In the Interest of J.B.S. and R. G. S., Children v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-24-00503-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF J.B.S. AND R.G.S., CHILDREN

ON APPEAL FROM THE 135TH DISTRICT COURT
OF DEWITT COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina, and Justices West and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

Pro se appellant H.M. (Mother) attempts to appeal the trial court’s order denying

her motion for enforcement against appellee J.S. (Father). 1 By what we construe as three

issues, Mother argues that: (1) the trial court reversibly erred by refusing to admit and

consider documentary evidence essential to proving her claim, thereby, infringing upon

1 We identify the parties by their initials or fictitious names. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
her right to a fair hearing, as defined in the due process principles established in the

United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution; (2) the trial court erred in failing to

apply § 25.03 of the Texas Penal Code that materially affected the outcome of the

proceedings; see TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.03 (interference with child custody); and (3) the

outcome of the proceedings were materially affected by the trial court’s failure to ensure

its court orders were followed.

However, as explained below, we do not reach Mother’s issues because we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings

On April 3, 2023, Mother filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship

requesting modification of a prior order “signed on February 13, 2017” (First Order). 2

Agreed temporary orders were signed on August 3, 2023 (Second Order). On January 2,

2024, both Mother and Father appeared and testified that the agreement read into the

record was the agreement they wished the trial court to enter. Thereafter, the trial court

signed a final order in suit to modify the parent child relationship, which reflects that it was

“[r]endered on January 2, 2024, but SIGNED on March 6, 2024” (Third Order).

About a month later, on April 19, 2024, Mother filed a “Motion for Enforcement of

CAUSE NO. 14-08-23,135.” In it, she alleged that Father “disobeyed” three separate court

orders (i.e., the First Order, the Second Order, and Third Order) and did so as described

2 We observe an “ORDER IN SUIT TO MODIFY PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP” reflecting that

the order was “judicially PRONOUNCED AND RENDERED . . . on February 13, 2017[,] and further noted
on the court’s docket sheet on the same date, but signed on [March 30, 2017].” Additionally, we observe
that another child is listed in this March 30, 2017 order, but that child is not a party to this appeal.
2
“on the dates, times, and places, and in the manners” described in her attached exhibits.

Below are the orders Mother alleges Father violated alongside the exhibits 3 she attached

in support of her motion.

Order(s) Exhibit(s) Purporting to Show
Violation(s) 4
First Order—“ordered [Father] to make the B–Call History Report
children available to [her]” C–Email Correspondence
D–Visitation Journal
Second Order—“ordered [Father] to make F–Call Journal
the children available to speak with [her]” G–Phone Records
Second Order—“ordered [Father] to not M–January 2, 2024 Hearing
make disparaging remarks” N–Journal Entry
Third Order—“ordered [Father] to make R–Our Family Wizard Correspondence
the children available to [her]” S–Our Family Wizard Summer Schedule
Correspondence
Second Order and Third Order—“ordered I–Incident Detail Report
[Father] to provide a safe, stable, and J–Offense/Incident Report Cover Sheet
nonviolent environment” K–Incident Detail Report
O–Call for Service
P–Incident Detail Report
T–Screenshot of Text Message
U–Incident Detail Report
Third Order—“ordered [Father] to submit X–Expense Details Report
any and all medical and school information Y1–Y5–Email Correspondence
to [Mother], via Our Family Wizard”

For each purported violation, Mother requested that the trial court “hold [Father] in

contempt, or fine . . . [him] . . . .” Additionally, Mother prayed that Father be held in

“contempt and punished,” that he pay court costs, that a bond or security be ordered to

ensure future compliance, that the trial court clarify any part of its prior order found not

specific enough to be enforced by contempt, that the trial court enter any further orders it

deems just, equitable and appropriate to facilitate compliance with the trial court’s

3 Mother also attached as exhibits the three orders referenced in this memorandum opinion.

4 We have labeled the exhibits as they are identified on the exhibits themselves (whether typed or

handwritten) or how Mother has identified them in her motion.
3
visitation and possession orders, that Father be ordered to jointly manage the children’s

care with Mother, that Father be ordered to jointly set up payment options with Mother

when the children incur a large medical expense, that further orders be entered in the

children’s best interest, and that she be awarded any expenses, costs, interest, and

further relief as authorized by law.

On April 29, 2024, Father filed an answer to Mother’s motion for enforcement in

which he, among other things, generally denied her allegations, alleged her claims were

barred by res judicata, and requested sanctions against her. On September 24, 2024, a

hearing was held on Mother’s motion, and the following pertinent exchange ensued:

The Court: Okay. [Mother], I believe this is your motion.

[Mother]: Yes. It is my understanding I can make an opening statement.

The Court: Well, tell me what your motion is.

[Mother]: My motion is to enforce due to continuation of just blatant disregard
to the Court orders, and there is evidence that is current stating that
as well as interference with child custody has a three[-]year statute
of limitations within the State of Texas.

The Court: Okay. [Father’s counsel].

....

The Court: [Mother].

[Mother]: Again, this was brought up. There is continuation, everything from
not being able to speak with the children freely, to . . . [Father]
continues to dictate when I am allowed to see my children.

The Court: Okay. We’re not in an evidentiary portion at this moment. [Father’s
counsel] has made legal arguments that your claims are barred by
res judicata.

Do you agree that you[r] alleged claims that (sic) predate the order
that was entered in this case?

4
[Mother]: Under my understanding, no, due to the fact that the Court hearing
was in January and instances that were documented happened prior
to the signing of that court date—of that court order.

The Court: Okay. So the instances are prior to the court date—I mean the order
date?

[Mother]: Being signed, correct.

The Court: Okay. So that is an admission that your claims are before the final
order.

What the law says is that you cannot go behind a final order. The
presumption is that when a final order is entered into a case,
everything that occurred prior to that has already been addressed,
so that’s barred by res judicata.

[Mother]: Okay. So the continuation of failing to follow the current court order,
where does that stand?

The Court: I don’t have any evidence before me to make an assertion that
there’s a continuation. I am asking you about the legal requirements
for you to bring this action and whether or not you’ve met them, and
your response seems to indicate that you have not met them. You’re
bringing up matters that the Court cannot address. They’ve already
been litigated.

[Mother]: So there’s nothing of the current condition that my children are in that
can be brought up today?

The Court: I have to go by what you filed with the Court.

[Mother]: Everything I filed was brought up in good faith due to the continuation
of his pattern of behavior.

The Court: Well, I am going to have to dismiss the motion because it doesn’t
have any viable legal claims to move forward at this time.

[Mother]: Okay.

The Court: Okay. So the enforcement suit is dismissed.

....

5
[Father]: I take it you’re denying our request for sanctions, Your Honor?

The Court: At this time, yes.

[Father]: Who is preparing the order, Judge?

The Court: Well, I think for efficiency, if you will. I don’t want that expense on
your client.

You’ll need to prepare an order that says that relief was denied today.

[Mother]: Understood.

On October 4, 2024, the trial court signed an order denying and dismissing

Mother’s motion. Mother then appealed.

B. Appellate Court Proceedings

Because our review of the record raised a question concerning our jurisdiction, we

ordered Mother on January 6, 2026, “to file a response not later than January 26, 2026,

showing cause why this appeal should not be dismissed.” On January 26, 2026, Mother

responded that we have jurisdiction. In relevant part, she argued that the October 4, 2024

order “fully and finally disposes of the Chapter 157 enforcement action and leaves no

issues pending[; thus,] it is a final appealable order under Tex[as] Fam[ily] Code

§ 109.002.” Additionally, she argued:

To the extent the term ‘enforcement’ may raise concerns about contempt
review, Texas law is clear: contempt orders are not reviewable by direct
appeal, but only through habeas corpus (if confined) or mandamus (if not).
This appeal is not from a contempt ruling, but from a denial of enforcement,
which is properly reviewable on direct appeal as a final order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

“Jurisdiction always comes first.” Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, 718

6
S.W.3d 233, 237 (Tex. 2025). This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders

arising under the Texas Family Code unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal.

See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(b) (“An appeal may be taken by any party to a suit from a

final order rendered under this title.”); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex.

2011) (“Unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal, appellate courts generally

only have jurisdiction over final judgments.”). However, orders enforcing a final judgment,

such as contempt orders, are not themselves final, appealable orders. In re A.P., No. 01-

18-00935-CV, 2020 WL 1429926, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 24, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op.).

“Contempt is an inherent power of the court . . . , and chapter 157 of the Family

Code provides the statutory framework for utilizing this power as a mechanism to enforce

child support orders and other final orders in family court proceedings.” In re Off. of Att’y.

Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. 2013) (internal citation omitted). Contempt proceedings

“are not concerned with disposing of all claims and parties before the court, as are

judgments; instead, contempt proceedings involve a court’s enforcement of its own

orders, regardless of the status of the claims between the parties before it.” In re Off. of

Att’y Gen. of Tex., 215 S.W.3d 913, 915–16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, orig.

proceeding). “Chapter 157 provides for the filing of a motion to enforce requesting

contempt and other relief . . . [.]” In re Off. of Att’y. Gen., 422 S.W.3d at 627.

B. Analysis

Although Mother characterizes the nature of her appeal as one arising from the

“denial of enforcement” as opposed to from a “contempt ruling,” Mother’s motion for

enforcement sought an order from the trial court to enforce its previous orders. Stated

7
another way, the substance of her motion sought to have the trial court enforce the First

Order, the Second Order, and the Third Order against Father by way of holding him “in

contempt” or “fin[ing]” him for his alleged disobedience. See In re Off. of Att’y Gen. of

Tex., 215 S.W.3d at 915–16 (“[C]ontempt proceedings involve a court’s enforcement of

its own orders, regardless of the status of the claims between the parties before it.”);

Ramirez v. Sanchez, No. 01-21-00417-CV, 2023 WL 2919545, at *12 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 13, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“It is well-established that courts

look to the substance of a motion to determine the relief sought, and not merely to its

title.” (citing Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999)); see

generally In re M.G., No. 13-09-00305-CV, 2010 WL 2776566, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg July 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted) (concluding that

Garzas’ November 21, 2008 petition constituted an original rather than an amended

petition after reasoning that “we look to the substance of a petition and not its title to

determine its effect”).

And even if one or more of the alleged violations occurred after the Third Order

and had merit counter to Father’s arguments made at the trial level and on appeal, 5 it

would not change that we lack jurisdiction over the trial court’s decision on Mother’s

sought after relief—i.e., holding Father in contempt. See Norman v. Norman, 692 S.W.2d

655, 655 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (“[A]n order finding a party not in contempt is not a

final, appealable judgment.”); Hooper v. Hooper, No. 14-09-01024-CV, 2011 WL 334198,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[B]ecause this

5 We observe that Father filed a brief and argued, among other things, that the trial court did not

err by refusing to admit Mother’s evidence because it was barred by res judicata.
8
is an appeal of the trial court’s refusal to find appellee in contempt, we have no

jurisdiction.”); see also Veranda Nation, Inc. v. Julian, No. 01-22-00200-CV, 2023 WL

4710891, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“An

order finding a party not in contempt is not a final, appealable judgment, and an appellate

court has no jurisdiction over such an order.”) (citation omitted). In other words, win or

lose, we lack jurisdiction on direct appeal from contempt rulings. See In re R.J.J., No. 12-

25-00126-CV, 2025 WL 3301167, at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (“Courts of appeal generally do not have jurisdiction to review decisions in contempt

proceedings (whether the court grants or denies the motion for contempt) on direct

appeal . . . [.]”) (citations omitted)). Accordingly, without reaching the merits of Mother’s

issues, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

JENNY CRON
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
26th day of March, 2026.

9