In the Interest of K.L.G., K.L.G., K.A.R.G., K.L.G., Children v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00643-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF K.L.G., K.L.G., K.A.R.G., AND K.L.G., CHILDREN

ON APPEAL FROM THE 377TH DISTRICT COURT
OF VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina, and Justices West and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

Appellant G.G. (Father) appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights to

his children, K.L.G.-1, K.L.G.-2, K.A.R.G., and K.L.G.-3 (the children). 1 Father requests

that this Court modify the judgment by deleting the Subsection (D) and (E) findings

because he argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support

them. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions), (E)

1 We refer to the parties and children by their initials in accordance with the rules of appellate

procedure. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
(endangering conduct). Father does not challenge the trial court’s Subsection (N) or best-

interest findings. See id. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(N), (b)(2). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Pre-Trial

Appellee, the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department), filed

a petition seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights to the children. 2 The petition was

accompanied by affidavits in support of removal alleging, among other things, that on

“January 18, 2024, the Department received a report that [K.L.G.-3], age two years, was

taken to DeTar Hospital North. The report states that there are indications that [K.L.G.-3]

has been the victim of serious physical abuse.” 3 The trial court awarded the Department

temporary managing conservatorship of the children.

B. Bench Trial 4

The case proceeded to a bench trial on July 15, 2025. The Department initially

called one witness, Hailey Valenzuela, a Belong 5 permanency specialist. After her brief

testimony, the Department requested the trial court to suspend and reset the trial, which

it did. On October 24, 2025, the trial proceedings resumed, and the following evidence

2 Although the Department also initially sought to terminate B.C.’s (the children’s mother) parental

rights, the record reflects that, despite the alarming reason the Department became involved, an agreement
was later reached with her in which her parental rights were not terminated, which was approved by the
trial court. Therefore, she is not a party to this appeal.

3 Additionally, a third affidavit by Department investigator, Curtis Bolden, concerned the “condition

of [K.L.G.-3].”

4 We do not recite the witnesses in the order in which they testified, nor do we recite B.C.’s brief

testimony, which related to the agreement she reached with the Department.

5 In. re J.M.B., No. 04-24-00522-CV, 2025 WL 782699, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 12,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that “[S]JRC Texas Belong is a contractor on behalf of the Department”).
Additionally, we observe that when Valenzuela testified on October 24, 2025 (i.e., when the proceedings
resumed) she stated her position was “a permanency specialist with SJRC Texas, BELONG.”
2
was adduced.

On direct examination, Detective Jeremiah Cantu with the Victoria Police

Department testified regarding the January 18, 2024 incident. He explained that he was

given information that there were signs of “shaken-baby syndrome.” K.L.G.-3 had

“multiple bruises on his face, back, legs, and arms” and “head lice and [an] extremely

soiled diaper.” At the DeTar North hospital where Detective Cantu responded, B.C.

explained to him that she received a call from Orlando Licerio, 6 that K.L.G.-3 was

“throwing himself back; he doesn’t know what happened; and whenever EMS got there,

he wasn’t breathing.”

When Detective Cantu observed K.L.G.-3, he “appeared . . . lethargic, wasn’t

really moving, just kind of—you know, just there. He did have bruises that were on his

face, under his eyes (indicating).” He also observed bruises “along his legs and his arms.”

When capturing photos, Detective Cantu also noticed a cut on K.L.G.-3’s foot. At the

hospital, Detective Cantu also spoke to Licerio who described overseeing the children

while B.C. went to work. Licerio reported that everything was fine until he checked on

them “closer to 1:00 o’clock” and noticed K.L.G.-3 “wasn’t responsive and didn’t appear

to be breathing and that’s when EMS was contacted.” Two photographs admitted in the

record depict bruising on K.L.G.-3’s face and body.

Detective Cantu testified that based on his experience, K.L.G.-3’s injuries showed

signs of child abuse, and he believed most of the injuries were inflicted by hand. He also

believed that the majority of the bruises appeared “historical,” as opposed to recent.

6 We note that Detective Cantu testified that Licerio and B.C. lived together. Additionally, we
observe that Valenzuela responded “Yes” when asked, “And do you believe that it was [B.C.’s] boyfriend
at the time that—Mr. Orlando Licerio that caused all of those injuries to the youngest child in this suit?”
3
During his investigation, he discovered that K.L.G.-3 had a previous child abuse case, but

he did not go into details of that case, stating, “There’s already convictions for that.”

Detective Cantu also observed that B.C. was the “common denominator” between the

previous case and the current one as two separate boyfriends were involved. Additionally,

he obtained a common response from friends and family that the children were not taken

care of, and their discipline was “more on the lines of abuse” because they were struck

with “belts” and “on the face to the point to where bruises were being left.” Additionally,

Detective Cantu testified that, after the forensic interviews of the other three children, he

concluded there was probable cause to arrest B.C and Licerio for injury to a child with

serious bodily injuries. To Detective Cantu’s understanding, both “pled guilty to [these

charges] in criminal court[.]”

On cross examination, Detective Cantu testified that he had no indication that

Father was involved in the abuse from the January 18, 2024 incident or the previous case

of abuse involving K.L.G.-3. On re-direct examination, Detective Cantu explained he

spoke to Father during his investigation in February. When asked what Father told him,

Detective Cantu testified as follows:

[Detective Cantu]: When I spoke to him at his residence at Mockingbird
Lane Apartments, I notated that, . . . [Father] had
suffered from serious head trauma due to being in a
vehicle accident. You know, at the time while speaking
with him, his statements appeared to be inconsistent,
which, you know, could be due to his injury because, to
my understanding, it was a severe brain injury.

At the beginning of my conversation with him, I was
shown—or [Father] showed me on his iPad, which
displayed a conversation between him and [Licerio].
[Father] was upset and had texted a lengthy message
belittling him, calling him a child abuser and offensive

4
slurs. So that was him speaking to [Licerio].

....

[Father] proceeds to talk about that, you know, he
knows about [K.L.G.-3’s] incident; and he stated that
[Licerio] had been abusing the kids for a long time and
that [B.C.] has been letting it slide. [Father] stated that
he pressed charges against [B.C.] for violating their
child custody court orders the year prior, which was
2023.

....

I asked [Father] how has [Licerio] been abusing the
kids, to which he stated the two oldest boys, [K.L.G.-1]
and [K.L.G-2], have told him that [Licerio] hits them with
a belt on their legs, giving them bruises. [Father]
advised that [K.L.G.-2] had been burned with a
cigarette on his chest. [Father] stated that [B.C.] and
[Licerio] put them in a room for four hours with no food,
drinks, water, or letting them use the restroom. [Father]
stated he was advised of this information last year in
2023[,] and reported this information to CPS.

I asked [Father] if the children mentioned any abuse
towards [K.L.G.-3], to which he stated, “Yes. They all
got hit.” When asked about [K.L.G.-3] in particular,
[Father] stated that he was advised that they wouldn’t
put him on his bed. He would get hit and stated that he
would be surprised if [K.L.G.-3] got fed.

[Father] stated that a former neighbor once made a
plate of food for all of the children; and [Licerio]
grabbed the plate, threw it outside, stating that, “Y’all
don’t need to eat.”

When asked if [K.L.G.-1] and [K.L.G.-2] ever saw
[Licerio] hitting [K.L.G.-3], he stated that . . . they saw
everything because everything happened in front of all
of the children.

....

I asked [Father], whenever he was with [B.C.], did he

5
ever see her hit [K.L.G.-3], to which he stated “no.” He
stated that when they were together, [B.C.] tended to
[K.L.G.-3]; but whenever they split apart, she didn’t
care.

Next, on direct examination, Valenzuela testified that she was assigned the case

in January or February of 2024. As part of her duties, she set up services for Father, which

included having him complete parenting classes, either in person or online, attend

individual counseling and a psychological, and gain stable housing. As to housing, at a

minimum, she wanted Father to have a plan for where he was going to be living given

that, at the time, he was in a hospital bed in his biological mother’s living room and that

location did not have room for the children. Additionally, Valenzuela explained that Father

had mentioned a house downtown that his adoptive mother had left him, but that house

was not taken care of, and it lacked running water and electricity.

Valenzuela testified that Father left his biological mother’s house around

“summertime” at a time he could live on his own after “a couple of domestic incidences.”

He then lived in the previously mentioned house downtown for a couple of months, but

Valenzuela believed the house was condemned, so Father left. After that, Father was

homeless for about four to six months and then he was arrested in November of 2024,

before he found another place to stay.

According to Valenzuela, apart from one visit and offering transportation, Father

never attended any other visits with the children. Valenzuela testified that ultimately

Father did not complete any services. She also testified that the children “have stated that

they wish to not see or speak with [Father].” Valenzuela believed the children would have

“emotional” harm if Father remained in their lives given that they lack a bond with him.

6
With regards to Father’s “criminal case,” Valenzuela testified that it is a “safety concern in

itself.” Further, she stated that “[Father] knew about the abuse and I personally had never

seen a report from CPS[,] but he had also told me that he reported it but in looking back,

I never saw any report.” Valenzuela believed that termination of Father’s parental rights

would be in the best interest of the children.

On cross-examination, Valenzuela agreed that for a period of time Father was

unable to earn money to provide for his own housing and pay for a vehicle to get to and

from his services or visits because of injuries he sustained in a car accident about a month

prior to the children’s removal. But, according to Valenzuela, Father’s biological mother

attempted to take him to his services. And, the Department offered to take him to

visitations and offered phone calls, but Father never took these opportunities. Valenzuela

acknowledged that his injuries required him to undergo several surgeries, including a

brain surgery in September of 2024. She also agreed that Father was not living with B.C.

when the January 18, 2024 incident occurred, and she believed Licerio caused the

injuries to K.L.G.-3.

When asked if Father knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or

surroundings that endangered their physical and emotional well-being at the beginning of

this case, Valenzuela responded, “Yes.” Additionally, when asked if Father engaged in

conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that

endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children, she responded, “I

would say ‘yes.’”

On direct examination, Susan White testified that she has been involved with the

7
case since February of 2024 and had a relationship with all of the children. 7 White

recommended that it would be in the best interest of the children that Father’s parental

rights be terminated given that he had not been involved nor attempted to be involved

with them. She also believed Father posed an emotional danger to the children. White

explained that even visits with Father would emotionally “take a toll” on the children, as

he missed opportunities in the beginning when the older two children were asking to talk

to him. She denied ever seeing Father in a wheelchair or a walker, including the beginning

of the case but acknowledged that he had his “skull cap removed and there was brain

damage.” She also acknowledged that it was possible that his injuries affected his ability

to see his children.

Lastly, on direct examination, Father agreed that a month prior to the children’s

removal, on December 10, 2023, he was in a significant car accident which required him

to undergo multiple surgeries with the last one occurring on September 3, 2024. 8 He

agreed he was in a wheelchair and unable to drive or work during the first part of the case.

He also testified to using a walker for some period of time. However, Father also explained

that although it hurt to walk, he “helped [himself with] how to walk. [He] threw [his]

wheelchair away, and [he] kept [his] walker in the backyard of [his] house.” Additionally,

Father admitted he was asked to complete services, but he did not. And he agreed that

he struggled to complete services because he was in a wheelchair and could not drive.

7 Susan White did not identify her role in the case during her testimony. However, we observe that

both parties have identified her in their respective briefs, as the “CASA,” i.e., the Court-Appointed Special
Advocate.
8 Father was incarcerated at the time of trial.

8
Additionally, Father testified that he was arrested on “November 13th.” And when

asked for what, he responded, “First, the reason why I got arrested at Speedy Stop is

because there was a possession of less than a gram.” He agreed that since then he has

been incarcerated and may see parole in two to three years. Father also agreed he is in

prison because he pleaded guilty to a criminal offense but he “forgot the name of it.”

He testified that he loves his children and is asking that his parental rights not be

terminated. Further, Father testified that “nobody wanted to help [him] do parenting

classes out there in the free world” so he is currently taking the classes on a tablet in

prison. He also said that from “behind four walls” he is trying to fix a house that the

children’s “grandma gave them.” Father admitted that he had not been in the children’s

lives for “the past nine years because [he has] been incarcerated,” but “[t]his is [his] last

time.” When asked whether there was anything else he wanted to tell the trial court, he

stated, among other things, that he is “done doing drugs,” and “y’all wanted me to force it

to trial, 25 to life, because I’ve been here twice and this is my third time.”

On cross examination, he admitted that solicitation of a minor sounds familiar for

what he is prison for but denied that it was true. A judgment of conviction was admitted

into evidence which reflected that Father was convicted for “Solicitation [o]f [a] Minor.” He

testified that he thought the minor was “[o]ld enough.” Father also admitted that if you add

his current five-year term of imprisonment along with the period of time in which he was

primarily absent from his children’s lives for nine years, then it would equate to a total of

fourteen years that he would not be in their lives. During this prolonged absence, Father

admitted to using cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. Additionally, Father admitted he only

visited the children once “because nobody wanted to take him to Cuero.” He also

9
explained that he “was trying to offer family and friends gas money to do it” but either they

had to work or would not do it. As far as financial support for the children, Father admitted

he had not provided any since his car accident. According to Father, however, he was

trying to get his disability, so he could pay for child support.

Father first denied knowing Licerio but then admitted that he knows him and, is a

“[l]ittle pissed off at him.” When asked why he was upset, Father stated, “Because the

same thing that he tried―or that he did to his daughters and his daughters’ mom is the

same way I’m upset because of what the boys showed me when I ate lunch with them.”

Father agreed that lunch occurred in 2023. He admitted that he knew Licerio was not a

good person to have around his children. Father also testified that he observed “cigarette

burns” and “bruises on their legs.” But he stated when the boys showed him their scars,

he “called CPS.” He admitted, however, that for the best part of a year, he allowed his

children to be in a harmful situation with Licerio “because they was with the mom. And I

talked to her mom and she told me, ‘Don’t do nothing. Just let her be with the kids,’ and

then when all this happened, we all got mad at her.”

On further cross examination, Father admitted that when K.L.G.-3 was born in

2021 he was incarcerated, and he got out when K.L.G.-3 was one. However, he

subsequently turned himself back in after running away from a halfway house. So, in total

before his accident, he had seen K.L.G.-3 approximately “a few times.” On redirect

examination, Father agreed that B.C. chose to have Licerio live in the home with the

children, not him.

C. Final Order

The trial court signed an order terminating Father’s parental rights based on

10
Subsections (D), (E), (N), and the best interest of the children. See id.

§§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (b)(2). This accelerated appeal followed. See id.

§ 109.002(a-1); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4.

II. SUFFICIENCY

By two issues, which we address together, Father argues there is legally and

factually insufficient evidence supporting termination of his parental rights under

Subsection (D), as the Department failed to show he knew about the abuse and he

reported it when he did, and under Subsection (E), as his previous imprisonment is only

a factor for consideration, and the evidence presented showed he did not physically

abuse the children given he was imprisoned or recovering from serious injuries. See TEX.

FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) & (E); In re T.R., No. 01-25-00924-CV, 2026 WL 958570

at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] April 9, 2026, no pet. h.) (“Because evidence

concerning termination under subsections (D) and (E) is interrelated, we may consolidate

our examination of the evidence for both grounds.” (citation modified)).

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

“A parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his child is of

constitutional magnitude.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 740 (Tex. 2022). “Consequently,

termination proceedings should be strictly scrutinized, and involuntary termination

statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20

(Tex. 1985). Before it can involuntarily terminate parental rights, a trier of fact must find

by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that a parent’s act or omission satisfies a statutory

ground for termination found in § 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code; and (2) that

termination is in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re

11
J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). Clear and convincing evidence

means “the degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 101.007.

“This ‘high evidentiary burden’ requires a ‘heightened standard of review’ on

appeal.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 311 (Tex. 2021) (citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d

230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam)). The distinction between legal and factual sufficiency

is the extent to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered. See In

re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018). When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, a

“reviewing court cannot ignore undisputed evidence contrary to the finding, but must

otherwise assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding.” Id. at 630–

31. Therefore, “[e]vidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the fact-finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable

factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. at 631.

On the other hand, factual sufficiency “requires weighing disputed evidence

contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.” Id. We must consider

“whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved

it in favor of the finding” in a factual-sufficiency review. Id. “Evidence is factually

insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder

could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the factfinder could not

have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id.

We defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses “so

long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d

12
at 573; see In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see also In re

C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002) (“A standard that focuses on whether a reasonable

jury could form a firm conviction or belief retains the deference an appellate court must

have for the factfinder’s role.”). “In a bench trial, the trial court acts as the fact-finder and

is the sole judge of witness credibility.” In re A.M., 418 S.W.3d 830, 841 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2013, no pet.) (citation modified).

B. Endangerment Predicate Grounds

When a parent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support endangerment

findings under Subsections (D) or (E), as Father does here, due process requires an

appellate court to address those findings to ensure a meaningful appeal because of the

collateral consequences of a finding under those subsections. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d

at 237; TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(M). Subsection (D) allows termination when the

evidence proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “knowingly placed or

knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D).

Subsection (E) allows termination if the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly

placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or

emotional well-being of the child.” See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

“[S]ubsection (D) addresses the child’s surroundings and environment rather than

parental misconduct, which is the subject of subsection (E) . . . .” In re A.L.H., 624 S.W.3d

47, 56 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (quoting In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 926

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)). Subsection (D) allows for termination based on only

13
a single act or omission. In re N.N.J., No. 13-25-00017-CV, 2025 WL 1700687, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 18, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Subsection (E) requires evidence that the endangerment was the result of the

parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351,

360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Under Subsection (E),

termination must be based on more than a single act or omission; the statute requires a

voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent. Id.; see C. R. F. v.

Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-25-00750-CV, 2026 WL 844380, at *7

(Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 27, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Relevant evidence in

determining whether a parent engaged in a course of endangering conduct includes

conduct that occurred before and after the child’s birth, in the child’s presence and outside

the child’s presence, and before and after removal by the Department. See In re J.O.A.,

283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Further, endangerment under subsection (E) “does not

require [the parent’s conduct] to directly harm the child.” In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d 760,

764 (Tex. 2025) (citing In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024)). Instead, the

proper inquiry is whether there is evidence that the parent “exhibited a pattern of behavior

presenting a substantial risk of harm” to the child. Id. “‘Endanger’ in this context means to

‘expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.’” Id. (analyzing § 161.001(b)(1)(E)); see In re M.C.,

917 S.W.2d 268, 269–70 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (defining “endanger” as “to expose to

loss or injury; to jeopardize” in analyzing Subsections (D) and (E)).

C. Analysis

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial court heard testimony

from multiple witnesses, including Father himself, that while he was not directly involved

14
in the January 18, 2024 incident that led to the children’s removal, he was nevertheless

aware that they endured physical abuse from Licerio for a “long time,” yet he continued

to allow them to remain in the home where Licerio lived. See In re C.N.L., No. 13-23-

00591-CV, 2024 WL 1787893, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 25, 2024,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The children’s physical or emotional well-being is endangered when

the parent fails to remove them from a home in which abusive or violent conduct is

occurring.”); In re L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124, at *11 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[E]vidence that a parent does

not remove her children from, or allows them to remain in, a home where there is violent

conduct supports termination of parental rights.” (citation modified)). That abuse

consisted of K.L.G.-1 and K.L.G.-2 being hit “with a belt on their legs”, K.L.G.-2’s chest

being burned with a cigarette, and “all [of the children being] hit.” See In re B.E.T., No.

06-14-00069-CV, 2015 WL 495303, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 5, 2015, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (“[A]busive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of a child’s home

can produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the

child.” (citation modified)). Additionally, as Father conveyed to Detective Cantu, the abuse

consisted of B.C. and Licerio putting the children in a room for four hours with no food,

drinks, water, or letting them use the restroom. See In re L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019

WL 1523124, at *11, 16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (overruling parent’s challenge to subsection (D) and (E) after reasoning, among other

things, that parent disciplined two of her children, prior to one’s death, by making them

“‘get down in [a] push-up position for like an hour or until they got weak’ due to muscle

failure”). The trial court also was entitled to disbelieve Father’s testimony, that he had

15
made a report to the Department about the abuse, in light of Valenzuela’s testimony that

she “never saw any report.” See In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (providing

deference to the decisions of the fact finder that had “full opportunity to observe witness

testimony first-hand” and was “the sole arbiter when assessing credibility and demeanor

of witnesses”). Additionally, Detective Cantu testified that Father told him that K.L.G.-1

and K.L.G.-2 “saw everything” when Father was asked if they saw Licerio hitting K.L.G.-

3. See In re K.S., No. 02-14-00073-CV, 2014 WL 3867529, at *8–10 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence sufficient to support termination under

Subsections (D) and (E) where children witnessed violence in the home). And even if

Father was not aware of the most recent incident of physical abuse against K.L.G.-3,

Father was aware that K.L.G.-3 was not safe in B.C.’s care given he suffered abuse from

a different boyfriend of B.C.’s in which “convictions” already existed.

The trial court also heard evidence that Father (1) exhibited a pattern of behavior

that presented a substantial risk of harm to the children; (2) failed to provide the children

with a safe and stable home at any point; (3) failed to complete any services; and (4) used

narcotics. See E. D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-25-00526-CV, 2025

WL 3687988, at *4–6 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 18, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding

the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection (E) where

the trial court heard evidence that the father exhibited a pattern of behavior presenting a

substantial risk of harm to the children, had never provided much financial assistance,

could not provide a safe and stable home for the children, and could not provide the

Department with a suitable alternative placement).

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“[M]ere imprisonment will not, standing alone, constitute engaging in conduct

which endangers the emotional or physical well-being of a child.” In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d

at 765 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533). But “[a] parent’s

criminal history—taking into account the nature of the crimes, the duration of

incarceration, and whether a pattern of escalating, repeated convictions exists—can

support a finding of endangerment.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 313 (citing In re J.O.A.,

283 S.W.3d at 345–46). “Imprisonment thus ‘is certainly a factor’ the trial court may weigh

when considering endangerment. Id. (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).

As to Father’s criminal activity, by his own admissions, he had been mostly absent

from his children’s lives for the “past nine years” because he had been incarcerated, he

had been to prison twice before, he was arrested on “November 13th” for “possession of

less than a gram,” he ran from a halfway house when K.L.G.-3 was around one year old,

and the Judgment of Conviction reflects that he was convicted for “Solicitation [o]f [a]

Minor” with a five-year term of imprisonment imposed on May 28, 2025. In other words,

both before and after his children’s removal, Father has exhibited a pattern of behavior

that presented a substantial risk of harm to the children in that his criminal activity resulted

in his incarceration spanning over a decade. See In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d at 765

(“Although half of Father’s crimes occurred before N.L.S.’s birth, courts may consider a

criminal record beginning before a child's birth as evidence of an endangering course of

conduct. And Father’s endangering course of conduct continued after N.L.S. was born,

with Father continuing to engage in criminal behavior resulting in incarceration.” (citation

modified)). Moreover, Valenzuela testified that Father’s current conviction for which he is

imprisoned is a “safety concern” itself.

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Next, as to safe and stable housing, even crediting Father’s testimony that he was

attempting to fix a home from “behind four walls,” the trial court also heard testimony from

Valenzuela that Father lived at that location at some point during the case before he had

to leave and following that, Father became homeless before his most recent

incarceration. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281 (holding that legally sufficient evidence

supports the trial court’s determination that Father’s conduct endangered the children

under (D) and (E) after explaining in part that the “court of appeals should not have

ignored the aggregate weight of Father’s ongoing drug use, homelessness, employment

instability, and near-complete abandonment of his children for the six months preceding

trial.”); In re T.R., 2026 WL 958570 at *15 (“As the factfinder, the trial court was free to

credit the caseworker’s testimony and disbelieve [the parent’s] explanation.” (citation

modified)). Additionally, even if Father’s biological mother’s home had enough room for

the children, Father left after “domestic incidences.”

Next, Valenzuela testified that Father failed to complete any of his services. See

In re Y.B., No. 06-25-00049-CV, 2025 WL 2885861, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct.

10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In our analysis under Ground E, we may also consider a

parent’s failure to complete relevant requirements of a family service plan.”); In re A.L.H.,

624 S.W.3d at 57 (explaining that a parent’s failure to complete a service plan may qualify

as an endangering course of conduct). And while Father cited his car accident for the

reason he could not complete his services, the trial court also heard testimony that his

parenting classes were offered in person or online and that his biological mother offered

to take him to his services.

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Next, Father acknowledged that during the nine years that he was primarily out of

the children’s lives he used cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at

281 (“When a pattern of drug use is coupled with credible evidence of attendant risks to

employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the children, a factfinder reasonably

can find endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being under (D) and (E).”).

The apparent attendant risk here is Father’s prolonged absence at a time when the

children obviously needed him. See id. Finally, White believed that Father posed an

emotional danger to the children.

Based on the foregoing and giving due deference to the trial court’s findings and

the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a

firm belief or conviction that Father knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions

or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in

a conscious course of conduct including not only acts but also omissions or failures to act

that endangered the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Accordingly,

the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the challenged statutory

grounds for termination, and we overrule Father’s two issues.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

JENNY CRON
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
30th day of April, 2026.

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