Gottlieb A. Gutmann v. Timothy Hennig

NUMBER 13-25-00307-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

GOTTLIEB A. GUTMANN, Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY HENNIG, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 377TH DISTRICT COURT
OF VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Cron, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca

Appellant Gottlieb A. Gutmann argues the trial court erred by granting appellee

Timothy Hennig’s motion for partial summary judgment in the underlying real property

dispute. Hennig has filed a brief in which he agrees that the partial summary judgment

order should be reversed and further argues that the trial court erred in severing the order

from the remainder of the proceedings. For the reasons stated herein, we will reverse and
remand in accordance with his request.

I. BACKGROUND

Gutmann and Hennig own neighboring tracts of land in Victoria County, and the

underlying dispute concerns a road which runs between the two tracts. Hennig sued

Gutmann in 2020, arguing that in 2017 Gutmann “decided he owned [the road] and could

fence out and exclude [Hennig] from his land, despite the undisputed and uninterrupted

use by [Hennig] and his predecessors for at least the preceding fifty years.” In his live

petition, Hennig raised the following causes of action: (1) declaratory judgment for

easement by estoppel; (2) declaratory judgment for implied dedication; (3) negligent

misrepresentation; (4) fraudulent inducement; (5) equitable estoppel; and (6) trespass to

try title. He sought actual damages, temporary and permanent injunctive relief,

declaratory relief, “[e]quitable relief in the form of granting the title to the property

containing the Road Tract due to title in favor of [Hennig],” attorney’s fees, court costs,

and interest.

Hennig filed a “Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment” on November 6, 2023,

requesting that the trial court

enter Judgment in favor of [Hennig] declaring as a matter of law that:

a) [Hennig] is entitled to an unobstructed easement for vehicular and
pedestrian traffic along, over and across the [subject road];

b) [Hennig] is entitled to fence and improve the necessity easement;
and to keep the necessity clear, safe, and usable at [Hennig]’s sole
cost and expense[; and]

c) [Gutmann] shall not block, lock out, hinder, obstruct, or interfere with
[Hennig]’s use of [Hennig’s property] by obstructing [Hennig]’s
easement.

By order dated January 2, 2024, the trial court granted Hennig’s motion and awarded all

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of the relief requested therein. Gutmann appealed this order, but we dismissed for want

of jurisdiction, noting that the order was not final for purposes of appeal because

“[Hennig]’s motion for summary judgment did not pertain to all of the claims raised in his

live petition.” Gutmann v. Hennig, No. 13-24-00106-CV, 2024 WL 4707813, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 7, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Subsequently, on April 29, 2025, Gutmann filed a motion for summary judgment

seeking dismissal of Hennig’s remaining claims and requests for relief. Gutmann asserted

in part that, because the January 2 order “resolved the substantive claim,” it “mooted

[Hennig]’s alternative causes of action.” Gutmann also stated that “[i]f the Court does not

deny the remaining claims, it should resolve them to create an appealable judgment.”

On May 20, 2025, the trial court signed an order denying Gutmann’s motion for

summary judgment in its entirety. However, it also signed an order sua sponte severing

Hennig’s “claim for easement by estoppel (Count 1)” from the rest of the case. The

severance order stated:

The easement by estoppel claim is independently dispositive of [Hennig]’s
right to access the Hennig Tract across the Road Tract.

The easement by estoppel claim involves discrete legal issues that can be
resolved separately from the remaining causes of action.

Severance of this claim will not prejudice any party and will promote judicial
economy by allowing immediate appellate review of this dispositive issue.

....

This [sic] Order Granting [Hennig]’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
previously entered on January 20 [sic], 2024, is hereby made FINAL as to
the severed easement by estoppel claim only.

This order is a final and appealable judgment as to Count 1 (easement by
estoppel) only.

The remaining causes of action shall proceed separately.

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Gutmann then perfected this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

By one issue on appeal, Gutmann contends that Hennig was not entitled to

summary judgment because he failed to conclusively establish an easement by estoppel

and there are disputed issues of material fact. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

In his responsive brief, Hennig does not defend the trial court’s January 2, 2024

partial summary judgment order. Instead, he argues that “the District Court improperly

severed the summary judgment” and that, as a result, “there are now two proceedings

involving the same parties and the same facts over the same road, and [Hennig] is being

forced to defend one summary judgment on appeal while the rest of the case proceeds

to trial.” Even though his partial summary judgment motion was successful in the trial

court, Hennig claims that this sequence of events has left him “in a lose/lose position from

a cost and practicality perspective.” Hennig thus asks this Court, “for purposes of judicial

efficiency and economy,” to “reverse the trial court’s summary judgment order entered on

January 2, 2024[,] without respect to the merits of [Gutmann’s] appeal and remand the

case to the trial court.” He also asks us “to vacate the severance order and instruct the

trial court to reconsolidate the case with the original trial court cause [number].”1

Hennig did not file a notice of appeal in this case, and we “may not grant a party

who does not file a notice of appeal more favorable relief than did the trial court except

for just cause.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c). Accordingly, this Court requested that Gutmann

file a response to Hennig’s brief specifically addressing whether this Court should:

1 On October 23, 2025, Hennig filed with this Court a “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or

to Alternatively Abate, Remand and Consolidate or Alternatively to Abate and Remand for Clarification” in
which he made many of the same arguments and requests. We denied the motion. We note that, unlike
Hennig’s brief, this motion did not request reversal of the partial summary judgment order.

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(1) reverse the January 2, 2024 summary judgment order without regard to the merits;

and (2) reverse or vacate the May 20, 2025 severance order. Gutmann has filed a

response stating that “he does not object to [Hennig]’s request” and “will defer to this

Court as to the best and most judicious way to resolve this appeal.”

In light of Gutmann’s acquiescence to Hennig’s requests, and in the interest of

judicial efficiency and economy, we reverse the January 2, 2024 partial summary

judgment order without regard to the merits of Gutmann’s appellate issue.2 Further, we

reverse the May 20, 2025 severance order as moot.3

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s January 2, 2024 and May 20, 2025 orders are reversed as set

forth herein, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

memorandum opinion.

YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
29th day of January, 2026.

2 To the extent these rulings are more favorable to Hennig than that which the trial court awarded,

we find that Gutmann’s agreement constitutes just cause to award it despite Hennig’s failure to file a notice
of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c).
3 Our reversal of the severance order renders moot Hennig’s request that we instruct the trial court

to “reconsolidate” the case.

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