the present case. Here, Officer Simpkins

did not merely say he pulled appellant over for an obstruction or reduction in the

operator’s clear view. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(a)(1). He provided specific facts:

he observed an air freshener swinging from side to side during dusky conditions while

appellant was driving well below the posted speed limit. Given the statute’s language and

the context of Officer Simpkins’s observances, I agree with the majority that an officer

could have had a reasonable suspicion that the air freshener reduced appellant’s clear

view under § 547.613(a)(1).

JON WEST
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
4th day of June, 2026.

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NUMBER 13-25-00445-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JARVIS LAMAR BOOKER, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 25TH DISTRICT COURT
OF LAVACA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

Appellant Jarvis Lamar Booker was convicted of the felony offense of possession

with intent to deliver a controlled substance in an amount greater than or equal to four

grams but less than two hundred grams, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five

years’ imprisonment. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.1123(d). By his sole issue,

Booker argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because there

was no reasonable articulable suspicion to perform a traffic stop. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND

On May 28, 2025, the trial court heard Booker’s motion to suppress. Patrol Officer

Justin Simpkins testified that he was working patrol on August 27, 2024, with the Lavaca

County Sheriff’s Office. Officer Simpkins stated that he was parked “parallel, observing

[passing] traffic.” When Booker passed in front of his patrol unit, Booker began “rubbing

his face, blocking his face from [Simpkins’s] view.” Officer Simpkins stated this “gesture,”

led him to believe that his “presence inflicted an amount of stress on [Booker] that is a

gross deviation from that of the general motoring public.” Thus, Officer Simpkins was

prompted to investigate further, and he began to follow Booker’s vehicle.

Officer Simpkins testified that he was immediately behind Booker’s vehicle

traveling northbound. Through Booker’s rearview window, Officer Simpkins observed

what he believed to be an “air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror, swinging back

and forth.” Prior to making this traffic stop, Officer Simpkins understood the Texas

Transportation Code to prohibit anything “affixed to a windshield, not including the

rearview [mirror], but attached to the rearview [mirror], that may possibly impair the

driver’s view.” Additionally, Officer Simpkin testified that he had been taught that a small

3x5 inch obstruction creates a larger visual impairment at 100 feet, and “can obstruct the

driver’s view to pedestrians or vehicles.” As he followed Booker, Officer Simpkins

observed Booker “to be traveling below, well below, the posted speed limit, something

that is, again, a gross deviation of that of the general motoring public.”

Officer Simpkins decided to conduct a traffic stop based on Booker’s violation of

the Texas Transportation Code. As he made contact with Booker, Officer Simpkins

observed the air freshener hanging from the dash. Booker “only rolled his window down

approximately two to three inches,” which according to Officer Simpkins “has always been

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in an effort to conceal odor with inside the vehicle.” Officer Simpkins detected an odor of

marijuana emanating from within the vehicle. Officer Simpkins then asked Booker to exit

the vehicle and escorted him to his patrol unit to issue the warning and conduct a records

check.

Officer Simpkins described Booker as jovial, compliant, and nonconfrontational.

When Officer Simpkins questioned whether Booker had marijuana in the vehicle, Booker

denied having illegal drugs. Officer Simpkins explained he detected an odor of marijuana

in the vehicle, and Booker advised that his stepson may have possibly left marijuana in

the vehicle. Officer Simpkins then conducted a search of Booker’s vehicle. The search

revealed a “block-like shaped cookie,” which tested positive for cocaine, “more of th[e]

same rock-like substance in the center console, individually packaged,” and two bags “of

large amounts” of marijuana. Booker had over $5,300 in cash on his person.

Officer Simpkins’s dashboard camera and body worn camera videos were

admitted into evidence, which confirmed the testimony. The trial court denied the motion

to suppress. Booker pleaded guilty to the offense, and this appeal followed.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

By his sole issue, Booker argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to

suppress because Officer Booker lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion

under a bifurcated standard of review. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016) (citing Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010));

see Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We view the evidence in

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we assume the trial court made findings

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consistent with its ruling and that are supported by the record. Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d

872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “We give almost total deference to the trial court’s

determination of historical facts and review de novo the trial court’s application of law to

facts not turning on credibility and demeanor.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005). We will only reverse a trial court’s ruling if it is arbitrary, unreasonable,

or outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

B. Reasonable Suspicion

A warrantless traffic stop must be justified by reasonable suspicion. State v.

Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). “[R]easonable suspicion exists

where the officer has ‘specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational

inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person

has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity.’” Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d

at 437 (quoting Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “When

making a determination of reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the

circumstances.” Hardin, 664 S.W.3d at 872. This means we “must look at all of the facts

together to make the reasonable suspicion determination; facts that do not show

reasonable suspicion in isolation may do so when combined with other facts.” Loesch v.

State, 958 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). There is no requirement that the

facts giving rise to a detaining officer’s reasonable suspicion “must show that the detainee

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, a particular and distinctively

identifiable penal offense.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). Instead, the “articulable facts must show that some activity out of the ordinary has

occurred, some suggestion to connect the detainee to the unusual activity, and some

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indication that the unusual activity is related to crime.” Id. (citation modified). “[T]he

detaining officer need not be personally aware of every fact that objectively supports a

reasonable suspicion to detain; rather, ‘the cumulative information known to the

cooperating officers at the time of the stop is to be considered in determining whether

reasonable suspicion exists.’” Id. at 914 (internal footnote omitted). But “the officer must

have more than an inarticulable hunch or mere good-faith suspicion that a crime was in

progress.” Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 437.

Under Texas Transportation Code section 547.613(a), it is a misdemeanor for a

“person operat[ing] a motor vehicle [to have] an object or material that is placed on or

attached to the windshield . . . that obstructs or reduces the operator’s clear view.” TEX.

TRANSP. CODE § 547.613(a)(1).

C. Discussion

Appellant argues that there “is no Texas law that clearly proscribes hanging air

freshener from the rearview mirror” and that rearview mirrors are specifically excepted

from the Texas Transportation Code. See id. § 547.613(b). Appellant further argues that

there “is no evidence in the record that the paper air freshener obstructed the driver’s

clear view, and thus, there was no reasonable suspicion” that Booker was committing a

crime. Despite Officer Simpkins’s testimony describing the visual impairment caused by

the hanging air freshener and similar sized obstructions, Booker seems to suggest that

because there was no evidence his view was actually obstructed, there can be no

reasonable suspicion. However, regarding reasonable suspicion, “[t]he State does not

have to establish with absolute certainty that a crime occurred.” Abney v. State, 394

S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Aguilar v. State, No. 03-11-00133-CR,

2012 WL 677505, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not

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designated for publication) (“There is no requirement that a traffic regulation must be

violated in order for an officer to have sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic

stop.”). “[T]hat an officer must personally witness facts giving rise to criminal activity, is

against the great weight of authority.” Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 258–59 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005).

In this case, the State was required to show that Officer Simpkins had reasonable

suspicion to stop Booker based on the suspected violation of section 547.613: that an

object or material was placed on or attached to the windshield that obstructed or reduced

his clear view. As stated in Rittingger:

In determining whether Trooper Francis had reasonable suspicion to stop
Merida based on a suspected violation of . . . § 547.613(a), the court
assesses whether Trooper Francis had a basis for his belief that justified
the stop; the question whether Merida’s view was actually obstructed or
reduced by the GPS holder does not control whether Trooper Francis had
a reasonable suspicion that the GPS holder was positioned in a way that
violated § 547.613(a).

United States v. Morales Rittingger, No. 2:16-CR-053-D(2), 2017 WL 367491, at *6 (N.D.

Tex. Jan. 25, 2017). Thus, we only assess whether Officer Simpkins had a basis for his

belief that justified the stop: whether he had a reasonable suspicion that an object was

positioned in a way that violated section 547.613(a). See id. Officer Simpkins testified that

he observed Booker attempt to obscure his face when he passed Officer Simpkins; he

observed “an obstruction” “hanging from Booker’s rearview mirror, swinging back and

forth,” which could have presented “a hazard to other motorists” or Booker himself; at the

time Officer Simpkins did not know it was an air freshener only that “it was something

affixed”; and that Booker was driving “well below” the speed limit, which was a “gross

deviation” from the general public. This evidence, including the video from his dashboard

camera, measured from an objective standard, supports the conclusion that there existed

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at least a reasonable suspicion that Booker was driving with an object attached to the

windshield that obstructed his view, justifying the stop. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE

§ 547.613(a)(1). Requiring evidence with certainty that a violation occurred, as Booker

suggests, would raise the standard for reasonable suspicion far above probable cause.

See id.; Abney, 394 S.W.3d at 548; see also Azzam v. State, No. 13-22-00370-CR, 2023

WL 5624094, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (noting that an officer only needs reasonable suspicion

for a traffic stop, which “requires only some minimal level of justification for the stop”).

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the

motion to suppress. We overrule Booker’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Concurring Memorandum Opinion
by Justice Jon West.

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
4th day of June, 2026.

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